



AC  
5  
C72


CORNELL  
UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY

1906-07  
69

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY



3 1924 096 465 855



# Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in  
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in  
the United States on the use of the text.







## Contents.

1. Davison. Some forerunners of St. Francis of Assisi.
2. Hughes. The concept action in history.
3. Lipsky. Rhythm as a distinguishing characteristic of prose style.
4. Loomis. Medieval Hellenism.
5. Smith. Luther's table talk.
6. Williams. The concept of equality in the writings of Rousseau, Bentham and Kant.



# SOME FORERUNNERS OF ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI

BY

ELLEN SCOTT DAVISON, B. S., A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1907





# SOME FORERUNNERS OF ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI

BY

ELLEN SCOTT DAVISON, B. S., A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1907

D





# CONTENTS

---

	PAGE
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTORY . . . . .	5
CHAPTER II	
APOSTOLIC SECTS ALLIED TO THE CATHARI . . . . .	16
CHAPTER III	
ARNOLD OF BRESCIA . . . . .	31
CHAPTER IV	
THE HUMILIATI . . . . .	55



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY

EARLY in the thirteenth century, there appeared almost simultaneously in different parts of southern Europe two men destined to influence the lives of multitudes: Dominic, a noble Spaniard and a scholar; Francis, son of a merchant in the little Italian town of Assisi, destitute of the learning of the schools. Both believed that, as disciples of Christ, they were bound to obey literally the commands of the Master: to teach; to help the suffering; to live, as Christ had told His Apostles to do, in utter poverty. Throngs of followers eager to spend their lives in apostolic poverty speedily gathered about both men.

Both Francis and Dominic were born leaders of men; but in no age can any man lead the masses except in paths toward which the age is tending. The movement, quickened by them into a world-force, was in its underlying principle and even in its details no new one. Apostles of primitive Christianity and of evangelical poverty had arisen in the church at various times, especially since the opening of the eleventh century; and a clear appreciation of these earlier movements, orthodox and heretical, is necessary to a full understanding of the origin and growth of the Mendicant orders.

Francis and Dominic remained devout sons of the Church; yet the basis of their action was essentially a protest against the existing condition of the ecclesiastical institution, which was far removed from the apostolic ideal. The history of Christianity presents a series of such movements; protests against the conformity of the Church as an institution with universal social and economic laws.

Early Christianity was an enthusiasm for an ideal, an attempt to regulate individual life according to the precepts and commands of Christ. Among His commands were several which,

if followed literally, would have barred effectually the development of any institution based on Christianity. When the young man who had great possessions asked Jesus what he should do to inherit eternal life, the answer was: "Sell that thou hast, and give to the poor." When Christ sent the Twelve forth to preach, He said to them: "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves." "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." These commands, literally obeyed, would have made of the men vowed to spend their lives in Christ's service a company of penniless wanderers. No institution has ever existed in a society based on property without holding property. Further, every community or individual that holds possessions must manage and defend them; yet Christ said: "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also."

Even during the life of Christ on earth there were signs that the little company of His followers was becoming an organized community. Christ had laid upon His disciples obligations which could not be fulfilled without resulting in definite and extensive organization. They were, for example, to take constant care of the weaker brethren, to teach and baptize all nations, to establish and maintain the cult of Christ throughout the world.<sup>1</sup>

The process by which the Church became an organized, property-holding institution is obscure, and cannot be traced here.<sup>2</sup> That it had already become such an institution before it was given a legal existence by Galerius and Constantine, their edicts bear witness.<sup>3</sup> The development of the institution

<sup>1</sup> Luke 10: 27 *seq.* Matth. 19: 21.

<sup>2</sup> The reader may be referred to Friedberg, *Kirchenrecht*, pp. 10 *seq.* (ed. 1895). A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, Chapters ii-viii.

<sup>3</sup> Edict of Galerius (311), Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, c. 34. Edict of Constantine (Milan, 313), Lactantius, *ibid.*, c. 48. Codex Theodosianus, lib. xvi (ed. Haenel). Boyd, *The Ecclesiastical Edicts in the Theodosian Code*, Columbia Univ., doctor's dissertation, 1904. For comment, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. 21, pp. 132 *seq.* Ed. Bury, 1896.



along lines already marked out was stimulated by the new imperial policy. When the Church was sanctioned by the Empire it gained the opportunity for larger functions, and received endowments of land and of other wealth which made possible the performance of those functions.<sup>1</sup> The Church of the poor became the Church of the rich and powerful.

The Bishops had now two functions. They were shepherds of men, as Christ had commanded them to be; they were also administrators of wealth, an office forced into their hands by the inevitable logic of events.<sup>2</sup> Their secular obligations were destined to grow heavier in the age that followed. Before the time of Constantine the Empire's strength had been taxed to keep the barbarian invaders beyond her frontiers. Later, as province after province fell into the hands of Germanic chiefs, the civil organization of the Empire was shattered. In many districts the Bishops became the sole representatives of the old law and order. They had civic functions while the Rhine and the Danube still separated the Roman world from the barbarian. These functions were now expanded as the need for them grew greater.<sup>3</sup> Further, in the prevailing confusion the landed property of the Church increased. Barbarian kings were used to offer gifts to their gods, just as they sent presents to chieftains whose friendship they sought; converted to Christianity, they gave freely of their vast, new lands and of their treasure to the God who gave them victory.<sup>4</sup> Many estates fell into the hands of the Church because of this naïve faith; others by the working of more complex motives and forces. In Italy, Pepin asserted no claim to the lands which, at Pope Gregory's call, he had freed from the Lombards; and Charles the Great drew the southern boundary of his Kingdom of Lombardy somewhat

<sup>1</sup> Codex Theodosianus, lib. xvi, tit. 4. Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* (ed. Bury, 1896), vol. ii, pp. 320 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* (ed. Bury, 1896), vol. ii, pp. 39-47, 53-54, 322 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Milman, *Latin Christianity*, vol. i, pp. 95 *seq.*; pp. 162 *seq.* Allard, *Le Christianisme et l'Empire Romain*, pp. 150 *seq.*

<sup>4</sup> Milman, *ibid.*, pp. 399 *seq.* Montalembert, *The Monks of the West*, vol. ii, pp. 123 *seq.*

north of Rome. The ancient capital of the world, with the surrounding territory, became the capital of the Church, the dominion of the Pope. The occupant of the chair of Peter the Fisherman became the possessor of an enormous patrimony.

Christ's apostles, commanded by Him to have "neither gold nor silver," to wander from city to city, teaching and baptizing, seeking no settled home, were succeeded by men who held and administered property in trust for the needs of the ecclesiastical community, and who wielded the power of secular potentates. The institution which had grown out of the religion of Christ was at variance with the commands of Christ. This contradiction of the ideal by the real did not escape the notice of idealists. From the beginning of the Church's triumph there were men whose lives were protests against the Church as an institution, and attempts to follow literally the most ascetic commands of Christ.

The triumph of the Church as an institution and the great extension of the Christian monastic movement were co-incident. The age of the great Christian Councils was the age of Jerome, prophet of monasticism,<sup>1</sup> and every further development of the Church as an institution has been accompanied by a reaction toward asceticism. The rule of Benedict of Nursia found numerous and enthusiastic adherents during the pontificate of Gregory I;<sup>2</sup> under Gregory VII, or during the fifty years following his death, were founded the order of Grammont, most rigid in discipline, the Carthusian brotherhood, the Premonstratensian order, and, by the great Bernard, the monastery of Clairvaux.<sup>3</sup> The age of Innocent III was the age of Dominic and of Francis of Assisi. Monasticism is, it is true, based on complex human motives, yet in the origin of many rapidly growing monastic bodies may be found, acting as a compelling force, this one motive: protest against the non-apostolic character of existing ecclesiastical institutions. Not that the men

<sup>1</sup> Milman, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 115 *seq.* Milman, *ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 190 *seq.* (ed. 1892).

<sup>2</sup> Montalembert, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 389 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Wurm, *Der heilige Bernard*, *passim.* Luchaire, *Manual des Institutions Françaises*, pp. 100 *seq.*

who first, by devotion to the apostolic life, furnished centres for these movements were all consciously led to do so by dissatisfaction with the Church's worldliness. Francis certainly was not influenced by this motive, but doubtless the rapid growth of his band of followers was due to the fact that many other men felt the need of a life strictly given to obeying these commands of Christ which lead to asceticism and the impossibility of such a life in the Church. It was this same need to which was due, in close succession, the growth of the various sects of heretical Apostolic Christians—the Arnoldists, the Humiliati, the Waldenses.<sup>1</sup>

However, monasticism, at first a protest against the institutional side of Christianity, became itself an institution. The noble works done by the monastic communities while their faith was young and the enthusiasm which had brought them into being was still undimmed, are too familiar to need reiteration. We can go with the early missionaries into Germany and Gaul, with Sturmi into the forest hard by "the fell Saxons," with Columban into Frisia, or Gall into Suabia;<sup>2</sup> all fugitives from the world, seeking a life of poverty, simplicity, and self-denial, combating paganism and the wilderness.<sup>3</sup> The rigors of the conflict forced upon these men and their devoted followers close and efficient organization. Their very virtues led to their undoing. Gifts to God brought salvation to the givers; and gifts to the monks were gifts to God. So secular responsibility increased, and with it power to command luxury. The growing institution of monasticism was already departing from the spirit of the first enthusiasts when the genius of Benedict of Nursia gave it definite shape in the Rule which seeks, while organizing the institution, to maintain for the individual something of literal obedience to Christ's command "Be ye poor."

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 50 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Montalembert, *ibid.*, vol. ii, pp. 241, 292 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Montalembert, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 30-47; vol. ii, pp. 185 *seq.* On the services of the monks to civilization see also Sommerlad, *Die wirtschaftliche Thätigkeit der Kirche im Mittelalter*, *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> The Rule of Benedict has been edited many times. See, for instance, *Benedicti Regula Monachorum*, recensuit Eduardus Woelfflin (1895). See Montalembert, *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 389 *seq.*

But Benedict undertook what was impossible; he tried to combat by formal laws the inevitable sequence of events. Monastic communities became rich and powerful, luxurious and pleasure-loving.

Voices were, it is true, never lacking to demand that the monks be faithful to their original aims, and in truth in the eleventh century, monasticism alone among Christian institutions kept alive even the tradition of evangelical poverty.<sup>1</sup> Ecclesiastical offices were sought by men who coveted their revenues and paid scant attention to the duties which they involved.<sup>2</sup> Simony was rife.<sup>3</sup> The revenues of benefices were often increased in questionable ways. For example, Bishops and Abbots alike saw in the adoration of relics a means by which the wealth and influence of their churches might be increased, and they were not always scrupulous as to the means by which they obtained such relics. Sometimes prelates invented and circulated histories of the saints whose relics they possessed, exalting their merits and the miracle-working power of their bones, that pilgrims might be induced to visit their shrines in large numbers, and leave rich gifts behind them.<sup>4</sup>

Men who ruled vast lands had to become princes rather than shepherds if they were to keep their possessions. In times of political disorder, all owners of property must protect it by means more drastic than the imposition of penance, or even

<sup>1</sup> Dresdner, *Kultur- und Sittengeschichte der Italienischen Geistlichkeit* im 10ten und 11ten Jahrhundert, *passim*. Especially pp. 50 *seq.* De Wette, *Geschichte der Christlichen Sittenlehre*, *passim*. Delarc, *St. Gregoire et la reforme de l'Eglise*, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Gerohus Reichersbergensis, *De Investigatione Antichristi*, lib. i, c. 42. Ed. Scheibelberger, p. 88. For a diverting account of an Archbishop of Rheims who quite frankly found his duties a nuisance, see Guibertus Novigenti, *De Vita Sua*, lib. i, c. 11, ed. D'Achery, p. 467. He quotes the Archbishop, a certain Manasses, "Bonus esset Remensis archiepiscopus si non missas inde cantari oporteret." The same prelate robbed the treasury (1084). See below, pp. 29 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> See note 1.

<sup>4</sup> For various stories illustrating this point, see Guib. Nov., *De Pignoribus Sanctorum*, lib. i, cc. 2 and 3; lib. ii, c. 3, ed. D'Achery, pp. 334 *seq.* See also a satire on the zeal for relic hunting displayed by Pope Urban II, in Pflugk-Harttung, *Iter Italicum*, pp. 439 *seq.*

excommunication.<sup>1</sup> At all times when a foreign foe harried the land, Bishops and Abbots, like Counts and Dukes, had to arm themselves against the invaders.<sup>2</sup> Not only was defence necessary on the battle-field, but often in the courts. While some laymen gave gifts to the Church to secure rest for their souls, other laymen were always ready to seize Church property on any plausible pretext, or without a pretext.<sup>3</sup> It is not difficult, then, to understand the preoccupation of the higher clergy with secular affairs, and their consequent neglect of their spiritual functions. Bishops who had sought preferment in the Church for the sake of wealth and power, were almost of necessity engrossed in the material cares which wealth and power brought with them. They frequently did not labor to organize their dioceses, nor secure for their people an active and competent priesthood. It was then not only the prelates who became false to their apostolic commission; the lower clergy suffered also.

It is impossible to speak with certainty of the character of the lower clergy as a class in the period preceding the reform movement in the eleventh century. The literature of the time abounds with drastic criticism of the evil lives of the priests, and of their neglect of duty.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, there were doubtless God-fearing priests, laboring in obscurity, sincerely fulfilling their duty to their people, so far as their ability and

<sup>1</sup> Geroh. Reichersberg, *De Investigatione*, lib. i, c. 42. Peter Damian says an abbot could not be a monk, nor a bishop a priest. Opusc. 21, praef. opp. vol. iii, p. 455.

<sup>2</sup> See Hugo, *Destructio Farfense*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xi, pp. 532 seq. Also Ekkehard, Cas. S. Galli. M. G. H. SS., vol. ii, pp. 105-109. Also, for Monte Cassino, Desiderii, Abbat. Casinensi *Dialogi*, lib. i. Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd., vol. xviii, pp. 339 seq.

<sup>3</sup> See Suger, *Gesta Ludovici regis cognomento grossi*, cc. 2, 23 (ed. Molinier, in *Collection des textes*), for accounts of attacks on ecclesiastical property in France in the early twelfth century. Seher, Abbot of Chamoncey in the diocese of Toul, tells of his struggle to keep his property. Seheri, *Primordia Calmosiacensia*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xii, pp. 324-347. The Canons of Lucca built a castle for defence against an aggressive layman. Muratori, *Antiquitates*, vol. iv, p. 733. See also Dresdner, *ibid.*, pp. 87 seq.

<sup>4</sup> Dresdner, *ibid.*, pp. 100 seq.

education allowed. History does not record the lives of inconspicuous, commonplace, good men, whether they be priests or laymen. Now and then a virtuous priest rose into notice because he was an eloquent preacher; but unless he possessed conspicuous gifts, a worthy priest lived and died and left no record. The lower clergy were drawn largely from the common people, and it was among the common people that religious enthusiasm never waned. Further, reform movements always found adherents among the common people and among the lower clergy.<sup>1</sup>

Yet it would seem that there was ample justification for the abuse heaped upon the priests. How could it be otherwise? Little effort seems to have been made by the bishops to secure the proper preparation of priests for holy office, or to limit ordination and installation to men of God-fearing lives; nor was episcopal supervision always directed to securing faithfulness to duty. The Bishop who had paid a high price for his benefice exacted payment in his turn for the humbler offices in his gift. Too often a priest was chosen because he could pay for his appointment, not because he was fit to have the cure of souls. There is, then, ample evidence that many of the clergy were ignorant, neglectful, sinful; that churches were allowed to fall into ruins, while their priests took the tithes, sometimes sold the very vessels from the altars, and did not cumber themselves with the cure of souls.<sup>2</sup> It is true that it cannot always have been possible to secure competent priests; educational facilities were scanty in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is on the other hand undeniable that most bishops were too busy with the cares of state and wealth to make the attempt.

There is little material for judging what the layman desired of his priest. The clearest light is thrown on the subject by a study of the enthusiasts who easily gained a following. Within the Church itself, the source of the prevailing evils was often

<sup>1</sup> Dresdner, *ibid.*, pp. 169 *seq.* Note Arialduus in Milan, see below. Also Arnold, see below.

<sup>2</sup> Dresdner, *ibid.*, pp. 100 *seq.* S. Bernard, *De consideratione*, lib. iv, c. 2. Ed. Mabillon, vol. i, cc. 436 *seq.*



declared to be the possession of wealth. The Church had always praised poverty; but generally the eulogies refer to individual poverty coupled with communistic possession, which did not exclude individual enjoyment.<sup>1</sup> The inconsistency between the actual wealth of the clergy and their theoretical poverty was not lost upon thoughtful and conscientious churchmen. "We seek," says Abelard, "to be made richer as monks than we were in the world."<sup>2</sup> Gerohus, of Reichersberg, laments: "The Bishops claim that the evangelical perfection in which Peter gloried, saying to the Lord, 'Behold, we leave all and follow Thee,' and of which the Lord said, 'Unless a man has given up all that he possesses, he cannot be my disciple,' that this perfection pertains to the monks alone, and not to the secular clergy."<sup>3</sup> By these men, members of the clergy were criticized because they appropriated to unwarranted uses the wealth of the Church, or because they, as individuals, possessed property. The tendency to such criticism increased during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, reformers protested against the individual possession of wealth by the clergy, and the misuse of property held in common; on the other, there arose a more radical conception of evangelical poverty, which excluded even communistic possession by the clergy, and in some instances by the laity as well. An investi-

<sup>1</sup> S. Bernard, *l. c.* *Sermo: In Solemnitate Omnium Sanctorum, Igniacensis S. Bernardi Discipulis, ibid.*, vol. ii, cc. 1043-1044.

<sup>2</sup> Abelard, *De Sancto Joanne Baptista Sermo*. Opera, ed. Cousin, vol. i, p. 572.

<sup>3</sup> Geroh. Reichersbergensis, *De Investigatione Antichristi*, lib. i, c. 43. *Ibid.*, p. 90. Cf. the practical protest against the wealth of the clergy by Arialduſ of Milan. See *Vita Arialduſi*, AA. SS. Boll. V Junii, p. 282, and below, p. 32. Cf. also St. Norbert, Archbishop of Magdeburg, to 1127, who gave all his wealth to the poor and travelled about barefoot, preaching. *Vita S. Norberti*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xii, p. 673. See also p. 8 above. The founder of the Chartreuse fled to the desert in disgust at the luxurious lives of the clergy of Rheims, and their misuse of ecclesiastical property. See Guibertus Novigenti, *De Vita Sua*, lib. i, c. 11, ed. D'Achery, p. 467.

<sup>4</sup> Note, for instance, many passages in the sermons of Berthold von Regensburg; for example, ed. Pfeiffer-Strohl, pp. 93 seq. and 393-4; also Guibert. Novigenti, *l. c.*; also Jacques de Vitry, *Historia Occidentalis*, c. 5 (ed. 1596, pp. 272 seq.); also Desiderius, *De Miraculis S. Benedicti*, in Bibl. Max. Patrum. Lugd., vol. xviii, pp. 839 seq.; also John of Salisbury, *Polycraticus*, bk. iv, cc. 2-5.

gation and analysis of this enthusiasm for evangelical poverty is the precise subject of this essay.

We cannot know to what degree this tendency to emphasize poverty as an integral part of Christianity was due to a realization that wealth was corrupting the Church; to the contrast between the simple life and the privations of Christ and the Apostles, and the magnificence and luxury which surrounded the clergy. As this study proceeds, however, an effort will be made to explain the conditions under which each reformer began his work, and it will become apparent in some cases that there was certainly present an element of direct reaction against the unapostolic character of the lives of the clergy and the magnificent ceremonial of the Church.

Efforts to restore primitive Christianity, to follow literally the commands of Christ and the teaching of the Apostles in daily life and in religious observance were very numerous in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The conceptions men formed of the essence of Apostolic Christianity varied widely. The fundamental motive of all was the same: they would live as Christ taught men to live; they would conform their worship to that of the little group of believers who first followed Him in far-away Palestine. Arialdus and Waldo, Arnold and Francis,<sup>1</sup> agreed in basing the apostolic life on evangelical poverty. But Waldo wished to sweep away all doctrines, all religious observances, which were not found in the Church of the apostolic age; Arnold believed that the vicar of Christ should not be a secular prince, and assailed the whole vast fabric of the temporal power of the Church; Arialdus tried to purge the Church of simony, to teach the priests to lead pure lives; Francis saw clearly his own duty—to be poor, as Christ had commanded, to help suffering humanity, while he upheld the Church as an institution.

Moreover, in these two centuries, a great tide of religious enthusiasm swept over the nations of western Europe. The eleventh century was the age of the Cluniac Reform, of the

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 32, 33 *seq.*

foundation of Cistercian and Carthusian orders, of the first great Crusade. The twelfth century brought to light many new enthusiasts, most of whom the Church counted as heretics. These men were in most cases reformers as truly as were Norbert and St. Bernard. The leaders among them spoke in Christ's name, and voiced Christ's commands. The multitude followed, and found itself outside the Church which claimed to be the fold of Christ. They did not plan heresy; they, in many instances, thought themselves champions of the Church. Waldo, like Francis, asked the Pope to sanction his work, to authorize him to help the Church in teaching the people to follow Christ. Orthodox and heretical reformers were alike products of the religious enthusiasm of the age, and sought to restore apostolic Christianity. All found a following. Whenever a man appeared who possessed enthusiasm and brought a message, the people flocked to hear him. When he told his hearers what Christ had commanded them to do, some among them were always ready to obey the command.

The Church finally awoke to these facts. The Papal Curia was convinced that if the dangerous growth of heresy were to be checked the Church must appeal to the people through the enthusiasm for primitive Christianity and evangelical poverty, which was carrying thousands into the ranks of heresy. Then began a consistent effort to enlist under the banner of the Church apostles of primitive Christianity,<sup>1</sup> and of these apostles St. Francis is the chief in beauty of life, in power over the masses, in influence upon the age. Of that age he is a true child, and a study of the primitive Christians who preceded him may throw some light upon the movement he inspired.

<sup>1</sup> For attempts of the Curia to secure the adherence of the Humiliati and the branch of the Waldenses known as the Poor Catholics, see below. Note also the significant story of Diego of Osna and St. Dominic, who found themselves utterly unsuccessful in combating heresy until they, like the heretical preachers, stood before the people in the guise of simplicity and poverty. See Guillelmis de Podio Laurentii, *Historia Albigensum*, c. 8 (Ann. 1206). Bouquet, vol. xix, p. 200.

## CHAPTER II

### APOSTOLIC SECTS ALLIED TO THE CATHARI.

THE Cathari were the arch-heretics of the Middle Ages; they are best known to the general student of European history through the successful attempt of Simon de Montfort to exterminate the powerful community of them known as the Albigenses. Their belief was a form of dualism, and they were manifestations of the great Manichaeism which seems to have traveled from the East, perhaps originally from Persia, westward into the African and European provinces of the Roman Empire.<sup>1</sup>

The first great wave of Manichaeism swept over southern Europe in the fourth and fifth centuries. The Emperor Valentinian discovered it in Italy, and in 372 found it necessary to forbid the meetings of Manichaeans.<sup>2</sup> Later emperors issued stringent decrees against these heretics. Their belief was declared to be a public crime, and ferocious laws were enacted to secure the extermination of the faith and of its adherents.<sup>3</sup> In spite, however, of all the proceedings against the Manichaeans their number grew. About the middle of the fifth century Pope Leo the Great discovered an alarmingly strong community of them in Rome. He preached against them, and caused them to be condemned by a synod and banished by the Senate. For the time the movement was checked in Rome.<sup>4</sup>

The efforts of Leo resulted not in exterminating the heretics,

<sup>1</sup> C. Schmidt, *Histoire des Cathares*, vol. i, pp. 1-8, and authorities there cited. Cf. *Real Encyclopaedie*, vol. xiii, p. 762.

<sup>2</sup> Cod. Theod., lib. xvi, tit. 5, l. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Theodosius the Great, in 381, 382, 389. *Ibid.*, tit. 5, l. 7, 9, 18. Honorius, in 399, 405, 408. *Ibid.*, l. 33, 40, 43. Theodosius II, in 423, 425, 428. *Ibid.*, l. 59, 62, 65.

<sup>4</sup> C. Schmidt, *ibid.*, p. 17.

but in dispersing them, to form elsewhere centres for the promulgation of their doctrine. Effective persecution was then, and for a long time afterward, impossible to the Popes; the organization of judicial machinery for the extirpation of heresy was not to be achieved for some centuries.

It is then not strange that Manichaeans were discovered at Ravenna in 550 and at Rome by various Popes between Leo I and Gregory I. The latter made earnest efforts to root out the heresy; he issued emphatic commands to Bishops in whose dioceses it was known to exist, adjuring them to exterminate it.<sup>1</sup>

For more than four hundred years after Gregory's death there is no evidence of the existence of the dualistic heresy in Europe. It must, however, have existed and grown below the surface of society, for early in the eleventh century it was so formidable as to invite persecution in northern Italy and southern France.<sup>2</sup> Beginning with the year 1012 there are various accounts of the discovery of dualists and of edicts against them.<sup>3</sup>

The tenets which attracted the attention of the clergy were: denial of the efficacy of the Mass, of the baptism of infants, and of the intercession of saints; and refusal to venerate the Cross. When their manner of life was questioned, it was found that they considered marriage sinful, and that they would not use as food milk, nor anything made from it, because of the connection of milk with the function of generation. By these signs the Manichaeans were always recognized. They were called by various names during the centuries in which this form of belief was to the Church an ever present and malignant foe; but whether known as Manichaeans, Cathari, or mem-

<sup>1</sup> For all this early movement, see C. Schmidt; *ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 1-18.

<sup>2</sup> See Schmidt, *ibid.*, pp. 24 *seq.*

<sup>3</sup> Schmidt, *ibid.*, pp. 24 *seq.* Among the accounts are: for Limoges (1012), Ademari *Historiarum libri III*, lib. iii, c. 69. M. G. H. SS., vol. iv, p. 148. The same source furnishes accounts of the discovery of Manichaeans, at Arles (*ibid.*, p. 143), and at Toulouse, *l. c.* For further account of the heresy in Arles, see Radulfi Glabri, *Historiarum libri V*, lib. iii, c. 8. Bouquet, vol. x, p. 35. The Synod of St. Carroux in Vienne (1028) took action against the heretics. Concilium Karro-fense, Mansi, vol. xix, c. 485. The synod held at Arras in 1025 also took action concerning them. Mansi, vol. xix, cc. 423 *seq.*

bers of the great Albigensian organization, such adherents of the dualistic Philosophy were probably never entirely eliminated from mediæval Europe.

The form of dualism which was most prevalent recognized "two co-equal principles, God and Satan, of whom the former created the invisible, spiritual, and eternal universe, the latter the material and temporal, which he governs. Satan is the Jehovah of the Old Testament; the prophets and patriarchs are robbers, and, consequently, all Scripture anterior to the Gospels is to be rejected. The New Testament, however, is Holy Writ, but Christ was not a man, but a phantasm—the Son of God who appeared to be born of the Virgin Mary and came from Heaven to overthrow the worship of Satan." <sup>1</sup> "The Church was the synagogue of Satan, and all its rites were futile or worse than futile. Asceticism and the prohibition of marriage were logical consequences of a belief which recognized the body as the handiwork and servant of Satan, hampering and striving to ruin the soul, the child of God." <sup>2</sup>

The Church having been repudiated, the dualists formed their own organization, their own hierarchy. They themselves, forming the Church of Christ, had, they believed, the power to "bind and loose," to reconcile the sinner with God, which had been given by Christ to the Apostles, and was the basis of the power of the Church over the people. Admission to their sect was conferred through the *Consolamentum*, or laying on of hands, by which sin was wiped out and the Holy Spirit entered into the aspirant. <sup>3</sup>

It is, however, the concrete facts of the lives of these people together with their opposition to the Church, which are formulated and discussed by persecutors and writers against heresy. The philosophy on which their system was based is often not alluded to at all. Perhaps the subtleties of the doctrine were not understood by the great body of the Cathari. So philosophical and intellectual a creed as the Catharan version of

<sup>1</sup> Lea, *Inquisition*, vol. i, pp. 24 seq.

<sup>2</sup> Lea, *ibid.*, pp. 93 seq. Cf. *Real Encyclopædie*, vol. xiii, pp. 762 seq.

<sup>3</sup> Lea, *ibid.*, pp. 93 seq. Cf. Schmidt, *l. c.*



dualism could hardly have won converts in numbers sufficient to enable Catharism to supplant the Church in southern France and to weaken it seriously elsewhere. Probably the Catharan preachers who sought converts emphasized the asceticism which grew out of their creed and drew a contrast with the worldliness of the clergy. Condemnation of the clergy was a not unpopular pose in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the Cathari explicitly and implicitly attacked the clergy. Exhortation to simple, pure lives, such as Christ enjoined upon the first Christians, aroused popular enthusiasm. As will be shown later,<sup>1</sup> appeals to the people were made by some dualists on grounds similar to those of Arnold, of Waldo, of Francis; that the perfect life consists in literal obedience to the commands of Christ; that their own duty lay in an attempt to revive the primitive Church.

So some of the Cathari, or of enthusiasts who were affiliated with them, fall within the scope of this essay, though the great Catharan movement as a whole lies outside it. The line between the Catharan sects and other heretical bodies is not always easy to draw, because, as has been said, the dualistic basis of their belief is not always formulated. Popular preachers now and then arose whose doctrines savored of Catharism so strongly in their tangible characteristics that it seems impossible they can have sprung from any other root than that of dualism. Such leaders were Peter of Bruys and his co-worker Henry of Lausanne. These men preached mainly in southern France, between 1106 and 1134, where, as has been shown, Catharism had been discovered and condemned a century before.<sup>2</sup> It had meantime, working under the surface, grown in strength.<sup>3</sup> It was only to be exterminated a century and a half later by a bloody war.

Peter and Henry were unquestionably Cathari, but they appealed to the people who thronged to hear them on grounds far more tangible—they preached apostolic Christianity. "They say in their sermons that Christ sent his apostles forth to preach,

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 22 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Schmidt, *ibid.*, p. 28.

for he says in the Gospel: 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. Whosoever shall believe you and be baptized shall be saved; but whosoever shall not believe you shall be condemned.'"<sup>1</sup>

The conditions under which Peter of Bruys began his mission are unknown, beyond the fact that he was convinced he was following Christ because Christ laid commands upon him as he had done upon the twelve.<sup>2</sup> Like many another apostle of the Middle Ages, he comes suddenly into the light of history, plays for a brief space a stormy part, fleeing hither and thither before persecution, and does not cease to cry out his message until he is silenced in the fierce glare of a martyr's pyre (1126).<sup>3</sup> Henry of Lausanne seems to have been aroused by Peter's preaching. Like Peter, he was persecuted. His life ended not at the stake but in prison.<sup>4</sup>

The teaching of the two men was the same in all essentials. There are several statements, contemporary or nearly so, of their doctrines. Their principal tenets are these: they denied the efficacy of infant baptism because Christ said, "Believe and be baptized," and a child cannot believe; Christ's body and blood are not offered in the Sacrament, nor did God command that the Sacrament be celebrated; all sacrifices and prayers for the dead avail nothing; churches and altars are unnecessary, for prayer before a stable is as efficacious as that before an altar. Further, they did not venerate the cross, but execrated it as the symbol of Christ's torture.<sup>5</sup> Except that the baptism of adults is not expressly denounced, these doctrines are Catharan. They result in pruning away many rites of the Church of post-apos-

<sup>1</sup> Petri Venerabilis, *Tractatus adv. Petrobrusianos Haereticos*, B. M. P. Lugd., vol. xxii, p. 1036.

<sup>2</sup> Lea, *ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>3</sup> Petri Venerabilis *Tractatus adv. Petrobrusianos Haereticos*, B. M. P. Lugd., vol. xxii, pp. 1033 seq. See also Lea, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 68. St. Bernardi, *Epistolae*, 241, 242. Opera, vol. i, pp. 237-239.

<sup>4</sup> *Actus Pontificum Cenomannis*. De Hildeberto (Bishop in 1097). In Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, pp. 315 seq. (ed. 1723). Bouquet, vol. xii, p. 547. *Chronica Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium*. M. G. H. SS., vol. xxiii, pp. 840 seq.

<sup>5</sup> Petr., Ven., l. c. *Act. Pont. Cen., l. c.*

toloc origin. There is scant positive evidence to show whether this return to apostolic conditions was conscious. There is, however, presumptive evidence for the conclusion that these heresiarchs had compared the existing Church with the early Christian community and were trying to do away with the rites and doctrines instituted after the close of the Apostolic Age, and to conform the clergy to the model established by Christ. For the heresiarchs were evidently convinced that they themselves were apostles of Christ, preaching because He had commanded his apostles to preach, and their doctrine of baptism was founded on Christ's words. In no other case have their arguments in support of a tenet been directly reported.

There is fuller evidence of the apostolic character of a body of heretics discovered at Cologne between 1144 and 1147; and these were apparently Petrobrusian.<sup>1</sup> They were found about twenty years after the martyrdom of Peter, while Henry was dying in prison at Rheims, by Everwin, Provost of Steinfeld, who wrote an account of them to St. Bernard, and begged the great Crusader to preach against them.<sup>2</sup> St. Bernard acceded to Everwin's request, and attacked the heretics in question in two sermons.<sup>3</sup> These sermons follow closely the account furnished by Everwin, and therefore give little additional information about the heretics of Cologne. The important source is then the letter of Everwin. His account reads like an expansion of Peter the Venerable's digest of the Petrobrusian heresy.

The heretics of Cologne, like Peter and Henry, rejected

<sup>1</sup> *Real Encyclopaedie*, vol. i, pp. 701 seq. *Kirchen Lexicon*, vol. i, p. 1142. Lea, *Inquisition*, vol. i, pp. 68-72. Tocco, *l'Eresia nel medio evo*, p. 164.

<sup>2</sup> Evervini Steinfeldensis Praepositus, *Epistola ad S. Bernardum abbatem, De Haereticis sui temporis*. In Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, p. 473 (ed. 1723). Hüffer, in *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, for 1889, p. 765, note 4, says that the trial of these heretics cannot have been earlier than 1147, because the letter suggests a personal acquaintance between Everwin and Bernard hardly likely to have been formed before the latter's journey to Germany in 1147. Cf. Wurm, *Der Heilige Bernard*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> S. Bernardi, *Sermones In Cantica*, nos. 65 and 66. *Opera Omnia* (ed. Mabillon, 1690), vol. i, cc. 1490 seq.

infant baptism, and for the same reason. They condemned entirely all the sacraments except baptism. They were convinced that the Church had lost its primitive character, and had thus ceased to be the Church of Christ. "They say that all the priests of the Church are not consecrated; for the apostolic dignity, so they say, has been corrupted because the clergy have been involved in secular business. He who sits in the chair of Peter is no soldier of God like Peter, and has deprived himself of the power which Peter had in so great a degree, and he has it not at all. The Archbishops and Bishops who in the Church lead secular lives do not receive from the Pope power to consecrate others. This belief they base on the words of Christ, 'the Scribes and Pharisees sit in the seat of Moses.'"<sup>1</sup> "They do not believe in prayers for the dead; they hold that fasts and other methods of mortifying the flesh imposed for sin are unnecessary for the just and even for sinners. For 'in whatsoever day a sinner shall repent, all his sins shall be remitted unto Him.' All the observances of the Church which were not founded by Christ and the Apostles in direct succession from Him they call superstitions. They do not admit that there is Purgatorial fire after death; but hold that the souls of men when they go forth from the body pass at once either into eternal rest or everlasting punishment. So they count as of no avail prayers and offerings of the faithful for the dead."<sup>2</sup> Further, they deny that the body of Christ is made on the altar.

So far their doctrine is quite clearly the result of a desire to restore the simplicity and purity of the primitive Church—they were then apostolic heretics. They show also traces of Catharism: for "they call all marriage fornication unless it be contracted between two virgins, man and woman. They derive this doctrine from the words of Christ, with which he answered

<sup>1</sup> Evervini, *Ep. ad S. Bern.*, *ibid.*, p. 474. Cf. this attack upon the worldly clergy with the accounts of the effect of Henry's preaching at Le Mans: "Qua haeresi plebs in clerum versa est in furorem, adeo quod famulis eorum minarentur cruciatus, nec eis aliquid vendere, vel ab eis emere voluissent; immo habebant eos sicut ethnicos et publicanos etc." *Actus Pontificum Cenomannis*. In Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, p. 315.

<sup>2</sup> Ep. Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 474.

the pharisees: Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."<sup>1</sup> They were not strict Cathari, or they would not have sanctioned marriage under any conditions. Moreover, they cited the Old Testament in proof of their doctrine of immediate reward or punishment after death;<sup>2</sup> and the Cathari usually rejected the Old Testament altogether. So far as Everwin's information went, they had no hierarchy. "They hold our Pope of no account," he says, "but they do not say that they have any other besides him;"<sup>3</sup> and the Cathari had their own hierarchy. Nevertheless, the heretics of Cologne must be counted among the sects which were allied with the Cathari, and probably owed their origin to Peter of Bruys.<sup>4</sup> It was, however, through their attempt to restore the apostolic Church that they gained their hold on the popular imagination.

Contemporary with these last reformers were others, who called themselves "Apostolics." They, too, were discovered at Cologne by Everwin. He, in describing the new heretics, who he says had everywhere "boiled up from the depth of hell,"<sup>5</sup> distinguishes two classes "detected through their mutual disagreement and contention." One class has already been discussed; the second, according to Everwin, disagree with these altogether. This is perhaps too strong a statement, but the Apostolics are more clearly Catharan than the other heretics described by Everwin. "They said in their own defense that

<sup>1</sup> Ep. Evervini, *l. c.*

<sup>2</sup> Purgatorium ignem post mortem non concedunt: sed animas statim, quando egrediuntur, de corpore in aeternam vel requiem vel poenam transire propter illa Salamonis, "Lignum in quamcumque partem ceciderit, sive ad Austrum, sive ad Aquilonem, ibi manebit," *l. c.*

<sup>3</sup> *L. c.*

<sup>4</sup> It is, however, possible that the doctrine of Tanchelm may have spread to Cologne and aided in the formation of these sects. Tanchelm was a layman of Antwerp, who denied the ability of sinful priests to administer the sacraments, and said that any good man might administer them; that his followers were the church; that tithes should not be given to the clergy, etc. See Tocco, *ibid.*, pp. 157 seq. *Epistola Trajectensis Ecclesiae ad Federicum Archiepiscopum Coloniensem* (1112). In D'Argentré, *Coll. Jud.*, vol. i, p. 11. *Vita Norberti*, c. 16. M. G. H. SS., vol. xii, pp. 690-691.

<sup>5</sup> Ep. Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 474.

this heresy had existed secretly from the time of the martyrs to our own day, and had persisted in Greece and some other lands."<sup>1</sup> As has been said, this tradition of antiquity and of eastern origin is common to all Catharan sects.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the remote origin of their philosophy may have been, however, the Apostolics of Cologne, like Arnold and Waldo, were inspired by the contrast between the Roman hierarchy and the primitive Church to make an effort after reform. "You," they told Everwin, "add house to house and field to field. You seek your own and the things of this world. Even those who are held most perfect among you, the monks and the regular canons, though they do not hold property as individuals, but possess it in common, yet have all things. . . . You love this world and are at peace with this world because you are of this world. . . . Christ possessed nothing and allowed His disciples to possess nothing. . . . They say they are the Church because they alone walk in the footsteps of Christ and follow truly the apostolic life. They seek not the things which are of this world; they possess nothing, neither house nor lands nor any money, just as Christ possessed nothing and allowed His disciples to possess nothing. . . . We, they say, are poor men of Christ, having no permanent abiding place, fleeing from city to city; like sheep in the midst of wolves, we suffer persecution<sup>3</sup> with the apostles and martyrs. Yet we lead a life holy and very strict, persisting in fasting and abstinence, in prayers and labors day and night, seeking only the necessities of life from our followers.<sup>4</sup> All these things we bear because we are not of this world. Pseudo-apostles have misinterpreted the word of Christ, and have sought their own, and have made you and your fathers proud and worldly. We and our fathers are born

<sup>1</sup> Cf. St. Bernard, "Nec enim in cunctis assertionibus eorum (nam multae sunt), novum quid aut inauditum audisse me recolo, sed quod tritum est, et diu ventilatum inter antiquos haereticos, a nostris autem contritum et eventilatum." *Serm. In Cantica*, 65, par. 8. Opera, ed. Mabillon, vol. i, cc. 1493.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 16.

<sup>3</sup> There is no record of this persecution, unless it be the effort to extirpate Catharism in France, to which reference has been made above.

<sup>4</sup> "Tantum necessaria ex eis vitae quaerentes," *l. c.*

of the apostles. We have remained in the grace of Christ, and we will so remain until the end of the world. To separate you from us, Christ said: By their fruits ye shall know them. Our fruits are the foot-prints of Christ." <sup>1</sup>

One of their tenets then was evangelical poverty—literal destitution, according to the command given by Christ to His disciples. They not only believed that they were bound to live in utter poverty; they carried the doctrine to its logical conclusion: a hierarchy which did not obey literally this command given by Christ to the group of men from whom that hierarchy claimed to derive its authority, was not the Church of Christ at all. They made then the deduction which Arnold and Waldo made, and which Francis never made. Repudiating the Church of Rome, they had organized a church of their own.

They did not copy the simple democracy of the early Church. They seem to have had no doubt that Christ founded a hierarchy not dissimilar to that of the debased Roman Church; that He instituted sacraments of which Baptism and the Mass as administered by that Church were a travesty. "They have their own Pope," says Everwin; <sup>2</sup> "one of those captured was a Bishop," <sup>3</sup> and there were among them simple hearers (*auditores*), "who may, by receiving the laying on of hands, become believers (*credentes*)."<sup>4</sup> This sounds like the Catharan organization.

As to the sacraments, Everwin believed that they accepted adult baptism, and that they were given to consecrating their food and drink, in obedience to the words of Christ at the Last Supper. Their attitude toward baptism cannot, however, be exactly determined. Whether they really did believe in adult baptism, or whether Everwin was led by their purposely equivocal statements to think that they did, one thing is certain: full membership in their sect was conferred by the laying on of hands. This rite, they claimed, was instituted by Christ. It

<sup>1</sup> Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 473.

<sup>2</sup> Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 474.

<sup>3</sup> Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 473.

<sup>4</sup> Evervini, *ibid.*, p. 474. Cf. St. Bernardi, *Serm. In Cantica*, no. 65, *ibid.*, c. 1491.

was that "baptism with the Holy Ghost and with fire" which John the Baptist promised would be given by the One mightier than he who was to come after him. In the baptism of Paul, according to Luke's account, no water was used; and "whatever is found in the Acts of the Apostles about the laying on of hands, they would apply to this baptism."<sup>1</sup> This ceremony is characteristically Catharan.

Like the Cathari, the Apostolics were accustomed to consecrate all food and drink at their daily meals, following the custom of Christ and the Apostles. The consecration was effected by means of the Lord's Prayer, as was the custom of many Cathari. The food and drink were consecrated "*in corpus Christi et sanguinem*," and the Apostolics believed "*ut inde se membra et corpus Christi nutriant*."<sup>2</sup> These statements may indicate belief in transubstantiation. If this be true, then the Apostolics were not genuine Cathari; for the Cathari believed that Christ "was not a man, but a phantasm."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Everwin may have given undue significance, drawn from the doctrines in which he himself believed, to a rite very simple, really apostolic, which he was incapable of understanding.

True Cathari these men may or may not have been, but Apostolics they clearly were. For they founded their customs on their literal interpretation of the commands of Christ and the usage of the apostles. They may have been Cathari who differed from the body of their brethren in their effort to restore primitive Christianity through evangelical poverty. All branches of the sect believed that they were of apostolic origin and char-

<sup>1</sup> *L. c.* The question of their belief in adult baptism, like that regarding the acceptance of the doctrine of transubstantiation, concerns inquirers who would establish their relation with the Catharan movement. This essay is concerned with the relation of the Apostolics of Cologne with the movement to revive primitive Christianity and apostolic poverty.

<sup>2</sup> *L. c.*

<sup>3</sup> See above. There is ground for assuming that Everwin thought the Apostolics did believe in transubstantiation; for, after describing them, he turns to his "other heretics" with the words: "Omnino ab istis discordantes. . . . Isti negant in altari fieri corpus Christi eo quod omnes sacerdotes ecclesiae non sunt consecrati." *L. c.*



acter, and that the Papacy had lost the apostolic spirit and power which it once possessed. This loss they connected with the false Donation of Constantine the Great, by which, according to mediæval belief, temporal power over Italy was conferred upon Pope Sylvester. The Cathari believed that the Church was perverted by the possession of temporal wealth and power, and ceased from that time to be the Church of Christ, "and they say that the blessed Sylvester was Antichrist."<sup>1</sup>

This belief in their own apostolic character might easily be emphasized in the minds of some members of the Catharan body and develop into the strictly apostolic doctrine of the heretics of Cologne.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, a company of men who set out independently to lead a life conformed to the usages of the apostolic Church might find in the Catharan belief in their own apostolic origin a common ground on which to meet. Indeed, in districts permeated by Catharism,<sup>3</sup> as much of western Europe seems to have been at this time, such men would be drawn both by the logic of their reasoning and by the pressure of events toward the Catharan organization.

On the whole, however, the Apostolics of Cologne are most easily accounted for on the assumption that they were a branch of the Cathari, and had, in accordance with the spirit of the age, become enthusiasts for evangelical poverty, without severing their connection with the great body of the Dualists. Several circumstances point to this conclusion. They do not speak of a heresiarch, and usually a sect begins with adherence to a leader. They refer to persecutions endured; and no such persecution is known to have taken place, beyond the attempts to put down Catharism, and the proceedings against Peter of

<sup>1</sup> Evervini, *l. c.* For a more detailed account of the Sylvester legend, and the influence of the Donation of Constantine on heresy in mediæval Europe, see Comba, *Histoire des Vaudois*, pp. 77 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> This is the theory of Tocco. See *L'Eresia nel medio evo*, p. 163. There are no detailed treatises on the Apostolics, and it is therefore impossible to refer to secondary authorities on points which lie outside the scope of this essay.

<sup>3</sup> On Catharism in Cologne, see Schmidt, *ibid.*, pp. 94 *seq.* Also *Annales Colonienses Maximi* (Anno 1163), M. G. H. SS., vol. xvii p. 778, for account of influx of Cathari from Flanders.

Bruys and Henry of Lausanne and their followers.<sup>1</sup> Whatever their origin, they had Catharan beliefs, and they were, as they called themselves, Apostolics.

They also knew how to die. "They were seized against our will by an over-zealous populace," says Everwin, "and put upon the fire and burned. What is more marvellous, they entered the fire and bore the torture not only with patience but with joy. Whence," he naively inquires, "do these children of the devil obtain a steadfastness in their heresy such as is scarcely found in believers in the faith of Christ!"<sup>2</sup>

There is no possibility of estimating the influence and the diffusion of the Apostolics. Their own statement that "they have a great multitude, scattered almost everywhere throughout the world," may refer to the Cathari in general. Heretics were discovered at Trèves in 1122,<sup>3</sup> at Toul in 1130,<sup>4</sup> and in Champagne in 1144.<sup>5</sup> In all these cases, they were apparently Cathari. There is no real evidence that they were Apostolics.<sup>6</sup> St. Bernard seems to have heard of other persecutions of the Apostolics besides those of which Everwin wrote; but his statement is far too vague to serve as evidence.<sup>7</sup>

That there is no record of any discovery of Apostolic heretics in Germany from the time of Everwin to the days of the Walden-

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 20 seq.

<sup>2</sup> *L. c.*

<sup>3</sup> *Gesta Treverorum Episcoporum*, M. G. H. SS., vol. viii, p. 193.

<sup>4</sup> *Epistolae Hugonis Metelli*; *Sacrae Antiquitatis Monumenta*; in oppido Sancti Deodati (1731), ep. 15, vol. ii, p. 347.

<sup>5</sup> *Ep. Ecclesiae Leodiensis ad Lucium Papam II*, Martène et Durand, A. C. I., p. 777.

<sup>6</sup> Of the heretics of Toul, Hugo writes: "Pestilentes homines, qui veriori nomine, bestiae appellari possunt, quae bestialiter vivunt. Conjugium enim detestantur, baptismum abominantur, sacramenta Ecclesiae dirident, nomen Christianum abhorrent," *l. c.* Cf. accounts for Treves and Laon.

<sup>7</sup> "Quaesiti fidem, cum de quibus suspecti videbantur, omnia prorsus suo more negarent; examinati iudicio aquae, mendaces inventi sunt. Cumque negare non possent, quippe deprehensi, aqua eos non recipiente, arrepto, ut dicitur, freno dentibus, tam misere, quam libere impietatem non confessi, sed professi sunt, palam pietatem adstruentes, et pro ea mortem subire parati. Nec minus parati inferre qui adstabant. Itaque irruens in eos populus, novos haereticis suae ipsorum perfidiae martyres dedit." *Serm. In Cantica*, 66, par. 12. *Ibid.*, c. 1499.

sian movement is no proof that such heretics did not exist there. The great prelates of the Rhine valley were absorbed in the struggle which was vital to their wealth and power<sup>1</sup>—the strife to determine the relations of Church to Empire. They were probably not over-zealous in the pursuit of heresy. Moreover, detection of the Apostolics might well be difficult; for those discovered by Everwin partook of the Sacraments of the Church, and so for a time escaped notice.<sup>2</sup> The secret growth of the sect in the twelfth century is the more probable because the Church had, as yet, no organized system for ferreting out heresy. The fact that the Apostolics are not mentioned by name in the great works on heresy written in the twelfth century: those of Bonacursus,<sup>3</sup> and Moneta,<sup>4</sup> for example, does not prove that the sect ceased to exist. The Apostolics might easily seem indistinguishable from other Cathari on the one hand, or from the Waldenses on the other. The same reasoning applies to the absence of the name Apostolics from the Papal and Imperial edicts against heresy, issued in the latter part of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth.

Though there is no proof that the Apostolics maintained themselves and diffused the "poison of their doctrine," it seems probable that they did so, for the district "infected with their heresy" was to be a fertile ground for Waldensianism forty years later; and the practical teaching of the Apostolics was identical with that of Waldo. In only one other locality did the preaching of Waldo gain so quickly a large following, and that was in Lombardy, where Arnold and the Humiliati had aroused an enthusiasm for primitive Christianity and evangelical

<sup>1</sup> On the preoccupation of these prelates with worldly affairs, and the resulting tendency of heresy to increase unmolested, see Röhrich, *Die Gottesfreunde und die Winkeler am Ober rhein*, in Illgen's, *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, vol. x, pt. 4, pp. 118 seq. (1840). For an interesting contemporary account of the clergy, especially in the diocese of Treves, see Potho of Prum, *De statu domus Dei*, in *Bibl. Max. Patrum. Lugd.*, vol. xxi, pp. 489 seq.

<sup>2</sup> St. Bernard, *Serm. In Cantica*, no. 65, par. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Vita haereticorum*. D'Achery, *Spicilegium*, vol. xiii, p. 64.

<sup>4</sup> Moneta Cremonensis *adv. Catharos et Valdenses*, ed. Rome, 1743, by T. Richinius.

poverty. The Apostolics of Everwin furnish an explanation for the wonderfully rapid growth of the German Waldenses into an organization formidable to the Church. Their creed had doubtless lived on, strengthened in the popular mind by constant contemplation of the wealth and luxury and absorption in the duties and pleasures of secular rulers which characterized the great Prince-Bishops of the Rhine valley.

## CHAPTER III

### ARNOLD OF BRESCIA

LOOKED at in the large, the history of the Church in the eleventh century presents two great conspicuous facts: the attempt to define the relation to the secular power in the Investiture struggle, and that effort to purify the clergy and bring their lives into conformity with the apostolic ideal known as the Cluniac Reform. These two movements doubtless had an incalculable influence in arousing popular consciousness to the unapostolic condition of the Church. They also helped to produce in the cities of northern Italy a state of unrest and confusion which still further emphasized the need for reform and made all ecclesiastical questions also political ones. A reformer could hardly attack any ecclesiastical evil without straightway finding himself at the head of a party in his own city arrayed against a faction itself headed by ecclesiastics.<sup>1</sup> The situation was complicated by the breach between Papacy and Empire and the warfare between the adherents of the two powers.

The prevailing evils seem to have been especially flagrant in the Lombard communes, of which Milan was the chief.<sup>2</sup> When the Synod of Sutri in 1059 enunciated the principles of reform, the Lombard bishops, who, if they tried to enforce the decrees were sometimes savagely assaulted by their clergy, found support among the people. The alliance was not always, however, between bishops and people. The Investiture struggle often arrayed the commune against the bishop, inasmuch as the burghers were striving after civil rights and political independence, and bishops who, in league with the emperor, tried to

<sup>1</sup> Arialdus at Milan, Arnold at Brescia. See below, pp. 32 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> C. Schmidt, *Histoire de la secte des Cathares*, p. 19.

retain temporal power became enemies of the commune. The patriot leaders would then ally themselves with the papal legates against the bishops.

In Milan the popular party was known as the Pataria, and was led by a certain Arialdu, a man of noble birth sprung from the neighborhood of Milan, who had traveled widely and studied much. Perhaps he may have encountered Hildebrand and learned at first hand of his great effort to purify the Church. At all events he had before his eyes the ideal of the evangelical Church, and he fearlessly called upon the clergy of Milan to give up their wealth, repent of their wickedness and follow Christ as the apostles had done. Democrats and reformers flocked to his support, and for a time his faction ruled in Milan. The Pope, Alexander II, found in the Pataria a useful ally in his effort to enforce the Cluniac Reform and in opposing the Emperor and the Anti-Pope upheld by the prelates of Lombardy. Simoniacal and married priests were driven from their altars, and for a time the Pataria controlled the city.<sup>1</sup> When the Pope's opponents had been humbled, the Curia had no further need of the party of Arialdu, and the downfall of the Pataria was inevitable as soon as Rome by their aid had triumphed in Lombardy.

But the principles of Arialdu did not die with the fall of his party. The history of the communes varied greatly in details. In all, however, there was strife involving ecclesiastical questions, together with a state of unrest favorable to the development of revolutionary sentiment, political and ecclesiastical.

One of the most turbulent towns in northern Italy was Brescia, which then furnished a vivid example of the unapostolic condition into which the Church had fallen. Despite the reform decrees, the clergy were almost without exception simoniacal. The evil effect of the possession of temporal power was glaringly evident. Though the city was nominally governed by two consuls, the bishop controlled one-fifth of the land, which was

<sup>1</sup> Hausrath, *Arnold von Brescia*, p. 1. *Vita Arialdi*, AA. SS. Boll., 27 Juni, v, p. 281. Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserzeit*, vol. iii, p. 30.

infeudated to the Church.<sup>1</sup> Conflicts between the bishop and the consuls were frequent.<sup>2</sup> A sort of compromise between the lay and clerical authorities is indicated by a document of 1127<sup>3</sup> issued by both together, but this was evidently a momentary agreement, and did not mean the end of the strife.

New conflicts were imminent. The year 1127 saw two German kings contending for the imperial crown; in 1130 two Popes claimed the Fisherman's Chair. Brescia supported Lothair III and Innocent II against Conrad III and Anacletus; the laity of Brescia, that is, headed by the consuls.<sup>4</sup> The bishop, Villanus, was a creature of Anacletus, and bitter strife existed between the clergy under his leadership and the popular party. Innocent II visited Brescia in the autumn of 1132. He deposed Villanus, and replaced him by Manfred, an adherent of his own.<sup>5</sup>

It was during the confusion attendant on the schism of Anacletus that the man known to history as Arnold of Brescia first came into prominence. He was a native of the town, of noble family, born toward the close of the eleventh century. Nothing is known of the events of his early life, except that he had been ordained "*clericus ac lector*," and had been a pupil of Abelard. He was a man of affairs rather than of theories. We judge of his beliefs by his own acts and those of his followers. According to all the accounts extant of his life, all the attacks made upon him by his enemies, he remained always a consistent figure, tracing the evils of the day to the wealth and temporal power of the Church, finding a remedy in a return to the conditions of the Apostolic Age.<sup>6</sup> There is no word of Arnold's in existence to show the process by which this conviction was formed.

<sup>1</sup> Odorici, *Storie Bresciano*, vol. iv, pp. 237 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 8. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>3</sup> This document is given by Odorici, *ibid.*, vol. v, p. 92.

<sup>4</sup> Hausrath, *l. c.*

<sup>5</sup> Hausrath, *l. c.* Giesebrecht, *l. c.* See Odorici, *ibid.*, vol. iv, pp. 240 *seq.*, for an account of Innocent's visit. "Innocentius papa Brixiam venit et ejecit Villanum de episcopatu." *Annales Brixienensis*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xviii, p. 812.

<sup>6</sup> See below, pp. 33 *seq.*

Besides Arnold's Lombard environment, then, the only known influence in his early life is that of Abelard, during the period when the author of the "Sic et Non" was living at the Paraclete.<sup>1</sup>

When it is remembered that Abelard exalted the province of human reason, it seems probable that the fearless independence of Arnold's later attitude was in part due to him. Abelard had, moreover, spent years in bitter conflict with ecclesiastical authorities, at whose hands he had received treatment severe, if not unjust. He had protested against the disregard of monastic vows sadly prevalent at that time. Arnold's hostility to the clergy, natural enough in a citizen of Lombardy, may well have been stimulated by Abelard. Further, the beauty of the simple life at the Paraclete must have had its effect on a man of ascetic tendencies. That Arnold was devoted to Abelard, and therefore likely to feel his influence strongly, may be inferred from his return to his master some years later.<sup>2</sup>

Of the further influences to which Arnold was subject, we know that he was "learned in the Scriptures,"<sup>3</sup> and that he can hardly have failed to hear some Patarin teaching. Moreover, the study of the Roman law was quite general in Lombardy, and inevitably made men critical of the relation between the secular and the ecclesiastical power.<sup>4</sup>

The Church as Arnold saw it in Lombardy bore little resemblance to the Church of the Apostolic Age, and the clergy did not conform their lives to the commands of Christ which

<sup>1</sup> V. Clavel (*Arnould de Brescia*, pp. 28-29), gives exaggerated importance to the influence of Abelard's "Nec credi posse aliquid nisi primitus intellectum." For an account of Abelard's life down to this period, see J. McCabe, *Life of Abelard*, pp. 1-207.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 35 seq.

<sup>3</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31; M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 537. [Believed to have been written by John of Salisbury, who was with Arnold in Paris, under Abelard, and in Italy during the Roman crisis. Giesebrecht, *Arnold*, pp. 4, 124-126; Hausrath, p. 4; Pauli, *Ueber . . . Johannes Sarisburiensis*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht*, vol. xv, pp. 265 seq.]

<sup>4</sup> Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 129. Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 2. Breyer, *Die Arnoldisten*, p. 397. Note also quotations from Justinian's *Institutes*, in Wezel's letter, Jaffé, B. R. G., vol. i, p. 539. For this letter, see below, pp. 42 seq.



Arnold found in the Scriptures. So in the midst of unseemly wrangles through which prelates of the Church strove to gain or to retain wealth and power, he began to cry out that by possessing wealth and power the Church had departed from the way marked out by Christ and followed by the Apostles; and that only by surrendering all property to the laity could the clergy hope to be saved.<sup>1</sup>

With relentless logic, Arnold called on the clergy of Brescia to give up their worldly goods. A fresh schism arose. Manfred and the clergy opposed Arnold, the laity supported him. Popular feeling was so intense that during Manfred's sojourn in Rome in 1137, the citizens of Brescia conspired to prevent his return. For a time Arnold's party ruled Brescia. When, in 1139, Rome condemned Arnold, his "*duo consules haeretici*" fell.<sup>2</sup>

Exiled, Arnold joined Abelard,<sup>3</sup> who, after an experience as Abbot of St. Gildas in Brittany, made stormy by his attempt to reform the monks, had returned to Paris and was teaching on Mt. St. Genevieve. In 1141 St. Bernard declared that Abelard was teaching heresy, of which, we are told, Arnold partook: "that new form of belief," as St. Bernard calls it, "which has been devised in France. Its standpoint toward virtue and vice is not moral, toward the Sacraments not faithful, toward the mystery of the Holy Trinity something quite different from that simple and sober one to which we have been trained."<sup>4</sup> Like Abelard, Arnold was lashed by St. Bernard's denunciation.

<sup>1</sup> "Dicebat enim, nec clericas proprietatem, nec episcopus regalia, nec monachos possessiones habentes, aliqua ratione salvari posse; cuncta haec principis esse, ab ejusque beneficentia in usum laicorum cedere oportere." Otto Frisingensis, *Gesta Friderici I*, bk. ii, c. 20, M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Annales Brixiensis*, Ann., 1135, M. G. H. SS., vol. xviii, p. 812. (Cited by Giesebrecht, p. 130. But the year is not that of Arnold's condemnation.)

<sup>3</sup> St. Bernardi, ep. 195. *Opera*, ed. Mabillon, vol. i, p. 187; also in Bouquet, vol. xv, p. 575. Walter Map, *De Nugis*, D. I, c. 24, ed. Wright, p. 43. (Friend of John of Salisbury, who wrote during latter half of 12th century, and was present at 3rd Council of the Lateran, 1179. Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 155, n. 6. See also below. *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31; *ibid.*, p. 537.

<sup>4</sup> St. Bern., ep. 330. "Ad Innocentium Papam." *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 182.

With him he was condemned by the Council of Sens in 1141.<sup>1</sup>

Abelard, worn out by the labors and contentions of his strenuous life, was persuaded by Peter the Venerable of Cluny to make peace with St. Bernard and to submit to the Church.<sup>2</sup> Arnold was younger, he was vigorous and uncompromising, and he did not yield.

The sentence of Sens was not approved in France, and after the submission of the arch-heretic no bishop was found to execute the harsh judgment of the Council against Arnold. He was therefore left unmolested for a time.<sup>3</sup> Further, Hyacinthus, later a cardinal, evidently an influential man, espoused Arnold's cause.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, conditions in France were unfavorable to united clerical action. A heated controversy centred around a bitter struggle for the see of Bourges and diverted attention from all minor issues. King and Pope, noble and monk, stood arrayed against each other. Bloodshed, ban, interdict,<sup>5</sup> furnished a vivid illustration of Arnold's characteristic doctrine, while by shielding him from the punishment decreed at Sens the strife made possible a still wider promulgation of the doctrine. He tarried for a time in Paris, and at Mt. St. Genevieve "expounded sacred letters to the scholars. What he said agreed perfectly with the laws of the Christians, but differed as widely as possible from their lives. He did not spare the bishops, because of their base and avaricious greed of gain and because of their impure lives and because they sought to build the Church of God in blood." <sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mansi, vol. xxi, cc. 564 *seq.* Cf. St. Bern., epist. 189; *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 182. On Abelard's views condemned at Sens, see McCabe, *ibid.*, pp. 320-321, and S. M. Deutsch, Peter Abelard, pp. 255-288.

<sup>2</sup> Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 53. Abelard died shortly afterward (April 21, 1142), in a priory belonging to Cluny, at Châlons sur Saône. McCabe, *ibid.*, p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> Hausrath, *l. c.* St. Bern., epist., 195.

<sup>4</sup> St. Bern., ep. 189. *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 184. Hyacinthus was with John of Salisbury, Arnold and Abelard in Paris in 1136. McCabe, *ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>5</sup> Hausrath, *ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>6</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31. *Ibid.*, p. 537.

Though Pope and bishop gave no open sign of hostility, St. Bernard had not laid down his arms. Unable to secure the execution of the papal verdict, he sought to drive the condemned man out of Christendom. He hunted him from land to land by appealing to any power he could influence. He did his best to make true his own description of Arnold: "Wherever he has once set his foot, thither he never dares to return any more."<sup>1</sup> St. Bernard mediated between the Pope and the King of France when his country lay under an interdict, and he finally succeeded in persuading Louis VII to drive Arnold from Paris and from France.

For a time, probably about a year, he found refuge in Zürich.<sup>3</sup> Still he taught and won followers.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the preaching of Henry of Lausanne had prepared the way for Arnold.<sup>5</sup> To the Bishop of Constance, who had won his see by spending large sums in Rome during the very year (1139) of Arnold's condemnation by Innocent II,<sup>6</sup> St. Bernard sent an emphatic letter of warning. Arnold, he said, was a man of ingratiating manner, who never failed to make use of all the influence he could acquire against the clergy.<sup>7</sup> We may judge both of Arnold's course in the diocese of Constance and of the effect of this letter by the fact that Arnold did not stay long in Zürich. We know also that he had preached there the regeneration of the Church by a return to the conditions of the Apostolic Age.<sup>8</sup>

He next went to Guido, the papal legate in Moravia and Bohemia.<sup>9</sup> To Guido also St. Bernard sent a letter of warning

<sup>1</sup> St. Bern., ep. 195. *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 57. The interdict was removed by Celestinus II (1143-1147).

<sup>3</sup> Otto Frising. *Gesta Frid.* I, bk. 2, c. 20. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 403. St. Bern., ep. 195. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>4</sup> Otto Frising. *Ibid.*, p. 404. Wezel (see below, p. 42 *seq.*) writing from Rome in 1152, recommends to the Emperor Frederick I "Comitem Rodulfum de Ramesberch, et Comitem Andalricum de Leucenburch, et alios idoneos scilicet Eberardum de Bodemen" who, Giesebrecht (p. 133) thinks, were followers of Arnold from Constance, as was Wezel himself.

<sup>5</sup> See above, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Hausrath, p. 68.

<sup>7</sup> Ep. 195.

<sup>8</sup> Otto Frising., *ibid.*, p. 404.

<sup>9</sup> Giesebrecht, p. 136. *Epistolae Wibaldi*, Jaffé, B. R. G., vol. viii, p. 542. See Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*, vol. iv, p. 458.

couched in much the same terms as that to the Bishop of Constance.<sup>1</sup> The effect of this letter is not certainly known. For two years (1143-1145) there is no trace of Arnold.<sup>2</sup> At the close of that period he and Guido appeared simultaneously in Italy.<sup>3</sup>

At this time, according to the *Historia Pontificalis*, "Arnold promised satisfaction and obedience to the Roman See, and was received by the Lord Eugenius at Viterbo. Penance was enjoined upon him, which he agreed to fulfill: fasting, vigils and prayers about the sacred places in Rome." The errors for which Arnold made satisfaction are not stated; it is uncertain whether they were the heresies of Abelard or the direct assaults upon the Church for possessing wealth and power which had caused his banishment from Brescia,<sup>4</sup> and which he had apparently continued to make in other lands. He owed satisfaction for both. When he was condemned for his teaching at Brescia in 1139 he had promised not to return to Italy;<sup>5</sup> and the ban of Sens still hung over him.

Arnold may have forsworn at Viterbo his views on the wealth and secular power of the Church. If so, the state of things he found in Rome forced him once more to resume his mission. In Rome as in Brescia, a great many of the citizens were aroused against the secular power of the Church.<sup>6</sup> The lower nobility and the burghers had taken advantage of the prevailing disorder during the schism of Anacletus, to reorganize the

<sup>1</sup> "Arnoldus de Brixia, cujus conversatio mel, et doctrina venenum; cui caput columbae, cauda scorpionis est; quem Brixia evomit, Roma exhorruit, Francia repulit, Germania abominatur, Italia non vult recipere," etc. St. Bern., ep. 196. *Op. cit.*, *ibid.*, vol. i, p. 188. The date according to Giesebrecht (p. 135) is not before 1142 nor after the autumn of 1143.

<sup>2</sup> Vacandard, *Arnauld de Brescia*, p. 71. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>3</sup> Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 136. See also Jaffé, *Regesta*, 9296, for a document dated Sept. 12, 1145, which shows that Guido was in Italy.

<sup>4</sup> St. Bern., ep. 195. "Adhaeserat Paetro Abaelardo." But "Videbetis hominem aperte insurgere in clerum," etc. Further, he was cast out from Italy and from Rome "pro simile causa."

<sup>5</sup> St. Bern., ep. 195.

<sup>6</sup> For the whole revolutionary movement, see Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter*, bk. viii, cc. 4 seq., 4th edition, vol. iv, pp. 428 seq.

Senate and replace the Papal Prefect by a Patrician of their own choosing.<sup>1</sup> Lucius II, during his reign of one year (1144-1145), had not succeeded in wielding the temporal power in Rome. He had aroused the higher nobility against the Senate; but the burghers had none the less prevailed. They had substituted Imperial for Papal authority by offering to take the oath of allegiance to the Emperor Conrad II, and by demanding that the Pope give up all temporal power and all income save tithes and free-will offerings.<sup>2</sup>

Eugenius III spent eight months early in his pontificate with his cardinals at Viterbo;<sup>3</sup> months during which the new government in Rome showed itself powerless to prevent rioting and the destruction of property belonging to the cardinals and other papalists. At the end of the year 1145 a compromise between Pope and revolutionists enabled Eugenius to enter Rome.<sup>4</sup> Strife soon broke out again, however, and in January, 1146, Eugenius found it expedient to return to Viterbo. In March he went to Sutri.

Such were the conditions when Arnold went to Rome in the latter weeks of 1145, presumably to fulfil the *penance* imposed upon him at Viterbo and to complete his reconciliation with the Roman See.<sup>5</sup> He saw, as he had seen at Brescia, the clergy engaged in unseemly strife to retain temporal power, and to continue leading the luxurious lives which Arnold thought so inconsistent with their calling. Walter Map believed that the sight of "the luxuriousness of the cardinals and their tables laden with gold and silver dishes" first led Arnold once more

<sup>1</sup> The Revolution was a fact before Arnold went to Rome (1144). See Otto Frising. *Chron.*, bk. vii, cc. 27, 31, 34. M. G. H. SS, vol. xx, pp. 264 *seq.* *Historia Pontificalis*, l. c. Two letters of St. Bernard, no. 243 (*op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 240-242), an appeal to the Romans to return to their allegiance to the Pope; no. 244 (*ibid.*, pp. 242-243), an appeal to Conrad to defend the Pope. Both letters were written in 1145-1146 (Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 139), and neither contains any reference to Arnold.

<sup>2</sup> Otto Frising. *Chron.*, bk. 7, c. 31, l. c.

<sup>3</sup> Until December, 1145. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>4</sup> Otto Frising. *Chron.*, bk. vii, c. 34. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 266.

<sup>5</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, l. c. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 138.

to lift up his voice in protest. For the Prophet of Brescia could not keep silence. First "he censured the clergy temperately in letters to the Lord Pope; but they took it in bad part, and cast him forth. He then returned to the city and began to teach indefatigably. The people flocked about him and heard him eagerly."<sup>1</sup> The Pope was absent in France, and there was no power to prevent Arnold's preaching openly.<sup>2</sup> "He was heard frequently in the Capitol and in public disputations."

What were his subjects? "He was," says Otto of Freising, "a slanderer of the bishops and clergy, a persecutor of the monks, and a flatterer of the laity as well. For he said that clergy who hold property, bishops who enjoy regalia, and monks who have possessions cannot in any wise be saved. All these things pertain to the secular rulers, and should by their beneficence be given to the laity to use."<sup>3</sup> Arnold did not hold the extreme view of the Apostolics,<sup>4</sup> or of Waldo, concerning apostolic power. He would allow the clergy to have the "first-fruits and tithes, and whatever the devotion of the people offered."<sup>5</sup> The clergy might then, according to Arnold, have an income without violating the commands of Christ and the customs of the Apostolic Age. Property they must not hold. The accounts extant of Arnold's teaching can hardly mean that he sanctioned even communistic possession, ownership of any

<sup>1</sup> Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium*, d. i, c. 24, ed. Wright, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, l. c. He went in January, 1147, to bless crusaders. Vacandard, *Arnauld de Brescia*, p. 81. Hausrath, *ibid.*, p. 94.

<sup>3</sup> Otto Frising. *Gesta Frid.*, bk. ii, c. 20. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 404. Cf. Gerohus Reichersbergensis, *De Novitatibus hujus saeculi*; in Grisar, *Geroh über die Investitursfrage*, Zeitschrift für Katholischen Theologie, vol. ix, p. 549. "Memini me, quum fuisset in urbe (Roma), contra quendam Arnaldinum valenter literatum in palatio disputasse." Breyer (*Die Arnoldisten*, p. 397), says this was not Arnold but an Arnoldist, and considers it evidence of the existence of a sect founded by Arnold—a conclusion which seems hardly warranted. See below, pp. 50 seq.

<sup>4</sup> See above, pp. 21 seq.

<sup>5</sup> Gunther, *Ligurinus*, ed. Reuber, p. 322. Believed to be a production of the late twelfth century, the material being taken from Otto of Freising. See Hausrath, *Arnold*, p. 155, n. 8. Cf. Platform of the Romans before Arnold's advent, above, p. 38.

sort of capital by the Church as an institution. Specific charges were made against the clergy—simony, worldliness and evil living, lack of charity, "They love not God nor their neighbor,"<sup>1</sup> and all these vices were attributed to their wealth.

He then attacked the governing body of the Church, the Pope and Cardinals, for their unapostolic position. The College of Cardinals, he claimed, "was, by reason of the pride and avarice of its members, their hypocrisy and manifold sins, not the Church of God, but the house of buying and selling, and the den of thieves, who played the part of the scribes and pharisees toward the Christian people. He said the Pope was no Pope because he was not an apostolic man and a shepherd of souls, but a man of blood,<sup>2</sup> who maintained his authority by killing and burning; a tormentor of the churches; an oppressor of the innocent, who did nothing in the world but feed on flesh and fill his coffers and empty those of others. He said he was not apostolic, because he did not imitate the doctrine nor the life of the Apostles, and therefore no reverence nor obedience was due him."<sup>3</sup> Further, "Nothing in the government of the city pertains to the supreme Pontiff; ecclesiastical jurisdiction ought to be enough for him."<sup>4</sup>

It was on the common ground of this last doctrine that Arnold and the Roman Revolutionists formed an alliance. They, in their rebellion against the temporal rule of the Pope, were seeking to restore the mechanism of the Roman government to the state in which it was in the time of Constantine and Justinian, "who held in their hands the whole earth through the might of the Senate and the people of Rome."<sup>5</sup> The Revolu-

<sup>1</sup> *Gesta di Federico*, vv. 780-799. *Fonti di Storia d'Italia*, vol. i, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gerohus of Reichersberg, who regrets that Arnold was punished by death because the Church was thus guilty of bloodshed. In *De Investigatione Antichristi*, bk. i, c. 42, ed. Scheibelberger, p. 89.

<sup>3</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, 538. Cf. *Gesta di Federico*, vv. 785-795. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>4</sup> Otto Frising. *Gesta Frid.*, bk. ii, c. 20. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 404.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Otto Frising., bk. ii, c. 20. SS., xx, p. 404. He formulates Arnold's political doctrine thus: "Proponens antiquorum Romanorum exempla, qui ex senatus maturitatis consulto et ex juveniliū animorum fortitudinis ordine et integritate totum

tionists, as has been shown,<sup>1</sup> had reorganized the Senate. Through this body they now besought the Emperor to dwell in Rome and rule all Italy; "for all clerical obstacles are now set aside."<sup>2</sup> Arnold was not primarily a republican, he was not an imperialist. He believed that the Church was vitiated by the possession of wealth and temporal power; and he was convinced that it could be restored to apostolic purity only by losing that wealth and power. To him, then, the Roman movement afforded an opportunity to purify the Church. With this object in view, he made common cause with the Revolutionists.

From this time our sources for the life of Arnold are very meagre. The *Historia Pontificalis* ends; Otto of Freising becomes unsatisfactory; there are only a few brief notices of Arnold in the chronicles of the progress and subsequent decline of the Roman Revolution. Just here, however, may be placed two letters which are believed to have been inspired, if not written by Arnold. These form part of a correspondence between the Revolutionists and the Emperor. They are: first, a letter from "a certain friend of the Senate" to Conrad III;<sup>3</sup> second, one from Wezel to Frederick.<sup>4</sup> Giesebrecht<sup>5</sup> believes that "*quidam fidelis senatus*" of the first letter may well be Arnold himself; for he had bound himself to the Senate by an oath of allegiance.<sup>6</sup> The friend of the Senate is at all events a thorough Arnoldist. Wezel is evidently an adherent of Arnold. His identity is unknown. It seems probable that he was a German. Possibly he and the group of men mentioned in his ap-

orbem terrae suum fecerint. Quare reaedificandum Capitolium, renovandam senatoriam dignitatem, reformandum equestrem ordinem docuit." Giesebrecht (*Arnold von Brescia*, p. 19, note) does not credit this statement. Vacandard (*Arnauld de Brescia*, p. 73) does.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, bk. i, c. 27, p. 366. Otto Frising.

<sup>2</sup> Otto Frising., bk. i, c. 27, *ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>3</sup> *Epistolae Wibaldi*, no. 216. Jaffé, B. R. G., vol. i, pp. 335 *seq.*

<sup>4</sup> *Epistolae Wibaldi*, no. 404. *Ibid.*, pp. 534 *seq.*

<sup>5</sup> *Arnold*, p. 142, note.

<sup>6</sup> Arnold of Brescia "qui honori urbis et rei publice Romanorum se dicebatur obligasse prestito juramento." *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 537.



peal to the Emperor, men who, like him, have German names, were followers won by Arnold during his sojourn in Constance.<sup>1</sup> It is then probable that in these documents we have reasoning after the characteristic Arnoldist method.

The letter of the man who describes himself as "*quidam fidelis senatus*" is an earnest appeal to the Emperor to come quickly to Rome and re-establish imperial control, thus limiting the ecclesiastical authority to its proper sphere. For, he says, no wars should be waged nor murders committed in the world by priests, who are not permitted to bear the sword with the chalice. Their duty is to preach, and to support their preaching by good works.<sup>2</sup> Wezel's letter was written after Conrad was dead, when Frederick had been chosen king, but before his coronation as emperor. He reproaches Frederick because he has failed to recognize the Roman people as the source of his power, but like his predecessors has obeyed the summons of the "Julianists, heretics, apostate clergy and false monks, who disregard their vows and wield authority despite the evangelical, apostolic and canon law, and in defiance of all other laws, both human and divine." Wezel then quotes St. Peter himself<sup>3</sup> to prove that the Pope is "apostate": that he is no true descendant of the Fisherman. Flee that which is of this world, "add to your faith virtue, and to your virtue knowledge." How, he says, could the members of the Curia say with St. Peter: "Behold I leave all and follow thee?"<sup>4</sup> And again, "Silver and gold have I none?"<sup>5</sup>

Wezel thus convicted the worldly See of Rome out of the mouth of the apostle whom the mediæval world honored as the founder of that See and the chief of the apostles, and proved that the Papacy was unapostolic. He then turns to the foundation of all:—the commands of Christ, uttered when he sent his apostles out into the world and, according to the belief of ecclesiastics, organized the Church. Referring again to the prelates Wezel says: "How can such men hear from the Lord's lips

<sup>1</sup> Clavel, *Arnauld de Brescia*, pp. 281-283. Giesebrecht, *Arnold*, p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> Jaffé, *B. R. G.*, vol. i, pp. 335-336.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Pet. 1: 4-7.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. 19: 27.

<sup>5</sup> Acts 3: 6.

'You are the salt of the earth?' 'Ye are the light of the world?' To Peter and the vicars (*vicariis*) of Peter the Lord said: As my Father hath sent me, so send I you.<sup>2</sup> But the manner of his sending by the Father he expressed, saying: 'If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.'<sup>3</sup> If Christ, who did no sin, was not to be believed without works, how are those to be believed who do evil—nay more, who do evil publicly?" "How," Wezel proceeds, "can the clergy, given over to luxurious living, bear to hear the foremost of the commands of the Gospel: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit,'<sup>4</sup> when they are not poor in fact or in aim?" He continues his argument, following up the quotations from the New Testament by passages from the early Fathers, showing how far the Church of his day has lapsed from the apostolic ideal of a ministry given to self-denial, humility, poverty, in obedience to the commands of Christ.<sup>5</sup> Wezel's letter, like that of "*quidam fidelis senatus*," reflects Arnold's characteristic doctrine. The two documents go to show that during the alliance with the Roman Revolutionists, Arnold retained and championed the views which had led to his banishment from Brescia and from Italy in 1137.

During seven turbulent years (1145-1152)<sup>6</sup> Arnold remained in Rome. At the end of that time the Pope made peace with the popular party. One of his demands was the banishment or surrender of Arnold.<sup>7</sup> Given these alternatives, Arnold chose exile rather than capitulation. As soon as he had left Rome he was captured. Shortly after his capture he was put to death.<sup>8</sup> The manner of his death is uncertain.<sup>8</sup> The significance of it is

<sup>1</sup> Matt. 5: 13, 14.

<sup>2</sup> John 20: 21.

<sup>3</sup> John 10: 37.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. 5: 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Epistolae Wibaldi*, no. 404. Jaffé, B. R. G., vol. i, pp. 539 seq.

<sup>6</sup> Giesebrecht, *Arnold*, p. 141.

<sup>7</sup> Gregorovius, *ibid.*, 498-499, for an account of the interdict on the verge of Holy Week, by means of which the Pope prevailed over Arnold's party. See also Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, pp. 145 seq., and Clavel, *Arnould*, pp. 273 seq. *Vita Hadriani Papae IV*, Watterich, *Pontificorum Romanorum Vitae*, vol. ii, pp. 344 seq.

<sup>8</sup> For accounts of it, see Otto Frising., bk. ii, c. 20, who says he was burned, and his ashes were scattered on the Tiber; *Gesta di Federico*, for statement that he was hanged; a statement supported by Walter Map, vv, 831 seq., l. c.

unquestionable. The party which stood for evangelical poverty in the Church, which believed that the clergy should confine themselves to the duties enjoined upon the apostles by Christ, had been crushingly defeated by the power of the Church as an institution.

The defeat of a party, however, by no means necessarily implies the conquest of the principles for which that party has contended. Did the triumph of the Papacy and the death of Arnold mean the end of Arnold's influence? So Giesebrecht would have us believe.<sup>1</sup> The part Arnold played in the Roman Revolution has, for the historian of the Imperial Age in Germany, obscured the fundamental doctrine which led him to cast in his lot with the Revolutionists. That doctrine formed one of the great world currents in Arnold's time, and was destined to grow in strength during the two succeeding centuries, and Arnold had preached it untiringly with all the force of vivid, magnetic personality and overwhelming conviction.

The extent of his personal influence in the great movement toward Apostolic Christianity can never, owing to dearth of evidence, be determined. His ideas were not spread by any writings of his own, so far as we know. There is in existence no written word which can be proved to be his.<sup>2</sup> There is not even any certainty that he ever wrote books. It is true that Innocent II in condemning Arnold with Abelard after Sens commanded "that the books containing their errors"<sup>3</sup> be burned, but St. Bernard, in his account of the council, speaks only of Abelard's books.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Walter Map says: "This Arnold was condemned by Pope Eugenius<sup>5</sup> undefended, in his absence, not out of his writings, but because of his preaching."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Giesebrecht, *Arnold*, pp. 145 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See comment on the letter written by "*Quidam fidelis senatus*," above, p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> Mansi, vol. xxi, c. 565.

<sup>4</sup> St. Bernard, ep. 189, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 182.

<sup>5</sup> A mistake, unless the reference is to the final condemnation in 1155. The first condemnation was in 1137, under Innocent II, the second at Sens, in 1141, under the same Pope. Vacandard, pp. 63, 67.

<sup>6</sup> *De Nugis*, D. I., c. 24, ed. Wright, p. 43.

We are then largely dependent for information about Arnold upon his enemies—St. Bernard, Otto of Freising, John of Salisbury, and the rest, from whom we have already quoted. All these accounts show that Arnold preached evangelical Christianity.<sup>1</sup> They prove that he did more—that he lived the Apostolic life himself, and that he owed to his life, at least in part, his great personal influence. St. Bernard wrote to the Bishop of Constance: “Would that his doctrine were as sound as his life is austere. If you would know, the man comes neither eating nor drinking; like the Devil alone, he hungers and thirsts for the blood of souls. He is a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”<sup>2</sup> St. Bernard cannot deny that Arnold has the bearing of a good man. “His conversation is honey, his teaching is poison; he has the head of a dove, the tail of a scorpion.”<sup>3</sup> “Arnold,” says another witness, “was a man even too stern and detached in manner of life.”<sup>4</sup> Otto of Freising could not condemn his life. The worst he could say of Arnold is summed up in the following statement: “He was a man not without natural ability, though he was gifted with a flow of words rather than with solid judgment. He was fond of the unusual, eager for novelty. He belonged to that type of man whose mind is easily turned to devising heresies and schismatic disturbances.”<sup>5</sup> John of Salisbury testifies, “he had the priestly dignity, wore the dress of a regular canon, and mortified the flesh by fasting and sackcloth. He showed himself keen of intellect, but perverse in the interpretation of the Scriptures. He was an eloquent preacher, and inveighed vehemently against the delights of this world.”<sup>6</sup> His doctrine was censured, not his life. According to Walter Map, “he was noble and great by birth. He excelled in letters, and was first in religion. He allowed himself no indulgence in food or clothing beyond what sternest

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 35, 40 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Ep. no. 195, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 187-188.

<sup>3</sup> Ep. no. 196, *ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> *Gesta di Federico*, v. 762. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> Otto Frising. *Gesta Frid.*, bk. i, c. 20, *ibid.*, p. 403.

<sup>6</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 537.

necessity demanded. He went about preaching. He sought not the things that were his own, but the things that are of God. He did always what was amiable and admirable."<sup>1</sup>

There can be no doubt that Arnold's apostolic life and teaching aided by learning, eloquence, and magnetism, swayed the people among whom he lived. "In no place where he dwelt would he allow the people to be at peace with the clergy. He was abbot<sup>2</sup> at Brescia, and while the bishop was on a journey to Rome, he so influenced the minds of the citizens that they would hardly admit the bishop when he returned."<sup>3</sup> It is not probable that the Apostolic doctrine on which this opposition was based, failed to find adherents also.

In Paris, after the condemnation of Sens, when Arnold was preaching at St. Genevieve, he did not lack hearers: "Poor men, who openly begged for alms from door to door, and so supported themselves and their master."<sup>4</sup>

The success of Arnold in winning converts is, however, best proved by St. Bernard's fear of his influence, expressed in the letters already cited to the Bishop of Constance, and to Guido, the Papal Legate. Some allowance should be made for St. Bernard's habitually vigorous language, and for his indignation because the French bishops had failed to execute the Papal ban which he himself had secured. Still the subject of these letters must have been a man of dangerous power. "Up to this time," wrote Bernard, "wherever Arnold has dwelt, he has left behind him footprints so foul and terrible, that where he once has set his foot, he never dares to return thither any more. Indeed he aroused with exceeding violence the very land in which he was born, and threw it into confusion."<sup>5</sup> Therefore he was accused before the Lord Pope as a very evil schismatic,

<sup>1</sup> *De Nugis*, *ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> A provost of Augustinian Canons was called abbot in Italy. Giesebrecht, *ibid.*, p. 127.

<sup>3</sup> *Historia Pontificalis*, c. 31. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 537.

<sup>4</sup> *L. c.*

<sup>5</sup> For commentary on Bernard's injustice in ascribing the confusion to Arnold, see above, pp. 32 *seq.*

and expelled from his native country. . . . Then for a like cause, he was cast out of the French kingdom as a noted schismatic. He had held to Peter Abelard, all of whose errors, attacked and condemned by the Church, he undertook to defend with enthusiasm and energy, with him and for him. Through all these experiences his frenzy has not been diverted; but his hand is still stretched out. Like a raging lion, he goes about seeking whom he may devour. . . . He is a fugitive and a wanderer upon the face of the earth, and he ceases not to do among strangers what he may not do among his own people. . . . If you receive him, he will work discord, and devour your people. . . . He knows not the way of peace. He is an enemy of the Cross of Christ, a sower of discord, a disturber of the peace, a maker of schisms, a sunderer of unity. His teeth are arms and arrows, and his tongue is a sharp sword. Wherefore he is used to draw to himself by sweet words and the appearance of virtue the rich and powerful.”<sup>1</sup>

No man is a dangerous disturber of the established order of things and of the peace founded thereon unless he can command an enthusiastic following. Arnold was a peril to the ecclesiastical order because his attacks upon its inconsistencies and abuses aroused the people to desert the unapostolic clergy for the apostolic Prophet of Brescia. Perhaps the Bishop of Constance found out by experiences of his own the power of Arnold. It has already been shown<sup>2</sup> that adherents of Arnold's in Rome may well have been followers won at Zürich. Hausrath believes that a revolt of Augustinian canons at Zürich against the bishop may have been due to Arnold's influence.<sup>3</sup> The revolt took place, however, ten years after Arnold's departure, and there is no proof that it was an echo of his preaching.

As has been said, no one knows where Arnold was during the two years after he was driven from Zürich.<sup>4</sup> Possibly he remained, protected by the Legate Guido, in Moravia and Bohemia—a region which was to become a centre for heretical evangelical Christians later on.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St. Bernard, ep. no. 195, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 187 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 38.

<sup>5</sup> See below.

In Rome, Arnold at once became a power. The whole history of the revolutionary movement after his appearance there testifies to his influence. One incident is particularly striking: "The citizens flocked about him," says Walter Map, "and heard him eagerly. It happened they heard how he had preached a sermon about mammon and the scorning of riches in the very ears of the Cardinals and the presence of the Pope. Arnold was cast out by the Cardinals. The people thronged to the Curia and cried out against the Lord Pope and the Cardinals, saying that Arnold was a good man and just, and the others were avaricious, unjust and evil; not the light of the world, but its defilement."<sup>1</sup>

He did not win the people by condoning their sins. One writer, it is true, calls him "flatterer of the people,"<sup>2</sup> but the more trustworthy author of the *Gesta di Federico* gives a very different account of him. "He chid with equal severity priests and lesser folk, thinking that he alone lived rightly, and that others were in error with the exception of those who adhered to his dogmas. He also carped at the deeds of the supreme Pontiff, and in short spared no one. He mingled true statements with false, and thus gave pleasure to many. He also cursed laymen for withholding tithes, receiving usury, taking what was not their own, and for gaining wealth by false means."<sup>3</sup>

The laity followed him in spite of plain-spoken denunciation of their ill-doing, and even the clergy whom he ceaselessly lashed furnished him with adherents in Rome numerous enough to be deplored by Pope Eugenius.<sup>4</sup> There is one supreme proof of the influence which made him the dread of the Prelates: on no account would the Pope suffer him to live in Rome

<sup>1</sup> *De Nugis*, d. i, c. 24, ed. Wright, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Gunther's *Ligurinus*, l. c.

<sup>3</sup> Vv. 767-780.

<sup>4</sup> *Epistola Eugenii III Papae*, Baronius, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, Ann. 1148, no. 38, vol. xii, c. 371. "Fallax et invidus humani generis inimicus per Arnaldum schismaticum, quasi per membrum proprium, hoc effecit, ut quidam capellani unitatem Ecclesiae, quae sectionem non patitur, quantum in eis est, dividentes, ipsius Arnaldi sequantur errorem; & Cardinalibus atque Archipresbyteris suis obedientiam & reverentiam promittere & exhibere debitam contradicant."

after the downfall of the Revolutionary government. Even his dead body was a source of dread. His ashes were scattered on the Tiber, lest his body be held in veneration by the people.<sup>1</sup> The Prelates feared Arnold even in death.

There is then no question that Arnold had everywhere he went a following. There is, however, no absolute proof that he founded a sect.<sup>2</sup> It is true that a sect called "Arnoldists" was condemned in various decrees, and mentioned by writers on heresy in the two centuries following the death of Arnold of Brescia. Few details are given concerning this sect, its origin or its dogmas. No one can be sure that the name was derived from Arnold of Brescia.<sup>3</sup> Even if this be true, it is still uncertain whether the sect was founded by him and held the beliefs which he had preached. What are the authorities on these points? The only contemporary writer who states clearly that Arnold founded a sect is the author of the *Historia Pontificalis*, who is believed to have been John of Salisbury.<sup>4</sup> This authority says that Arnold founded a sect whose members won popular favor because of the purity and austerity of their lives. "It is called the heresy of the Lombards."<sup>5</sup> The *Ligurinus*, written no later than 1186, contains a veiled reference to such a sect.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Otto Frising., *Gesta Friderici*, bk. 2, c. 20, l. c.

<sup>2</sup> Among the authorities who believe that Arnold founded the sect known as Arnoldists are: Preger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Waldenser*, p. 220; Dieckhoff, *Die Waldenser im Mittelalter*, p. 163 (ed. 1851); Keller, *Die Reformation und die Aelteren Reformparteien*, p. 17 (ed. 1885); Tocco, *L'Eresia nel Medio Evo*, pp. 187, 258 (ed. 1884); Comba, *Histoire des Vaudois*, pp. 102 seq. (ed. 1901); Gregorovius, *ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 475. The following do not hold that the Arnoldists were derived from Arnold of Brescia: C. Schmidt, in *Real Encyclopedie*; G. Arnold, *Unpartheiische Kirchen u. Ketzerhistorie* (1740), pp. 378-395; Guadagnini, *Vita d'Arnaldo*, in Niccolini, *Arnaldo da Brescia*, p. 34 (1873). For Giesebrecht's view, see above, p. 45. Hahn, *Gesch. der Ketaer*, does not mention the sect. Breyer, *Arnoldisten*, pp. 389-390, does not believe that Arnold founded it.

<sup>3</sup> There was a group of heretics burned at Cologne, of whom one "Arnoldus Nomine" was called by the rest "magistrum suum." Caesar. Heisterbach, *Dialogus Miraculorum*, c. 19, ed. Strange, 1851, p. 298.

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 34, for the authorship of the *Historia Pontificalis*.

<sup>5</sup> *Hist. Pont.* SS., vol. xx, p. 538.

<sup>6</sup> Unde venenato dudum corrupta sapore, Et nimium falsi doctrina vatis inhaerans servat adhuc uvae gustum gens illa paternæ," ii, 310 seq., l. c.



All other twelfth century accounts are silent regarding any organized following of Arnold's. It should, however, be remembered that the *Historia Pontificalis* is an especially reliable source.

Toward the end of the twelfth century the Papal and Imperial records begin to furnish evidence of the existence of a sect called Arnoldists.<sup>1</sup> In 1181<sup>2</sup> Lucius III issued a bull in which he condemned "catharos, patarenos, leonistas, arnoldistas."<sup>3</sup> The condemnation was substantially repeated in 1184<sup>4</sup> and in 1229.<sup>5</sup> Further, Frederick II included a sect of Arnoldists among the heretics doomed to extirpation by his ferocious edicts.<sup>6</sup> The sect is only named, not described; and it must be reiterated that according to the one reliable account which mentions a sect founded by Arnold of Brescia, that sect was not during his lifetime called by his name. "It was called the heresy of the Lombards." While these decrees are incontrovertible evidence that a sect existed called Arnoldists, they are not proof that these heretics were followers of Arnold of Brescia.

There is a little further evidence of the continued existence of such a sect. Several thirteenth century writers mention it. Among these are: David of Augsburg,<sup>7</sup> Berthold of Regensburg, Stephen of Bourbon, and Durand of Mende. Now David of Augsburg was a Franciscan, of the South German province, who died in 1272. He belongs to the early period of the organized Franciscan labors against heresy.<sup>8</sup> Berthold of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. letters of Wezel and "*Quidam fidelis senatus*" for indications that followers of Arnold had formulated his doctrine. Above, pp. 42 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> According to Dieckhoff, *Waldenser*, pp. 157, 168. Breyer, *Arnoldisten*, p. 198, gives the date as 1184.

<sup>3</sup> Mansi, vol. xxii, c. 476.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 477.

<sup>5</sup> M. G. H. Ep., saec. 13; vol. i, p. 318.

<sup>6</sup> Nov. 22, 1220. M. G. H. LL., vol. ii, p. 244. Feb. 22, 1232, *ibid.*, p. 285. May 14, 1238, *ibid.*, p. 326. June 26, 1238, *ibid.*, p. 328. Feb. 22, 1239, *ibid.*, p. 485.

<sup>7</sup> Under the name "Arnostute," in *Tractat de inquisitione hereticorum*, given by Preger, in: Kgl. Bay. Akad. der Wissensch. Hist. Cl., vol. xiv, pt. 2, p. 216. Also in Martene, *Thesaurus*, vol. v, pp. 1778 *seq.*, where it is attributed to Yvonetus. Breyer (*Arnoldisten*, p. 412) says that all the sects mentioned by David are Waldensian.

<sup>8</sup> Breyer, *ibid.*, p. 187.

Regensburg was his pupil, and was also a Franciscan. He was a popular preacher, and travelled in Austria, Bohemia and Silesia, between 1250 and 1260.<sup>1</sup> He, like his master, simply names the "Arnoldisti." If Arnold of Brescia founded a sect, there should have been traces of it, certainly in Switzerland, possibly in Austria and Bavaria. We might then expect to find a more distinctive account of these heretics than the mere reference in one of Berthold's sermons,<sup>2</sup> a reference which might well imply only an acquaintance with the stereotyped lists of heretics given in the condemnatory edicts, Papal and Imperial.

Stephen of Bourbon was a Dominican monk of Lyons, and an Inquisitor; a genial person, somewhat garrulous, who often gained information by talking with people of various sorts, somewhat as Herodotus did.<sup>3</sup> He writes in a diverting fashion of the multifarious heresies existing in Lombardy, and gives as his authority a man who had studied for eighteen years among the Waldensians.<sup>4</sup> He mentions a bewildering variety of heretics. In a list of sects named after their founders he includes the Arnoldists.<sup>5</sup> He says nothing about their tenets. He has just been speaking of "those who are called Communiati, because they say all things ought to be in common," in contradistinction to "Pauperes de Lumbardia," who receive possessions.<sup>6</sup> It is impossible to determine who these are. Stephen evidently believes them to be outside the sects, among which he has included the Arnoldists. Yet the reader is at once reminded that, according to John of Salisbury, the sect founded by Arnold was called the heresy of the Lombards.<sup>7</sup> The doctrine regarding property, suggested rather than stated by Stephen, might

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Pfeiffer-Strohl Edition of Berthold von Regensburg (1862-1880).

<sup>2</sup> Speaking of heretics, he says: "Ein heizent Poverlewe und ein Ariani und Runkeler unde Sifrider unde Sporer und Manachei und Arnolder." Sermon, "*Saelic sint die reines herzens sint.*" Ed. Pfeiffer-Strohl, vol. i, p. 402.

<sup>3</sup> Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diversis Materiis Praedicabilibus*, ed. Lecoy de la Marche, pp. iv-vii.

<sup>4</sup> *Tractatus*, etc., pt. iv, tit. 7, par. 330; *ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>5</sup> The list reads: "Arnaldiste, Speroniste, Leoniste, Cathari, Patareni, Manachei sive Burgari; *ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 280, 281.

<sup>7</sup> See above, p. 50.

conceivably have been derived from Arnold of Brescia. It might, on the other hand, have come from the Humiliati, who certainly existed in Arnold's day, and who, as we shall see, were widely distributed through Lombardy in the thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

The last reference to the Arnoldists in thirteenth-century literature is in Durand of Mende's famous little "*Rationale divinorum officiorum*," finished in 1286, published first in Mayence in 1459, and very many times afterward.<sup>2</sup> Durand says the Church is "called a city because of the communion of her citizens; she is defended by the fortifications of the Holy Scriptures, by which heretics are repelled."<sup>3</sup> Among these heretics, whom he specifies, are the "Arnoldistæ, blasphemous heretics who say that in no place is it stated that Christ handed over the guardianship of his spouse, the Church, to sensual and unchaste servants, or gave to such the power to perform the sacred mysteries or to bind and loose, or the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Because only those, as says Gregory, even the just men who are still alive, have the power of binding and loosing possessed by the apostles, if they, together with the doctrine, hold also to the life and faith of the apostles."<sup>4</sup> This rings like the creed of Arnold of Brescia. No ministry can be a true one except through imitating the ministry of the Apostolic Age. In another place Durand says that the Arnoldists assert that men do not receive the Holy Spirit through baptism, but by the laying on of hands.<sup>5</sup> Do these two passages refer to the same sect? Upon this question no light is thrown by the context. Again, is this last doctrine likely to have been derived from Arnold of Brescia? He, to be sure, held peculiar views regarding baptism.<sup>6</sup> The doctrine attributed by Durand to his

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 59 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Note the long list of editions in the British Museum Catalogue.

<sup>3</sup> Durandus of Mende, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, lib. I, par. I; "*De Ecclesia*," ed. Fust & Schoffer, Mainz, 1459, fol. I.

<sup>4</sup> Lib. 4, *ibid.*, fol. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Lib. I, *ibid.*, fol. 16.

<sup>6</sup> Otto Frising., bk. 2, c. 20; *ibid.*, p. 404. Praeter haec de sacramento altaris, baptismo parvulorum non sane dicitur sensisse. Further, he believed the sacraments were not valid in the hands of sinful priests. *Gesta di Federico*, ii, 784-785. Cf. Breyer, *Arnoldisten*, pp. 389-390.

Arnoldists is, however, Catharan,<sup>1</sup> and no proof exists that Arnold of Brescia was influenced by Catharism.

These thirteenth-century writers then prove that a sect called Arnoldists maintained for a time an individual existence among the numerous heretical bodies of that time. They do not prove that this sect had any connection with Arnold of Brescia. It is then not certain that Arnold founded a sect. The question whether he did or did not leave behind him an organized following is, of course, interesting and significant. The fact that this question cannot be answered does not, however, make any real difference in the estimate of Arnold's influence. There is no doubt that he won everywhere a following large enough to be a danger to the established order. His restless wanderings led him along paths which were to be trodden by many believers in primitive Christianity, in apostolic poverty. His own Lombardy was the home of the Humiliati, of a powerful branch of the Waldenses, of the nameless sects described by Stephen of Bourbon. France gave birth to Waldo, and harbored many communities of his followers. In Germany the Poor Men of Lyons especially flourished. The zeal of some of these enthusiasts may easily have been kindled by Arnold's fiery words or by their echoes. They may have been inspired by the apostolic life of the Prophet of Brescia to model their lives after the commands of Christ.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Schmidt, *Histoire des Cathares*, p. 150; Lea, *Inquisition*, vol. i, pp. 93-94.

<sup>2</sup> Breyer (*Arnoldisten*, pp. 403 *seq.*) is convinced that the Arnoldists existed in Lombardy as a separate sect when the Waldenses first appeared there; that the Waldenses were influenced by the Arnoldists, who, however, from this time ceased to exist as a distinct sect. He bases his view on the teaching of the Lombard Waldenses that the Sacraments are worthless in sinful hands, on the fact that Arnoldists and Waldenses apply to the Church the same unpleasant epithets. This last argument has little force because the epithets in question were habitually applied to the Church by people who were dissatisfied with it.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE HUMILIATI

LESS than twenty-five years after the death of Arnold, and nearly thirty years before Francis of Assisi first went to Rome, there were heard at the Vatican the voices of other men who wished to restore evangelical Christianity. Their principle was essentially that of Arnold, though their demands differed from his. Arnold's voice had made the streets of Rome resound with denunciations of the Pope and the members of the Curia for their wealth, their sins, their possession of temporal power—all forbidden by Christ to His Apostles. The new apostolic Christians came humbly seeking the Pope's sanction for their attempt to conform their own lives to the model of the primitive Church. Peter Waldo was among them. Their request that they be allowed to serve God and the Church was refused, and they were driven into the ranks of the héretics.<sup>1</sup> Francis was to make the same request, and to become the staunch supporter of the Church, when, hard pressed by heresy, she needed all the champions who would enlist under her banner.

Meantime, five years before the "First Rule" was given to Francis and his followers, a group of enthusiasts had gained audience of Innocent III on a similar errand. Like Waldo and Francis they wished the Pope to authorize them to lead a life of humility, self-denial, and hard work. They wanted to become an organized community with an established rule, sanctioned by the Curia.<sup>2</sup> Unlike Waldo, they came at the sum-

<sup>1</sup> See below, pp. 59 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> *Privilegium qualiter ordo Humiliatorum licite potest habere proprium in comuni, et de confirmatione regule, et de juramento non prestando directo prelati ordinis cum certis gratiis.* June 12, 1201. Tiraboschi, *Vetera Humiliatorum Monumenta*, ed. 1766, vol. ii, p. 135.

mons of the Pope himself. Between 1179 and 1201, apostolic Christianity had become a recognized force. Innocent III realized that the Church, beset by enemies who fought for conscience's sake, needed to organize all the enthusiasm and religious zeal she could command within her own ranks. He authorized the existence of this new band of religionists, and issued rules for the three sections into which they were divided.

Thus were formally founded the three orders of the Humiliati. The orders thus sanctioned shared the fate of most of such organizations founded by enthusiasts within the Church. For a time they remained true to the ideal of the founders. Then, because of their sanctity, all people "thought themselves blessed if the brethren would receive alms from them. So it came to pass that they were enriched beyond measure, and the owners of great possessions."<sup>1</sup> The present essay is not concerned, however, with the downfall of the authorized Humiliati, but with the wider movement of which they were but one manifestation; and to this end their origin rather than their destiny needs investigation.

There is no reliable evidence bearing on the early history of the Humiliati. They did not write their history until the fifteenth century;<sup>2</sup> and their chroniclers then give no references to authorities or sources, beyond statements that they have seen certain documents of early date, which, however, they omit to transcribe, and of which no trace has since been found.<sup>3</sup> If their traditions are to be believed, the first Humiliati gave themselves up to the evangelical life of preaching and poverty a hundred years before Arnold of Brescia dwelt with Abelard at the Paraclete.

<sup>1</sup> Jacobi de Vitriaco, *Libri Duo, Quorum prior Orientalis sive Hierosolymitana; alter, Occidentalis Historiæ Nomine Inscribitur* (ed. Duaci, 1596), c. 20, p. 317. The passage refers to the "gray monks," but it is an excellent statement of the process by which the very virtues of orthodox religionists brought about their corruption.

<sup>2</sup> For account of sources, see Tiraboschi, *ibid.*, vol. iii, Introduction.

<sup>3</sup> The earliest known document relating to the history of this order is a gift of land by Guido de porta Orientalis of land in the diocese of Milan. "Guidonis de Porta Orientali pro Vicoboldonensibus Humiliatis" (1176), Tiraboschi, *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 117. In 1186 Urban III assured them the right to hold property. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

"The origin and beginning of the order of the Humiliati," runs the legend, "was in the time of the Emperor Henry II,<sup>1</sup> who came into Lombardy and held under suspicion many Lombard nobles, especially of Milan and Como. To prevent their plotting against the Empire, he sent them into exile in Germany in the year 1017. After a time these same nobles were inspired by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and promised to serve God with humility, and to put aside all worldly pomp; for they thought they could not go to Heaven without humility. Then these exiles made no delay. They put off the old man, they laid aside their costly garments and put on clothing of sack-cloth. When they came to speak together, they decided that if by God's help they should return to their native land, they would persevere in the religious life as they conceived it. When these facts came to the Emperor's ears, he summoned them to appear before him in the dress they had assumed; and wondering he said: 'Draw near, best beloved Humiliati. Have you given yourselves to religion as your habit bears witness?' To whom they answered: 'Even as thou seest, O Emperor.' And then he suffered them to return to their fatherland. And they who had been exiles brought their own families in their homes to this same devotion, and lived with their wives. Because they would not be idle they were merchants and established workshops for wool, as I know from their successors. They multiplied like fish, in Lombardy and outside it."<sup>2</sup>

These companies of devout men and women persisted, the legend runs, for more than a century without any recognized rule; "and they were called brethren of the third order."<sup>3</sup> Later, certain of the brethren separated from their wives, and communities of monks and nuns were established. Thus was founded the second order. To this order St. Bernard gave a

<sup>1</sup> Henry II was in Italy in 1004 and 1014. Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 143 (ed. 1889).

<sup>2</sup> *Chronicon Ordinis Humiliatorum Compilata de anno, 1419*, cc. 1 and 2. Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 230. For account of this chronicle see Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 *seq.*

*Ibid.*, c. 3.

rule in 1134. We are still, of course, in the domain of legend. After a time, we are told, a certain John de Oldrado, surnamed de Meda from his birthplace, a town of that name near Milan, established the first, or clerical order.<sup>1</sup>

The legend stands unsupported by any contemporary evidence. There is no trace of St. Bernard's connection with the order in his letters or any other of his voluminous writings. The canonization of John de Meda rests on tradition; though it was confidently and persistently asserted in writings of the brethren of a later day, and taken for granted in a Breviary of the order approved by Paul III in 1548.<sup>2</sup> The earliest known facts are that in 1176 a grant of land was made to the Humiliati near Milan, and that their right to hold land was assured in 1186 by Pope Urban III.<sup>3</sup> In 1201 Innocent III granted Rules to the three orders of the Humiliati.<sup>4</sup>

Though 1201 saw the first formal recognition of the Humiliati as an order, the real beginning of the movement must have been a good deal earlier. Formal recognition of every movement is always preceded by a period of obscure development; and men and women in Milan had doubtless been giving themselves to a life of poverty and humility for some years before their representatives won Innocent's sanction.<sup>5</sup>

There is, however, one bit of evidence as to their early history which the orthodox order of the Humiliati would not have cited, and which indicates that the movement of which the authorized Humiliati were but one manifestation was already a strong one at least twenty-two years before Innocent's Rule was

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicon Ordinis Humiliatorum*, cc. 9 and 10. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236. A deed of gift from John de Meda, dated 1056, executed apparently by his wife, is one of the documents which the compiler of the *Chronicon* saw, but did not think it necessary to transcribe. *L. c.* Cf. *Joannis de Meda, Presbyteris, Vita Auctore anonymo*, AA. SS. Boll., vii, Sept., pp. 343 *seq.* The Life has little value. See *Praef.*

<sup>2</sup> *L. c.*

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 56.

<sup>4</sup> Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 128 *seq.* See below, pp. 62 *seq.*

<sup>5</sup> A condemnation of heretics by the Council of Verona in 1184 shows that already at that time the Church recognized the existence of true Humiliati as distinguished from false. See below, pp. 60 *seq.*



issued. "There were," says the author of the chronicle of Laon, "certain citizens at this time (1178) in the cities of Lombardy who lived at home with their families in poverty, following a certain kind of religious living. They abstained from lies, oaths, and law suits; they were content with simple clothing. They posed as upholders of the Catholic faith. They went to the Pope, and asked him to sanction their tenets. The Pope granted that they might carry out their theories provided they did this in humility and honesty; but he expressly forbade them to hold conventicles, and strictly prohibited their presuming to preach in public. They, however, defied the apostolic command, were disobedient, and allowed themselves to incur excommunication. They called themselves Humiliati, because they were not clad in dyed garments, but were satisfied with those of natural colour."<sup>1</sup>

In the light of this brief account Innocent's Rule becomes intelligible, and shows, as will appear, that the great statesman reversed the policy of his predecessor toward the apostolic reformers, and conciliated so far as he could enthusiasts who might otherwise become enemies of the Church.<sup>2</sup> It is probable that these Humiliati were received by the Pope at the very Council to which Waldo had gone to win the Church's sanction for his attempt to lead the apostolic life, and from which he, like them, went forth to strengthen not the Church, but heresy.<sup>3</sup>

The Humiliati whom Alexander III censured were almost certainly the same in origin with the men to whom Innocent III gave the Sanction of the Church twenty-two years later. The heretical Humiliati abstained from oaths; the orthodox Humiliati were, according to Innocent's Rule, to take oaths only in case of necessity. The disobedient Humiliati lived at home

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicon Laudunense*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xxvi, p. 449.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Innocent's policy toward the Poor Catholics, see below, and toward Francis and Dominic.

<sup>3</sup> Breyer, *Arnoldisten*, p. 404. But the *Chronicon Laudunense* gives 1178 as the date of Waldo's mission to Rome, and 1179 for the Humiliati. Walter Map, in his account of the appearance of the Waldenses at the 3d Lateran Council, does not mention the Humiliati; but he might have failed to distinguish among the humbly clad men who came thither on much the same errand. See below.

with their families; the third order approved by Innocent were to remain with their families, and were forbidden to put away their wives except for adultery. Both groups wore simple clothing. Both believed themselves to be champions of the Church. Both true and false Humiliati wished to preach. Permission was refused to those who first sought papal sanction. It may well be that Innocent's carefully guarded license in the Rule of 1201 was the result of the disregard of the first set of humble brethren for the unqualified prohibition of his predecessor. It had been proved that denial of the right to preach turned into heretics men who were disposed in all things else to serve the Church faithfully, and Innocent enlisted champions wherever he could.

There is further evidence that both branches of the Humiliati sprang from the same trunk. The Council of Verona issued in 1181<sup>1</sup> a decree against various heretics. Among them were named "those who falsely pretend to be Humiliati, or Poor Men of Lyons."<sup>2</sup> The execution of this decree was evidently found to be difficult, so far as the Humiliati were concerned; for, in 1197, Innocent wrote to the Bishop of Verona: "We understand that on the authority of our letter<sup>3</sup> sent to our beloved sons the clergy of your Church against the Zazari, the Poor Men of Lyons, and the Humiliati who have not yet followed the papal command, one of the aforesaid clergy has issued sentence of excommunication against the Humiliati and all heretics, without the distinction we established in our letters. Acting on the precedent of this sentence, some have shunned certain men who are called by the people Humiliati, perhaps against their will, and who savour not of heresy, but of orthodox faith, and who in all humility of heart and body are

<sup>1</sup> Bull "*Ad abolendam*," Mansi, vol. xxii, c. 476. D'Argentré, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 71, gives 1183 as the date. Cf. Mansi, *ibid.*, c. 477, for repetition of the edict in 1184.

<sup>2</sup> "In primis ergo Catharos, et Patarinos, et eos qui se Humiliatos, vel Pauperes de Lugduno, falso nomine mentiuntur. Josepinos, Passaginos, Arnoldistas, perpetuo decernimus anathemati subjacere."

<sup>3</sup> No such letter appears in the "*Regesta*" of Innocent III, nor is any such cited by Tiraboschi or by Spondanus. What his qualifications were, it is therefore impossible to determine.

anxious to be servants of God, and who may even have sworn to you that they remain faithful to the rule of the Church . . . Since it is truly not our intention to condemn the innocent with the guilty, we command that you call such men to your presence and inquire of them and of others about their life and conversation and anything else which you think should be investigated.”<sup>1</sup>

Two years later Innocent made overtures and gave a Rule to men who styled themselves Humiliati. May it not be true that in the letter just quoted he distinguished between these men, who did not wish to be numbered among the heretical Humiliati, and those obdurate people who had persisted, in the face of the papal prohibition, in obeying Christ's command as they interpreted it, and preached the gospel? The obedience of the Humiliati whom he conciliated<sup>2</sup> had been questioned on precisely the points which constituted the contumacy of the “false Humiliati.” The whole body had not disobeyed to an equal degree; but the tendencies which had made heretics of some of its members were at work in the rest. Innocent had then written to the Humiliati to suggest that they, in order to put an end to certain scandals which had been circulated regarding them, draw up for his approval a Rule. It was in accordance with this command that the representatives of the order went to Rome in 1201, and the Rule approved by the Pope was a modified version of that which they themselves prepared.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. Innocentii III Veronensi Episcopo.*, Lib. ii, no. 228, Migne, vol. 214, cc. 788-789.

<sup>2</sup> See study of the Rules, below.

<sup>3</sup> *Ad scandalum extinguendum, quod contra vos fuerat obortum, vobis dedimus in mandatis . . . ut proposita vestra conformaretis in unum propositum regulare;*” *Literæ ad præpositos primi Ordinis*; Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 140. “Cum ad sopiendum vel sepeliendum potius scandalum, quod contra vos fuerat suscitatum non paucis credentibus, vos constitutiones Ecclesiasticas non servare, ad nostram presentiam certos nuntios misissetis, mandatis vos apostolicis exponentes, nos proposita vestra de consilio venerabilis fratris nostris Vercellensis Episcopi, et dilecti filii Leco-diensis et bone memorie de Cerreto Abbatum, mandavimus in unum regulare propositum conformari. Cumque ipsi presentatam sibi a vobis vite vestre formulam et regulam, quam proponitis profiteri, examinassent diligentius, et in aliquibus correxissent, nos eam tandem per dilectos filios. . . . examinari fecimus, et tandem correx-

Rule, then, is based on the principles and the manner of life which the Humiliati had adopted. The modifications made by Innocent, and his arguments in support of those modifications, are evidence bearing on the attitude of the Curia toward the Apostolic movement after the "false Humiliati" and the followers of Waldo had proved how strong a hold that movement had over the people.

There are really three separate Rules: for the First, the Second, and the Third Orders respectively.<sup>1</sup> The first two show most clearly the circumstances under which they were adopted; the third throws most light on the character of the whole movement. The Biblical extracts cited as authority for the regulations are, it is most probable, those by which the Humiliati themselves had been influenced to their convictions. "You propose," runs the Rule, "to seek humility of heart and gentleness in life by God's aid. As the Lord says in the Gospel: 'Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls.'"<sup>2</sup> Then, doubtless having in mind the stiff-necked behavior of those other Humiliati, as well as the doubtful position of those to whom the Church's sanction was to be given, the writer of the amended Rule proceeds: "You propose to render obedience to the Church's prelates, as the Apostle says, 'Obey them that have the rule over you and submit yourselves; for they watch for your souls as they that must give account,'"<sup>3</sup> for that is not true humility which lacks obedience as a yoke-fellow."

The disobedient Humiliati "abstained from law suits." The Order authorized by Innocent were told: "patience is also necessary, especially in adversity, to bear evils inflicted upon you by others. As the Lord saith in the Gospel: 'It hath been said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; but I say

*mus per nos ipsos, et correctam curavimus approbare.*" *Litteræ ad dilectis filiis de Braida*, Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136. Cf. *Litteræ ad Ministros tertii ordinis*, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>1</sup> Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 128 *seq.*, 135 *seq.*, 139 *seq.* The Bull was issued June 7, 1201.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. 11: 29.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. 13: 17.

unto you that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek turn to him the other also; and whosoever shall compel thee to go with him a mile, go with him twain, and if any man will sue thee at law and take thy coat, let him have thy cloke also.' <sup>1</sup> Again, the Apostle: 'Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath; for it is written, vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord.' <sup>2</sup> Again he saith also: 'Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?' <sup>3</sup> And again the Lord in the Gospel: 'In your patience possess ye your souls.' <sup>4</sup> Again, 'Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven.' <sup>5</sup> Imbue yourselves also with fervent charity which is summed up in two precepts, that is to say in the love toward your God and your neighbor, as it is written: 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself.' <sup>6</sup> Charity should be shown even to thy enemies, for the Lord said: 'Do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your father which is in Heaven; for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.' <sup>7</sup> Also the Apostle: 'If thine enemy hunger, feed him, and if he thirst, give him drink.' <sup>8</sup> One of the reproaches cast upon the Church by Apostolic reformers was that, contrary to the commands of Christ and the Apostles, her prelates engaged in law suits and contentions. For this Arnold attacked the Clergy; so did the Apostolics of Cologne, and Waldo.<sup>9</sup> So did earnest Churchmen who remained sons of the Church whose faults they saw and lamented.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Matt. 5: 38-41.

<sup>2</sup> Rom. 12: 19.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. 6: 7.

<sup>4</sup> Luke 21: 19.

<sup>5</sup> Luke 6: 37.

<sup>6</sup> Matt. 22: 37-39.

<sup>7</sup> Matt. 5: 44-45.

<sup>8</sup> Rom. 12: 20.

<sup>9</sup> See above, pp. 22 seq.

<sup>10</sup> See reproach by Alexander II to the clergy of Lucca, in *Memorie di Matilda*, vol. ii, p. 133. Also Pet. Damiani, ep. i, 15. *Opera*, ed. cit., vol. i, p. 25.

It may well be, then, that the Humiliati who defied the Church had decided on the basis of these very texts cited in Innocent's Rule that Christ had intended His disciples to "abstain from law suits."

The disobedient Humiliati "abstained from oaths." Apparently the Humiliati of the Rule had wished Innocent to allow them also to refrain from oaths. This the Pope could not do without some qualification; for taking an oath was a necessary part of many business transactions, and jurisdiction over all cases in which an oath was involved belonged to the Church.<sup>1</sup> Here, then, the great statesman was on difficult ground. The Humiliati, in the Rule which he had told them to prepare, had incorporated a principle held by all members of their brotherhood, the disobedient and the wavering alike, which he could not sanction their retaining. They believed that this tenet rested on an incontrovertible command of Christ. Innocent had then to bring them to a different interpretation of Christ's command, or lose their loyalty and drive them into the ranks of the too numerous apostolic heretics, among whom were already counted many of their brethren. He began his amended version of this section of the Rule with the clear, unqualified statement which had doubtless formed a part of the Rule as they had submitted it to him—the apostolic mandate on which other Christians have based a belief in the sinfulness of all oaths. "'But above all things, my brethren, swear not at all, neither by Heaven, neither by earth, neither by any other oath; but let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation,' as saith the blessed Apostle James."<sup>2</sup> Having laid down for the order as a law for their guidance a precept they had adopted, the Pope proceeded to "interpret" it. "For," he says, "the indiscreet and impulsive taking of oaths is forbidden, not only by James in his Epistle but by Christ Himself, who said: 'It hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths; but I say unto you, Swear not at all, neither by Heaven,

<sup>1</sup> *Corpus Juris Canonici*, c. xxii, qu. 5, c. 7; and X bk. ii, tit. 1, c. 13.

James 5: 12.

for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is His footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black.'"<sup>1</sup>

There follows the explanation by which Innocent tried to prevent these Humiliati from interpreting these commands in the painfully literal way which the Church had reason to dread, because of her experience with other Apostolic Christians. "When Christ says, 'Swear not at all,' it is impulsive swearing that He prohibits. And, indeed, should we take oaths not from impulse, but from necessity. When He adds, 'neither by earth nor by heaven,' He forbids indiscreet swearing, because we should not swear by the creature, but rather by the Creator. 'But let your communication be yea, yea; and nay, nay,'<sup>2</sup> that is, whatever you utter in affirmation or denial, should be the thought of your heart. For not only affirmation or denial is involved, but rather truth itself, as Christ according to John frequently says in the Gospel, 'I say unto you Amen, Amen.' All that goes further than this leans to the side of evil; its nature, however, is not so much that of *culpa* as of *poena*. Furthermore, the burden of the oath rests less on him who takes it than on him who requires it, because it proceeds from that weakness which is ever a matter rather of *poena* than of *culpa*."

Innocent would have the Humiliati understand, moreover, that Christ and the Apostles did not, as they had supposed, prohibit the taking of oaths, but on the contrary sanctioned the practice. "It is permitted," proceeds the Rule, "to swear under the compulsion of necessity. This is taught by the Apostle when he says, 'For men verily swear by the greater; and an oath for confirmation is to them an end of all strife.'<sup>3</sup> The angel also, whom John saw in the apocalypse, who stood 'upon the sea and upon the earth, and lifted up his hands to Heaven, swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever.'<sup>4</sup> And thou shalt swear, the Lord liveth in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness,' saith Jeremiah the Prophet."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Matt. 5: 33-36.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. 5: 37.

<sup>3</sup> Heb. 6: 16.

<sup>4</sup> Rev. 10: 5.

<sup>5</sup> Jer. 4: 2.

This portion of the Rule has been quoted somewhat at length because it shows the great anxiety of Innocent to retain these Humiliati within the Church.<sup>1</sup> Starting with an apparent agreement that they may keep a tenet and a practice, itself a fundamental belief of all the Humiliati and of other Apostolic Christians, whose influence the Church had reason to dread; which would, unqualified, inevitably lead to conflict with the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, the Pope "diligently corrected" and qualified the original, unequivocal statement "Swear not at all," until the Rule no longer threatens any controversy or difficulty. That they accepted the Papal interpretation of their own doctrine seems unquestionable; there is no record of disobedience.<sup>2</sup>

Preaching was one of the characteristic practices of the Humiliati, and persistence in preaching in the face of the unqualified, uncompromising prohibition of the Pope had been the form of disobedience which brought about the condemnation of the "false Humiliati." This obligation, believed by so many Apostolic Christians to have been laid by Christ upon His servants, was incorporated in the Rule for the government of their life submitted to Innocent by the Humiliati in 1201. Innocent treated the subject with caution. The Rule runs: "It shall further be your custom to come together in a suitable place every Lord's Day; and then shall one or more of the brethren of proved faith and tried religion, powerful in deed and word, with the permission of the Bishop of the diocese, utter the word of exhortation, warning his hearers and leading them to honest habits of life, in such a way that no word shall be said about the articles of belief and the sacraments of the Church."

<sup>1</sup> In Tiraboschi's edition, this portion of the Rule occupies more than two pages out of a total of eight.

<sup>2</sup> This part of the Rule admits of another interpretation, less plausible than the one adopted above. It is possible that the prohibition of oaths had been found by the Humiliati themselves, already wavering from their first intention to follow literally, at no matter what cost, the Gospel commands, to be inconvenient. They were not ready to cast aside altogether the tenet regarding oaths. They were glad to explain away its rigor. But even if this interpretation be the true one, it does not disprove their connection with the heretical Humiliati, who also held this tenet.



The license to preach could not be altogether withheld in the face of the insistence of the Humiliati and the risk of antagonizing them. It was therefore given, and carefully qualified. On the other hand, Innocent provided against trouble which might be caused by over-zealous bishops. "Beyond the limits heretofore stated," says the Rule, "we forbid any bishop to hinder brethren of this sort from uttering the word of exhortation; since, according to the Apostle, the Spirit ought not to be quenched."

The Third Order, from whose Rule the preceding quotations have been made, were, it must be remembered, like the legendary founders of the movement, laymen living not apart from the world, but at home with their families. According to the Chronicle of Laon, the heretical Humiliati resembled them.<sup>1</sup> Whatever can be learned concerning the manner of life of the Third Order bears directly on the "false Humiliati." Involved as they must be in secular affairs, they were, nevertheless, so runs the Rule,<sup>2</sup> to obey the laws of Christ. "'All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.'<sup>3</sup> 'Strive to enter in at the strait gate; for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction and many there be that go in thereat; because strait is the gate and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.'<sup>4</sup> Further, keep peace with all men; and return all money taken in usury and all ill-gotten gains."

All the three orders of the authorized Humiliati held property. The members of the Second order were communists.<sup>5</sup> Apparently the brethren of the Third held possessions as individuals; for the Rule provided that they were to supply the needs of brethren who were in need, and disabled by illness.<sup>6</sup> If property were held in common, all would have shared alike

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 59 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. 2: 12.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. 7: 13.

<sup>5</sup> Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

<sup>6</sup> *Sciatis autem, quod vestri moris existit, si quis de vestra societate rebus temporalibus indiguerit, aut forte infirmitate detentus fuerit, tam in rebus temporalibus quam in custodia necessaria ei subvenire. Ibid.*, p. 133.

as a matter of course, and no such provision in the Rule would have been necessary. The Rule lays certain restrictions on the use of all property possessed by the Second and Third orders, as communities or as individuals. The First order was to pay no tithes—quite naturally, as the brethren were priests.<sup>1</sup> The Second order paid tithes on property, but not on products.<sup>2</sup> The Third or secular order was laid under strict obligations as to the duties of its members to contribute in this way to the support of the Church. They were to pay tithes and first-fruits. They were on no account themselves to possess tithes. Nor was their property really their own after the tithes were paid. "Of the fruits that remain to you, you ought to give alms. Give to the poor all that is left after your just and necessary expenses are paid. 'Give alms of such things as ye have; and behold, all things are clean unto you.'<sup>3</sup> Again, 'Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth currupt, and where thieves break through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal.'"<sup>4</sup>

Between the "false Humiliati" and the Humiliati who formulated the Rule which, with certain amendments, was issued with the Papal sanction and has been in part analyzed, there existed a resemblance so close that they must have been originally one body. The Biblical commands cited in the Rule as authority for the tenets and practices of the brethren were probably the original sources of their conviction that those customs and practices were enjoined by Christ upon His followers and maintained during the Apostolic Age. The Humiliati whose reconciliation with the Church was assured by Innocent's careful policy, departed from the spirit of the movement, which was essentially an apostolic one. Their fate is a matter of history, and of history which has no part in an essay on

<sup>1</sup> Tiraboschi, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Cf. document giving them the right to redeem tithes (1186). Tiraboschi, vol. ii, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>3</sup> Luke 11:41.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. 6: 19-20.

primitive Christianity.<sup>1</sup> The other Humiliati, false according to Innocent III, true to their convictions at great cost, were lost to sight among the Apostolic heretics who abounded in Lombardy. They had much in common with Arnold of Brescia, and may easily have coalesced with his disciples. Like him, they believed in a life of poverty, not destitution. With him, they agreed that tithes and first-fruits should be given to the clergy. On the other hand, like the followers of Arnold, they were naturally swept along with the Waldensian portion of the apostolic movement.

The Humiliati and the Arnoldists lost their separate identity in their fusion with the Waldenses, to whose rapid progress in Lombardy both largely contributed. They are referred to by name as late as 1213;<sup>2</sup> but they are coupled with the Poor Men of Lyons. The heresies ascribed to both sects are: that they preach in secret, and assail the priesthood and the Church of God.<sup>3</sup> Stephen of Bourbon, when he names the sect existing in Lombardy, on the authority of a man who for eighteen years had studied in the sect of the Waldenses in Milan, does not mention the Humiliati. Perhaps, however, they are to be recognized in the "Poor Men of Lombardy, who receive possessions."<sup>4</sup> For, if the practice of the heretical Humiliati is revealed by the Rule, they owned property, but yet were poor, since they reserved for themselves only enough to supply actual needs, and gave all that remained as alms. To their influence and that of the Arnoldists may be in part ascribed the peculiar character, different in some features from their French brethren,

<sup>1</sup> The order fell into disrepute. In 1560 it was abolished, except for the sisterhood of the Second Order, called Blassionist Nuns after Clara Blasso of Milan. *Real Encyclopaedia*, vol. viii, p. 447.

<sup>2</sup> *Burchardi et Cuonradi Urspergensium Chronicon*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xxiii, p. 376.

<sup>3</sup> The Papal approval of the Franciscans and Dominicans is here definitely ascribed to the existence of the Humiliati and the Poor Men of Lyons, whose influence it was hoped might be counteracted by the Mendicant Orders.

<sup>4</sup> "In occultis quoque predicationibus, quas faciebant plerumque in latibulis, ecclesiae Dei et sacerdotibus derogabatur." *L. c.* Steph. Borb. *Tractatus*, etc., pt. 4, tit. 7, par. 330, ed. cit., p. 280.

of the Lombard Waldenses and the German converts won by their missionaries.<sup>1</sup>

---

The foregoing chapters form part of a larger work which the writer hopes some day to complete. This will deal with the Waldenses, and also with sundry Forerunners of St. Francis of Assisi who, like him, remained loyal sons of the Church.

<sup>1</sup> In support of the theory that the rapid growth of the Waldensian movement in Lombardy was due to the presence of the Humiliati, see, among other authorities, Comba, *Valdo ed i Valdesi*, pp. 99 *seq.* *Real Encyclopædie*, vol. viii, p. 477. Lea, *Inquisition*, vol. i, p. 76. Breyer, *Arnoldisten*, p. 405. For the missions of the Lombard Waldenses in Germany, see Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101; H. Haupt, *op. cit.*, *Waldensertum und Inquisition im Südöstlichen Deutschland*, in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, vol. i, pp. 285-286 (1889).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

### GENERAL.

- Cantu, *Gli heretici d'Italia*.  
*Gallia Christiana*.  
 Hahn, C. U., *Geschichte der Ketzer* (1845-1850).  
 Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte* (1873).  
 Herzog, *Real-Encyclopaedie*.  
*Histoire littéraire de la France*.  
 Lea, H. C., *History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*.  
 Wattenbach, *Deutschland Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter* (1893).

### COLLECTIONS OF SOURCES.

- d'Achery, Veterum aliquot scriptorum Spicilegium*. Ed. 1609-1685, 13 volumes; or ed. 1723, 3 volumes. Cited *d'Achery, Spicilegium*.  
*Acta Sanctorum*, Bollandist collection. Cited AA. SS. Boll.  
*Archivio Storico Italiano*.  
*d'Argentré, Collectio Judiciorum*.  
*Bibliotheca Maxima Veterum Patrum . . . a Margarino de la Bigne . . . edita*. Ed. Lugdunensi (1677). Cited *Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd.*  
 Bouquet, *Scriptores rerum Gallicarum*. Cited Bouquet.  
 Döllinger, *Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte*. Cited Döllinger.  
 Jaffé, *Bibliotheca Rerum Germanicarum*. Cited Jaffé, B. R. G.  
 Mansi, *Conciliorum Amplissima Collectio*. Cited Mansi.  
 Martène et Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* (1717). Cited Martène, *Thesaurus*.  
 Martène et Durand, *Veterum Scriptorum Amplissima Collectio* (1724-1733). Cited Martène, *Ampl. Coll.*  
 Migne, *Patrologiae Latinae, Cursus Completus*. Cited Migne.  
*Monumenta Germaniae Historica*:  
     *Scriptores*. Cited M. G. H. SS.  
     *Leges*. Cited M. G. H. LL.  
 Preger, *Beiträge zur Sektengeschichte*; in *Königliche Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philologische-historische Classe*, vols. xiii, xiv. Cited Preger, vols. xiii, xiv.  
 Further, the *Papal Regesta*:  
     Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*. Cited Jaffé, *Regesta*.  
     Potthast, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*. Cited Potthast, *Regesta*.

## CHAPTER I.

## I. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.

- Allard, *Le Christianisme et l'empire Romain*.  
 Allen, A. V. G., *Christian Institutions*.  
 Delarc, S. *Grégoire et la réforme de l'église*.  
 De Wette, *Geschichte der christlichen Sittenlehre*.  
 Dresdner, A., *Kultur und Sittengeschichte der italienischen Geistlichkeit*. Im 10ten und 11ten Jahrhundert.  
 Friedberg, *Kirchenrecht* (1895).  
 Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Ed. Bury, 1896.  
 Lecoy de la Marche, Albert, *La chaire française au moyen âge*.  
 Milman, *History of Latin Christianity*.  
 Montalembert, *The Monks of the West*.  
 Prévost, *Les églises et les campagnes au moyen âge*.  
 Reuter, *Die Religiöse Aufklärung im Mittelalter*.  
 Sommerlad, T. von, *Die Wirthschaftliche Thätigkeit der Kirche im Mittelalter*.  
 Wurm, *Der Heilige Bernard von Clairvaux*.

## 2. SOURCES.

- Abaelardi, *Sermo de sancto Joanne baptista*. In Opera, ed. Cousin, vol. i, p. 572.  
 SS. Arialdi et Erlembaldi Vita, in AA. SS. Boll. V, Junii, p. 282.  
 Benedicti Regula Monachorum, recensuit E. Woelfflin (1895).  
 S. Bernard, *De Consideratione*, lib. 4, c. 2. Opera, ed. Mabillon (1690), vol. i, p. 436 et seq.  
 Berthold von Regensburg, *Predigten*, ed. Pfeiffer-Strohl, vol. i, pp. 93, 393.  
 Codex Theodosianus, ed. Mommsen, 1904.  
 Desiderii, *Abbatis Casinensis Dialogi*, lib. i, Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd., vol. xviii, p. 339.  
 Desiderius (Pope Victor III), *De Miraculis S. Benedicti*, Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd., vol. xviii, pp. 839-859.  
 Ekkehard, *Casus S. Galli*, M. G. H. SS., vol. ii, p. 105 et seq.  
 Gerohus Reichersbergensis (+ 1169), *De Investigatione Antichristi*, lib. i, c. 42, ed. Scheibelberger, p. 88 et seq.  
 Guibertus Novigenti, *De pignoribus sanctorum*, lib. i, c. 3, ed. Opera, ed. d'Achery, p. 334 et seq. (1651).  
 Guibertus Novigenti, *De vita sua*, ed. cited, p. 467.  
 Guillelmus de Podio Laurentii, *Historia Albigenium*, Bouquet, vol. xix, p. 200 et seq.  
 Hugo, *Destructio Farfense*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xi, p. 532 et seq.  
 Igniacensis, S. Bernardi discipuli, *Sermo in solemnitate omnium sanctorum*. Opera S. Bernardi, ed. cited, vol. ii, pp. 1043-1044.  
 Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*. Migne, vol. vii, c. 189-276.  
 S. Norberti Vita, M. G. H. SS., vol. xii, p. 673.  
 Satire on Urban II, by a Henrician priest, *Pflugk-Harttung, Iter italicum* (1883), p. 439 et seq.

- Seheri, *Primordia Calmosiacensis*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xii, p. 324 et seq.  
 Suger, *Gesta Ludovici regis cognomento grossi*, cc. 2, 23, ed. Molinier,  
 in *Collection des textes pour servir à l'étude de l'histoire de la*  
*France*.

## CHAPTER II.

## I. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.

- Füsslin, J. C., *Unparteiische Kirchen und Ketzerhistorie* (1770).  
 Mosheim, *Ketzergeschichte* (1746).  
 Röhrich, *Die Gottesfreunde und die Winkeler am Oberrhein*, in Ilgen's  
*Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, vol. x, pt. 4, p. 118 et seq.  
 (1840).  
 Schmidt, C., *Histoire des Cathares* (1849).  
 Tocco, Felice, *Eresia nel medio evo* (1884).

## 2. SOURCES.

- Actus Pontificum Cenomannis, De Hildeberto*. Mabillon, *Vetera Ana-*  
*lecta*, p. 315. Also in Bouquet, vol. xii, p. 547.  
*Ademari Historiarum libri III*, lib. 3, c. 69, M. G. H. SS., vol. iv, p.  
 148.  
*Alberici Monachi Trium Fontium Chronica*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xxiii,  
 p. 840.  
*Annales Colonienses maxima*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xvii, p. 778.  
 S. Bernardi, *Epistolae* 241, 242, ed. cited, vol. i, pp. 237-239.  
*Sermones In Cantica*, 65, 66. *Ibid.*, p. 1490 et seq.  
 Bonacursi, *Vita haereticorum*, ed. d'Achery, *Spicilegium*, vol. xiii, p.  
 63 et seq.  
*Codex Theodosianus*, lib. 16, tit. 5, ed. Mommsen.  
*Concilium Karrofense* (1028), Mansi, vol. xix, cc. 485 et seq.  
*Epistola ecclesiae Leodiensis ad Lucium papam II* (1144), Martene,  
*Ampl. Coll.*, vol. i, cc. 777-778.  
*Epistola Trajectensis ecclesiae ad . . . archiepiscopum Coloniensem*  
 (1112), d'Argentré, *Collectio Judiciorum*, vol. i, p. 11.  
*Everwini Steinfeldensis praepositi, Epistola ad S. Bernardum: De hae-*  
*reticis sui temporis* Mabillon, *Vetera Analecta*, p. 473 et seq. Also  
 in *S. Bernardi Opera*, ed. cited, vol. i, p. 1487 et seq.  
*Gesta Treverorum Episcoporum*, M. G. H. SS., vol. viii, p. 130 et seq.  
 Hugo Metellus, *Epistola ad Henrico Leuchorum Episcopo*; in *Sacrae*  
*Antiquitatis Monumenta Historica* (in oppido Sancti Deodati, 1731),  
 vol. ii, p. 347 et seq.  
*Moneta Cremonensis adv. Catharos et Valdenses*, ed. Rome, 1743.  
 Petri Venerabilis abbatis Cluniacensis IX, *Epistola sive Tractatus ad-*  
*versus Petrobrusianos haereticos*, Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd., vol. xxii,  
 p. 1033 et seq.  
 Potho of Prüm, *De statu domus Dei*, Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd., vol. xxi,  
 p. 489 et seq.  
 Rodulfi Glabri, *Francorum historiae libri V*, lib. 3, Bouquet, vol. x, p. 35.  
*Synodus Attrebatensis* (1025), Mansi, vol. xix, cc. 424-425.

## CHAPTER III.

## I. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.

- Breyer, Robert, *Die Arnoldisten*. In *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, vol. xii, p. 387 *et seq.*
- Breyer, *Arnold von Brescia*. In Maurenbrecher, *Historisches Taschenbuch*, 1889, p. 123 *et seq.*
- Clavel, V., *Arnauld de Brescia et les Romains du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (1868).
- Giesebrecht, *Arnold von Brescia* (1873). *Sitzungs-berichte der königl. Baier. Ak. der Wissensch. Phil. hist. Classe.*
- Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiserzeit* (1874-1895).
- Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter* (1886-1896).
- Guibal, *Arnaud de Brescia et les Hohenstauffen* (1868).
- Guerzoni, *Arnaldo da Brescia secondo gli ultimi studi* (1882).
- Odorici, *Storie Bresciano*.
- Vacandard, M., *Arnauld de Brescia*. In *Revue des Questions Historiques*, vol. xxxv, p. 61 *et seq.* (1884).
- For Abelard:
- Deutsch, S. M., *Peter Abelard*.
- Hausrath, *Petrus Abälard*.
- McCabe, Joseph, *Peter Abelard*.
- For the Pataria:
- Päch, *Die Pataria in Mailand*, 1056-1077.
- Pellegrini, *I santi Arialdo ed Erlembaldo*.
- Rotondi, *Pataria di Milano*. In *Archivio storico Italiano* (1807).

## 2. SOURCES.

- Abelard, *Historia Calamitatum*. Opera, ed. Cousin, vol. i, p. 25 *et seq.*
- Annales Brixienses*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xviii, p. 812 *et seq.*
- S. Bernardi Epistolae*, 189, 195, 196, 243, 244, 330, ed. cited, vol. i, p. 182 *et seq.*
- Berthold vom Regensburg, *Sermon: Saelic sint die reines herzens sint*, ed. cited, vol. i, p. 388 *et seq.*
- Durandus of Mende, *Rationale divinorum officiorum*, ed. Fust & Schoffer, Mainz, 1459.
- Epistolae*: (1) "Cujusdam senatus fidelis"; (2) Wezeli. In *Epistolae Wibaldi*, Jaffé, B. R. G., vol. i, p. 216 *et seq.*
- Epistola Eugenii papae III, Universo clero Romano* (1148). Jaffé, Regesta, 1281. Mansi, vol. xxi, c. 628.
- Gerohus Reichersbergensis, *De Investigatione Antichristi*, lib. 3, ed. cited. Also, *De Novitatibus hujus saeculi*, published by Grisar, in "Geroh über die Investitursfrage"; *Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie*, vol. ix, p. 549 *et seq.* (1885).
- Gesta di Federico in Italia, In *Fonti di storia d'Italia*, vol. i, (1887).
- Gunther, Ligurinus, In *Veterum Scriptorum . . . Collectio, ex Bibliotheca Justi Reuberi* (Frankfurt, 1584), vol. i, p. 322 *et seq.*
- Hadriani papae IV vita*. In Watterich, *Pontificum Romanorum Vitae*, vol. ii, p. 344 *et seq.*
- Historia Pontificalis*. In M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 516 *et seq.*



- Walter Map, *De Nugis Curialium*, d. i, c. 24, ed. Wright (1850), p. 43.  
 Otto of Freising, *De Gesta Friderici I, Imperatoris*. M. G. H. SS., vol. xx, p. 403 *et seq.*  
 Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus de diversis materiis praedicabilibus*, pt. iv, tit. 7, ed. Lecoy de la Marche, p. 281.

## CHAPTER IV.

## I. SECONDARY AUTHORITIES.

Breyer, *Die Arnoldisten*.

Tiraboschi, Girolamo, *Vetera humiliatorum monumenta*, vol. i (1766).

## 2. SOURCES.

*Burchardi (1226) et Cuonradi (+1229) Urspergensium Chronicon*, M. G. H. SS., vol. xxiii, p. 376 *et seq.*

*Epistola Innocentii papae III ad Veronensi Episcopus*. In *Epistolae Innocentii papae III*, lib. ii, no. 228. Migne, vol. 214, cc. 788-789.

S. Joanne de Meda, *Vita*. (Taken from an office for the use of the Humiliati, written long after the death of the subject. The date is unknown.) AA. SS. Boll. VII Sept., p. 346 *et seq.*

*Rules for the Three Orders of the Humiliati* (1201). Tiraboschi, *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 128 *et seq.*

Torrechi, Hieronymus, *Chronicon ordinis Humiliatorum*. Written about 1419. Tiraboschi, vol. iii, p. 230 *et seq.*

Stephen of Bourbon, *Tractatus*, &c., pt. 4, tit. 7, par. 330, ed. cited, p. 280.







.

.









THE  
CONCEPT ACTION IN HISTORY  
AND IN  
THE NATURAL SCIENCES

BY  
PERCY HUGHES, A.M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
OF  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK  
JUNE, 1904







THE  
CONCEPT ACTION IN HISTORY  
AND IN  
THE NATURAL SCIENCES

BY  
PERCY HUGHES, A.M.  
=

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY  
OF  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK  
JUNE, 1904

D

COPYRIGHT, 1905,  
BY  
PERCY HUGHES

# CONTENTS

---

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION. . . . .	7
CHAPTER I	
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SCIENCE OF HIS- TORY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES . . . . .	10
CHAPTER II	
ACTION AS THE CONTENT OF HISTORIES. . . . .	27
CHAPTER III	
ACTION AS THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL CON- STRUCTION . . . . .	43
CHAPTER IV	
ACTION IN MECHANICS. . . . .	61
CHAPTER V	
ACTION IN THE SCIENCES OF NATURE OTHER THAN MECHANICS . . . . .	72
CHAPTER VI	
REMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF HISTORY . . . . .	91
CHAPTER VII	
HISTORY AND ETHICS. . . . .	99





## INTRODUCTION

The title of this essay suggests a certain antithesis between history and the natural sciences. This antithesis, which is maintained in Germany and France much more commonly than here or in England, I intend to set out along lines that seem to me somewhat more clear, at least to English-speaking people, than those adhered to by German logicians. The gain results, in my opinion, largely from our possession, in the common word and concept *action*, of an instrument of speech and logic to which no German term, in its common use, is equal for this particular purpose.

To establish this antithesis is to exhibit the independence and importance of historical science proper, as contrasted with sociology, with political or any other science that notes "uniformities of sequence or co-existence." In their efforts to bring home to all the existence of historical science, and to exhibit its peculiar purpose and value, such men as Kant, Hegel, Droysen, Windelband, Münsterberg and Rickert have insisted that it is through the appreciation of the nature of historical construction that the common thought of the times can free itself from the tendency wrongly to employ mechanical concepts, to rest in fatalism and individualism, to neglect or even positively to scorn all those deeper interpretations of the world, which, escaping or transcending the demands of a science of *law*, serve to substantiate Bacon's dictum that it is through histories, rather than through natural science, that men become wise.

But, until we can set over and against the purpose and

ideal of natural science, against the definite concept of *law*, a no less definite and complete concept, purpose and ideal of historical science, the impression must remain common that the eulogies of that science are marked rather by fervor and fine speaking than by the clear thinking and residence with the fact on which the naturalist insists, and which, in large measure, he has attained. In the concepts of teleology, individuality and freedom, by which the above-mentioned writers and others have defined the nature of historical construction, there may lie the whole truth which they sought. But it is certain that no general acceptance has been gained for any of the accounts yet given of the nature of history. The latest and clearest is that of Professor Heinrich Rickert, in *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. But even this, I think, in asserting the bold antithesis of the sciences of *individuals* and of *universals*, fails to grasp the wealth and positive character of the historian's work, or really to unite under one concept the full purpose of historical as contrasted with naturalistic construction.

My thesis is, that to describe the content and purpose of historical construction the concept *action* is fully adequate. And I have the less sense of temerity in advancing this theory, that I feel my position is really in close touch with those above mentioned; and particularly with that of Droysen, a practical historian, a philosopher and a logician. *Action*, then, as contrasted with *Law* is to be the central theme of this essay.

The plan of this essay is as follows: First, by tracing the history of the attempt to establish the logical basis of historical science, I introduce my own theory as a development of those preceding. Then, in chapters II and III, I intend to show, inductively, that action is the concept of historical content and construction, and also, de-

ductively, starting from the most obvious character of history, that action *must* be that concept. Chapters IV and V would show that the constant drift of natural sciences towards mechanical science proper is the elimination of the historical element in the concrete *facts* from which those sciences start; that those concrete *facts* are actions, but that natural science, in seeking laws, eliminates the conception of action; and that the elimination of action is the elimination of qualitative differences.

Chapter VI answers some logical difficulties and propounds others; in general, it *outlines* the field of the logic of history so far as I have surveyed it. Chapter VII exhibits the great significance of historical science for ethics. History furnishes the proper material of ethics. To neglect history is to have a formal ethics; to neglect the wider constructions of historical science is to have a petty ethical perspective.

## CHAPTER I

### THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES

1. EARLIER THEORIES ON THE SUBJECT. DROYSEN.—2. LATER THEORIES.—3. ACTION AS THE DISTINGUISHING CONCEPT OF HISTORY.—4. A COMPARISON OF THIS THEORY WITH RICKERT'S.

1. With few exceptions, English and American historians and logicians seem to have overlooked the significance of the problem here proposed.<sup>1</sup> So, to focus the attention of the reader, I submit this simple but important aspect of the question.

In any history, as, *c. g.*, of the United States, there are massed a vast number of facts; some only implied, others definitely given. Each of these facts is itself a history. For example, the surrender at Saratoga is one history; the "Missouri Compromise" is another. And each of these, in turn, is composed of many histories, whether the latter are written out in full or not.

The history of the United States, then, is counted one thing, which is a combination of many lesser things. The historian, in his combination of the many histories into the one, seeks to discover and record the *actual* combination of many facts, or histories, into one fact or history; for the unity is not merely his invention.

<sup>1</sup> See, however, the address of Professor Burgess before the Amer. Historical Assoc. (*Annual Report*, 1896, vol. 1, pp. 201-219), and Professor Flin's summary of the recent discussion of the subject, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Oct., 1903.

On and by what principle are such combinations traced? The sociologist brings unity to the several histories, small or great, which the development of a society presents, by using the principle of generalization. But the historian, though he does indeed state that the several lesser histories have the common character of being parts of one and the same whole, yet has for his purpose the presentation of that whole, with the parts appearing each in the particular, unique place that pertains to it.

In Herodotus's history there is, as Rawlinson in his introduction thereto puts it, a *unity of action*. There are many lesser actions united in the greater, *i. e.*, in the general course of the Persian war; although many actions appear in the work not because they are parts of that one, but because they have an interest of their own and are accidentally related to the main action. Thucydides, however, adheres strongly to this unity of action. In his introductory chapter we have a fine picture of the single complex process by which Greek became differentiated from Barbarian, and in Greece, Spartan from Athenian. Hobbes, in the introduction to his translation, admires the art with which Thucydides preserves the unity of action, the *oneness* of the war, treating the parts as parts throughout, instead of writing, as it were, "many histories," which then had been in need of "sowing together." But Hobbes did not definitely perceive that the historian employs a distinct method of organizing facts. History, he says, is a mere "register of fact," nothing but sense and memory; it requires no reasoning, for it is not a compilation or organization of fact! (*Leviathan*, chap. ix.)

This apparent blindness to the character of the historian's work appeared, too, in Aristotle. He refers, I believe, never to Thucydides, but frequently to the less methodical Herodotus, to exemplify history. He speaks of it as con-

cerned only with the particular, and therefore as a less "philosophical," a less high or serious pursuit than poetry. (*Poetics*, 1451, b. 4; *Problemata*, 916, b. 8.) In chapter VII I shall try to show how this failure to grasp the aim and concept of history affected the ethics of Aristotle.

In Leibnitz, it is possible to see, I believe, in his insistence on the free development of monads, for each of which the universe possesses an absolute unity, the *historical* counterpart to that other side of his teaching, which may fairly be called the *naturalistic*, in which the monads *appear* reciprocally to determine each other in space. But I cannot work out this thought here.

Kant, after laying down the postulates of the *mechanical* sciences in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, exhibits in his *Critique of Judgment* and in his *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* the principles of *teleological* science. Teleology may, he says, refer to the purposiveness in an object relative to the observer; but, as a matter of science, it concerns the purposive relation of the parts of the object to each other and to the whole. Objects in which this latter relation is found are "natural purposes." Such are not only all living things but also nations, and, indeed, humanity and nature itself. In his *Idee* above mentioned it is shown how all men are one in virtue of a tendency that lies in humanity to constitute a world-federation, a federation that must, because of the nature of man himself, tend continually to include the whole race. The race reproduces itself in the fulfilment of this purpose, and all its parts are in this relation reciprocally means and ends to each other and the whole. Therefore, the race is a "natural purpose"; a term which, to my mind, is practically equivalent to that clearer and more common term, agent, which best marks the object of history. And though Kant wrongly limited the term history

to human political history, he in fact laid down the general principles of historical as contrasted with mechanical or natural science.

In Herder we see a tendency to break away from the conception of man as isolated through the possession of reason from the rest of nature. Brutes are men's "elder brothers." But, though Herder insists on the presence of "organic powers" and internal, as contrasted with mechanical causation, and thus retains the material of historical science, yet he has no idea of a distinct historical method.<sup>2</sup> His "philosophy of history" covers indiscriminately both economic laws and also the unity of peoples or of the race itself in the light of its unique development.

To discuss Hegel's account of historical science would unduly lengthen this chapter. I venture to attribute his restriction of history to the affairs of states to the impossibility, in his day, of foreseeing an exact, detailed record of the development of nature, such as we possess.<sup>3</sup> He emphasizes more than did Kant the freedom which distinguishes the agent of history from the atom, the object of external necessity. He attempted to answer Kant's demand for a philosophy of history that would show how mankind has in fact worked towards the realization of reason, but maintained that freedom is the form of that realization.

It is from Hegel that Droysen learned his logic of history. Droysen is the first who contrasts historical science with that form of natural science with which history is most likely to be confused, viz., sociology. His *Elevation of History to the Rank of Science*<sup>4</sup> appeared in 1852, in

<sup>2</sup> See his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 63, Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, Bohn's edition.

<sup>4</sup> For Droysen's works on this subject, I refer to the pages of Andrews' translation, *Outline of the Principles of History*, Ginn & Co., 1897.

answer to Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*. The latter work had arraigned the incoherence of histories. Because he could find in histories few discoveries of the *laws* of the human mind under natural or social conditions, Buckle could see in histories no *science*, and none but a literary synthesis of materials.

Droysen's reply was not effective, because it assumed in his readers more knowledge of the subject than they had. But in his *Outlines*, his *Nature and History*, and the work just mentioned may be found latent almost all that since has been advanced towards a logic of history. His readers, in too many cases, seem to have supposed he meant to deny the existence of laws in the realm of human will.

History, he says (pp. 9, 10), deals with objects that do not simply repeat themselves, but *advance*, continually developing what was potential in them to something actual and new (pp. 98, 99). Thus engaged, it presents in its several fields a succession, and must seek, for its final material, an endless succession, and an ever-advancing object. Therefore, it transcends the perishable individual man, exhibiting those "partnerships" (p. 36) into which men enter, which caused them, which they are, and which they in turn make. In these "partnerships" greater and more enduring unities are continually discovered. Humanity is the greatest of them (pp. 10, 48). Its advance is towards a knowledge of itself (pp. 48, 49).

Such "partnerships," *c. g.*, marriage, the family, the Church, the State, humanity, constitute together the moral world, the field of history. Through these greater unities the individual men that constitute them can attain the realization of their own highest nature (pp. 74-77). Therefore, the union is a *free* one in proportion as men become conscious of this fact of reciprocal aid.



History, therefore, deals with free, "self-progressing" <sup>5</sup> objects, and historical science determines in what unities or syntheses such objects appear.

I would criticize Droysen's treatment on two grounds: the first, that he wrongly marks off the history of the moral world from histories in general, as history's peculiar field. *There is one concept common to all histories.* The history of the earth, with which the geologist may deal, is history in its own right, not merely because of its relation to the history with which the historian of "moral partnerships" may deal. And the second, that he keeps in the background the essential feature that gave unity to his treatment, the fact that history deals with objects as determined from within by latent tendencies, with activity, with agencies and actions, not with objects void of character, determined by circumstances, by their relations, not with passivity, not with atoms and motion. Indeed, had he remedied either of these defects, he could hardly have failed, it seems to me, to have proceeded to correct the other.

2. Two conceptions of history I shall now advance that seem to me valuable, to be sure, for their truth, but also for the questions raised by what I take to be their errors. Schopenhauer maintained not only that history does not seek laws, but also that, not seeking laws, dealing only with the unique,<sup>6</sup> the never recurring, history is "Wissen," in-

<sup>5</sup> Adopting a phrase suggested by Prof. Burgess in the address already mentioned.

<sup>6</sup> M. Xénopol (*Les principes fondamentaux de l'histoire*, and *Caractère de l'histoire*, an article appearing in the *Revue philosophique*, January, 1904) adopts this element of *uniqueness* as the distinguishing mark of historical material. He fails, however, to indicate the *positive* aim of historical science. Surely it does not simply aim to present the unique as unique; that would hardly be worth while, unless history

deed, but cannot be "Wissenschaft." He denies, of course, the existence of those continually advancing agencies of which Droysen wrote. History is at bottom ever the same. Whoever has read Herodotus may save himself the sorrow of reading further. But though history tells of the same, yet it tells it otherwise; *eadem sed aliter*.

Whether history does present ever the same character or whether it presents a continuous advance of some kind is a question of fact. We are sure, at any rate, that certain men of much talent have tried to present histories in which there appeared continuous advance in character in things that remained in some sense identical. We shall see that such constructions so enter into all our thinking that to deny to them some accordance with reality would be hardly less absurd than to deny the existence of uniformities of co-existence and sequence in the real world. We must admit, then, that there is a science, or at least a pseudo-science, of considerable practical interest, that is known as history. We have to determine as exactly as possible its concept.

Professor Münsterberg has taken the somewhat paradoxical position that the science of history deals, not with law, not with causal connections, *not even with a temporal series*, but with the interrelation of human volitions. Thus, when we assert that Socrates' decision to stay in prison was a

is a mere handmaid to other sciences, the discoverer of the facts with which they may deal. It would be possible to take this latter point of view, but it is far from M. Xénopol to do so. He is much aggrieved, apparently, that the sociologist should seek to present "laws of development" within the realm of historical fact, except in the field of primitive human history. But if there, why not everywhere? M. Xénopol, because he fails to see the positive character of historic construction, which make the historian a scientist in his own right, regardless of what laws the sociologist or geologist may discover, is supersensitive to the perfectly legitimate "incroachments" of such sciences.

decision to obey the laws of Athens unto death, or when a German, by asserting his nationality, means thereby to assert his conformity with the "will-influences" of Goethe and Beethoven, Kant and Hegel, Luther and Bismarck, these are historical constructions, examples of historical science. "It is the unique task of history as a science to work out and make complete this teleological system of individual will-relations, to bring out the connection between our acts and all the acts which we must acknowledge as somehow influencing our own."<sup>7</sup> History has to find out those will-influences that determined the multitude which imitated, acknowledged, affirmed them, or the contrary. The most complete historical synthesis would present the history of the world as determined by one will. This would be its ultimate "generality."

Professor Münsterberg here insists, fundamentally, that history is the science of freedom. By the psychological, as well as by the physiological account of Socrates' decision, he appears causally determined, unfree. But it is a fact, as Socrates himself says,<sup>8</sup> that he *freely* "chose the better and nobler part, to undergo any punishment which the state inflicts." Socrates and Münsterberg agree further that both these aspects of the matter are true; but the latter believes that, if he would avoid confusion, the historian must, "at least in principle," keep sacred for his sole material the freedom of such decisions. But, as a fact, history seems, without any confusion, to embrace both aspects. Socrates, in freely resolving to stay, resolved to stay bound by chains that, under natural laws, cohered and pressed down, and to stay subject to the inevitable effect of the hemlock upon his

<sup>7</sup> *Psychology and Life*, pp. 211, 214, 215, 220. Cf. *Grundzüge der Psychologie*.

<sup>8</sup> *Phaedo*, 98, 99.

body. Kant and Hegel, Droysen and Rickert, are at one in opposing to Münsterberg's absolute elimination from history of time and cause the other conception that, in historical science, the mechanical appears as subsidiary to the teleological, not as opposed to, and not as excluded by it.

✠ ✠ ✠

3. The concept which should express this realm of history and the purpose of historical science is action. This notion of action, of doing, as opposed to passion, mere reciprocity, I believe to be the common-sense view of things, a point that I shall develop later. I mean that our *primary* explanations of events are in terms of a potentiality, a tendency *within* the individual which is the cause of what that thing has done. The apple falls from the tree because it *has* weight; the boy became a good citizen *primarily* because he *had* the *power* to become one. In the fulfilling of those tendencies both apple and boy *did* something, acted. It requires a degree of sophistication to see that either is to be explained in categories of external influence, of mechanical necessity, even in part.

Histories take note of the fact that while in certain aspects a thing is passive in respect to its environment, or else reduces that to a condition of passivity in certain respects, in yet other ways a thing may enter into association with a limited portion of its environment in such a manner that the primary category of activity is retained both by the thing and by that limited environment. Then we have a union of agents within one agent, viz., the total limited environment just mentioned. It is thus that a cell is active in an organ and an organ in an organism; it is thus that a citizen is active in his village and his village in the state; it is thus that a scholar is active in his university and his university in the world of learning. The detection and presentation of such associations, such syntheses of agents

within agents, in the teleological relationship essential to a synthesis of agents, is the purpose of historical science. And that purpose is effected by the discovery and presentation of the corresponding actions.

The content of any history is fundamentally that *action* which characterizes the one agent, and in which the lesser agents appear as members of that one agent. The actions of those lesser agents are histories, and together make up the one action and the one history.

This concept action indicates, at once, the vast extent of the term history, covering as it does all past events of which there is record—the step of a dinosaur on a mesozoic shore, the signing of a check or a treaty, the course of a comet or of a reform movement. It denotes the freedom which so often has been noted as characterizing the objects of history; also the form of the relation between the elements of any given history, for that relation is fundamentally one in which the activity of the elements is not only conserved, but increased. It indicates, therefore, the purpose and point of view of the historical scientist in his constructions. And, finally, it permits the temporal character which common usage gives to history, and the inclusion of mechanical relations between the several elements, subordinated to the teleological relation which the history aims to present.

The proof of this position occupies the rest of this essay; but I hope to secure provisional assent, sufficient to secure patient study of that proof, by the following illustration: Consider Green's well-known shorter *History of the English People*. Its title is singular; it is *a* history. Then, if my position is correct, it must describe one action, a single process, the realization of a certain tendency. And in virtue of that fact the English people must be presented as one agent. Dare I maintain these corollaries?

I have no hesitation in so doing. I may, in the first place,

call attention to the title he selects. Not only is "history" singular, but the English people is used, here as elsewhere, as a single term. To those who deny that they were one agent we may fairly put the question, in what sense, then, are the English one throughout Green's work? The emphasis Green places on the Teutonic core of the nation, rather than on the land, as his predecessors had done, is an attempt to keep to the one genuine agent of the history, in spite of its migrations.

That the unity of that agency was impaired, Green could not but admit; but he insists that the English people remained substantially one, in spite of all divisions and admixtures. It was a unity, not simply of race but of purpose. No one, it seems to me, who reads Green with the devotion that he deserves, can mistake his conviction that his history was one, his historical synthesis complete, and the aim of his work realized, just in so far as he could see and show this—that in the pirate Angles, Jutes and Saxons lay the nature whose proper, though not the only possible flower, is the England of his day, with its free colonies, its Shakespeare and its Bible, its court and parliament. Not all ages or peoples, not all events are equally susceptible to historical construction, any more than all facts are equally susceptible to subsumption under universal laws; but a study of the many histories written will convince, I think, that where the concept of history is consistently employed, a failure to discover and exhibit within the material presented a synthesis of action, a union of the several actions as members of one action, is at the same time a failure to justify the use of the singular title, a history, and is a failure in the essential of that construction which is peculiar to historical science.

#### 4. Droysen's failure to establish the distinctive character

of historical science seems to me due in large measure to his lack of a definite concept of natural science with which to contrast it. Heinrich Rickert, in his comprehensive and most lucid exposition of the relations of history and natural science,<sup>9</sup> commences by defining the concept of natural science. It tends constantly toward the mechanical ideal, in which we are presented with atoms, without specific characters, the attributes of which lie in their relations to the environment. In other sciences than mechanics there remains an historical element, which introduces differences among the things treated; they have specific characters. But the tendency in the natural sciences is always towards the general and away from such specific characters, from the unique. Hence, Rickert says, the natural sciences are *abstract*, departing from the realm of *reality* where all is unique, where there is an inexhaustible fund of specific characters.

Historical science, on the contrary, deals with the unique; it retains the wealth of detail that characterizes reality, immediate experience. Natural science, in arriving at the general, has to break up that complex unity of character that makes up the individual. History, on the other hand, clings to the individual as something indivisible. It does this in the subsumption of lesser individuals under greater; as, *e. g.*, in placing the individuals Garibaldi and Mazzini within the greater individual, the Italian nation. In all such greater individuals there are some members whose complex unity of character is of significance for the whole, as in the case of the above-mentioned heroes. They were of value to Italy not merely as one among many, but as having certain specific unique characters, as indivisible complexities. It is of such members that history treats, and

<sup>9</sup> *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung.*

historical synthesis is the subsumption of such members within greater individuals.

History in the broadest sense, Professor Rickert says, is not a science, but merely "what has happened." It then is reality, but not the *science* of reality. *Scientific* history he tends to limit to human history. It is not reality, but, because of its retention of individuality and uniqueness, is nearer reality than is natural science, with its abstract generalizations.

Certain features Professor Rickert adds to his concept of individuality to complete the historical concept. Historical content is continuous, developing, and is bound together by a teleological relationship, though causal explanation proper is not excluded from it.

Many points in the logic of history Professor Rickert has worked out in some detail. His work certainly is the best on that general subject, in view of Droysen's obscurity. But I think that his general position is not the best; that it falls short of Droysen's in its failure to emphasize the element of freedom peculiar to history, and the concept of inner causation and potentiality that applies to historical development.<sup>10</sup> And it is meaningless to me to assert that history is nearer reality than natural science. They both are real if truly science.

The point to make here, I think, is, that the natural sciences in all cases *start from* a history, whether it be an observation or an experiment. For the "fact" from which the naturalist starts and to which he returns for verification

<sup>10</sup> In expounding the significance of spiritual as contrasted with natural, Rickert does not base the distinction on freedom. On p. 415 he seems to assume that those who defend the existence of freedom mean by it "Ursachlosigkeit." Surely only its opponents do so. No wonder he concludes that: "Der logische Gegensatz von Natur und Geschichte mit dem Gegensatz von Notwendigkeit und Freiheit nichts zu thun hat."



is a *past process*, of which there remains only the evidence; as when the meteor has left its traces on the photographic plate, or the falling ball has caused a certain displacement in the material into which it fell. The naturalist starts by employing historical concepts, inner causes, potentialities, and, do what he may, never escapes from them wholly. The direction of the naturalist's efforts is to refer all events to the motion of the thing as conditioned by the "totality of circumstances"—a reference that reduces the thing to a condition of passivity relative to this immeasurable totality.

Just as in the naturalist's constructions the historical element of specific activity in things persists, so, in historical syntheses, agencies and actions never appear entirely free or entirely one. That there is unity within the sum of tendencies that the historian has grouped under one tendency and action is a truth he and his reader often *feel* and *believe* rather than prove for all men. And lack of unity in the action means interference, and mechanical, causal relations between elements unsubordinated to the teleological.

The physicist starts with simple histories, *e. g.*, the fall of a ball through different distances; and, noticing resemblances and differences between these past processes, these histories, finds a law which applies to all such histories, whenever they shall have occurred. And, indeed, in order that he may thus generalize, he analyses these simple concrete histories into others yet more simple. Thus he arrives at agents of less and less complexity and less internal significance. On the other hand histories direct the common perception of man to the existence of agents and actions greater than it knew, presenting us with beings of greater and greater complexity and internal significance. It seeks the unity of action of a nebula or of the Milky Way; to comprehend, not in a formula but as a concrete fact, the "life," the de-

velopment of the material earth as a whole; to grasp not merely the life of one living thing, but the purposive growth of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, separately, and also as one interrelated and mutually helpful evolution; to note the development of a nation, of a race, of humanity, now in a political, now in a social, now in an economic aspect; in terms of its art, its religion, its philosophy; and again in some one meaning and purpose fundamental to all of these.

In the *genesis* of natural and of historical science mutual dependence may be observed. The dictum, for every effect there must be a cause, lies at the basis of the generalizations of natural science; but it itself is not the result of generalizations, but the expression of the historical sense of the unyielding character of the past, that for any given present fact there is *just one past history, which can be discovered*, although it has vanished. But the inviolability of this relation between a past fact and the evidence it has brought about and which persists, is a product not so much of experimental science as of social, and especially legal relations. For advanced social life requires the comparison of evidence and the record of one among conflicting "histories" proposed for that evidence; and experimental science has never begun until, after ages of close social contact and legal contention, there has arisen the historical sense above referred to.

On the other hand, in the discovery of the past, in the interpretation of evidence, it is obvious that the historian not only cannot run against universal law, but often must seek its aid. If he would write a history of the earth, of a man, or of a nation, his account must be confirmed by its accordance with the laws of geology, sociology or of psychology, etc.; or, if it ventures to oppose the known laws of those sciences he must assert the credibility of new laws,

on the ground not only that the facts of his history fit in with each other better than would a history constructed along the lines which the laws he would overthrow demand, but also that the new laws he would suggest in fact fit in with the *totality of science* as well as, or better than, the laws he would supplant.

But, of course, the historian cannot depend on the generalizations of science always to tell him what is the past event which is causally connected with some present fact. The historian who, in striving to realize Cæsar or the Roman Empire, supported every inference as to their character by a law of psychology or some other science would not get very far. So far as I know, no historian ever tried to do such a thing.<sup>11</sup> He uses his memory and his constructive imagination more freely than the naturalist dare.

Such manifold interrelations, such interdependence and supplementation of each other's labors, exist, I would show, between historical and natural science, rather than the neat but barren antithesis between sciences of the universal and the individual, of the abstract and the real. A further advantage in characterizing action rather than individuality as the concept of history, is that in the former not only is individuality included but also the temporal, developing, continuous character of historical content, the peculiar character of historical causation, the teleological character of historical construction, and the practical purpose of historical study are implied. That one term, action, in antithesis to law, thoroughly distinguishes the field and purpose of history from that of natural science.

And, if this can be proved, surely no unimportant thing has been done. For it should aid to focus and to put in a form not easily laughed away the conviction so strongly

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Rickert's remarks, p. 429 *et seq.*, *op. cit.*

maintained by some and so lightly set aside by many that there is a tendency in human knowledge and science quite different from that towards a mechanical interpretation of things; a tendency that should enrich the world with new meanings, that should heighten the importance of merely individual convictions, wherever these take the form of a comprehensive system. For, in saying that there is a science of history, I do not mean a science of measurement; though history always defers to evidence that in the last resort is physical and measurable, it climbs towards such interpretations of things that in respect of them assent or dissent can be awarded, not after the use merely of statistics and measurements, though these have their place, but after an examination and reorganization of individual purposes and ideals.

## CHAPTER II

### ACTION AS THE CONTENT OF HISTORIES

5. PROOF THAT THE CONTENT OF HISTORY MUST BE ACTION.—6. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND THE "DEAD" PAST.—7. ILLUSTRATIONS; OBJECTIONS MET.—8. A FURTHER OBJECTION; PASSIVITY IN HISTORY.—9. FURTHER ILLUSTRATIONS, AND SUMMARY.

5. In the last chapter I attempted to distinguish historical from natural science by contrasting the purposes of each: the former seeks and exhibits action; the latter, law. In this chapter I aim to prove and illustrate my position with respect to history, having regard, however, in the first place, to the purpose of what may be called historical *invention*, or discovery, in contrast with historical *construction*. The latter notes the relations between historical elements, and is dealt with in the next chapter. The former seeks the elements, the material of history.

This search for the material of history is, in the first place, a search for a past fact, of which there exists now only some effect, which is the evidence of it. The historian loves to insist that he is concerned with fact; but must, of course, add that it is not present but past fact. Further, this past fact of history is to be distinguished from memory. The historical past is not the property of any one person's consciousness, but is open to the discovery of any man, just as the physical world is not feeling but is what any one may somehow feel.

Memory, itself a present fact of consciousness, refers, in so far as it really is memory, to past events. The truth

of memory means the reality of that past. But the reality of that past, in turn, *means* that it was a possible object of common perception, needing only the presence of a percipient. The primary *proof* of this possibility is some present object, some object of present perception, the product, the effect of that past. This present object of common perception is fundamentally physical, and the past event of which it is the product is a process fundamentally physical, or with a physical reference.

History emphasizes the *proof*, the certainty of the past; it, therefore, has for its content, externally considered, chains of physical events connected with present facts, their evidence. Each of these chains is "impenetrable"; and it not only excludes from past fact all conflicting chains, but it serves to posit, as it were, other chains of events that correspond with it. Thus, that B was at C at the date D, and the fact that A saw B then, tells where A was, within limits. In this way, from different pieces of evidence, all in the last resort physical, the historian constructs, or rather reveals, a vast "web" of interconnected chains of events, all leading to those pieces of evidence, all having also a physical reference, and, together, confirming each other, constituting a realm of fact immutable so far as it is really known. This character of history that contrasts it with memory we may call its "objectivity."

With these points in mind let us ask what the "inventive" historian does when he seeks the past fact corresponding to a present piece of evidence. Is his pursuit, indeed, a search for *actions*? It is a pursuit that all of us take part in; when the mistress fronts unexpectedly a broken tea-cup, when later the maid marks in wonder her angry tone.

In the first place, we note that the inquiry always starts from a history: the tea-cup *has been* broken; Crusoe saw

that *some* naked foot had trodden on the sand. That is, the "inventive" historian does not seek the past, the history, of the present in general, but of a *limited* present, which already has a *unity* of its own in virtue of a certain history, a past process that brought it about. And his inquiry proceeds because, within this original unity, or in its relations to the environment, appear conflicting elements, so that there is difficulty in recognizing at once the history that shall apply without contradiction to them all. How could bare feet tread on shores where the booted Crusoe walked alone? Whence the irritation of so amiable a mistress?

In like manner, until Hutton realized that rocks are to be regarded as evidence of some kind of past process of deposit, he did not seek to know more exactly the nature of the deposit. Until Pickwick recognized that the famous marks were evidence of the process of inscription of some kind in an unusual place, he did not begin his twenty-seven different constructions thereof to suit as many imagined histories. But when this inquiry is completed the multiplicity that was its cause has been reduced again to a unity, due as at first to the perception of one past process that has brought the several elements into their respective conditions and relations. The cup was broken through a stupid and ungrateful act; the footstep was that of a savage from some neighboring isle; these rocks of like character thus scattered along this line far from any similar bed are of one deposit, but eroded, conveyed and again deposited by one ice-movement, the scratches caused by which remain on that bed-rock or its vicinity; put in a letter or two, and then what seemed merely so many disconnected signs becomes now one Saxon inscription.

This past process, which thus gives unity to the several elements of the evidence, is a unique fact of a certain dura-

tion: that is, it has a beginning and an end. The end is the present fact, the evidence; the beginning can be thought of only as the *potentiality* of that end. For the histories, the past facts, which we daily seek in order to explain the present, as in the examples given, are of a complexity covered in its unity by no law. Thus the geologist, when he has noted the configuration of the several levels of a flood-plain, and of the hills bordering it, the character of the stream, etc., may construct a rough history of the plain's formation, its approach to the present condition from the time that it was a plateau, perhaps, or an ancient lake. Though guided throughout by his knowledge of natural laws and by intuitions of space relations, he constructs a unique fact. Even where a law later is found to cover the whole history, as in the case of periodic comets, the historical construction of the comet's past course was at first a unique thing which served as the basis of future generalization.

Hence the beginning, the cause of the past process, when thus first discovered, is known only as the *potentiality*, latent *within* the known limited conditions, to produce the result, the fulfilment in the present evidence.

This potentiality which thus unites the several elements of a history, and explains the result, is properly called a *tendency*, for the following reasons: A *possibility* is something that requires an external stimulus to bring it into effect, as in the case of potential energy. A ball, perched in an uplifted cup, stays up forever unless some external influence shall change its condition. But the historian, in his search for the past of given evidence, has not, in the first instance, a knowledge of the influences external to the several elementary processes in which he is to find the one, the unifying process. Hence, he cannot conceive the initial stage of that process as dependent on external stimulus.



It realizes itself. *It is not, therefore, a mere possibility.* But, moreover, just because of his ignorance of circumstances, he cannot suppose that the initial stage is such that in itself it *must* be realized. The potentiality is not a *necessity*. It is a *tendency*, because we mean by tendency that which realizes itself, unless thwarted. Thus, we may say a boy has a tendency to become a good citizen, even though circumstances later prevented it.

The *past process*, then, which the historian seeks, to explain the present fact, which fact is the evidence because it is the product of that process, is the *fulfilling of a tendency*; this tendency, latent in the multiplicity of elements which originated the historical inquiry, in its realization gives unity to that multiplicity, until the evidence is perceived as the product of one process. This fulfilling of a tendency is *action*, of which the unity in which the tendency resides is the *agent*.

It is important to note the part played by *reaction* in historical conception. In physics, action and reaction are said to be equal. But this is somewhat to pervert the meaning of reaction. If I move this ink-well along this desk the past process is *my action*; but where resides the reaction? If, anywhere in the universe, there had been a surface of *no friction*, the motion would have taken place *there* and not at the surface of my desk. Hence all things external to me participated in the reaction. Hence the latter is properly an *indefinite term*; and, in asserting the equality of action and reaction, the physicist really takes some convenient portion of the universe external to the original agent, and treats that portion as *agent* of an opposite process. He compares two *actions*. But, in history, the agent is that in which the tendency resides; the reaction is an indefinite term applying to the unknown and supposedly passive environment. A portion of the multiplicity of that

past process, whose apparent incongruity started the inquiry of the historian, usually becomes merged in this indefinite environment.<sup>1</sup>

6. It is not always obvious that action is the content of any given history, and, to see more readily that it is, one must keep well in view the *dynamic* character of the historic content. This character follows from the connection of an historic event with its evidence; which, if it is lost sight of, carries with it the "*factness*," the reality so essential to history, resulting from its association with the evidence.

Thus, if I assert that it is an historic fact that Perry defeated some British ships on Lake Erie, I find that the force of that assertion lies in the dynamic connection that I at once postulate between that event and some present piece of evidence, be that only a school text-book. The historic battle brought about the story told of it in that book; it brought about the sense of patriotic pride I feel when I hear of it, or some other present thing. I also connect it, no doubt more or less vaguely, with the general stream of history, giving it therein its date, and its inter-connections with other events past. This general history is a stream, I find, whenever I have regard to its reality, to its genuine historic character. It moves towards the pres-

<sup>1</sup> It is well to note here that there is no inherent reason, apparently, why we take the past processes of history to begin at one point rather than another. The term "tendency" covers this character of historic processes; for a tendency is not an absolute beginning, but a point in a process which may be treated as the fulfilment of one process and the beginning of another. Thus, the boy's diligence at home may be regarded as a tendency to produce a good citizen; but if so, the process of producing a good citizen is already taking place in the very existence of the tendency, the diligence at home. And so, backwards, indefinitely. The tendency marks a convenient point at which to start.

ent everywhere. Whatever I can definitely localize in it takes the same character of movement, as it attains historic worth.

In reading histories we constantly forget this connection of the material with the evidence. At such times we might as well be reading fancies as history; but we are constantly recalled to a sense of that connection, and of the fact that what we are reading produced a certain present state of things that is evidence of it. We can, indeed, free ourselves from the historic point of view. Then, instead of dwelling on the "factness" of the past event, we dwell on its "pastness." Thus Longfellow said:

"The bubbles we pursue on earth,  
They vanish ere death shuts the eye,  
And leave no trace."

This past that leaves no trace is what he elsewhere calls the "dead" past. The bubbles left indeed traces, evidence, but no one pays heed to that. The thing, the past fact *has gone*. But the historian always pays heed to the evidence, for his whole realm is built on that, on the dynamic connection of the past with that evidence. His past is not a mere dead past, but an "eternal possession."

Very often the historian makes us forget that the event of which he speaks is a past fact in order that we may study it as a stable present condition. This gives us the "*historic present*," thus well named by grammarians. The change from this stable presentation to the dynamic stream of history may be illustrated by a selection from Green's *Shorter History of the English People*. He wishes to bring vividly before us the England of Chaucer. "*It is this new gladness of a great people that utters itself in the poetry of Geoffrey Chaucer.*" This picture is held before us for some pages, while Chaucer's fancy presents us with

the England of his day. Finally, Green once more makes us aware of the general trend of the stream into the depths of which we have been steadily gazing. We are made to perceive again that the facts just told us ceased long since, but have their place in the action the issue of which is the England of to-day. "*It is strange that such a voice as this should have awakened no echo in the singers that follow; but the first verse of English song died as suddenly and utterly with Chaucer as the hope and glory of his age. The hundred years that follow. . . . No age of our history. . . .*" The dynamic association with the evidence is renewed, and we deal again with historic action.

It is only by looking through the details, the proofs, the moral reflections, etc., of the historian to grasp this underlying movement which makes the work a history, that we can appreciate the worth of my contention that action is the concept of history.

7. Thus far I have tried to show that history, simply because it is the "past of evidence," must have action for its content. I have given some simple examples of historic content in which the concept seems to apply. I shall now proceed to examine some typical histories of a more complex character. In each of these some objection against the applicability of the concept action may be raised. But in each case I think I fairly meet the objections, while the discussion serves to illustrate, explain and amplify my fundamental position.

For example, it may be objected that we have in fact no unity in the evidence corresponding to the assumed unity of the action. Thus, in Green's *Shorter History of the English People*, what single piece of evidence can I point out which is the issue of the action that, according to my account, should be the central theme of his history? If

there is no such single piece of evidence, then there can be, according to the definition of history we started with, no one past action, nor can the concept of Green's history be action.

It is possible to question whether Green has in fact presented us with a single *issue* of his action. In that case he has also failed to present us with any one *action*. For the unity of an action certainly includes the unity of the end towards which it is directed. And in a past action that end must have been realized. But the obvious fact is that Green, least of all men, did question the unity of the result of that action. He goes out of his way to write the history of the English people, not the history of England. He names it *one* history, and asserts the unity of the subjects it deals with. To him, as to most Englishmen, there is a unity in the present English race as certainly as there is a unity (in spite of the "porosity" of matter, and the constant change of the body's substance) in any Englishman's living body. Moreover, whoever questions the unity of the evidence and the action, questions the right of Green to his title. To those who would write the history of the Anglo-Saxon race, or at least speak as though such a history could be written, it is objected that no such history could be written, because no corresponding unity of evidence can be found. There is not, and, they say, there never has been, an Anglo-Saxon race. Thus, the "objection" turns out to be a confirmation of my definition of historic content. For, to deny that this history is a single action resulting in a single piece of evidence, is to deny that the history was one as the title indicates. That is, the history and my definition of it stand or fall together, thus far.

A second objection may be raised on the ground that in many histories the course of events, instead of leading up to the present evidence, winds up in a past more or less

remote. Grote's account of the Athenian democracy may be taken as an example. The evidence long since created by the actions of the Athenians has, with whatever unity they gave it, been handed down by another agency, by the "action of time." Of this other agency Grote does not speak, it may be urged, and therefore his history is not an action with a dynamic relation to the present.

My answer may be anticipated. What is it that assures us, as we read his narratives, that it is more than a tale of what might have been? The fact that, from the first page, the movement of the action he records toward the present is indicated. This is the meaning of the *date*, and the placing of the action in the physical world. By these simple devices we are at once assured that this action is a part of the onward trend of things to certain features of the present. Were not the Athens of those days emphatically connected by an unbreakable chain with some features of the present world, *i. e.*, its evidence, the whole narrative would be in the realm of fancy. Athens still exists and the connection with the present is so easy that it may readily be overlooked. But it is essential to the historical character. It persists in the background throughout the history. And when Grote leaves the people of Athens, by the very fact that he leaves them definitely in the historic past, he connects them, by the steady stream of that historic past, with the unity of the present evidence that he discovered.

8. If the concept of history is action, it may be asked, how can passivity appear in history? If it is action that produces evidence, how can we have evidence of no action, or of the opposite of action? Was not George III more or less passive in 1781? Were not those ambitious of annexing Canada in 1812 shortly reduced to a passive condition, in large measure? How can history record such passivity?

Passivity may mean (1) thwarting of tendencies, as above; (2) no action; (3) motion or change of a thing in which the nature, not of that thing but of something external, is realized, as when a body moves under the influence of its relations to its environment.

The first occurs in history only as a matter of *inference*. It is not what George III failed to do, but what he and others did that made evidence. But from what George did, including, of course, what he said or wrote, it is *inferred* that his nature was such as was thwarted in the sequel. Thus, when we see two trees of a certain kind growing very close together, and less developed than most trees of their kind, we generalize as to the nature of such trees, and infer from the evidence that they have not done what it was their nature to do. They have been partly passive to each other. But the evidence, their present bulk, is what they did, not what they failed to do.

The second kind of passivity, mere absence of action or, indeed, of change of any kind, is again a matter of inference. While in certain things changes took place, in others nothing occurred, for there is no evidence of their action during that period; only at the beginning and end.

The third kind of passivity, which amounts to external as contrasted with internal determination, marks, as I shall show in the next chapter, the limits set to historical synthesis, for that deals with internal determination or action. Here the question is, how can such passivity be part of the material of history? How can evidence record external determination?

This differs from the first case because, here, instead of asserting that the nature of a thing has been thwarted, *specific* nature is denied to it. What happens to it results from the environment, to which it responds according to law—according, that is, to the *general* constitution of things.

It is thus that Socrates appears weighted by chains and poisoned by the hemlock. But, though staying and dying simply under general laws, those laws by which he dies are not as general as those by which he stays weighted down; for not all things can die, and not to all mortal things is hemlock fatal. So it may be said that in all cases of "external" determination we have *reciprocal* determination; that is, *two* actions occur; *i. e.*, that of Socrates in dying, that of the hemlock in poisoning; and each needs the other, *each* is externally determined. Only in the case of an atom, which is acted on by a universe *like it in nature but immeasurably greater*, may the part of the individual thing, being regarded altogether quantitatively, sink to zero. There the external determination may be regarded as complete for purposes of calculation.

But in history, as the past fact of which there is present evidence, the universe, or anything infinite has no place. If an atom's history were discovered, its environment, so far as that appeared in its history, would be as limited as the evidence from which the historical inquiry must start and to which it must return. That is to say, in all histories the object perceived to suffer change under general laws has an appreciable influence in deciding the character of the laws that apply in its case. It is thus far active. In fact the history, as such, presents us with a multiplicity of agents, and these are causally interrelated. To note that these causal interrelations correspond to the general order of things, and to assert that therefore the objects are subjected to general conditions and passive, is to go beyond the evidence. That speaks only of several actions. Therefore, it is to go beyond the ground of history proper, which always rests on evidence. Moreover, the ascription of such passivity is never justified except on the assumption that the objects thus characterized could be analyzed into atoms,



and their actions explained strictly mechanically. But such an analysis deprives the objects of the character they possessed in history. Socrates, as a congeries of atoms, is not the wise and witty Athenian. That is to say, this third kind of passivity is something that history itself does not include; but it may be asserted to subsist between the several objects that history, from another point of view, regards as one. But that assertion has only a secondary value for history, viz., to clarify or make more probable the several actions the evidence seems to record.<sup>2</sup>

9. Undoubtedly the reader, if he now turns to histories to see whether they do indeed exhibit simply actions, so that a history is always *one action*, will have much difficulty in seeing that it always is so. Remember, however, that, even after the care that has been taken in recent years to make definite the concept of natural science, we still find

<sup>2</sup> A particular form of passivity appears in history, in what we call reactions. These are not reactions in the proper sense, but *reverse actions*. Thus, if we view England's history as the realization of freedom with a complex social order, we are likely to term Cromwell's later reign and the days of willing subserviency to Charles II a reaction. What place has it, then, in a history which is an action as above described? The answer is given, in general terms, in the popular view of reactions after too rapid advance. The advancement was too rapid *in view of the individual's character*; and, consequently, the reaction, in the same light, is really a preparation for the onward advance; and so, after all, is an element of the total action, and itself an action.

If, in histories, it is at times difficult to see this, it usually becomes evident if we remember the wider action in which the individual of the history enters as a historic element; thus England entered into the history of Europe and the founding of the American colonies at the time referred to. If she moved too quick for that environment, that fact, in view of the historical aspect of the environment as a part of the nature of the historic individual, makes of the "reaction" an action, a preparation for the next step in the fulfilling of the essential tendency.

treatises that are everywhere accepted as scientific in which, nevertheless, one can discover generalization or classification only with difficulty. Moreover, the term history still has some remnant of its original meaning of investigation, a meaning preserved in the expression, natural history. But for all that, any one that will consider histories with a readiness to move through the mass of details to the stream of movement behind, will not doubt long, I think, that it is the purpose of the historian, as such, to exhibit one action in his history, and that in so far as he failed to do so, he failed to justify the title of his work, if that be expressed in the singular, as "a history."

For example, in reading Gibbon's history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, it is not easy to see the one agent; for the Empire appears passive and its foes possessed of no one tendency worthy to be the centre of his history. But Bryce gives clearly the thought that underlies and gives unity to Gibbon's account: the idea and spirit of the dying empire, as its ancient body fell away, took hold of the barbarian hosts and made of them one agent, in the rehabilitation of imperial rule and order, a fresh incarnation of the spirit of civilization. Gibbon, to be sure, then turns to follow the fading fortunes of the Eastern Empire. Bryce seems to think that the unity, which at first he describes as idea and spirit, is preserved only as a mere form and institution, and therefore traces the degradation of the Western imperial crown. Hegel, however, thought he saw that the unity continued to underlie all the contending nations of Europe, as the deepest, biggest thing there. And so he followed them, tracing the one action which they embodied towards its later form.

Geologists usually confuse the history of the earth with the continuous development of animal life. Geology proper surely should deal primarily with the science and history of

the earth's material. And geological history, as Dana taught, should see the earth as an agent, and describe *its* life.<sup>3</sup> The idea of continent formation, and of the evolution of the earth's crust along two lines of upheaval, are examples of geological history proper. The attempt to grasp the solar system as the development of a primitive nebula is an historical effort. The nebula was an agent, and so is now the solar system. A multiplicity of elements are combined therein in terms of a common tendency—not a tendency present in the same form in all parts, but one requiring the co-operation of the several parts, each in different ways, for its realization.

In many so-called histories the main purpose is not historical, but is to present some general truth, or at least to note resemblances and differences between the several phenomena presented. Such attempts at generalization are usually presented in chronological form for the simple reason that examples most like each other are commonly thereby brought together, and (a point that is more important) the causal relations are thus more easily noted. Examples are: Del Mar's *History of the Precious Metals*, Bishop's *History of American Manufactures*, Dunning's *History of Political Theories*, Seligman's *History of Progressive Taxation*. In all these, the justification for the title "history" lies in the chronological order.

This chronological order, however, is an evidence of action. The reason that the order of sequence is preferred is the recognition, now universal, that the order in time imprints itself on events, so that there is internal evidence which of them precedes the other. This imprint is the action of events in general, of the course of the world, of the action of time. If the conception of this action is

<sup>3</sup> *Manual of Geology*, pp. 9, 10.

vague in such histories, it must be remembered that the element of historical synthesis is vague in them also; their primary function is to discover laws or classes.

In this chapter I have tried to show that the historian, in his inquiry after past events, starts from some present fact, or facts, which need explanation, and finds the past process that explains them in terms of the realization of a tendency, or an action; in the light of which those present facts, now the evidence of that action, take on a new unity and meaning. The content of history is always this past fact, thus associated dynamically with the evidence that it has brought about. But this essential content is seldom portrayed in its simplicity. Partly because the unity of action is seldom perfect in terrestrial things; partly because the historian must take his reader through a multitude of static details before he can enable him to penetrate to the hidden stream of unitary action. This it was that historians had done, before Buckle demanded of them that they turn their attention to the discovery of laws; and this historians have continued to do, in spite of his demand, though their work has suffered from the lack of a sufficiently clear answer to his clear and narrow challenge, What is it you have done? In the next chapter I shall try to state more clearly the purpose of the historian, and the value of his work, as he constantly finds more comprehensive and more significant unities of action in the past, and, therefore, new depths of meaning in the present.

## CHAPTER III

### ACTION AS THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION

10. GENERAL PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION, AND STATEMENT OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE.—11. HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION IN BIOGRAPHIES.—12. OTHER HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS.—13. THE BOUNDS OF HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION, AND FREEDOM.

10. In the preceding chapter we have discussed the search of the historian for the facts of the past, and have seen reason to believe that those facts, in the first instance, are always *actions*. This search for the past, which may be animated merely by a noble curiosity, is historic "*invention*." But there is another side to the historian's work, viz., historical *construction*, where the historian is concerned with the relations between historical elements, as these elements are revealed by the process described and discussed in the preceding chapter. I wish, in this chapter, to complete my account of the concept of history by showing (1) that, in this construction, the concept governing the historian *must* be *action*; (2) that the concept indicates also the *inspiration* and motive of the constructive historian; (3) that through this concept, thus applied, historical and "natural" science stand in the clearest antithesis.

As to the first, that action *must* be the concept of historic construction, it has been shown that the reality of the content of history (and history is nothing if not real) depends upon the dynamic association of the facts of history with the evidence we have of them. But the construction, the

synthesis of the elements of history, whereby the relation of several elements to each other is manifest, must also have this same historical character, for it cannot be mere fiction, and must therefore have the same dynamic connection with the evidence, and must by the same argument be action. That is, what makes the several elements *one* must be an action, and whatever is added to each of the elements through its presence in the whole must also be action.

As to the second point, that the concept action indicates the inspiration of the historian, let us note that it follows from what I have just said that anything that is an element in an historical construction or synthesis, thereby is active in a greater measure and in a different way than if it remained without that construction. Now action is the realization of the tendencies of a thing; and tendencies constitute the character or nature of a thing. Hence, to know in what wider syntheses of action a thing appears, is to know more of its efficient nature; and if the things in question be men, or, indeed, whatever they may be, the historian has a worthy task in thus ascertaining wherein things do or may realize themselves most fully. Not only would I show that this aim ought to be the aim of the historian, according to the deduction before given, but that it has been and is his aim and inspiration.

And as to the third point: action, as the concept of historical construction, implies a relation between the elements of history that is rightly called *teleological*, in contrast with the mechanical relations of things in natural science. For, inasmuch as the lesser elements of a history build up the greater, they are means towards its realization, that is, to the realization of its end. And, again, since that greater action must, as already shown, conduce to added activity of the lesser elements, it is a means to their realization and fulfilment; and so, through that greater action, to which

all the lesser contribute, each lesser element is a means to the realization of every other. This reciprocal relation of parts and whole as means and ends, is in terms of the fulfilments of the tendencies exhibited in each, that is, of the end, the *τέλος* of each. The relation, therefore, is teleological throughout.

The contrast between teleological and mechanical synthesis is made manifest by comparing the kind of causation implied in each. In the teleological relation the effect attained in any element of the teleological construction is the realization of the end or goal inherent in that element, proper to it. A thing is active only when it realizes *its* ends. And the explanation of the process through which that end was realized is the tendency which the thing had. In other words, in such teleological relationships between elements the causation is "*inner*;" whereas in the mechanical, the drift of explanation is always away from inner causation to external, until, in the mechanical explanation proper, whatever change takes place springs from an external cause. We shall see (chap. iv) that perhaps at no time does the physicist quite break free from explanation in terms of inner causation, but we shall also see that that is his drift.

It is because of the insistence on inner causation in history, I think, that it is rightly said to be the science of freedom; for freedom means to me nothing but activity according to one's own nature. If we mean by freedom, causelessness, therefore, the teleology of history is opposed to it. If we mean by freedom the *consciousness* of the realization of one's own nature, teleology is consistent with it but exists without it. There was teleological relation between plant and animal life, and even between the parts of the solar system, before man's consciousness took note of it. But if we mean by freedom the absence of external,

mechanical determination, then teleology does not assert it, or at all require it; for, wherever there is historical construction there is a multiplicity of elements as well as a unity, and between the many elements reciprocal and external determination appears.<sup>1</sup>

11. We have now to show that the historian does in fact seek to exhibit a synthesis of lesser in greater actions in a teleological relationship. We shall see, I think, that what other men leave in isolation and poverty he brings together, with the result that he fills the world with objects of deeper significance; objects that we may imitate or reject, objects into which we may enter as elements, or from which we may free ourselves.

Such a synthesis of many small actions into one great one is exemplified in a biography, if it be a good one. Samuel Johnson, in his seventy-five years of life, through many actions left behind him traces which survive in evidence still before us. To the common eye unaided, that

<sup>1</sup> In this contrast between mechanical and historical construction, I have not noted the character of uniqueness. That seems to me quite secondary. The historian does not look for unique things for the sake of their uniqueness. Why should he? He starts from a particular thing, viz., a piece of evidence, and whatever constructions he makes, he must return to a particular present fact as the evidence of the past existence of those constructions. But the naturalist also starts from and returns to the particular, for verification. But, while his search takes him away from the particular to the general, the historian's activity takes him from lesser to greater. So he never departs from the unique because there is no reason why he should. But that fact does not characterize his task. It is worth noting, however, that in the historian's explanations the coming into existence of *new* things is implied, for the realization of a tendency must differ from the mere tendency. Whereas, of course, the ideal of mechanical explanation is to find that everywhere the effect equals the cause—a result only achieved through rejecting all but quantitative characteristics.



evidence has no significant unity. To the naturalistic eye a synthesis of certain portions of that evidence might be made with the evidence that other men had left; for the Doctor seems to have been a splendid "case" for the pathologist; and one might study his eye, another his liver, another his brain, exemplifying, revealing or casting doubt thereby on certain generalizations of medicine or psychology. The unity of the man would not thus be discovered, nor would he appear as active—rather as subject to the aberrations as well as to the normal activities of his several parts.

But when Macaulay's appreciative eye fell on the mass of evidence, Samuel Johnson stood out for him in his unity as "one of the most eminent English writers of the eighteenth century," the "old philosopher," "a great and good man." In his unity he was active; it is the purpose of every biographer to exhibit the unity of his hero; and to that end he recounts the action through which the man in his life realized his inner nature. His several powers or "parts," as a disappearing idiom termed them, are successively revealed in the course of his life, in his actions, gaining their character in large measure from the *general* activity of the man which they, on the other hand, constitute. He *had* a kind and generous heart, a strong though scrofulous body, a mind of keenness and breadth of comprehension, a retentive memory, etc. Separate these parts from the one man, and they are phenomena for psychology or sociology; but in him they are the material of history, the elements that stand in a reciprocally teleological relation with the complete unity of the man. In the man as a whole, while his body attained a grotesque though powerful maturity, while his intellect continually mastered the heritage of his generation and the tendencies of his time, while his heart expanded towards wife and friends and country, we see one life, and one action, thus viewed now from one

side, now from another, but always the one great soul and character that England loves without quite knowing how to characterize the object of her love.

Such seems to me the object of a biography, a form of historical science. It is utterly different from the syntheses of biology or sociology; it is conceptually one with the work of historic science everywhere. And the power to grasp a life, one's own or another's, is no small part of knowledge.

The biographer must note further into what greater actions his hero enters; for in so far as he *enters* those actions he adds a new activity to his own nature. Thus, when "several eminent booksellers" enlisted the unique powers of Johnson in the compilation of the first dictionary of the English language, Johnson and they, and indeed all the contributors to and readers of the dictionary, entered into reciprocally teleological relations to each other in the constitution of a new form of literary activity. So, in his letter to Chesterfield, Johnson, by voicing the moral bourgeoisie of England, entered into another such action. And to England in its national aspect he contributed much, and from it he gained much, in depth and breadth of feeling and thought.

Of course, in such syntheses of action as I have just described, there is to be found a mechanical, or at least an external determination. It is always reciprocal, as explained in section 8. It may be well for the biographer to note that Johnson excited admiration in the booksellers, and that they moved Johnson through his ambition, his cupidity, or his love of letters. These explanations, which are, let us say, quasi-psychological, make the narrative clear. They are moreover true. They do not at all interfere with the further relation of reciprocal aid, of correspondence of purposes, of co-operation. But these latter

are something other than the explanations just referred to, and are important also. Through this kind of synthesis we get visions of things greater than Johnson or the book-sellers, things that made them in large measure what they at their best were; that still persist, perhaps; for it is the same world of letters, surely, that moves onward now as then, and is to-day a thing worth knowing about.

Among those who have the direction of methods in teaching history, we may note the conviction that the scientific aspect of history is the noting of these causal relations between elements of histories. The person who could do that, who could note the widest generalizations in the material of history is what Macaulay meant by a philosopher of history. There was a time when the insistence on these illustrations of general laws in historic material was all-important—at the time when sociology was first finding itself. The insistence on the subservience of the interpretation of evidence to general laws was necessary, too, and perhaps still is necessary to protect us from the myths that patriotism, religion and “philosophy” may seek to cite as history. The historian must become *prosaic*, as Hegel said, meaning just this. But what Hegel might well have called the *poetic* side of history must not be neglected, for there is no genuine historic science without it. In days when men love to dwell on what man shares with brutes and the inanimate, thus always turning toward the smallest things, the most insignificant of the world, for these are the objects of the most sweeping generalizations, it is well to insist no less on the capacity to perceive all the greatness that is to be seen in the world; a capacity not exhausted by discovering a formula for the spatial and kinetic readjustments of things. This capacity is exercised in the perception of syntheses of actions. It is not to be limited to political associations. Historical science touches

every side of our lives. And it is not quickly to be decided that any one of them is fundamental to the others.

12. Biography is in some ways the most simple of historical constructions. We usually think, however, in this connection, of the histories of states. It is seen to be of fundamental ethical and political importance that men should realize the existence of a reciprocally teleological relation between themselves and the state, and that histories may serve that end. This aspect of the state has been called its organic character. Spencer called the state a super-organic unity, but I doubt whether his view can be classed as teleological, for he does not conceive the state to have an end in itself. It is a policeman deprived of his humanity. The term organic is properly biological. Whether, or how far, it applies to the state should be decided in detail. We have in the term *agent* a word that certainly applies both to the state and to organisms. Its definition, that which fulfils its own tendencies, implies a unity existing in a multiplicity of elements that are one in virtue of a tendency existing in them all, to which the several elements contribute in different ways because of their interconnection in that group, that contribution being, in turn, a fulfilment of tendencies latent in those elements.

Any history of a country exhibits this teleological relation in a measure. It is made explicit more in histories that are trying to prove the existence of an agency than in those that deal with well-established agencies. It is not often that the historian stops to ask himself what he means by the unity of the state in which he lives and moves all the time. And when we turn to those less assured agencies, such as those of the "Anglo-Saxon race," the Germanic race, American civilization, European civilization, the Yellow race, the Mohammedan world, etc., we are likely to be

told that no two men agree on the nature of the agencies in question. This I do not consider a vital defect, for the reasons I give in Chapter VI, but I shall turn for illustration rather to Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, because there is likely to be less question on this last point in connection with that history, and we may consider simply what the historian in general *means* by that unity which is the object of his history.

Though Bryce says he writes the history of an institution, created by and embodying a "wonderful system of ideas," yet he does not succeed in separating the institutions from the people in whom it was realized. He exhibits Goth and Roman, pagan and Christian, coming within the fold of one agency, the Empire, the possessor, the incarnation of this "system of ideas." In them the institution is real: they create it; but in turn they are created, in their truer selves, by it. Here is a teleological synthesis.

Between the Roman Church and the Roman Empire Bryce notes an underlying unity; they are one and the same thing in two aspects (p. 166). Here, too, is an historical synthesis; a past fact, a unity which must be recorded in the evidence and not a mere discovery of the historian. They were one because they acted as one, towards common ends. But Bryce treats this unity as partial. Though we catch glimpses of the idea that the people of Europe are the seat of a real unity, gaining by the conflicts of Church and Empire, the dominating sense is one of loss. I have shown how, in spite of the character of history as the science of action, such passivity, such mutual interference and reciprocal determination in an external way may appear within histories.

Hegel, however, insists that this conflict itself may be taken up into the "inner" development of the age. It was not a case of interference but of assistance. We may para-

phrase his account as follows: The essence of the Christian principle which the German race was in process of learning, is the recognition that man, so far as he is spirit, possesses the activity of the deity. But, before this idea could fully be grasped by the mind of man, the antithesis between man as nature and man as spirit had to be brought to daylight, as it were—that is, “externalized” in a conflict between two divisions of the people, the one representing nature, the other spirit. The spiritual “therefore” limited itself to the visible church, and that proceeded to subject to itself the merely natural, the laity, in conformity with the generally but confusedly recognized principle of Christianity. The natural sought, then, the spiritual in activities directed by the church, even to the point of seeking the burying-place of Christ. In this subjection of its deepest nature to the tyranny of church doctrine, combined with the discipline of feudalism, the “knotty heart” underlying the German temperament was softened, and, with the aid of art and science and discovery, was itself lead to the recognition of the divine. Then could follow, as the next step in the self-realization of the Christian world, the overthrow of the church usurpant. For the spirit no longer resided with it, for any purpose. This again is a teleological synthesis.

We may quarrel with the facts or the theories of Hegel, but the general nature of his work in his philosophy of history was that of historic science; and if he did it badly it simply remains for some one else to do it better. For the point I would urge here is that the unity the Scotch jurist perceives is just as “mysterious” as the underlying Spirit or Idea which the German philosopher presents, and no more so than the unity of any person we “meet.” Bryce says the Holy Empire is “incapable of expression,” “above all description or explanation.” Though its realization was

the common aim of all its members, yet that realization was not merely the common element of those aims, any more than the purpose of a man is the element common to the purposes of his several organs. To know that unity, to "enter into the mystery of its being" as Bryce says in his Conclusion, is to know it in its prime, as a whole, as a product of historical conditions, occupying a certain place in historical development, as living, as an agent. The historian does not gain knowledge of such unities through synthesis of elements. He meets it, in the sense in which we meet persons, coming down through the past, and knows it by *investigating* (*ἱστορεῖν*) its part *as parts*. For his purpose is to understand and appreciate, but not to control or direct, not to create a new combination of those elements, or to predict such a new combination. And this character of his work is deducible from the definition, that the historian studies the past of which there is evidence.

Is the Spencerian synthesis historical? The answer is a complete negative; but to establish this requires rather careful distinction between terms. All things, says Spencer, tend towards integration of matter, with concomitant increase in coherence, heterogeneity, definiteness and complexity; or, with the disintegration of matter, there appear the opposite of these concomitant characters. The former is the prevailing tendency. The question for us is, have we here merely common characteristics of phenomena and a unity brought into existence by a comparison of those phenomena, or have we a unity of past process, in which things have acted as one, producing a unity of evidence, so that the historian may discover a unity that existed concretely and independently of him?

The answer is that the unity is of the former type, it is one of generalization. Though Spencer is sure his formula applies to lesser elements, he is not sure that it applies to

greater elements, though he would like to prove that it does. Hence the unity is not one in which the existence of the unity contributed to the character of the parts. Nor is there any significance in the converse statement, which at first sight seems plausible, that at least the lesser elements, in their realization of the evolutionary process, contributed to the greater. For what lesser elements can we name? Were we to take the human body as an example of the whole, there would be no point in asserting that what we know of its organs, the liver, heart, etc., in their realizations of the formula, contributed to its realization in the whole. For, if we remember the quantitative character of the formula, to say that it is realized in such parts, is merely to say that it is in truth realized throughout the whole. The specific functions of those organs have no place in the formula, and individuality goes with them. Again, there could be no synthesis of action between the ultimate elements and the whole; for the ultimate elements, quantitatively considered, being units, could not themselves undergo increase in integration, etc., as the formula requires.

Here I must leave the illustrations of historic construction. It will be necessary to give other examples in Chapter V. Examples are common enough. In common talk, and on almost every page of certain histories, appear references to these greater agencies. But we do not ask ourselves what we mean by them. Historical construction has not become self-conscious. But I hope that this essay may be an aid to its becoming so. In Chapter VII, I discuss the relation of history and ethics, maintaining that the drift of the present is towards a clearer conception of these greater agencies with which historical science is busied, and of our relation to them.

But I would here indicate what there is not space to



develop, that we would lose much by confining our application of historic synthesis to the synthesis of human actions. The *conception* is, as I think I have proved, much broader. And the historian of the earth's crust has already given beautiful examples of teleological relationships in such developments as those of the continents and of the general continental system along the two great axes of uplift; for that there is a teleological relationship, a reciprocity of aid between the parts, and the parts and the whole of such developments seems to me to need no demonstration here. In the process of covering the earth with beautiful forms of life, again, it would be not less worthy to exhibit the details of the synthesis of activities among animals and plants than to generalize about the conditions of the origin and preservation of variations. For in such wider fields of action the activities of man have a place from which we cannot altogether escape, though, through comprehension, we may modify it. So that we may realize, perhaps, that, in spite of external determination, we enter into a condition of mutual aid and true freedom.

13. There are two lines of thought current that seem to contradict this idea of recognizing our freedom by realizing into what syntheses of action we enter. The first is, that while we conceive certain sides of our natures, as the aesthetic and the intellectual, to be highest and essential to us, these activities are dominated by the lower, which we share with the brutes. Thus the economic interpretation of history would trace to causes connected with nutrition all transformations of society. I see no reason, however, why we cannot accept Professor Seligman's statement that this economic interpretation "will become less and less true of the future," and that it "only emphasizes the domain within which the ethical forces can at any partic-

ular moment act with success." <sup>3</sup> It does not, in its sane form, deny that man may subordinate, in very large measure, the factor of economic causation. It seems rather to exhibit factors always present than to show why *new* forms of civilization have arisen.

The second of these lines of thought which operate to call in question the possibility of human freedom declares, that "man, like everything else, is what he is because of his environment, past and present." This unqualified would eliminate the factor of "inner" causation. The latter explains the events in which the individual takes part by certain characteristics proper to that individual, that exist in him as a potentiality. In events thus explainable the individual is active. As I have already tried to show, wherever we deal with events that are not mere motions, or analyzable and, indeed, analyzed into motions, there enters this factor of internal causation and of activity. Even the rock that is dissolved by the stream is active in fulfilling its *solubility*, without which the river's action on it would be futile.

But the tendency to regard all events as determined by the environment returns, and a cause for this tendency must be sought. The belief that all things are explicable in terms of general laws has nothing to do with the matter, for, as I develop more fully in Chapter VI, those are laws of activities.

I find the cause for the tendency above described in the following circumstance. All events, those with specific qualities, and also mere motions in space, are in time. The movement of time is measured by certain motions in space

<sup>3</sup> See *The Economic Interpretation of History*, by Professor Seligman, pp. 3, 131, 158. Cf. Mill's statement, *Logic*, bk. vi, chap. x, § 7: "The pursuit of truth is the main determining cause of the social progress."

that are uniform. The necessity of these motions rests on the environment, as do all lesser motions that fit in with the great movements of the earth. But all events that are historically certain, that have an *objective* character, are so because of their connection with certain evidence of them, and this evidence is in the last resort physical, and therefore partakes of the absolutely determined movements mentioned. Hence the world, with its richness of specific qualities, is taken to be determined in like manner; for a change in the one is always accompanied by some change in the other. Hence, all events are determined, apparently, by this onward movement of time.

The following well-known passage from Guizot's *History of Civilization in Europe* suggests this arbitrary nature of the "action of time;" its qualitative efficiency is associated with the uniform, compelling revolutions of the earth.

On the one hand, he speaks of that civilization as *active*; e. g., ripening, enduring, advancing, pressing forward, while increased freedom attended its movements (p. 29). That civilization gives us the historical synthesis of action which he has actually discovered. On the other hand, there appears the conception of an unlimited environment forcing itself from without on this civilization. "Violence," he says, "presides at the birth of governments, but time rolls on. It corrects them. It changes the works of violence; it corrects them—simply because society endures and is composed of men. Independently of the favor of man, by a special law of Providence that it is impossible to mistake, the action of time gradually introduces into society more right, more intelligence, more justice. Thus forces itself into the world, and from the world into the mind of man, the notion of political legitimacy."

It surely is needless to give evidence of the almost uni-

versal belief in an all-powerful fate persistently bending the course of time in some direction, or as persistently, as ostensibly with Schopenhauer, rendering null and void all apparent progress. One character this all-powerful factor does undoubtedly possess; it drives all things onward in time. And in the field of history, of the science of the past, it has driven all things onward to the present, the present evidence of that past. This action has imprinted itself on the evidence, so that therein we may with care trace the successive stages of its fulfilling until it is completed in the present. Hence, it is strictly an action, and Guizot with reason calls it the "action of time." Now, with reference to the problem enunciated in the second paragraph of this section, I have to show that it is not possible for the historian as such to regard the character of his individuals as completely determined by this all-embracing "action of time."

I cannot see that we have any right to ascribe to this "action of time" an *infinite* power to determine events of specific character. Such events, so far as we can determine, always flow from "internal" causes, and in a certain limited environment. And, where we find that the activity of such limited portions of environment is in part conditioned by a wider environment, we always find that there is a *reciprocal* determination, and often a reciprocally teleological relation, in which, while the lesser action is swallowed up by a larger, it itself aids to create that larger. In such greater actions our part, *e. g.*, is not to be neglected, for there commonly rests on us an obligation, we feel, to do our part. And our part is apparently never like that of anything else, and has perhaps a unique value, therefore, in the whole.

Now the infinity of space gives us an infinity of evidence, no doubt, and therefore assures us that, however far we

carry our syntheses of action, in our activity as historians, we shall not have completed the task. But, on the other hand, however far we carry those syntheses, we shall still perceive a reciprocally teleological relation within those syntheses, and shall perceive freedom in the elements that enter the synthesis, that create it by their "inner" efficiency.<sup>4</sup>

The sense of determination that we receive from considering the "action of time," therefore, results from a confusion of thought, if I have argued correctly. In the qualitative aspects of our activity, the further we extend the knowledge of our relations the *more* activity we shall see reason to posit in ourselves. It is only in our quantitative aspect, as a congeries of atoms, that we must assign to our bodies a zero of efficiency in contrast with the infinity of space. But in the conception of the action of time the spatial and quantitative aspect is combined with the active and qualitative aspect of things, and the determinism of the one wrongly carried over to the world of freedom proper to the other.

In the hope that in these chapters I have shown that history has action for its content, and that historical science

<sup>4</sup> And when, in place of a synthesis of action, we find only a multiplicity and conflict of actions, we not only have, as a fact, reciprocal and not absolute determination, but we cannot exclude the possibility that these conflicting actions may be found to be parts, and of course, then, active parts of a synthesis of action. We cannot exclude *a priori* such solutions of apparent conflicts as that proposed by E. V. Hartmann, in his article, "Energetik, Mechanik u. Leben," in *Zeitschrift für Phil. u. Phil. Kritik*, Vol. 124, 2. He would show that the steady chilling of the solar system, in which equilibrium is indefinitely approached, instead of destroying life, as it would seem it must, is really the very means by which life may be maintained through infinite time at its highest spiritual level.

is defined through its purpose to exhibit action in the widest syntheses, I proceed now to attempt the demonstration that *natural* science, though it starts from past facts, from histories, from action, constantly works away from action to the conceptions of law and external determination.

## CHAPTER IV

### ACTION IN MECHANICS

14. GENERAL POSITION.—15. DEFINITIONS OF ACTION; ITS USE IN MECHANICS.—16. DISCUSSION OF ITS USES.—17. ACTION AND ENERGY.

14. In this chapter I wish to make as clear as possible what I understand to be the contrast between historical and natural science. As I conceive the latter to be marked by a tendency to explain all things in strictly mechanical terms, the contrast I seek should be found in comparing the ideal of historical construction with the ideal of mechanics. The latter ideal, there seems to be no doubt, is to explain all events in terms of motion and of the universal laws of motion; if possible, of one such law. Hence, the contrast referred to would set *action* over against *motion* as the material of these respective branches of science; and would set *action*, again, over against *law*, as the concept of construction in each case.<sup>1</sup>

To consider more precisely the material of mechanical science, since it seeks a law of utmost generality it deals with a property common to all things and events. All things and events have at least a reference to motion in space. In a law of utmost generality, again, differences in things must be quantitative, and the law itself proportional in form. In the laws of motion things possess the

<sup>1</sup> The antithesis is not complete, for action by no means excludes motion. In chapter vii I contest Münsterberg's position that purposes or ends are the aim of historical construction. What that position gains in symmetry, it loses, I think, in truth.

quantity of mass. Mass is a mere *possibility* of motion; it does not imply a tendency in things to move, but only the possibility that under certain external conditions the body will move. Hence the science of mechanics deals with motion and things moving, possibilities of motion and relations in space.

The general law, "circumstances determine accelerations" (Pearson's *Grammar of Science*, p. 323), refers whatever motions the body participates in to the totality of its circumstances. This general law does not, as I see it, of itself include the law of inertia, as Pearson maintains. In that law every motion or change of motion is conditioned by a preceding motion or change. Therefore such change of motion is a form of the continuance of motion. Now, the circumstances of a thing can determine acceleration only through continuances of motions within the totality of circumstances. And to explain that continuance we must fall back again on the law of inertia.

Therefore, to complete our comparison of historical with mechanical science we must consider the source of this supposed axiom, the continuance of motion and the law of inertia. To put the source of this continuance of motion within any limited or definite body or collection of bodies would be inconsistent with the general mechanical position, which avoids inner for external causation. But the law of inertia itself is so simple and positive a postulate that its source cannot be the mere search for an ever-retreating limit of circumstances.

If I can raise the question as to the validity of so simple a supposed axiom it must be by noting a distinction between things which common-sense treats as identical. In this case it seems that I have distinguished between the movement of time and the movement of things in general. The next moment has arrived, and I ask, why does the



totality of circumstances continue its indefinite or unknown movement, carrying on with it the movement of any particular body under consideration? But this is a distinction without significance for the common-sense that asserts the law of inertia. For what would the movement of time be without the movement of things in general? That is, the statement of the law of inertia as an axiom of mechanics is the preliminary positing of all efficiency, by which the possibilities of motion in things become actual, in the totality of circumstances as the action of time, and not as mere environment.

Thus, then, is brought out the antithesis between historical and mechanical method in perhaps its clearest form. Both of them have regard to this totality of circumstances. In mechanical science it is the infinite environment in the face of whose efficiency that of the atom is reduced to zero. In historical construction it merely asserts the incompleteness of any actual concrete, describable synthesis the historian may realize. But it thus impels him only to wider and wider syntheses of action. And the wider such syntheses become the greater the activity of the elements included within it. The latter makes us acquainted with the nature of ourselves and our environment, as objects that agree in the direction of their activities. The former is an attempt to take an impartial point of view, in which all things take the same quantitative character, in order that, within actions alien to ourselves, we may perceive movements like those we are able to control, and by a combination of such elementary motions proceed to the control of the at present opposing actions. Hence, to mechanics, inner causation marks the limit of control and is a category it has shunned since the days of Bacon and Descartes. For inner causation implies the impossibility of analysis into the simple movements of bodies in space. On the

other hand, inner causation is activity and freedom in the things in which it exists, and historical science aids us in the detection of those wider agencies in which our own activity is, or may be, conserved.

15. In fulfilment of my purpose to contrast the sciences of history and of mechanics, I shall now consider the use of the term action in mechanics. It has received but one definition, and that in a very special use of the term. In the theory of "least action," action is defined as the space integral of the momentum, or as double the time integral of the kinetic energy. In either case it is  $ml^2t^{-1}$  (*Enc. Brit.*, '98 *Mechanics*, § 200). When the particular presuppositions of that theory are allowed for, action appears equivalent to the product of velocity and distance. But this apparent identification of action and motion turns out, when we consider those presuppositions, to indicate the opposite. For the theory of least action, in its equations, treats economy of restraint as mere guidance and not as constraint, the minimum of effort as no effort. That is, the *limit* of diminishing action includes motion but excludes the overcoming of restraint. Hence, the latter is held by this theory and definition to be essential to action.

Though the term action has received no general definition in mechanics, it is used as a self-explanatory term in the definition of other fundamental categories. Thus Mach defines mass in terms of action (*Sci. of Mech.*, p. 220). Holman (*Matter, Energy, Force and Work*) defines force and also energy through action. He treats action as equivalent to a process, an operation; and again, as though it were intermediate between a force and its coming into operation. This use of action to indicate states of movement is common; thus, "the mutual actions between the parts of any system during any motion, as performing or

consuming work" (*Enc. Brit.*, l. c., § 200 *et seq.*); and action is described as a mode of passage, a process, a doing (*ibid.*). Newton, in his law of equality of action and reaction, intends the term action to apply to movements as well as to states of equilibrium. And continually we speak of the actions of natural forces, machines, animals, etc., as rapid or vehement, indicating this character of movement or change in action.

The term, however, is applied also freely where there is no motion, where there is equilibrium. Thus we say, "When a system is in equilibrium under the action of forces" (*Enc. Brit.*, l. c., § 258). Newton's equation between action and reaction is much more often applied to a state of equilibrium than to one of rest. Again, we speak of a body's sphere of action (*cf.* Mach, *Sci. of Mech.*, p. 385), and mean by this, not that there is some actual motion, but only that there is something, as it were, *there*, such that if anything did come under its influence change of some kind would result through the first body.

Among all these uses of the terms, act, action, there appears, necessarily, association with a particular thing, which is in some sense the agent. Such expressions as "the combined action of B and C," the "mutual actions of bodies" producing equal accelerations, occur in all writers on mechanics—these come from Pearson and Mach. But it surely is hardly consistent that such efficiency should be attached to the *things* by writers who say that force is the *circumstances of the thing* to which motion is consequent, or that it is an arbitrary conceptual measure of motion. Of course no more, probably, is here meant by speaking of *action* than that the motion which results from two or more bodies in known relative positions is best analyzed by localization of the several forces in the several bodies, so that the respective distances may be taken into

account. But it is interesting and important to notice that the word is used, to trace the origin of this use in mechanics, and to discuss its legitimacy.

16. If the position stated in the fourth section of this essay is correct, then the origin of the use of the term action in mechanics is obvious. If, in an experiment to determine the numerical value of the force of gravitation, a ball falls and thereby displaces certain marks at certain intervals, the plan of the machine, with the displacement of the ball and the records of the times of displacement are *present evidence of a past process*. In that process the ball was an *agent* effecting certain things. The process, therefore, as we face the present evidence of it, was an action and a history. That is the "natural" attitude to take, in the first instance. If we are conducting experiments in mechanics, our theorizing starts from such histories. It is later that we learn to posit in the totality of circumstances the efficiency and agency, which, from the immediate evidence, we were led to ascribe to the ball.

The fact that the physicist starts from histories, from little actions, accounts for the origin of the terms act and action in mechanics; and the retention of those terms in the definitions of such men as Mach and Pearson is to be explained again by the fact that it is the most natural, the most deeply rooted way of looking at the world, to conceive its parts as working out in some measure their own destiny, and that the terms act and action so immediately express this attitude that they are the last terms to be called in question. Hence, they themselves are not defined but surreptitiously appear in the definitions of the fundamental categories of mass and energy.

Mach, no doubt, would protest against the "voluntary penury" of thought that the exclusion of action from the

definitions of mechanics would produce. But to eliminate from mechanics at most points the idea of action and efficiency in particular things, and yet without warning to employ at other points the term that above all others denotes such efficiency and enforcement, is merely to confuse the matter and to disguise the logical character of what is being done. Without difficulty, in his definition of mass, Mach might, I take it, instead of the expressions, "bodies mutually acting on each other," "producing equal accelerations" (*Science of Mechanics*, p. 220) employ the conception of bodies in such quantitative relations to each other that there result equal accelerations.

It is hardest to eliminate the idea of action in mechanics from conditions of equilibrium, in which we are taught that action and reaction are equal and opposite. We are accustomed to think of a condition of strain or stress as existing between bodies in equilibrium; and the term action describes that. But the condition of strain in *us* is never one of equilibrium, but always of change, and often of violent, though not easily measured, or extended motion. Mill (*Logic*, chap. iii, p. 10, § 5) says there is a *tendency* to move in bodies in equilibrium; for, he argues, since a small additional weight will overcome the opposition, equilibrated force must all along have "exerted its full effect." But since, unless the additional weight is added, to all eternity the original forces will remain equilibrated, there is there a mere *possibility*, and not a *tendency*—nor any efficiency whatever. Only when the movement of circumstances brings some change, "impresses some force," does efficiency appear in the region in question.

It has, I believe, been thought not improbable that in so-called equilibrium we have exceedingly rapid oscillations, the oscillation itself traveling at infinite speed. This would do away with the special difficulty attending the

elimination of the idea of activity in states where we now conceive equilibrium and strain or stress.<sup>2</sup>

17. It is necessary to consider briefly the concept energy. For that term seems to suggest efficiency, and we must see whether mechanics, using that term as it does, can properly be said to exclude agency.

The term energy is now often asserted to be the fundamental concept of science. "Every change, and consequently every process, may be fully described by a statement of the kind and amount of energy, considered with respect to time and place, that has undergone conversion." It is claimed that even all psychical processes may so be described (Ostwald, *International Quarterly*, vol. vii, no. 2, pp. 312, 313; cf. *Vorlesungen*, p. 153). What, then, is the relation between the terms action and energy?

Energy is defined by Ostwald as "*work, or all that arises from work, and permits of transformation into it*"

<sup>2</sup> As to the use of the term action in the "theory of least action," I find a difference of opinion as to the significance of that theory and of those related to it. Professor Frederick Sleight, of the University of California, criticizes (*Science*, Mar., 1904) the "scheme of energetics" because it describes the conditions at the boundaries of an interval, and leaves us ignorant of the conditions within the interval. I suppose that that applies equally to the earlier conceptions of mechanics, except to those with which the theories of "least" and "modified" action are concerned. These, with the theorems based on them, attempt, I understand, to elucidate the character of the processes "*internally*" considered. The author of the article on "Mechanics" in the *Enc. Brit.* (§ 200) says that the quantity "action," *A*, is destined to play an important part in future physics; and I take it that its part is in the direction where, according to Professor Sleight, the theory of energetics does not avail. The environment, in the theories above mentioned, is limited, and we seem to have a close approximation to the original, proper and historical use of the concept action in mechanics. However, according to Mach, the theories in question are of value solely because they emphasize the uniqueness of the phenomena to which they apply.

(*Vorlesungen*, p. 158). Work is not here a process, but the effect (*Wirkung*) of a process, for it is a quantity (*Grosse* cf. p. 154). The German verbal noun, *Wirken*, seems to be associated rather with the effect than with the agent. The word *Arbeit*, work, commonly refers to the result; but it suggests the effort of the process that has achieved that result. It is with this suggestion of a *process* in mind that Ostwald says (*Vorlesungen*, p. 175) that *senses* react, not on forces, but on energies. But, as he commonly employs the terms work and energy, the process is only referred to, not contained in the terms. Thus, it certainly is not true that the *process* is transferable, transformable and conservable (*Vorlesungen*, p. 155). Ostwald, of course, rejects the notion that energy, as a concept, explains anything, or describes an independent somewhat, efficient and all-embracing (*Vorlesungen*, p. 413).

The definition given above seems to give energy at least two meanings. The criticisms of Mach (*Erhaltung der Arbeit*, pp. 174 *et seq.*) seem to imply that the second part of the definition should be taken as defining the first. Energy, he says, is a convenient concept for expressing the "substantiality" of work, its transferability, transformability and conservability (cf. *Pop. Sci. Lect.*, pp. 178, 184). Ostwald, however, frequently departs from this modest use of the word, as Mach (*l. c.*) and Professor Hibben (*Monist*, April, 1903) have sufficiently established.

The term energy, as Ostwald uses it, would seem properly to imply that, a certain process having been finished, there lies in the conditions of its fulfilment the possibility of another process, equal in amount and reversed in direction, that will leave things in their original condition. Or, where conditions of a certain kind are seen to prevail, the past occurrence of the first process is assumed in order to explain the possibility of a process, reverse in character.

While where, as in the case of the gradual heating of the cosmos, the reversibility is inconceivable, reference is made to an absolute zero in the light of which such reductions to uniformity and *loss* of intensity *would* mean the reduction to a *common* intensity.

The other definitions of energy also make it a capacity or possibility. Ganot calls it the "*capacity* for producing physical change" (*Physics*, § 63). Holman (*op. cit.* 29) says it is the "*power* to change the state of motion of a body." Sigwart defines kinetic energy as the capacity for work of the moving body; potential, that of a body at rest (*Logic*, §§ 73, 23). Actual, the opposite of potential energy, would be the *movement* as a continuous exercise of its energy. The potential energy of the ascended ball is a mere prevision. The ball may never fall, and no action, even indirectly, ever reverse the original motion. The attraction between earth and ball *through which we picture the potential energy is least* when the potential energy is *greatest*, when the bodies are furthest apart. Until the action is incipiently reversed the energy, as posited in the ball, is not even a tendency; *it is a mere possibility*. True, the energy as a function of the entire universe assenting to the reversing, would be a tendency. But such unlocalized tendencies would be of no service in prevision.

So I conclude that the concept energy has none of the efficiency and none of the individuality of action. It seems to have an advantage over the terms previously employed in physics simply because the others, for instance *force*, had certain associations with *particular kinds* of power. Part of its apparent advantage seems to be gained, as I have suggested, by ambiguity. More than one conception, as shown by Ostwald's definition, is locked up in its apparent simplicity. But there seems to be no question that heat energy, volume energy, etc., are not things which imply



connection with some particular object in order that they may be thought of at all. Energy lacks that characteristic of action. And further, energy needs something to call it out, or to determine its points of application. And so it lacks also the efficiency of action.

To sum up, then, the term energy in physics stands for a mere possibility and indicates no specially close reference, nor any return to the historical reality, the past process from which all physical calculations start. It is in no sense the equivalent of action. It in no way serves to introduce agency, efficiency, into the mechanical world. And, indeed, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, there seems no good reason why the mechanical world, the world of calculations, need try to retain or regain the concept of historic reality, unless it be in connection with the attempt to view "internally" a given process (*cf.* note 3).

In this chapter I have aimed to exhibit the antithesis between motion and possibilities of motions and things moving, on the one hand, with action, tendencies, and agents on the other, an antithesis resting on the basis of efficiency. It is my intention now to note the place of these contrasted conceptions in the natural sciences generally, the mingling therein of the mechanical and the historical notions, with the drift toward the mechanical and the ineradicable element of the historical.

## CHAPTER V

### ACTION IN THE SCIENCES OF NATURE OTHER THAN MECHANICS

18. GENERAL POSITION.—19. ACTION IN CHEMISTRY AND IN THE NON-MECHANICAL PHYSICS.—20. IN BIOLOGY.—21. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY.

18. By the sciences of nature I understand those that seek a knowledge of laws. The term mechanical is often applied loosely to phenomena on the ground that uniformity or law has been discovered within them. But, as we have a science of mechanics dealing with motions and with possibilities of motions, it would seem that the term mechanical should apply only to interpretations of phenomena in which the terms of mechanics are used. There is, however, in the derivation of the word mechanical the suggestion of machine or contrivance. And we may, I think, base the common use of the word in relation to certain phenomena in part on the fact that it is possible to use those phenomena as mere instruments, obedient to our will. If we can foresee phenomena, it is possible to make them, in many cases, almost as subservient to ourselves as when we, in the case of machines proper, put the parts together and set them in motion; and so we call events that we can predict, mechanical.

But, after all, such complete subservience is found only in the realm of phenomena with which the science of mechanics deals. So that the two fundamental uses of the term mechanical are really one; and it seems reasonable to

object to so loose a use of the term as is common, and to insist that mechanical explanations proper are in terms of mass, motion, and possibilities of motion.

This objection and the general distinction between the mechanical and the non-mechanical sciences of nature is best urged, I think, in terms of the concept action. The character of mechanics that I have just tried to establish, that it starts from experiments and observations in which the category of action is employed, and, through analysis of these actions, arrives at the elements common to all actions, viz., motions, the laws of which proceed on the fundamental assumption of inertia, in which the efficiency, the *agency* is eliminated from the particular thing and is placed in the totality of circumstances and the "action of time," this character indicates the kind of thing that all natural sciences attempt, but which none but mechanics can fully accomplish. The laws at which these other sciences of nature arrive are always special to certain phenomena, and this fact prevents the positing of the cause of those laws in the totality of things. The law specially pertains to, and springs from, a certain class of phenomenon, be it a particular kind of metal, be it protoplasm, or a particular class of animal, or be it mind. This limitation of the law is, I find, indicated by the concept action. For that concept implies *inner* causation; and, with such special laws, the effect is explained merely by the *localization of the tendency* in a certain thing, which tendency is merely the potentiality of that effect, is defined in terms of that effect and permits of no other definition. That is, the difference between explanations offered by these several sciences and mechanical explanations is marked by the residuum of action pertaining to each of the former as each in its own realm proceeds from the concrete facts and actions of observation and experiment, through analysis of these, to the

formulation of laws as general as is permitted in that realm.

But the full significance of the concept action in thus distinguishing the non-mechanical from the mechanical branches of natural science, is only seen, according to my view of the matter, when we recall that those processes which are the content of the observations and experiments of natural science, are always, just as we saw in mechanics, *past processes*, of which the observer or experimenter retains only the record, the evidence, which is evidence because it has been brought about by that past process. That is, the naturalist starts in all cases from *histories*. And his own peculiar task is the elimination, so far as possible, of the category that history seeks to retain, that marks the purpose of historical construction, as I have tried to show in Chapter III.

Now, in each of the realms that natural science has set up as separate, we find corresponding to the naturalistic construction an historical construction, the aim of which is not the elimination, but the retention of action. And the significance to which I referred above is this: that, on the one hand, in the naturalistic interpretation the elimination of action proceeds by a process of analysis of the given actions or histories, into elements that are common to many such actions, the course of which, therefore, can be foretold, and therefore in some measure controlled or utilized for the ends of man. If we cannot lift up a log as a whole, we analyze the total movement and lift first one end, and then, supporting that, the other. If we cannot direct the course of the human body as we would in its entirety, we must master the movements of organs and cells.

But, on the other hand, in the historical construction, within the same realms as those with which the naturalist deals, the aim is to discover the nature of actions of such power and extent that it is our purpose rather to under-

stand and enter them than to control them. We are, in the several aspects of our nature, mechanical, chemical, biological, sociological, etc., elements of these greater actions. And every step in the advance of our control over the lesser elements of these actions has introduced us to a new vision of the direction and the immensity of these historical realities.

The control of the elements of the several realms of natural science is the object of a multitude of *arts*. Thus we have the arts of politics, of medicine, of the rearing of animals, of landscape gardening. Even the so-called fine arts seem to be fundamentally an attempt to gain control of our feelings and of others' feelings by applying our knowledge of the nature of the simpler of such feelings.

Now, in each of these realms, in which we thus find, associated by community of objects, both natural and historical science and also art, it seems that the historical construction, though perhaps the vaguest and least developed of them all, leads all in influence. To consider first that realm in which historical construction has received the most attention, we see that the *state* may be viewed from two aspects: as a machine created by the art of man and intended to carry out his purposes—an aspect not without its truth, surely; and, again, as an agency whose movement it is, in certain features, impossible for man to control, and which he can only in part foresee. In its former aspect, an aspect which the natural science and the art of politics seeks to extend, the state demands tax and toil and tribulation of its constituents because of the promise it contains to give again more than is rendered to it. It is this side of the state that Western civilization, in spite of Hegel, tends now to emphasize. Whereas in Japan, and perhaps in Russia, there seems a disposition to recognize that what is of greatest worth in the individual comes from

his willing participation in the vaster and more enduring purposes of the state, that man must refashion his private designs until, regenerate, he can freely and gladly gain his real goal and life in the subordination of whatever was merely individual. But, in theory or by polite fiction and good intent, at least, we also have regard to the ultimate and more sublime purposes of the state, and subordinate our consideration of the means to bring about a fitting commonwealth to the consideration of what that commonwealth is itself moving to accomplish. And that goal of the state is derived from a study of the past action of the state, from its history, not merely as an isolated community, but as an agency within the greater agencies of civilization, humanity, &c. The action of the state must co-operate with those greater actions, and ours with that of the state as a whole.

So also in the sciences and the arts of medicine, &c., we see their subordination to the historical conception of the general intent and purpose, e. g., of bodily activity, as revealed by the nature of our long and splendid ascent from an humble origin, or to the historical account of the long process of domestication of animals or of the special culture of plants. And the formulation of the *laws* of philogeny and ontogeny have regard to the *single development* and history of life of all kinds upon the earth, in a direction that can in large measure be defined.

This process of continual development, with which history deals, necessarily includes and emphasizes the uniqueness of the events that have contributed to it, as in their course they have introduced new features into the world; and historical construction, therefore, also retains this uniqueness. The connection between these unique elements and the whole advance cannot be subsumed under laws, simply because they *are* new and unique; but they can be, and are subsumed as *means* and *ends* to each other in a reciprocal

teleological relationship, as explained in Chapter III. It is thus that Erigena's philosophy is related to the development of Scholasticism. What, then, could be meant by asserting that Erigena's philosophy occurred entirely in accordance with universal laws? <sup>1</sup>

Such assertions of the mechanical nature of historical developments seem to me not only meaningless, but to lead to the obscuring of the real purpose of historical construction. That there was a cause for the development of life, in the direction in which it has developed, is not denied. But all that can be said of the cause is that there existed a potentiality to produce this among other forms of animal evolution; we may *localize* this tendency thereto within certain limits, and try to show at various points how the potentiality took more and more definite shape. But the important thing for this unique development is to show how there existed a reciprocal teleological relationship between the elements of the whole action. For we are elements of the same action; and it is our province, not so much to transform it, for that we can do in but small measure, but to understand it, and learn to form our sympathies in accordance with it, that with loyal hearts we may, in furthering it, extend our freedom and activity within it.

In the following sections, then, we shall note the residuum of action that marks off the several fields we here deal with from the mechanical realm proper, we shall note the historical aspect that pervades the sciences of nature. And we shall also briefly note the nature of the historical construction proper pertaining to each of these realms as we come to them, since thereby the antithesis between historical and natural construction will become clearer.

<sup>1</sup> This statement comes from Eleutheropulos's *Wirtschaft und Philosophie*, vol. ii, pp. 82, 83. Similar statements abound in Haeckel's works, with regard to the development of animal life from some primitive one-celled parent form. (*Cf. Evol. of Man*, vol. ii, §§ 31 and 41.)

In these sections it is necessary to speak continually of reaction, as well as of action. The former word is used in many different ways. In mechanics, as I pointed out, it is used to designate some *action* opposed to another, which is equal to that other simply because it keeps that other in abeyance or has brought it to an end. If the first action had not been present the second would have occurred, equal in amount and opposite in direction. But in the proper use of the term reaction, in which it is opposed to action in meaning, and is not simply a reverse, a reciprocal, or an opposed action, the reaction is the "receptivity" of the universe, a process indefinable except in terms of the action to which it is the reaction. But this reaction, for practical purposes in natural science other than mechanics, is limited to a certain portion of the universe. But still it is definable only in terms of the correlated action. It corresponds in this use to the old term passivity, which is defined by Leibnitz as follows.

"A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer in relation to another in so far as it is imperfect; and one created thing is more perfect than another in this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain *a priori* what takes place in the less perfect; and it is on this account that the former is said to act on the latter" (*Mon.*, §§ 49-50). Thus, when, e. g., I write, the receptivity, the reaction of pen, paper and ink, or of muscle, is to be explained, with any approach to adequacy, only through my action. To say, as the mechanical use of the term requires, that their reactions with that of the air and other circumstances are equal to my action, is to deprive my action of nearly all its significance, and to leave utterly unexplained, and surely on that basis unexplainable, the most important connection of the several events.



## ACTION IN CHEMISTRY AND THE NON-MECHANICAL PHYSICS

19. These realms of natural science I class together because it seems that *action* has much the same place in all. By non-mechanical physics I mean that branch of science that deals with light, sound, heat, electricity and magnetism. I exclude gravitation because it seems that that is the one aspect of matter that is treated quite quantitatively and mechanically. It is true that we distinguish the specific gravities of bodies, and so seem to ascribe some specific property to things in terms of gravitation; but that view of the matter is set aside by interpreting this specific property as a variation due entirely to the quantity of matter, that is, to the mass of the body. This makes the body entirely receptive. The more mass it is, the more attraction pertains to it, on account of circumstances generally. Gravitation is taken to apply ultimately to bodies which are all alike in respect to it; the differences in effect depend on *external* relations.

But, in the case of chemical substances, of heat, &c., there exists in the thing or in a certain limited tract properties that spring from the nature of that thing. Ostwald's lecture, *Elemente und Verbindungen*, ("Annalen der Naturphilosophie," iii, 4) is a recognition, I understand, of this fundamental distinction between chemistry and the mechanical interpretations of chemical phenomena. The attempt to reduce chemical differences to spatial arrangements of similar particles leads, no doubt, to greater ease in controlling the qualitatively different phenomena of chemistry, but those qualitative distinctions are, after all, what is valuable, and they are not the same things as the corresponding spatial arrangements, supposing the latter were in all cases discovered. Rather they remain the product of the specific nature of the things in which they are found.

So, too, heat is not itself a "mode of motion;" the motion, e. g., travels with the luminous rays through a pane of glass, leaving that cool, and heats the objects on the other side. But the heat did not travel through the pane of glass, for that was not heated. Whether a body is hot depends on what would happen if a thermometer of standard construction were brought in contact with it. And that depends on the absorbing and radiating powers of the body in question, as well as on the circumstances in which it is or has been. That is, heat is the display under certain circumstances of certain specific properties of bodies. This is obviously true in the same manner of light.

In the case of electricity, there is a tendency to ascribe it to little bodies, electrons, that revolve round, or else constitute, the supposed atoms of mechanics. But the property residing in such electrons clearly is specific. If gravity by any chance is to be explained in terms of electricity, then we may perhaps regard the latter as the common property of things, and gravity, then as a result. That would establish a new science in place of mechanics as the science of ultimate generality. At present we treat electricity as a property specific to certain things in certain circumstances. At least the degree of electrical capacity rests on such specific properties, not yet explained quantitatively. So, too, with magnetism, though here the differences between bodies do not seem to be merely of degree. Dissolving power, and solubility, may be considered in like manner for the purposes of this essay.

In the case of all these powers we speak of action, as the action of heat, light, sulphuric acid, &c. Clearly, from the starting-point of ignorance, the question is, who or what caused this particular effect, the smart, the dazzling, the uplift of pieces of paper, erosion of a metal waste-pipe. The process for which the cause is sought is, first, then, an

action, of which the agency is as yet undetermined. But, when the source of such effects is found, there stands out, with regard to all the forces considered in this section, the fact that it is merely a property of a thing and not something of itself, a fact that would remain true if the corresponding motions of ultimate particles were discovered for each of these powers; for the motion would not be the specific power in question. And, in the case of all the properties considered in this section, *there is this peculiarity*, that the exercise of that property is its destruction. A body that has been hot long has thereby lost some of the heat that it had; an acid that has operated has lost some of its power to operate. Though we may say that heat, when it has reached the kindling temperature of the heated body, reproduces itself, it really produces heat in other bodies, not merely through radiation but through the medium of chemical activity. The original heat vanishes; the proof of which could be found in the condition of surrounding bodies. There is *in* the body, therefore, in virtue of these specific properties, merely a *possibility*; the action, as the actual heating of things, or the electric shock is the realization of the possibility. It *is*, however, an action, that is, the fulfilling of a *tendency*, because in a certain limited environment are found all the conditions of its realization, and in their propinquity may be seen the tendency which is thus fulfilled. This tendency is found always in a limited extent, because it implies the relation of certain properties specific to certain things. That a body should be hot does not require the co-operation of the universe, but the presence of one other body to which it may communicate heat, losing more than it gives. Here, then, we see the residuum of action that characterizes these realms of science, and makes impossible for them the purely mechanical view. The specific properties of the limited extent above referred to mean *inner* causation. The cause lies

within that extent, and can only be explained as a tendency.

The use of agency in the sense of instrumentality is common in this realm. The several forces, as those of the atmosphere or of the internal heat of the earth are called agencies, *means* towards the growth of the earth, as depicted in its history. This is of course quite a different use of the term agent, *to which the concept action does not correspond*. The term reagent, used by the chemist, also denotes instrumentality. A reagent appears to be a body introduced into a set of unknown circumstances to determine what those circumstances are; or else, the most easily manipulated of the elements needed to secure a chemical process, the formula of which is known, and called a reaction. But a chemical *agent or action* is spoken of commonly where the cause and character is uncertain or uncontrolled.

Contrasted with the movement of the natural sciences here described, which tends away from the concrete action from which observation, as we just saw, starts, to treat of mere possibilities, properties, to analyse all these actions into certain ultimate actions, whether of the elements of chemistry, or of the elementary forces of physics, we see the attempt, at present little more, to understand the nature of the movement by which a cosmos of extreme heat and a minimum perhaps of chemical action, goes through the stages of diminishing heat and increase of variety of chemical action to a stage of equal temperature everywhere, with no chemical action. At least that seems to be the common opinion of the nature of the action in which the several actions of heat &c., are merged. To try to control this great action except in minor details were foolish. One has but to understand it, and to understand our place in it, and to see whether it is perhaps part of some greater action that we can really see the good of. For the cause of this movement it were foolish to ask. It is the sole revelation of the tendencies wrapt

up in it. We do not give the cause of it by noting that certain aspects of its general character are revealed also in its parts.

This history is very different from the history of the world or universe as made up of moving atoms without qualitative differences, of which the nebular theory is a part or an approximation. From a history of the latter character we could never learn what heat and light are. But, just as the evolution of the atomic world, whether it take the character of integration of matter with concomitant dissipation of motion, or whatever character it take, just as this evolution dominates all conceptions we may have of the value of the machines we build, so this evolution of the world of specific properties tending toward their own annihilation dominates the several arts by which we would make use of heat, light, &c., &c.

#### ACTION IN BIOLOGY

20. The place of the concept action in this realm of natural science is much more clear than in the one just discussed. I shall, first, however, discuss a use of the concept that seems opposed to the definition of action and reaction given in section 18.

Spencer, in his *Principles of Biology*, gives one chapter to the "action of forces on organisms," and the following to the "reactions of organic matter to forces." Now the forces acting on the organism are comparatively simple, the reaction of the organism to these forces relatively complex. How is it here true that, as Leibnitz's definition requires, the reaction can be explained through the action, and not conversely? For we do continually speak of some simple force, as a pin-prick, as the stimulus, the action of which excites a complex reaction of the organism.

Now we may speak of the action of forces on an organism in many ways. First, in the cases where the force is one

that does not call for an organic response at all, but for a mechanical or a chemical response. Spencer, in section 23 of the work mentioned, says that this is the way in which he uses the expression; *he admittedly leaves out the essentially biological view*. In such cases the growth of the organism is not concerned, more commonly its injury. The effects of poison, darkness, and the attacks of other animals are examples.

But, when we designate the force a *stimulus* we use a biological term whose implications are many and various. By that term we already assert a certain relation of the force to the organism. For the same thing is not a stimulus to all organisms. Sometimes we use the term having in mind the growth of the organism; the stimulus is what that growth needs, and one activity of the organism, the selection of a particular element of the environment as the stimulus, contributes to the activity of another part which responds to the stimulus. Thus are related the sense of smell and the flow of saliva, the capacity to see a situation and to seize it. Thus praise stimulates man, both because he is susceptible to praise and because he can direct his actions deliberately to secure it. Here the action of the stimulus is true action, for the praise or the food or the situation are not mere mechanical things, but are means to a given end, and contain the end in themselves potentially or they would not be stimuli. The reaction of the organism to the stimulus is not so easy to localize as the stimulus, is less definite than it, and contains as its deepest significance only that end already contained in the stimulus, *as such*. Hence the action and reaction here correspond to Leibnitz's definition.

The same sort of argument is to be applied where the stimulation has in view rather the aim of some experimenter than the good of the organism on which he operates; or

where it is held to be part of a greater action in which the organism in question is an element, being brought within the larger action, e. g., the development of a given species, through the instrumentality of the stimulus.

While in biology, therefore, the term action has uses that fundamentally belong to the realms of natural science preceding, yet in the idea of a stimulus there seems to be a use distinctive of biology. One thing strikes us to distinguish the biological use of the concept, viz., the difficulty, and the necessity of localization. In chemistry and non-mechanical physics the action takes place throughout some body of a specific character. But, in biology, the action seems to be analysable into many different features, and there is a constant search for exactly the *place* of each. In any element in which a certain action is located, there appears growth with *differentiation*, and in consequence there must be sought out, not only the locality for the newly differentiated functions but also that of the source of those functions in the apparently undifferentiated element. Thus the cell undergoes analysis without end. And at every stage certain specific properties are "explained" merely by *localizing* them in a certain kind of body. That body is in the strictest sense an agent, and its movements are actions, explained only by *inner* causation, by tendencies posited within it.

Not only is this character of inner causation apparently not to be eliminated from biology, but there seems to be equally essential to it the idea of teleological co-ordination of the parts. Consider the theory of mitosis. Here we are told the "daughter chromosomes" are pushed apart by continually lengthening fibres (spindle-fibres, significantly called "pushing agents"), which grow out from the centres and dovetail, each being thereby connected with fibres from the *opposite* side. (Wilson, *The Cell*. p. 75). To explain

this co-operation by the "vague dynamical" phrase of "interaction" does not contribute even an idea. All that can be done is to state that they occur within some larger organ in which is localized the capacity to secure such co-operation. Professor Wilson, (pp. 327-9) notes the various phrases that have been advanced in explanation, "co-ordinating" or "guiding power," "predetermined polarities," "formative substances," and is surely right in asserting they contribute nothing. The synthesis of the lesser actions in a wider action is a fact which can be analysed into elements which again can be in measure *placed*, but it seems that the specific properties and also the teleological co-ordination of the specific properties in a specific synthesis can be explained only by the concept of inner causation and of tendency and action. That these properties are specific not merely to one individual but to a class does not make them mechanical. They are not universal; and the basis of speciality can not be reduced apparently to universal terms.

Indeed it seems that Professor Wilson must be right in asserting that "the study of the cell has on the whole seemed to widen rather than to narrow the enormous gap that separates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic world" (p. 330). If we adhere to the strict definition of mechanical, then to interpret the cell life mechanically would mean to discover in the first place what are the minutest parts which, in the course of multiplication through infinite time, may come to have separate movements. How should we know these if we met them? Further, the mass, the direction and velocity of movement of each of these must be known, and the relative position of all; also their elasticity. More, the effect of an infinite environment must be allowed for. Other difficulties occur; but, without working them out, there seems to me in those mentioned sufficient ground for doubting whether the movements of cell life will ever



be entirely calculated. But, even if they were, the specific properties pertaining to the different motions would not be mechanically explained. In fact, if, as I understand, mechanical interpretation means explanation of events in terms of laws of complete generality, it can apply only to phenomena of complete generality, i. e., only to motions. But, though life, color, love and hope may be accompanied by motion they are not motion and cannot be explained by motion. The concept of inner causation, of tendency and action must be employed to the end in explaining them.

In the events, then, with which biology deals, there is a very distinct historical element, which persists throughout the analysis of those events into lesser and supposedly more simple processes. These processes are always actions; the explanations biology offers rest on the fact that a certain kind of body acts in a certain manner. Moreover, in all, or very nearly all organs and organisms, the lesser processes, when united in the larger, from which they have been abstracted, stand in the reciprocal teleological relation which is the form of connection displayed in the life of that larger, which life is in every sense a history.

But in the analysis of these larger actions into elements there are noticed not only uniformities but also truly mechanical relations between these elements, or between them and the whole. For example the supply of the circulating fluid to the several parts is a matter of hydraulics, in part. But the explanation of that supply in its entirety and its complete adaptation to the growing or at least ever-changing organism rests on the activity of that specific organism as a whole.

Phylogeny deals with the development of races and not of individuals. It is not historical science, because it seeks to discover the laws common to all developments of race and species. It introduces, however, another agency into the

biological realm, and a further subordination of mechanical to teleological explanation. It seems to me a curious confusion of thought in Haeckel that he should consider the theory of correlation a triumph of mechanical explanation. The generality of the law is indeed remarkable. But the law itself remains a riddle; and it is hard to think of any biological phenomenon that presents greater difficulties in the way of interpretation in terms of mass and motion.

Quite different from this study of the laws of race development is the historical enquiry after the nature of the unique development of living things upon the globe. This branch of historical science seeks, not the unity of a common character but the single movement towards one and the same goal. It is concerned not only with the total development but also with its parts, e. g., with the development of man from lower creatures, and of civilized from uncivilized man. But it is not concerned primarily with resemblances between these parts; rather with all the fulness and uniqueness of each part, and with the relation of each such part to the whole. It seeks a unity of action; not of law. And the action is one that characterizes living things as such; men not only *live* in the biological sense, but are social, aesthetic, philosophical; the history of life is concerned with man and all other things in this first aspect; for it the other aspects are subordinate, just as the mere motions of things are subordinated to the view of things as living. Perhaps the *economic interpretation of history*, when fully worked out, will be this *history of life*.

Sigwart (Logic 100, 15) raises the difficulty that all such teleological developments imply a subject which persists through the "constantly progressive changes of form," and constant differentiations; for thus only can they be explained. Now where is the subject of such "histories of life?"

The implication of a *subject* is precisely my contention.

Sigwart's difficulty springs from a mistaken demand for a spatial compactness in such subjects resembling that of an organism. In our every-day talk of society, the nation, the "world of letters" &c., we refer to subjects that meet the definition of agency without essentially possessing such compactness and tangibility. That definition I have frequently suggested and may again sum up: a plurality of objects united in fulfilling an end which exists as a tendency in all collectively, in virtue of the several tendencies being fulfilled in each one, these several "fulfillings" in turn being dependent on the fulfilling of the whole.

A more fundamental objection is that such agencies are often matters of individual insight; even where all agree on the existence of an agent bearing a certain name, as a nation, they describe the agent differently, ascribing to it different purposes or ends. How can such matters of opinion be matters of science?

Natural science, concerned with general laws, aims at general assent at every step. Historical science, dealing with actions as unique constituents of one universal action or development, rests on the capacity of certain individuals to perceive and describe what is rare and hidden. This historical insight rises above opinion and is science in virtue of the breadth of vision, the exact definition of the elements, and the closeness, clarity and manifoldness of the relations between them and the whole. Its *truth* depends primarily on the points of connection it has with the present fact, as that fact is evidence of the processes that brought it about, according to generally accepted rules for the interpretation of evidence. Unless such points of connection are many the system has no *breadth*. But the *worth* of the historical construction depends also on the nature of the agency discerned in those processes as a whole, discernment which altogether goes beyond such generally accepted rules. We may deny

*worth* to a historical construction; and none can decide the point save for himself. We may deny its truth; then it is not historical. But if only the construction is highly organized in the sense just described it is surely scientific, though not naturalistic.

Thus the history of life is contrasted with the natural science of biology. In the latter the aim is to abandon historical categories; to substitute mechanical. But there remains throughout that natural science the use of the concept of action and inner causation to explain specific qualities of living things and the reciprocally teleological relations of organs and organisms.

#### LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

21. In the sciences of sociology and psychology my study of the concept action has opened for me most interesting but most difficult questions. These sciences have no accepted definition; nor are their tendencies altogether clear. To explain and defend my view of them would prolong this essay unduly and, owing to certain points not yet cleared up in my mind, would delay its publication more than is convenient. The use of statistics, especially in tables of correlation, seems to be the attempt to discover "varieties" of mankind, by the specific nature and agency of which, in various combinations, the complexity of social phenomena, and of the phenomena of the concrete individual personality may be unraveled and "explained." Action is here used much as in biology, but different methods are used to localize actions. I must neglect also to speak further of the antithetical historical sciences of biography, and of social evolution; I may refer to Chapter III., and also to section 18 of this chapter for a description of these.

## CHAPTER VI

### REMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF HISTORY

#### 22. ON THE THEORETICAL LOGIC OF HISTORY.—23. ON THE PRACTICAL.

22. I now attempt an outline showing the interconnection of all the concepts I have employed, in a systematic treatment of the logic of history. This enables me to give a general view of the subject of the essay, and also to consider one or two difficulties that so far I have rather slurred over.

And first I shall present a scheme of these concepts. I do this with the hope that I shall be credited with a sense of the tentativeness of such an outline. I simply wish to make clear what I have tried to do. This scheme covers what I suppose to be but one part of the logic of history, namely the theoretical. I shall speak briefly of the practical logic in the next section.

#### 1. Definition of history. Compare Chapters I. II and III.

- (1) Limiting definition = the *recorded past*, or the *past of evidence*.
- (2) Definition of its content = *action*. (Deduced from above.)
- (3) Definition of its purpose = *action*. (Deduced from (2).)  
Contrast between the unity of *law* and the unity of *action*.

#### 2. Fundamental concepts of history.

- (1) In terms of the limiting definition. Involves a logic of *time*.
  - a. Reality of the *past* as contrasted with that of the *present* and *future*.
  - b. Reality of the past as *derived from* the reality of the present. *Identity* and *continuity* of the former with the latter. *Impenetrability* of facts in past time.

- c. Significance of the present derived from its past.
- (2) In terms of its content. Involves a logic of *cause and efficiency*.
  - a. Action, the *fulfilling of a tendency*. "*Inner causation*." (Chapter II.)
  - b. Reaction. *The indeterminate environment as a mere means*. (Sections 5 and 19.)
  - c. Interaction and *passivity, plurality of agents*, and inference of passivity. (Section 8.)
- (3) In terms of its *purpose*, the exhibition of *activity*. Involves a logic of *freedom*.
  - a. Co-operation. *Reciprocal teleological relation between whole and parts*.
  - b. Limits to co-operation. The "*action of time*." (Sections 8 and 13.)
  - c. Relation between ultimate ends of the chief historical agents. (This section and Chapter VII.)

3. The special concepts of history. Peculiar to different realms of historical construction, corresponding to the several realms of natural science. E. g.: (Section 22).

- (1) Of the distributions of *matter and motion*.
- (2) Of *chemical and physical* (non-mechanical) powers.
- (3) Of *natural forms*.
- (4) Of *life*.
- (5) Of *societies*.
- (6) Of the *totality of action*.

#### 4. The relation of history to:

- Ethics and education. (Chapter VII.)
- Art. (Section 18.)
- Natural science. (Chapter I.)
- Metaphysics.

The first of these subdivisions, that concerned with the definition of history, I shall not now discuss, as it has been the theme of most of this essay. As to the second division, I would briefly consider the difficulty in defining the present fact, which is evidence of the past fact, of the process, the action, the history that brought that present fact about.

The sort of "present" that serves as evidence in history is not a mere immediate perception. For we may ask whether the immediate perception represented truly the present fact. The present fact, obviously, must *have been* immediately perceived; but in addition to this character, that it is the content of a past experience, it is also the content of a possible future experience. Present facts are ordinarily the object of repeated perceptions; repeated, perhaps, many times in a few seconds. And the assumption in describing them as *present fact* is that the perception may still again be renewed.

The term fact is derived from a past participle, and seems to denote fundamentally something that certainly *has* occurred. The certainty of the events that explicitly are past rests on connection with the so-called present fact. The latter is *fact*, because its content *has* already been experienced; it is *present* because it may *again* be the object of immediate perception. So that ultimately the certainty rests on connection with some immediate perception, either of the *effect* of the fact, as in the case of historic fact, or of the actual *content* of the fact itself, as in the case of present fact.

Logical puzzles galore may be raised as to why a present fact is evidence of a past fact. We may say that the past event is *identical* with the present, for the latter is the completion, the end of the former. They are therefore one. Their character is of course different; otherwise, the end and the middle and the beginning of the event being the same, the event would have been no event; nothing would have happened. But, if they differ in character, in what sense are they one? To say they are continuous with each other merely states the form of identity in time. The degree of resemblance is sometimes the *evidence* of the continuity; but not always; in no case *is* it the continuity; and it is hard to

say what the latter means, or what is the absolute test of it, the basis of our certainty of the connection of past with a present fact.

But the sense of the efficiency of the past fact to produce the present rests on this sense of identity; on the conviction that the beginning and end of the process are one and the same process. A conviction that is very strong, however vague it may be. Hence arises that massive character of the past, of history, which may be called impenetrability. As surely as but one piece of evidence can occupy a given spot of the present so surely but one source and explanation of that present is *true*, however many may be possible; there is one process of which it is the completion; and that process, though it has ceased to be, is fact, simply on account of the *identity* asserted between past fact and present evidence.

The remainder of the second section I have already discussed at some length. The third section presents many difficulties which are of practical importance, though they have received comparatively little attention. In section 20 I emphasized the fact that in the perception of the greater unities of action the insight of the historian cannot be submitted to rules of evidence. These govern perception of the lesser processes that brought about particular pieces of evidence. They cannot tell us the nature of such a unity as the Holy Roman Empire any more than psychology gives us the unitary character and personality of any one of the numberless individuals we meet. Such unitary processes as that of the earth, of a nation, of a race are, often without clear perception of the significance of the act, frequently referred to such greater and supposedly unitary processes as humanity, civilization, nature, &c. Kant, Hegel, Comte, Spencer, and others, have tried to get and give a clear idea of one or other of these. In so doing their chief contributions were



the formulation of *concepts* of reason, of nature, of freedom, of life, of humanity, &c.

Beside these there pervades historical construction the idea of a universal history, of an ultimate unity of action. Such words as Providence, universe, "action of time," &c., imply the conception of a process of which the processes of "reason," nature, &c., are elements or parts. Attempts have been made to identify the universal movement of things with that towards reason, freedom, perfectly adjusted economic conditions, &c. The failure of all such attempts suggests that it were better (1) to define clearly the concept of each such historical unity, and (2) to note the logical relation of one to the other, and of all to the concept of the totality of actions.

For example, Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, asserts the goal of nature to be beauty. To this unity of nature, it is true, he denies objectivity. But this denial is equally valid, as he says, for the existence of an end or goal in any organism. The concept action, however, implies the concept of fulfilment, of tendency, of end. What objectivity, therefore, exists in history, should apply to this goal of nature, if Kant's account is true. He, himself, in his "*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte*," gives the purposiveness of all history just the supposititious objectivity he assigns to nature.

Beauty, it is true, is an idea. So, too, is time; and there is no more reason to deny the partial realization of beauty before the existence of conscious beings, and its perfect realization when all life shall have ceased, than there is to deny the rise and disappearance of consciousness in time.

Man's sense of beauty changes its content with the ages. The human form is not to us, as to the Greeks, the most beautiful object. Only pedants and sensualists dare assert that it is. The finest buildings, too, pale in beauty, for us,

before the glories of flower and hill. Man's idea of beauty has changed with the climate where civilization flourishes, and with the power he has gained to traverse and modify land and sea. And what the standards of absolute beauty are no one can tell. Only we may assert that it cannot be other than that form to which nature tends. For a mind to which nature is unbeautiful we know is distorted. Hence, along with the varying content of the idea of beauty, goes a concept, true to the Greek as to us, to Plato as to Kant, in some feature that makes it a common term of thought, a feature that unites it with the supreme historical category of the good, with the ultimate fulfilment of things, in that aspect of that fulfilment which is gained through contemplation of forms, their measure and symmetry.

Man, then, enters the general historical process of nature, or of forms, of the realization of beauty. His idea of beauty at any particular time is a means by which nature subordinates his powers to the realization of her ends. Differentiation, e. g., appears to be essential to advance in beauty, and everywhere man brings variety into the primeval landscape. And that variety man loves. He must indeed produce it to live. But through cultivation of a sense of beauty, and in the recognition of the worth of nature's final purpose, he may freely break the monotony of the woods with pastures, grain-fields, roads and cottages, and even freely die, knowing that by death has been and will be preserved the freshness and variety of natural forms.

The clarification and inter-relating of such concepts as Beauty, Freedom, Need and Supply, Life, Adaptation, Justice, Love, Culture, &c., means the rectification of the vague conceptions that underly and color all histories, and is a branch of the theoretical logic of history. Subsidiary concepts are those of nationality, state, people, family, organism, society, personality, &c. Such a work as Professor

Seligman's "The Economic Interpretation of History," is an example, in part, of what I mean. It suffers, I venture to think, from the mistaken insistence on the question of the causal dependence of other lines of historical development on the economic. For to say that an event enters into the chain of economic causation is surely to say that it is an economic event, and so to assert the causal dependence of one aspect of a nation, e. g., on another, is to reduce all aspects to one. But there is of course in fact a line of causal development, connecting philosophies and religions for example, that is not economic. The problem is the logical relation of the ends or purposes of such developments.

The comparison between the various developments indicated by such concepts must be an *evaluation* of them, since they are to be compared as aspects of the one great movement by which the world realizes its own tendencies, or nature, i. e., of the fulfilment of the *good* of the world.

#### ON THE PRACTICAL LOGIC OF HISTORY

23. The practical logic of history, it seems, may be divided into the "inventive" and the "constructive." Books on historical method have dealt very largely with the former. Droysen gives considerable attention to the latter. The rules of interpreting evidence are, so far as they are definite, the quotation of natural laws. There are certain practical maxims as to the credibility of authorities and the attitude of the investigator which lack the analysis that would justify their inclusion under psychological laws. But as these maxims become definite they must become mere statements of natural laws, declaring the nature of the cause of which the present fact, the evidence, is the effect.

These rules concern historical invention. The logic of historical construction includes such a discussion as Droysen's treatment of the "*forms*" of history, the several unities

into which the lesser actions of history enter.<sup>1</sup> Such a discussion deals, as his does, chiefly with the generally accepted unities, and the relations of one to the other. Hence it differs from the "theoretical" logic of the specific concepts of history, in that the latter aims at a completeness of synthesis of the several forms or concepts and therefore tends to be individualistic; while the former seeks rather to arrive at such assurance as is given by community of belief and practice among historians with regard to such concepts.

<sup>1</sup> Droysen's *Outlines*, § 55 *et seq.*

## CHAPTER VII

### HISTORY AND ETHICS

24. ETHICAL CONSTRUCTION.—25. DEPENDENCE OF ETHICAL ON HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION.—26. FURTHER RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM.

24. In this chapter, as in the former, I introduce a subject that needs for its proper discussion a volume, and demands so wide a knowledge and so careful analysis that I half regret that some consideration of it seems essential to rounding out this essay.

Droysen believed that history, and, especially, historical science and construction, presents the material of ethical life. I have tried to show that historical construction is a thing much wider than Droysen supposed, that it deals with the earth and all animal life as well as with humanity, the family, the nation. But, so far from this extension of this term indicating a separation between historical and ethical construction, I think it indicates a most intimate union; for, in the last few decades, we find that with a growth of the ideals and actual productions of historical science to include all realms of action there is a tendency to extend also the scope of ethical obligations, to recognize that man has duties to all living things, and even to the very landscape of which he with his belongings forms a part.

The term action applies not only to past events but also to anticipated performances. In these latter the term signifies, of course, that to imagination the process has been completed and is the object of retrospection. A tendency towards the completion of a process either complete or thus imagined to be complete is an activity.

It is with such anticipated actions that ethics is primarily concerned; hence it depends on history, on the record of past actions, for the material with which to construct future actions. This initial dependence of ethics on history is so inevitable that a failure to recognize it need do no harm.

But since the imagination constructs future actions without immediate dependence on what *constructions* the past actually has to offer, it is to be considered how far a science of ethics must submit the anticipated actions, with which imagination presents it, to comparison with the actual past constructions that history also offers. For ethics is concerned not with actions merely imagined, but with those *anticipated*; and this anticipation implies that the historic past is to be the past also of which those imagined actions are to be the continuance.

There is a type of ethics in which this dependence is a minimum. This type asserts the test of goodness to be some subjective state of mind in the doer or in others, whether that state be pleasure, happiness or a recognition of obligations. Now such a test can be applied to one's own acts or to those of others without any regard to the greater unities of action with which historical construction deals.

But this type of ethics, it seems to me, is a branch of natural science, and indeed of sociology. For the following reasons: It does not of itself prescribe a definite action in any case, but asserts the *general conditions* of acts that are good. It is true that some have regarded the states of mind here described as ends in themselves. Kant, however, who is often quoted as justifying this latter belief, in fact explicitly repudiated it (Intro. to *Meta. Ele. of Ethics*, XII, A. & B.) And the fruit of asserting such states of mind to be the goal of action has been, in the case of hedonism, that false antithesis of egoism and altruism that lands one in profitless

paradox; while, in the case of "formalism," I doubt whether any one has attempted to base a system on it. Its fruit, one must suppose, would be a constant search for opportunities of "self-mortification," until it were found that that search must land one in the paradoxical conclusion that the worse one's natural desires are the better chance one has of shining with moral glory. I conclude, that these states are not ends in themselves.

The end, therefore, not being set forth by this type of ethics, must be presupposed by them. And knowledge of the general conditions of good actions is a knowledge of the *means* of bringing about that end. Thus it has been asserted, apparently correctly, that the sense of obligation is a means to produce the subordination of impulse to reason, of isolated to co-ordinated action; and that these latter, reason and co-ordinated action, are means to the preservation of life and of society. Again, there seems to be a close correlation between pleasure and activity, between pain and inhibition. Hence the presence of pleasure, especially if of a permanent character, is an indication of activity, and the observation of what actions produce pleasure is a means to secure activity. Thus these states of mind are *general conditions* the knowledge of which may lead to the employment of the right means to secure the proper conduct of members of society, or to secure actions conducive to the preservation of the individual life. But neither of them tell us what the proper end and good of the state or of the individual is.

Contrasted with this type of ethics, which thus is seen to be a branch of natural science, seeking generalizations, is the normative type that asserts a certain end to be *the* end. In this teleological type of ethics, of which we have examples in Plato and Aristotle, and of which the present age affords abundant illustration, common opinions are indeed cited;

but the conclusions are not arrived at by counting heads, nor by generalization. Nor is it true, it seems to me, that, as Professor Mezes asserts, ethics is a normative science because it seeks to define its peculiar concept. In the first place that would not distinguish it from the sciences of law. Mechanics is concerned just as much as is ethics with definition of its peculiar concepts. Further, Professor Mezes himself, like almost all writers of ethical works, lays down as good what seems *to him* to build up a consistent system of ends, without showing that any one quite agrees with him. His conclusion is ultimately an individual one, in spite of his protestations.

In such normative ethics the end is either statical or dynamic. In Aristotle we see both blended. The ideals of the high-minded man and the philosopher represent the former; the habit of bringing desire under control of reason the other. So, also, in the great systems of ethics associated with the names of Confucius, Buddha and Christ, we have held up as ends, both the *ideal*, whether sage or saint, and the *way*. The latter is an *end*, for it is in itself good, even though the *ideal* be unattainable or incomprehensible or a mere negation of conduct.

25. What I have called the static ideals of normative ethics cannot be said to be in a significant way dependent on the constructions of historical science. Confucius, Mahommed, Socrates, and Jesus—the life of each of these is a model and illustration of a given ideal; and what unity of action is in that life is a history. But it is not the unity of action in such lives that makes them models—not the fact that in their whole life the several actions were co-ordinated as means to the progressive fulfilment of a given end, but the fact that in many different ways their lives exemplified the attitude of the ideal. It is the unity of character, not of action, it is the artistic, not the historical unity that here is important to ethics.



But these static ideals are not apparently applicable by common men without the medium of historical construction. On the one hand we need intermediary narratives of the lives of men that have attained the blessed from an un-blessed state. Such pilgrim's progresses are historical constructions, or imitations thereof. Then again the disciple must know himself, and before stepping into a line of anticipated action must study his own past to determine its point of contact with that future. Such dependence is, however, more immediately obvious where the way, the pilgrimage itself, is denominated an end and a good, as in the dynamical ideals referred to.

Further dependence of ethical on historical construction appears, when we remember that most of the dominant ethical ideals have meant the construction of a new society. Christianity did not address the Jew as a mere individual man, but as a Jew, as a member of a nation, as a participant in a line of action that was supposed to move steadily in a certain direction from the days of Cain and Abel to the present, and even to an end not yet consummated. Christianity demanded of the Jew that he should form a somewhat different idea of this historic action in which his own life appeared as part. Because of that change of historic conception he was called on to change himself. So Augustine addressed the citizens of the Roman Empire, bade them forget the outlook of Livy and Polybius, for whom the march of Rome's dominion was what gave meaning to the passage of the centuries. They must think this career of earthly conquest a mere incident in a subsidiary line of action, the end of which was destruction, and the whole meaning of which lay in its contrast with the persistence under many forms, and with the steady advance of the earthly image of the City of God.

So in more recent days Herder and Kant and Hegel and

Spencer have grounded their belief in certain systems of conduct on a historical construction, in which they present the individual man as a member of a greater action which informs us of the character of the activity proper to him. Thus again Nietzsche tried to recast our conception of history in order to recast our ethics.

In Aristotle we see the neglect of this dependence of ethical ideals on historical constructions. In his *Constitution of Athens* he treats the history of that state as a steady decline. And I do not know that anywhere he speaks of a wider movement of men towards a better state with which the wise and good man might identify himself. The philosopher will separate himself from such a life as far as possible; and the high-minded man seems to be concerned with nothing greater than himself. For Aristotle the general movement of things towards perfection seems to be one that does not essentially depend on a unification of individuals acting under a greater agency. The highest, the rational, individual seeks his excellence least of all by entering into a unity of action with those around him. How far may we trace the absurdity of his high-minded gentleman and the one-sidedness of his philosopher to Aristotle's apparent blindness to any larger historical unity than those little Greek States that in his day seem to have deserved contempt?

26. The relation between historical and ethical construction is complicated by the fact that the former also is dependent in large measure on the latter. This is most obvious where the historian, as in the cases of Augustine, Hegel and Spencer, presents his historical construction in support of his ethical position. Augustine's history was certainly a fruit of his ethical attitude; though the latter would not have been adopted with decision until affirmed by the former.

The relation exists, however, even where the historian is writing of a past age, and without a pronouncedly ethical purpose. In the first place historical construction is seldom attempted unless the writer is profoundly, emotionally interested in the period. From Herodotus to Ranke or Green we see the historian starting with the conviction that he has got hold of a truth significant not merely for knowledge of the sequence of events, but also for the grasp of the meaning and purpose of events and for the will and action that follows therefrom. And, if we attribute moral excellence to men not more on the basis of their capacity to refrain from evil than on their ability to participate whole-heartedly in the good, the historian's insight is a moral quality, indicating the spirit and perhaps the direction of his own life. No better example is furnished than that of Green, the lover of peace. His history of the English people, he tells us, deals rather with the "missionary, the poet, the printer, the merchant and the philosopher," than with the mere warrior and courtier. Bryce's emphasis on the institutional unity that pervaded the "dark" and middle ages is the expression in part of his own moral constitution; these things are to him of more account in determining the right than they were to Carlyle, for example, or to Spencer. Motley and Grote in their histories of the Netherlands and of Athens, exemplify the same general fact. To the former the spirit of undying resistance to oppression was a sacred tradition; for the latter, a thorough-going democracy had moral worth. And each saw the unity of action that embodied what to them was of great ethical value.

It would be desirable to have a logical account of this reciprocal relation of ethical and historical constructions. The simple statement suggested by the immediate relation of past actions remembered to future actions imagined, that historical science furnishes the knowledge of the several actions

with which the individual may put himself in relations of assent or dissent, while ethical science relates the ends or purposes of such actions in a logical system under some supreme end, is true so far as it goes, it seems to me; but the following statement is preferable, although in the attempt to describe the reciprocal relation above mentioned the matter becomes too complex to grasp in a single sentence.

The distinction between the two is expressible only in terms of starting points and directions. History starts from particular present facts, and from the particular past events that have brought about those present facts, their evidence. In this starting point there is a conviction that verification and universal agreement is possible through physical measurement of the evidence, and through subsumption of the connections between past facts and the evidence of them under universal laws. But in historical construction, even the simplest, there is a perception of individuality making unity among such elements, transforming them into parts of some single agent, the character of which is not subsumable under general laws. And the assertion of the existence of such individuals seems to rest on the insight and the genius of each historian. He convinces rather by eloquence than by argument. But right from the heart of the world of individuals in which the constructive historian moves, from the apparent congeries of nations and races and embodied tendencies of feeling and thought, of continents and planets, along with an atomic system conceived as moving together under a certain mathematical necessity, out of this confusion appears a certain order and necessary relation of these individuals, not yet brought into definite shape to be sure, but undoubtedly present. I refer, of course, to the fact that it is possible to mark out and define these great movements in terms of their goals or purposes, just as Kant succeeded in part in defining the move-

ment of forms towards beauty, and again the advance of the nations towards a confederation of Reason or Justice; as Hegel defined in part the largely contemporary but distinct progress of political communities towards true Freedom; as Marx and Spencer have less adequately, perhaps, defined the economic development and the increase of life. Usually whoever defines such a field or goal of history sees all other realms of historical construction center around it. But now the demand seems to be that the historian keep a comprehensive view of all these and of other movements, and that he should note their teleological interrelations without assuming that one is central and supreme.

But the starting point of Ethics seems to be the idea of the good or of right, and it seeks to arrange thereunder such "goals" as beauty, freedom, justice, etc. And how can one hold *practical* ideals of the good unless he believe that these "goods" are the ends towards which actual movements tend, so that by his own action he may effect and support them? Thus he is driven, as Kant was in his "Idee," to ask whether history tells of such a movement; for nothing but history can. In the rendering practical of his ideals, then, the moralist tends towards study of the details whose existence as historical elements make it possible for him to map out a line of conduct connecting his ideal by not too abrupt a curve with the drift of things in the past up to the present.

The historian, whether the writer or the reader, moves away from the viewpoint common to all, through an individual insight which is to be tested by certain necessary relations of concepts, necessary and certain though only a few can think them. The moralist *starts* from the subsumption of those same or similar concepts under the idea of *the* good or universal end of things, asserting relations of value to exist between those concepts, and distinguishing one

from the other definitely. But, his conceptual scheme, however certain it seemed to him, undergoes transformation as he, in his attempts to make it actual, tries to see the good, with its subordinated ideas, to be the real good of the world where he and others meet in common action.

In the field intermediate between the physical and the logical, where moralist and constructive historian do their work, it is certain that there is as yet little agreement. The greater unities of action to which I have referred, are not matters on which any two historians agree. But the definition and systematization of the corresponding concepts, begun by Augustine, was not renewed, I think, until the day of Kant. And, something has already been done, though, as I have tried to show, with an unfortunate tendency to narrow the conception of historical development in general, and with it the field of moral obligation. A true conception of the history of nature will convince that it is our duty to make our habitations contribute to the beauty of the landscape as truly, though perhaps not so urgently as it is our duty to relieve the suffering or to obey the law. And this extension, both of historical construction and of ethical life, should follow from a clear conception of the purpose of historical science, as indicated by the concept action.

With this somewhat obscure treatment of a question not yet thoroughly worked out, I close my account of the concept action. I hope I have made more clear the nature of the historical as contrasted with that of the mechanical view of the world, that I have shown that the term action indicates the starting point of our reflection on things and marks the direction of the organization of our knowledge as we learn to move freely in the world, freely in proportion as we realize and appreciate its purposes and adopt them as our own.

## VITA

---

THE writer was a student at Christ's Hospital, London, England, to his 15th year: After eight years in commercial life, he pursued undergraduate studies at Teachers College, New York City, and at Alfred University, Alfred, N. Y., receiving a professional diploma from the former in 1897, the degree of A. B. from the latter in 1899. From 1901 to 1904 he pursued graduate studies in Philosophy, Psychology and Education at Columbia University, receiving the degree of A. M. in 1902. He has taught in high schools and academies; he was instructor in philosophy at Alfred University in 1898-9, fellow in philosophy, Columbia University, 1902-3, and assistant in philosophy there, 1903-4. His graduate work has been done under the direction of Professors F. J. E. Woodbridge, J. McKeen Cattell, Nicholas Murray Butler, Frank M. McMurry, E. L. Thorndike and S. T. Dutton.

Previous publications: "The Perception of Pitch," *Psychological Review*, Nov., 1902; "Moral Feeling as the Basis of a Psychology of Morals," Nov., 1903.













**RHYTHM**  
**AS A DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC**  
**OF**  
**PROSE STYLE**

**BY**  
**ABRAM LIPSKY, M. A.**

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University**

**NEW YORK**  
**1907**



**RHYTHM**  
**AS A DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC**  
**OF**  
**PROSE STYLE**

**BY**  
**ABRAM LIPSKY, M. A.**  
**=**

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University**

**NEW YORK**

**1907**

**D**





# CONTENTS

---

	PAGE
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1- 2
<b>LITERATURE</b> .....	2- 6
<b>THE FACT OF PROSE RHYTHM</b> .....	6- 8
Study of Phonographic Records .....	
Study of Public Speakers .....	
Composite Scanning .....	
<b>VARIETIES OF RHYTHM IN DIFFERENT STYLES</b> .....	9-23
Scanning by the Writer .....	
Scanning by Others .....	
Measures of Reliability .....	
<b>EXAMPLES OF PROSE RHYTHMS</b> .....	23-24
<b>RHYTHM OF PHRASAL SECTIONS</b> .....	24-27
<b>PHRASAL RHYTHM IN POETRY</b> .....	27-28
<b>MEANS OF PRODUCING PROSE RHYTHM</b> .....	29-32
Length of Words .....	
Choice of Words .....	
Order of Words .....	
Figures of Speech .....	
<b>THOUGHT RHYTHM</b> .....	33-37
Parallelism .....	
Balance of Phrase and Word.....	
<b>SENTENCE AND PARAGRAPH RHYTHM</b> .....	37-39
<b>THE CONCEPT "STYLE"</b> .....	40-41
<b>CAUSE AND UTILITY OF LANGUAGE RHYTHM</b> .....	41-44



## RHYTHM AS A DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTIC OF PROSE STYLE

It would be difficult to find a modern Rhetoric that does not contain a few paragraphs on "the rhythm of prose." It would be just as difficult to obtain from those paragraphs a clear idea of what rhythm in prose really is. One of the most explicit statements is:<sup>1</sup>

"Rhythm in prose may be defined as the alternate swelling and lessening of sound at certain intervals. It refers to the general effect of sentences and paragraphs, where the words are chosen and arranged so as not only to express the meaning of the writer, but also to furnish a musical accompaniment which shall at once delight the ear by its sound and help out the sense by its suggestiveness."

This writer does not tell us whether there is any regularity in the alternate swelling and lessening of sound; nor, if there is, how much. He does not say what are the means by which the rhythm of prose is produced; nor does he, or any other of the writers referred to, explain exactly what they mean by "rhythm."

When we come upon an allusion in literary criticism to an author's "rhythmical style" we commonly think of an agreeable sense of movement had in reading him. But if we ask ourselves what it is that moves, what makes the difference between a rhythmical and an unrhythmical style, or how the rhythm of one author differs from that of another, we find that our conceptions are exceedingly vague.

The writer was impelled to enter upon the present study on finding himself unable to use the concept "rhythm in prose," because of its vagueness, in a series of experiments that he had planned for determining the psychology of judgments on literary styles. He had taken, for instance, several versions of Dante's, "There is no greater sorrow than in misery to remember the happy time," and asked about thirty graduate students to arrange them in order of preference and to give reasons for first and last choice. "Because it is smooth," "Because it is rhythmical," "Like the sound of it," "Sounds rough," were among the reasons given. The question arose: What change in a sentence will make a rough one smooth or a smooth one rough?

<sup>1</sup> De Mille, *Elements of Rhetoric*. § 299.

It seemed necessary to know, what elements, of sound or of sense, go to constitute what is called the rhythm of a piece of writing.

The phenomenon of rhythm in prose was recognized by the orators and rhetoricians of Greece and Rome, and they gave definite rules for producing it. Aristotle philosophizes concerning the matter in a way suggestive of Herbert Spencer's effort in his well-known essay on style. "That composition which is entirely devoid of rhythm is indefinite," says Aristotle. "The indefinite or unlimited is displeasing and cannot be known. It ought to be limited, only not by meter like verse." "So soon as a definite measure is caught the ear waits for its return." He goes on to specify what kinds of "feet" are most suitable for prose. The "heroic" measure is not suitable because it is too solemn and too remote from the language of conversation; the "trochaic" is too light and tripping. There remains the "paeonic" rhythm, which, though used by many rhetoricians, had not been defined. It has two forms, — - - and - —, — the first suitable for the beginning of a sentence, the second for the end.<sup>1</sup> Cicero follows Aristotle in the main, and gives illustrations from his own orations.<sup>2</sup>

Recent students have found that the ancients wrote as they pleased and theory has to make the best of it. Blass has "scanned" selected passages from the classical "Kunstprosa" with the aim of disclosing the underlying rhythmical schemes. He leaves ancient theory far behind.<sup>3</sup> Weil disputes Cicero's dictum as to the reason why a certain celebrated oratorical period was greeted with tremendous applause.<sup>4</sup> Norden remarks that "in the antique conception rhythmic prose was identical with periodic."<sup>5</sup>

The subject of prose rhythm has received considerable attention of late years from psychologists. It has been touched upon incidentally by investigators of rhythm in general, like Bolton, Meumann, McDougal and Stetson; and directly attacked by Wallin, Marbe and Scott.

The experimental investigation of rhythm has added to our knowledge on such points as the limits within which irregularities in the time intervals between successive impressions may occur without destroying a rhythm, on the effect of the rate of succession of impressions in facilitating or hindering the arousal of a feeling of rhythm, on the availability of different kinds of impressions for

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* III, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*.

<sup>3</sup> Blass, *Die Rhythmen der Attischen Kunstprosa*. Leipzig, 1901.

<sup>4</sup> Weil, *Order of Words*, p. 13, tr. by Super, 1887.

<sup>5</sup> Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, p. 42, 1898.

shaping into a rhythm, on the relations between rhythm-perception and physical or mental activities, and so on. But owing to the nature of the stimuli used in these experiments—simple sensations, like hammer clicks or light-flashes,—few of the detailed results can be used in the study of the rhythm of language, where the rhythmical material is so much more complex in character. There are, however, a few facts of a general nature that are significant for our purpose.

The definition of rhythm in Baldwin's dictionary seems to commit the error of identifying mere repetition with rhythm.<sup>1</sup> "Rhythm is a repeating series of time intervals: events which occur in such a series are said to have rhythm." We have on the other hand the statement of Bolton that a rhythm in speech means a series of *groups* of sounds.<sup>2</sup> and Ebbinghaus's that rhythm is "an organization of sensations following one another in time, by the combination of several of them into unified groups (not, as is sometimes said, the mere succession of impressions following one another in equal intervals of time)."<sup>3</sup>

We are no longer bound, in considering language rhythm, to remain within the arbitrary limits of literary metrical theory. An increase in the number of elements composing a group in a rhythmical series does not proportionally increase the apparent length of the groups.<sup>4</sup> Rhythm does not depend upon equality of successive time-intervals. Only an approximate equality is necessary.<sup>5</sup> Meumann has shown that intervals as long as four or five seconds are very inaccurately estimated, are merely guessed at, while reading.

Attention plays an important part in the perception of rhythm. This is especially so in the case of subjective rhythmization—the feeling of rhythm in an objectively monotonous series of impressions. Different forms of rhythm are felt according as one or another is imagined. Conversely, a rhythmical series of impressions is more easily attended to and better remembered than a structureless series.<sup>6</sup>

The rhythmical material may be a succession of simple sense impressions like the auditory and visual sensations employed in laboratory experiments; auditory sensations that vary in pitch as well as in loudness and duration, as in music; a series of movements as in dancing; or of sounds having meanings, as in language. There is a

<sup>1</sup> Dict. of Philos. and Psychol. Art. "Rhythm."

<sup>2</sup> Bolton, *Am. Journal of Psychology*, v. 6, p. 158, 1894.

<sup>3</sup> Ebbinghaus, *Grundzuege der Psychologie*, vol. 1, p. 507.

<sup>4</sup> Miner Motor, *Visual and Applied Rhythms*, p. 36, 1903.

<sup>5</sup> Philos Stud., vol. X, p. 404.

<sup>6</sup> Mueller and Schumann. *Experimentelle Beitræge zur Untersuchung des Gedächtnisses*. Zeitsch. f. Psychol. und Psychol. d. Sinnesorg. Bd. VI, 1893.

rhythm of thought distinguishable, if not separable, from the rhythm of language, controlling and supplementing the purely phonetic rhythm. In poetry, phonetic rhythm often overrides thought rhythm. In prose, phonetic rhythm is, on the whole, subordinate to thought rhythm. As the complexity of the rhythmized material increases, irregularities in the succession of the simpler stimuli are more and more disregarded.

"Rhythm appears in thought with simple perception of a number of objects," says James. "Accentuation and emphasis are present in every perception we have. We find it quite impossible to disperse our attention impartially over a number of impressions."<sup>1</sup> When thought moves decidedly in a definite direction under the impulse to become speech, these accentuations and emphases become more distinct. Language fixes them permanently, although they may be felt before becoming embodied in words.

An experimental investigation of speech rhythm has been made by Wallin.<sup>2</sup> His subjects spoke various pieces of prose and poetry into a phonograph. The records were then reproduced and studied by ear. Durations were measured by reacting with a telegraph key to certain sounds or pauses in the reproduced speech. Intensities and pitches were estimated and grouped by the listener. When in doubt, other listeners were substituted to check his impressions.

Although the method is open to certain objections—the noise of the stylus, and subjective errors in making the estimations, which have been pointed out by Stetson—some of the results that especially interest us here may be safely accepted. Wallin found that the chief guide in deciding whether a piece of writing was prose or verse, was the arrangement of the lines to the eye. When verse was printed as prose, or vice versa, the one was often taken for the other. The following bit of prose by Bacon was called poetry by a majority of his subjects:

To the poor Christian that sits bound in the galley,  
To despairful widows, pensive prisoners, and deposed kings;  
To them whose fortune runs back and whose spirits mutiny,  
Unto such death is a redeemer, and the grave a place of rest.<sup>3</sup>

His subjects spoke prose more rapidly than poetry, the averages being 3.14 syllables of poetry per second, and 3.81 of prose—20 per cent. more prose. They spoke 10 per cent. more prose syllables during an expiration than poetry—5.91 of the former and 5.41 of the latter.

<sup>1</sup> Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, p. 284.

(( ( <sup>2</sup> Researches on the Rhythm of Speech, Studies from the Yale Psychological Laboratory, vol. IX, 1901.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*,

The natural inference from these figures seems to be that equal intervals of time in prose may be filled with unequal numbers of unaccented syllables, the larger number being spoken more rapidly. Perfect rhythm, measured by perfect equality of (time intervals between accents), was but slightly more common in verse than in prose.

The method employed by Scripture of measuring the physical impression on phonographic discs, although objective in a high degree, is too tedious for pieces of any length.<sup>1</sup> It is imperfect besides, in confusing objective magnitude with subjective impressions. An accent in language means an accent to the mind of the reader or listener, and is wholly relative to adjacent stresses, durations and pitches. A weak sound may be felt as accented if preceded and followed by weaker ones. The degree of difference that shall be judged sufficient to constitute an accent is a subjective matter. It follows, that this rigidly physical method must rely ultimately on the estimate of the listening mind, and cannot claim to be free from subjective errors.

The good, old process of "scanning," which was employed by Blass in his studies of Greek and Latin prose, has been used by Marbe on the prose of Goethe and Heine.<sup>2</sup> He began by scanning the first and second thousand words of Goethe's "St. Rochusfest" and Heine's "Harzreise" (both travel sketches), while a friend scanned the second and third thousand. The average number of unaccented syllables per interval between two accents was calculated, and the frequency of each variety of "foot" found in each thousand words. The scanning of his friend agreed sufficiently with his own to show that the differences found between Goethe's and Heine's prose were objectively there, and the results from the successive thousands showed that the characteristics of the first thousand might be expected to hold throughout each piece. It was found that Goethe's sketch had a greater number of certain kinds of feet and less of others than did Heine's, and that the average foot was shorter in the former than in the latter. Marbe then scanned a thousand words from each of half a dozen other writings of the same authors and found similar differences.

Finally, two very suggestive essays by Scott should be mentioned.\* This writer claims to have discovered two styles of vocal change within prose sentences. In one type the voice rises in pitch to the apex of an arc, is held suspended for a time, then descends; in the other it rises, begins to descend and the pause does not enter until it has

<sup>1</sup> Elements of Experimental Phonetics, 1902.

<sup>2</sup> *Rhythmus im Prosa*, Giessen, 1904.

<sup>3</sup> Modern Language Association Pub. 1905.

descended by the musical interval of a fourth or a minor fourth. Scott's theory is that these inflectional arcs constitute the "feet" of prose rhythm, which are compounded in various ways. He admits that there are other rhythmical elements also, such as stress, alliteration, balance of clause and phrase, etc. Scott's observations, it appears, were made on his own reading; he gives no detailed account of them. Stetson has estimated the falling slide at the close of sentences to be an interval of a third or a fourth.<sup>1</sup>

Phonographic recitation records enable one easily to observe the rhythm of prose. Cylinder records of Lincoln's "Gettysburg Speech," of Ingersoll on "Napoleon's Tomb" and of McKinley's "Speech at the Pan-American Exposition," are on the market,—spoken, of course, by an elocutionist. The elocutionist's artificiality mars rather than improves these pieces, but their measured character becomes obvious enough. The writer from much listening had them so impressed on his mind, that they ran through his head constantly in the elocutionist's voice, and he read them in the elocutionist's manner when he had the written copies before him. It was not difficult to mark on a copy the syllables accented in the phonograph. The rhythm of the first sentence of the Ingersoll selection, for example, is quite distinct. It is here given as marked, with accents and pauses:

A little while agó | I stoód at the tómb of the first Napóleon |  
a magnificent tómb of gílt and góld | where résted at lást the áshes  
of that réstless mán.||

No measurements or calculations were made on these specimens. The chief result of the study of them was to accustom the ear to detect beats in prose. The fact of the existence of rhythm in prose became clear and certain. It is easy to "beat time" while each of the phrases separated by the vertical lines in the above sentence is spoken.

In listening to public speakers, one is usually so interested in the meaning of the discourse that one does not observe the rhythm of its sound, but if the language is a foreign one and unintelligible there is nothing but the sound to attend to, and its rhythmical character becomes apparent. The writer listened to a sermon of which he did not understand a word, in the Russian church in New York. He was able to beat time for short stretches, though constantly thrown out at pauses, where the movement broke up and varied. But the delivery

<sup>1</sup> Harvard Psychl. Studies, 1903.



of some American public speakers is so markedly rhythmical as to become annoying in its unvaried chant. With a little effort, it is possible to abstract the attention from the meaning of what is said and beat time. The writer has done it very often.

That authors of marked individuality of style differ from one another in the quality of rhythm is a commonplace of literary criticism. Every sensitive reader feels the difference between such writers as Scott and Stevenson, Macaulay and Carlyle, De Quincey and Emerson, Dickens and Thackeray, Spencer and Huxley. What is at the bottom of these differences? In poetry different rhythms are produced by various metrical forms that may be schematically exhibited. Can anything like this be done for prose?

The following experiment to test this question was made. A number of mimeograph copies were made of selections from Scott, Stevenson, Thackeray, Carlyle, Ruskin, Hawthorne and Lotze (translation). The selections were arranged as if by one author in consecutive paragraphs, each of about 130 words. One person read aloud while another marked the syllables that to his hearing were accented. Six markings were thus obtained. In going over the copies afterwards, three or more marks on a syllable were considered an accent.

The most surprising result of the experiment was that only one of the persons engaged in it was sure, when asked, that the selections were by different authors. The others had not noticed the fact. One declared they were by the same author. The selections had, of course, purposely been chosen so as to be on congruous topics.

More syllables were marked towards the close than at the beginning, showing that the discriminativeness of the markers increased as they proceeded. There was a high degree of agreement among the markers but the selections differed from one another in the proportion of unaccented to accented syllables.

A couple of sentences with the markings gathered from the several sheets are here given:

<sup>1</sup> You <sup>5</sup> might <sup>5</sup> sooner <sup>4</sup> get <sup>4</sup> lightning <sup>1</sup> out <sup>5</sup> of <sup>4</sup> incense <sup>1</sup> smoke <sup>5</sup> than <sup>5</sup> true  
<sup>4</sup> action <sup>6</sup> or <sup>5</sup> passion <sup>4</sup> out <sup>6</sup> of <sup>5</sup> your <sup>3</sup> modern <sup>4</sup> English <sup>6</sup> religion. You <sup>5</sup> had  
<sup>5</sup> better <sup>4</sup> get <sup>6</sup> rid <sup>5</sup> of <sup>3</sup> the <sup>4</sup> smoke <sup>3</sup> and <sup>2</sup> the <sup>5</sup> organ <sup>6</sup> pipes <sup>3</sup> both, <sup>2</sup> leave <sup>5</sup> them  
<sup>5</sup> and <sup>6</sup> the <sup>5</sup> Gothic <sup>6</sup> windows <sup>6</sup> and <sup>3</sup> the <sup>5</sup> painted <sup>6</sup> glass <sup>3</sup> to <sup>5</sup> the <sup>6</sup> property <sup>3</sup> man,  
<sup>5</sup> give <sup>1</sup> up <sup>3</sup> your <sup>4</sup> carburetted <sup>6</sup> hydrogen <sup>1</sup> ghost <sup>4</sup> in <sup>5</sup> one <sup>2</sup> healthy <sup>6</sup> expiration  
<sup>2</sup> and <sup>6</sup> look <sup>5</sup> after <sup>5</sup> Lazarus <sup>5</sup> at <sup>5</sup> the <sup>5</sup> door-step.

The agreement is close enough to justify the assumption that the scanning of one individual having "a good ear," would be just as valid for the practical purpose in view as the result obtained by add-

ing markings of several persons. There is considerable variation in the scanning of good poetry by scholars. These individual variations, however, are insignificant beside the large differences due to different types of rhythm, like blank verse and hexameter, shown by the scanning of all alike. One person's scanning of a number of poetical specimens would be sure to show these typical differences, however it might vary in detail from the scanning of another. The assumption is that if there are distinct rhythmical types in prose, the same procedure there should give valid results.

The term "scanning" applied to prose obviously does not mean quite the same process as that gone through by the school-boy who scans Virgil. The school-boy is taught that the poetry he is to scan consists of two kinds of syllables arranged according to definite rules and his task is to find how each line conforms to the given pattern. The pattern being flexible within definite limits, the boy's ingenuity is expended in accounting for seeming irregularities in the line before him. But we never are provided with a ready-made pattern for any piece of prose. Scanning prose, then, must mean marking accents wherever we feel them. Here a certain amount of vagueness enters. Not having a pattern to guide us, which accents shall we mark? For there are accents of various degrees of intensity.

A good poem sets the tune in the first line so unmistakably that the succeeding lines, even though they be somewhat uncertain rhythmically, are drawn by the reader into the rhythm suggested at the beginning.<sup>1</sup> Prose has no lines like those of poetry, and its rhythmical units certainly do not follow each other with any such regularity as do the lines of poetry. Nevertheless, a phrase in prose frequently suggests a rhythm as distinctly as does a line of poetry, and rhythms are echoed in prose as in verse.

The tendency to accommodate the time of a syllable in prose to fit the movement of the phrase in which it occurs, may be shown by a simple experiment. Give a person the sentence, "You are a wicked man," to read aloud, and then, "You are a bad man." There will be a distinct lingering on the word "bad." So in the second of the sentences, "How do you *dó* this morning?" and, "How *dó* you do this morning?" where the first "do" is emphasized, "you" is prolonged. There may be a shifting of accent from one syllable to another, as may be seen on comparing the two sentences, "That judgment was unjust," and "It was an unjust judgment." In the first, "unjust" is accented on the second syllable; in the second, on the first.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lanier, *Science of Eng. Verse*, p. 10, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> Lewis, C. M., *Principles of Eng. Verse*, p. 1, 1906.

In order to determine whether various prose styles differ from one another in accentual rhythm the method of scanning was employed, as follows: A thousand words (or more, if needed to reach a full stop) were counted from the works of different authors, and "scanned" by the writer. The whole number of syllables was counted, also the accented and the unaccented syllables. The average number of unaccented syllables between a pair of accented syllables was calculated. Then the frequency of each type of "foot" was counted;—that is, the number of times the combination— —, — —, — — —, — — — — etc., occurred. Sentence stops were disregarded. The procedure here described, it will be seen, is the same as that employed by Marbe.

To illustrate: The first 1,004 words of Cooper's Red Rover contained 1,593 syllables, 498 were accented in scanning, 1,095 were left unaccented,—average unaccented interval 2.20 syllables, average deviation .99, average word 1.59 syllables. The distribution of groups or "feet" was as follows:

— —	33
— — —	120
— — — —	153
— — — — —	116
— — — — — —	57
— — — — — — —	15
— — — — — — — —	3

Since the number of syllables in the different selections scanned varied, distributions were calculated for a common base of 1,000 syllables. The above accordingly gave:

— —	20.75
— — —	75.48
— — — —	96.23
— — — — —	72.96
— — — — — —	35.85
— — — — — — —	9.43
— — — — — — — —	1.88
	<u>413.59</u>

Table I gives the frequencies of the various types of "foot" for 35 specimens scanned by the writer. The figures over the columns indicate types of "foot": 0 = — —, 1 = — — —, 2 = — — — —, 3 = — — — — —, etc. In the left-hand column of the Table are given authors and titles. These are in full:

COOPER	Red Rover
BARRIE	Little Minister
STEVENSON	Old Pacific Capital
KIPLING	In the Matter of a Private Incarnation of Krishna Mulvaney Man Who Was

JAMES, H.	Watch and Ward
	The Ambassadors
HOWELLS	The Lady of the Aroostook
	Landlord at Lion's Head
DICKENS	Nicholas Nickleby
RUSKIN	Modern Painters
	Sesame and Lilies
MILTON	Tenure of Kings and Magistrates
BROWNE	Urn Burial
ADDISON	Essay on Milton
JOHNSON	Essay on Shakespeare
DE QUINCEY	Essay on Shakespeare
CARLYLE	Hero Worship: Shakespeare
MACAULAY	Boswell's Life of Johnson
LAMB	Old and New Schoolmaster
EMERSON	Nature
HOLMES	Autocrat of the Breakfast Table
BURKE	On Conciliation With America
WEBSTER	Character of Washington
INGERSOLL	Heretics
THE TIMES	Editorial
THE JOURNAL	Editorial
THE TIMES	Report of an Accident
SPENCER	Principles of Psychology
HUXLEY	Physiography, Chap. I
	Preface to the above
DARWIN	Expression of Emotions
JAMES, W.	Principles of Psychology: Habit
TENNYSON	The Princess: Prologue (blank verse)

TABLE I.

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
COOPER .....	20.75	75.48	96.23	72.96	35.85	9.43	1.88		
BARRIE .....	26.34	120.08	98.75	54.30	24.49	10.27	2.37		
STEVENSON .....	39.49	140.01	76.10	85.44	16.51	3.59	.71		
KIPLING—									
I. M. P. ....	43.72	120.30	100.63	60.37	22.90	5.55	.69	.69	
I. K. M. ....	29.48	97.15	106.53	61.64	26.80	8.71	.67		
M. W. W. ....	25.92	93.96	93.96	63.30	28.51	8.42	5.81	.64	
JAMES, H.—									
W. W. ....	30.91	108.54	102.36	68.01	24.73	6.87	.68		
Amb. ....	31.32	95.35	112.05	61.24	23.66	11.13	2.08		
HOWELLS—									
L. A. ....	18.92	87.62	91.13	72.90	27.33	9.81	3.50	1.50	.70

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
L. L. H. ....	16.60	84.47	109.74	69.31	26.71	6.49	2.16	.72	
DICKENS .....	29.88	118.19	95.61	63.08	26.56	5.97	.66		
RUSKIN—									
M. P. ....	52.54	141.29	87.33	66.74	16.33	7.10	1.42		
S. L. ....	30.73	95.53	96.79	64.09	30.73	9.15	.65		.65
MILTON .....	28.93	107.00	78.74	82.10	26.24	6.73	.67		
BROWNE .....	24.58	112.69	116.11	62.83	21.85	4.78	.68		
ADDISON .....	19.96	88.87	89.51	66.33	36.06	8.37	3.86		
JOHNSON .....	8.56	77.72	87.51	78.94	37.94	6.73	3.06		
DE QUINCEY .....	16.83	89.76	92.56	64.51	38.14	8.97	2.24		.56
CARLYLE .....	33.36	116.45	102.83	63.33	19.06	6.81	2.72	.68	
MACAULAY .....	20.86	73.67	87.36	73.02	29.34	11.08	4.56	3.91	
LAMB .....	17.95	85.42	100.27	60.04	33.42	11.14	2.47	.61	
EMERSON .....	23.76	106.24	111.14	65.00	23.06	9.08			
HOLMES .....	22.04	89.58	105.93	63.99	27.72	8.53	.71	1.42	.71
BURKE .....	15.31	75.28	98.25	74.00	33.81	9.57	1.91		
WEBSTER .....	26.78	87.22	88.46	71.02	31.77	8.09	3.73	.62	.62
INGERSOLL .....	26.67	135.48	91.26	55.45	28.78	7.72	1.40		
THE Times .....	17.44	81.61	96.56	64.79	33.64	9.34	3.11	1.24	.62
THE Journal .....	26.22	113.16	101.43	61.41	23.46	5.52	3.45	1.38	
THE Times, R. ....	35.00	93.60	98.93	78.38	22.83	3.80	2.28		
SPENCER .....	20.36	51.45	75.04	63.78	34.30	23.58	5.89	3.21	1.07
HUXLEY—									
Phys. Ch. I. ....	38.30	111.55	120.96	57.12	22.84	4.69			
Pref. ....	20.46	84.28	105.35	65.61	34.31	5.41	4.21		
DAEWIN .....	34.59	91.20	111.96	66.04	23.27	7.54	1.25	.62	
JAMES, W. ....	28.42	93.86	116.99	65.43	23.13	7.27	1.32		
.....									
"THE PRINCESS" ..	22.68	286.52	28.72	65.01	6.04	2.26	.75		
AVERAGES .....	26.85	98.52	98.95	66.81	27.53	8.80	2.11		
<i>(excluding the last)</i>									

Table II gives the average unaccented interval in syllables, the average deviation from this average, and the average word-length in syllables, for each of the selections.

TABLE II.

	Av. Int.	A. D.	Av. W.
COOPER .....	2.20	.99	1.58
BARRIE .....	1.87	.98	1.26
STEVENSON .....	1.76	.97	1.37
KIPLING—I. M. P. ....	1.77	.95	1.40
I. K. M. ....	1.97	.91	1.43
M. W. W. ....	2.09	1.02	1.52
JAMES, H.—W. W. ....	1.91	.92	1.44
Amb. ....	1.96	.92	1.42
HOWELLS—L. A. ....	2.18	.98	1.42
E. L. H. ....	2.18	.90	1.38









DICKENS .....	1.89	.94	1.46
RUSKIN—M. P. ....	1.67	.98	1.35
S. L. ....	2.01	.96	1.46
MILTON .....	1.99	.93	1.47
BROWNE .....	1.89	.85	1.43
ADDISON .....	2.17	1.02	1.50
JOHNSON .....	2.31	1.00	1.59
DE QUINCEY .....	2.17	1.01	1.66
CARLYLE .....	1.87	.94	1.44
MACAULAY .....	2.29	1.30	1.51
LAMB .....	2.19	1.00	1.50
EMERSON .....	1.95	.85	1.42
HOLMES .....	2.08	.94	1.39
BURKE .....	2.24	.97	1.56
WEBSTER .....	2.13	1.13	1.53
INGERSOLL .....	1.85	.96	1.40
THE <i>Times</i> , Ed. ....	2.23	.99	1.54
THE <i>Journal</i> , Ed. ....	1.93	.93	1.44
THE <i>Times</i> , R. ....	1.95	.93	1.42
SPENCER .....	2.56	1.01	1.76
HUXLEY—Ch. I. ....	1.80	.88	1.42
Pref. ....	2.13	.95	1.63
DARWIN .....	1.95	.91	1.57
JAMES, W. ....	1.97	.86	1.50
"THE PRINCESS" .....	1.40	.71	1.29

A cursory glance at Table I shows that each selection has a foot of maximum frequency, either (1) or (2); that the curves rise more steeply than they descend; that there is considerable variety of shape in the curves. A few typical ones have been plotted and are given in the accompanying charts. The points to be noted are: the acute and the rounded summit, the steep and the gradual descent, the summit in (1) and the summit in (2), the double apex or dip (Milton and Stevenson).

Before proceeding to discuss the figures presented in the preceding tables, it will be desirable to give some evidence of their reliability; first, as measures of objective fact; second, as typical of the whole work from which each selection was taken.

The first thousand words of Cooper's "Red Rover" were scanned by two persons besides the writer. Both were students at Teacher's College, Columbia University, but one had never scanned poetry. The numerical results are given, together with those from the writer's scansion, for comparison, in Table III.

0 = — —  
 1 = — — —  
 2 = — — — —  
 3 = — — — — —  
 etc.



0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

TABLE III.

COOPER'S "Red Rover." (1st 1,000 words.)								
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	Av. Int. A. D.
A. L. ....	20.75	75.48	96.23	72.96	35.85	9.43	1.88	2.20 .99
M. R. ....	25.82	79.37	98.12	71.25	33.12	8.75	2.50	2.13 .99
L. T. ....	8.75	56.25	82.50	71.25	40.62	14.37	6.25	2.54 1.09

The agreement between the first two is close. The third varies from the other two, but it will be noticed that the maximum is in the same column. The low number in column (0), and the high numbers in columns (5) and (6), indicate that this person omitted a great many accents that were marked by the first two.

Stevenson's "Old Pacific Capital" was scanned by C. W., who had never scanned poetry. The next table gives the result, together with the corresponding figures from Table I. C. W. scanned the *second* thousand words; A. L. the *first* thousand.

TABLE IV.

STEVENSON'S "Old Pacific Capital" (1st & 2nd 1,000).											
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	Av. Int.	A.D.	Av. W.
A. L. ....	39.49	140.01	76.10	85.44	16.51	3.59	.71		1.76	.97	1.37
C. W. ....	57.67	122.46	79.74	76.18	18.51	7.12	.71	1.42	1.74	.98	1.38

The two scansions give widely divergent figures in columns (0) and (1). Now, it will be observed that the number of (0)'s marked by C. W. is far in excess of that given for any writer by A. L. in Table I. It is also more than double the number marked by M. R. in the Cooper selection. It seems a fair inference that C. W. was abnormal in accenting successive syllables. C. W.'s manner of speaking supports this inference. It is slow and deliberate, with strong emphasis, always noticed by new acquaintances. If we throw in a few unaccented syllables here and there so as to reduce (0) to more normal size, (1) will rise proportionally. It should be noticed that the high frequency of (1) and the relatively high frequency of (3) appear in both records.

Henry James' "Watch and Ward" was scanned by K, graduate student of English.



TABLE V.

JAMES' "Watch and Ward" (*same section*).

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	A.Int.	A.D.
A. L. ....	30.91	108.54	102.36	68.01	24.73	6.87	.68	1.91	.92
K. ....	33.61	109.07	93.98	66.54	26.06	8.91	1.37	1.92	.97

We observe here that the maxima are in the same column and the general agreement good. A piece of prose having a large excess of one kind of "foot," we may assume, will have a different rhythmical character from one with an excess of another kind. Its rhythm will be greatly colored by the predominant type. Hence agreement among different markers in marking the most frequent "foot," indicates agreement in feeling the predominant rhythm.

The most frequent "foot," it has been noted, is always in column (1) or (2). These two intervals are radically of different type. Foot (1) is two-rhythm—iambic or trochaic; foot (2) is three-rhythm—anapaestic or dactylic. Foot (3), on the other hand, may be the result of negligence in marking foot (1), as a little consideration will show. Similarly, foot (4) may be due to neglect of adjacent (1)'s and (2)'s, and foot (4), to neglect of successive (2)'s. One would expect the scansion of an inexperienced person to show a greater number of the long intervals than the scansion of a person who had marked a large number of pieces. The scansion of three of the markers illustrates this point. But the opposite may happen. The inexperienced marker may mark too minutely, marking word-accent instead of sentence-accent. This seems to have been done by (M. R.).

As to the extent to which the figures in Table I may be taken to be typical for the piece of writing as a whole from which each selection of a thousand words was taken, some evidence will be found in Table VI and VII.

Each of the selections named in the first column of Table VI was divided in half, and the different types of foot in each half were counted just as they had been in the wholes. The halves ranged in size between seven and eight hundred syllables. The figures in the table have been reduced to a common denominator of 500.

In Table VII are given the figures resulting from L. T.'s scansion of the *first* and *second* consecutive thousand words of Cooper's "Red Rover."

TABLE VI.

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
KIPLING—I. K. M. ....	17	47	59	36	10	3
	13	54	52	28	24	5
RUSKIN—S. L. ....	15	49	51	31	15	3
	15	46	45	33	15	5
MILTON .....	19	52	37	50	10	3
	10	58	44	35	16	3
BROWNE .....	15	57	60	30	13	2
	9	55	56	32	8	2
CARLYLE .....	13	57	55	29	8	2
	19	66	47	34	10	4
LAMB .....	11	46	50	29	17	4
	6	38	49	30	16	6
EMERSON .....	10	58	56	30	9	6
....	13	49	55	35	14	2
INGERSOLL .....	12	73	42	26	15	4
	14	61	48	29	13	3
SPENCER .....	10	24	39	30	15	11
	9	27	35	33	19	12
HUXLEY—Prof. ....	10	37	50	31	15	2
	8	37	43	27	15	2

TABLE VII.

## COOPER'S "Red Rover" (L. T.).

	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1st. 1,000.....	875	56.25	82.50	71.25	40.62	14.37	6.25	
2nd. 1,000.....	679	56.23	78.48	69.83	42.02	19.15	4.32	.61

Let us now return to Table I. The selections were taken from authors of the most diverse styles. There was, of course, no need of establishing the fact of the *widest* diversities by experiments in appreciation. That Stevenson's style, for example, is extremely different from Cooper's will be disputed by no one. Innumerable printed opinions have given expression to this judgment. A similar consensus of opinion may be confidently assumed as to the fact of diversity between such styles as that of Ruskin's "Modern Painters" and that of Lamb's "Essays of Elia," between Burke and Ingersoll, between Herbert Spencer and William James, between Addison and Carlyle, between the *Times* and the *Journal*.

The figures in the table, so far as these very dissimilar styles are concerned, at least, vary in sympathy with the estimate of literary criticism. Carlyle and Addison are a strongly contrasted pair. The epithets applied most often to Carlyle's style are "vigorous" and

"emphatic," while Addison's writing is characterized as "smooth" and "urbane." To a person scanning styles such as these two, the difference is felt to be one between strong or distinct, and weak and vague accentuation. One scanning a vaguely accentuated style will pass over a relatively large number of syllables without marking an accent. In a strongly accentuated style the accents marked are numerous and close together. This is shown in the table by the great excess of (4)'s, (5)'s and (6)'s in Addison over Carlyle, and the excess of (0)'s in Carlyle over Addison.

Similar differences may be seen in the table between Burke and Ingersoll, Spencer and James, Cooper and Stevenson, the *Times* and the *Journal*. Comparing the figures in column (0) with one another, and those in columns (4), (5), and (6), we should class Lamb, De Quincey, Johnson and Howells with Addison; and Barrie, Kipling, Browne, H. James, Ruskin M. P., with Carlyle.

We now pass to consider columns (1) and (2). These two columns, as has been remarked before, represent radically different types of rhythm. "Iambic" or "trochaic" with reference to (1), and "anapaestic" or "dactylic" with reference to (2), are objectionable terms; both because no distinctions between "iambic" and "trochaic," or "anapaestic" and "dactylic" were made in scanning, and because these terms carry implications of classical prosodic theory that are inapplicable. The term "duple" for the shorter foot, and "triple" for the longer, will be used. Each of these may be again characterized, if necessary, as "rising" or "falling," according as the accent comes last or first in the foot.

Taking two contrasted styles like Ruskin's "Modern Painters" and Lamb's "Essays," we note that the one has a large excess of (1)'s over (2)'s, the other of (2)'s over (1)'s. Ruskin's style, then, we should say is markedly duple in this selection; Lamb's triple. For similar reasons we would affirm that the styles of Stevenson, Barrie, Dickens, Milton, Carlyle, Ingersoll, the *Journal*, Kipling's "In the Matter of a Private," exhibit marked duple rhythm; while Huxley, Darwin, W. James, H. James in "The Ambassadors," Howells, Holmes, Kipling in "The Incarnation of Krishna Mulvaney," have a predominant triple rhythm. The degree of duple or triple should be estimated by the degree of excess of (1)'s over (2)'s or vice versa. But low amounts of both (as in the case of Spencer) even though there be a considerable excess of one over the other cannot constitute a rhythm, for they may both be scattered throughout the piece of writing as isolated groups of syllables, not as groups of "feet." Large amounts of both, on the other hand (as in the case of Browne), even though neither predominate, indicate rhythm, a mingling or alternation of duple and triple.

## DISTRIBUTION OF FEET FOR ABOUT 400 WORDS.


COOPER: R. R.



STEVENSON: O. P. C.



RUSKIN: M. P.



MACAULAY: E. on B.



BARRIE: L. M.



## DISTRIBUTION OF FEET FOR ABOUT 400 WORDS.

*(Continued)*

COOPER: R. R.



STEVENSON: O. P. C.



RUSKIN: M. P.



MACAULAY: E. on B.



BARRIE: L. M.



In the best of duple rhythms there will be found a certain amount of (2)'s. "The Princess," which is duple rhythm by a great artist, is instructive on this point. Some of the (2)'s there are due to syllables intended to be hurried or slurred in reading. Others arise from the substitution here and there of a duple falling for a duple rising foot—a permissible procedure in blank verse—which brings the unaccented syllables of two feet together. Amid triple rhythm, by the opposite process of lengthening syllables, duple feet may be inserted without breaking the rhythm.

The figures in column (3) are to be interpreted in two ways. They indicate partly failure to mark accents in successive duple feet. This point, too, is illustrated in "The Princess." It probably accounts for the large number of (3)'s in Milton and Stevenson. But (3)'s to a large extent constitute a distinct type of rhythm. It will be remembered that Aristotle recommended this type, which he called the "paeonic," as the most suitable for prose. A few phrases of English from the selections that were scanned will show the character of this foot.

In the first from Macaulay's "Boswell," the (3)'s are alternated quite regularly with other intervals:

Áll the capríces of his témpér, áll the illúsións of his váníty, áll his cástles in the áir.

The next is from Johnson:

He sácrafices vírtue to convénience.

And this from Burke:

If ánything were wánting to this nécessary opératió of the fórm of góvérnment, religión would have gíven it a compléte efféct.

This type of foot seems to be comparatively numerous in Burke, Webster, Johnson, Macaulay, The *Times* reporter, and "The Lady of the Aroostook."

Column (4) has already been discussed in connection with column (0). It does not represent a distinct type, but is a resultant of weak and vague accentuation, or may be resolved into shorter feet. The same may be said of the columns beyond (4).

The assumption has been made once or twice above that a large amount of a particular type of foot in a piece of writing indicates the presence of a rhythm of that type. The assumption may be tested by actual counting. This was done for portions of a few of the selections. The first 200 feet of Stevenson, Barrie, Ruskin (M. P.), Cooper and Macaulay were plotted and counted in the following manner:

A dot was placed one unit above the base line for each foot of type (0), 2 units above for every (1), 3 above for every (2), etc., separated horizontally by units of space. Starting at the beginning of the

selection, each foot was given a dot on its appropriate altitude, the dots succeeding each other in the same order as the feet in the prose. The dots were connected by straight lines. The same type of foot repeated, gave an unbroken horizontal line. A change from one type to another appeared as an oblique line. By counting the dots in the horizontal lines at any altitude we get a measure of the amount of rhythm of that type. Single occurrences appear in the diagram as angles.

The count gave the following results:

TABLE VIII.

	Duple Rhythm per cent.	Triple Rhythm per cent.
STEVENSON .....	26	5
BARRIE .....	18	12
RUSKIN .....	22	4
MACAULAY .....	12.5	13
COOPER .....	8	13.5

In the Stevenson prose, that is to say, 26 per cent. of all the feet occurred in groups of two or more, and were of the duple type; 5 per cent. occurred in groups of two or more and were of the triple type. In Cooper's prose the duple feet that occurred in groups of two or more were only 8 per cent., while the triple feet so occurring were 13.5 per cent. of all the feet. The 200 feet that were counted comprised about 400 words.

It should be observed that although the method of counting above described probably gives a fair comparative measure of the amount of rhythm in each passage, it by no means gives an absolutely correct measure. The angles in the diagram may form parts of a complex rhythmical pattern. The intrusion of feet of diverse types is frequent, as we have seen, even in poetry which is theoretically all in one rhythm. A regular alternation, besides, may be rhythmical as well as a uniform repetition. Each alternating pair then forms one complex group which is repeated. A phrase like this of Ruskin's, for instance:

"into fantástic sémblances of fórtress tówers,"

would not give a horizontal line in the diagram, but it appears to be rhythmical.

Our next inquiry is whether a writer can be known by his rhythm, as measured in Tables I and II, in everything he writes. The list of works scanned includes two by Ruskin, three by Kipling, two by Howells, two by James, and two by Huxley—the first chapter and the preface).

Ruskin's "Modern Painters" differs very much in Table I from his "Sesame and Lilies." The one is highly accentuated, with a great number of duple feet, the other shows moderate accentuation, with a slight preponderance of triple feet, and more than the average of both (4)'s and (0)'s which is exceptional. These figures seem to conform to the impression made by the two styles on at least one reader. The passage from "Modern Painters" is extraordinary prose—a description of sun-rise in the Alps and a palpable effort at rhythmical writing. "Sesame and Lilies" is didactic, a homily to young ladies on their duties and privileges. The one almost breaks into song; the other is uneven and spasmodic.

Kipling's three stories show three different types of rhythm—duple, triple and mixed. Readers of Kipling will not be surprised at this. There may be characteristics in his style that would enable one to distinguish his work from another writer's without knowing the authors, yet nothing could be plainer than that some of his stories *move* very differently from others. Compare for instance two such extreme kinds as "The Big Drunk Draf" with "An Habitation Enforced."

Huxley's Chapter I shows a greater amount of accentuation than his Preface, though the predominant type of rhythm is the same in both. The two selections differ in the character of their matter. The Preface discusses the place of Physiography as a science, its importance in an educational curriculum and the best ways of teaching it. The thought is strong, the vocabulary abstract and polysyllabic. It is addressed to men of science. In Chapter I, technicalities are abandoned and the author faces the task of instructing the average man in the elements of science. The movement becomes comparatively light and rapid.

The extracts from both Howells and Henry James were chosen with the view of testing whether there had been a change of style form early to late works. The critics make much of a difference in Henry James' style. The table shows that there has been a change from duple rhythm in "Watch and Ward" to triple rhythm in "The Ambassadors." The average foot has lengthened slightly; the average deviation is exactly the same; the average word is a trifle shorter. The relatively high number of (5)'s indicates greater vagueness of accentuation. The change from predominant duple to predominant triple rhythm despite the slightly shortened word length is significant, for it shows that the change has been brought about by other means—word-arrangement, or thought-form.

Howells' later work, "The Landlord at Lion's Head," shows a greater amount of triple rhythm than his earlier, "Lady of the Aroostook." The average foot, the average deviation and the average



word have nevertheless all decreased. There are fewer (3)'s, (4)'s, (5)'s and (6)'s. All these facts seem to indicate, that Howells' style has become more decidedly triple rhythmically, and in general more clean-cut and distinct.

It appears from these comparisons that a writer's style is not the same rhythmically in different works, whether of the same or of different periods of his career. And this generalization based upon a count, from which the possibility of subjective error is indeed not excluded, is confirmed by the purely objective test of the average word-length. The difference in this respect between Huxley's Preface and his Chapter I is considerably greater than that between either of these and the selections from Darwin or Prof. James. The difference between Kipling's "In the Matter of a Private" and his "Man Who Was," in word-length, is greater than that between the former of these and Lamb or Macaulay. A greater difference, moreover, is shown by this objective test between the above-mentioned stories of Kipling, than between the two by Howells, or the two by James, although a period of over twenty years elapsed between the writing of each of these pairs.

Table I shows no agreement among writings of the same *genre*, excepting the group of scientists. Novelists and essayists display all varieties of accentuation and rhythm. Ingersoll differs markedly from his fellow orators. The two journalistic styles form a strong contrast. But although Spencer is extreme in his very low degree of accentuation, he agrees with the other scientists in having a predominance of triple feet.

Some illustrations will now be given to show the distinctness with which prose rhythm occurs in different rhythmical types. The first is a sentence from "The Little Minister" in perfect duple rhythm:

"When Gávin cáme to Thrúms, he wás as í am nów, for the páges láy befóre him on which he wás to write."

The next is a sentence from Macaulay's "Essay on Milton," in which triple rhythm is dominant:

On the rích and the éloquent, on nóbles and priests, they looked dówn with contémp't; for they esteémed themselves rích in a more précíous tréasure and éloquent in a more sublíme lánquage, nóbles by the ríght of an éarlier création and priests by the imposition of a mightier hánd.

In the following from Jeremy Taylor there is an alternation of duple and triple:

It bówed the héad and bróke its stálk, and at níght having lóst sóme of its léaves and áll its béauty, it féll into the pórtion of weéds and óutworn fáces.

Finally a passage from the writing of Thompson-Seton is given, arranged as regular blank verse:

So in this land of long, long winter night,  
Where nature stints her joys for six hard months,  
Then owns her debt and pays it all at once,  
The spring is glorious compensation for the past.  
Six months' arrears of joy are paid in one  
Vast lavish outpour.<sup>1</sup>

The Bible is a great treasury of rhythmical English prose. Examples of sentences in perfect triple rhythm, and even regular hexameters, may be found almost anywhere in the book. A few such, from a larger collection, are here given:

How art thou fallen from Heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning.  
Is. 14: 12.

God is gone up with a shout, the Lord with the sound of the trumpet. Ps. 47: 5.

For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea. Hab. 2: 4.

We have eaten and drunk in thy presence and thou hast taught in our streets. Luke 18: 26.

He looseth the bonds of kings and girdeth their loins with a girdle. Job 12: 18.

Mischief shall come upon mischief and rumor shall be upon rumor. Ps. 18: 15.

Cease then and let me alone that I may take comfort a little. Job 10: 20.

Be as the sands of the sea which cannot be measured or numbered. Hos. 1: 10.

Wall of the daughter of Zion, let tears run down like a river. Lam. 2: 18.

A few examples of perfect duple rhythm from the Bible follow:

He casteth forth his ice like morsels,  
Who can stand before his cold?  
He giveth snow like wool.

Ps. 58.

The sea and all that in them is,  
Who keepeth truth forever.

Ps. 146.

Take my yoke upon you and learn of me. Matt. 11: 29.

Death is swallowed up in victory; O, death where is thy sting? O, grave where is thy victory." I Cor. xv.

<sup>1</sup> Atlantic Monthly, 90:283.

Division into lines, which present rhythmical units to the eye, is one of the principal distinguishing marks of poetry. But prose has its rhythmical units also. These are not presented to the eye as are the lines of poetry, but the voice in reading calls attention to them by pauses. These phrasal sections are often, but not always, marked out by the punctuation.

The part of the sentence before the copula, the subject, usually forms a phrasal section of the kind here meant, although it is seldom separated by punctuation. The pause after the statement of the subject can be readily perceived in one's own reading. In the preceding sentence, for instance, there seems to the writer a distinct pause before "can." The fact has been verified in a number of examples by having one person read while three others noted the pauses by writing down the words after which they occurred. There is no pause after the subject if the subject is very short, or has been fully suggested in the previous sentence. There is no pause after "He" in the following sentence. "He was always laying himself at the feet of some eminent man." The real subject of a proposition sometimes does not coincide with the grammatical subject. In such cases the position of the pause indicates the true division. In the following sentence, for example, it is after "night," not after "It." "It was a dark night between two sunny days." Compare this with the sentence that succeeds it in Macaulay's text, "The age of the Macenases had passed away," where the pause divides the sentence into equal halves—the subject and the predicate.

Considering the phrasal section in prose as the analogue of the verse in poetry, the question arises whether the phrases within a given piece of prose, like the verses in a poem, display any uniformity of rhythmical structure. To determine this point, twenty of the texts that had been scanned were read again and divided into phrasal sections. The accents in each phrase were then counted. Here is a passage from Macaulay scanned and divided:

What silly things he said | what bitter retorts he provoked | how  
at one place he was troubled with evil presentiments | which came  
to nothing | how at another place | on waking from a drunken  
doze | he read the Prayer-book | and took a hair of the dog that had  
bitten him | how he went to see men hanged | and came away maul-  
lin | how he added five hundred pounds to the fortune of one of his  
babies | because she was not frightened at Johnson's ugly face | etc.

Table IX gives in percentages the number of phrases in each selection that contained one, two, or more accents—as indicated at the head of each column. Decimals have been omitted.

TABLE IX.

(Accents per phrase.)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
BARRIE .....	5	26	33	23	8	1		
KIPLING—I. M. P.....	8	24	28	21	9	6	1	
HOWELLS'—L. L. H.....	4	20	28	18	12	8	3	2
DICKENS' .....	6	29	31	19	6	4	1	
RUSKIN—M. P.....	4	29	29	16	12	3	2	1
MILTON .....	11	19	33	22	6	5	1	
BROWNE .....	10	24	44	12	6	1		
JOHNSON .....	7	32	31	19	7	1		
DE QUINCEY .....	15	21	29	21	5	5		
CARLYLE .....	22	31	29	11	4			
MACAULAY .....	12	23	27	23	7	3	1	
LAMB—P. R.....	6	28	41	16	2	1	1	
EMERSON .....	7	22	38	18	5			
HOLMES .....	6	26	26	18	12	3	4	1
BURKE .....	11	29	26	18	9	1	1	1
WEBSTER .....	8	15	28	20	9	6	1	1
INGERSOLL .....	21	36	26	10	2	1		
<i>Times</i> (Rep.) .....	6	35	32	14	9	1		
<i>Journal</i> .....	22	29	30	10	7	2		
W. JAMES .....	7	21	31	24	9	3	1	
Averages .....	10	26	33	13	7	3	1	
A. D. ....		4.7	4.4					

The distributions shown in Table IX are so much alike that we cannot on the strength of them infer distinctive rhythmical types for various selections. There are, however, a few exceptions. Sir Thomas Browne, Lamb and Emerson have phrases with three accents, much above the average. This must be regarded as indicating another rhythmical effect in addition to that discussed in connection with Table I. The figures in Table I were rather disappointing for Browne's style, in view of his great reputation as a writer of rhythmical prose. The figures in Table IX supplement those of Table I and give a more satisfactory explanation of his reputation. Lamb, it is known, modeled his style to a great extent on Browne's. His high percentage in column 3, almost as high as Browne's, seems more than a mere coincidence. In column 2, we notice Ingersoll's and the *Times* reporter's high figures. So far as Ingersoll is concerned, we seem to have a correct register of the short-phrased, staccato style characteristic of him.

We note next that Table IX appears to show a central tendency as

a whole in column 3. The fact is suggestive of Wundt's "Gesetz der drei Stufen."<sup>1</sup> Three accents form a sort of natural unit-group, permitting discrimination of "much," "more" and "most." A German sentence accented and divided by him is of interest. The acute, the grave and the double-acute accents indicate different intensities.

"Äls er sich den Vòrwurf | séhr zu Hérzen zu nèhmen schien | |  
und immer aufs néue bethéuerte | dass er gewiss gern mittheile | gérn  
für Frèunde thätig sei | | so empfánd sie | dass sie sein zártes Gemüth  
verlétzt habe | und sie fühlte sich als seine Schúldnerin."

Here are a few English sentences from Lamb to illustrate the phrase of three accents, degrees of accent and pause being ignored:

"His depórtment was of the éssence of grávyty | his wórd's féw or  
nóne | and I was nó't to make a nóise in his présence."

Äwful idéas of the Tówer | twined themselves abóut his présence.

A cáptive—a stáately béing | let óut of the Tówer on Sáturdays.

In Wundt's example not only are accents grouped in threes, but also phrases. The single and double bars indicate shorter and longer pauses. There are three long phrases, made up of shorter ones, sometimes three also, in the whole sentence.

The number of phrases per sentence (phrases distinguished, as before said, by sensible pauses) was counted in the selections named in Table IX. A central tendency appeared in only two or three cases. Emerson had 44 per cent. of two-phrased sentences. Burke had 33 per cent. of three-phrased sentences. The frequency of two-phrased sentences in Emerson is probably due to his large proportion of simple sentences.

The question may be raised whether we have a right to speak of the "rhythm" constituted by phrases that are uniform only in respect to the number of accents contained in them, disregarding unaccented syllables. Some answer to this question was given in the early part of the essay. Another, perhaps more forcible one, is, that poetry meant to be and accepted as rhythmical has been in many languages constructed on exactly this principle. The rhythm of the German Nibelungenlied is composed of main accents, the unaccented syllables not being counted. The same principle, besides alliteration and balance, is employed in Old-English poetry. In the earliest Anglo-Saxon manuscripts the lines were written in the same way as in prose, rhythmical divisions being indicated by punctuation. Later, the lines were written as in modern poetry, and half-lines were marked by punctuation; or the half-lines were written one below the other

<sup>1</sup> Voelkerpsychologie, Theil 1, Bd. 2, S. 391.

as lines. The following from *Piers Plowman* is an illustration, each line as printed being a so-called "half-line":

There preáched a párdoner  
 As hé a priest were  
 Bróught forth a búll  
 With many bíchop's séals.

In hábite as an héremite  
 Unhóly of wórkes  
 Went wyde in this wórld  
 Wóndres to hére.

Each half-line corresponds closely to what has been called above a phrasal section. Each contains two "heavy" words.<sup>1</sup> The "heavy" words of the first half-line are distinguished by an alliterative consonant, which re-appears in the "heavy" word of the second half-line. The number of unaccented syllables is disregarded. When many, they are hurried over. We have here a rhythm of main concepts following in approximately equal times. The times are conditioned but not strictly determined by the intervening unaccented syllables.

Most scholars now hold that the ancient Hebrew poets considered only the syllables receiving the accent. The subject has been studied with great care by Sievers, König and others. König points out that the popular poetry heard at the present day in Palestine is also of this character:

"Lines with two, three, four and five accented syllables may be distinguished, between which one to three and even four unaccented syllables may be inserted, the poet being bound by no definite number in his poem. Occasionally two accented syllables are joined. . . . The symmetry and variation being determined by emotion and sentiment."<sup>1</sup>

The metrical theory which Coleridge meant to exemplify in "*Christabel*," was practically the same as that here described. But Coleridge held that, although the number of unaccented syllables might vary, the number of accents must remain the same in every line. Something of the same sort may be seen in Milton's "*Samson Agonistes*," and Whitman ranges from the strict limits of modern conventional verse to a freedom that is less rhythmical than good prose.

When one considers the comparatively artificial means forced upon poetry for rhythmical purposes, it appears as if rhythm in prose must be a purely accidental effect. A little study will convince us

<sup>1</sup> Skeat, *Introd. to Piers Plowman*. Clarendon Press.

<sup>1</sup> Koenig *Stylistik, Rhetoric, Poetik*, p. 305, 1900.

that prose is not so naive and helpless as we might suppose. It has at command a variety of means for creating rhythm.

There are in the first place short and long words. Table II gave the average word-length in each selection along with the average foot-length. The fact of correlation between the two is apparent. On applying the Pearson formula for the coefficient of correlation we get  $r = .76$ —which is high.<sup>1</sup> This means that to a large extent short "feet" go together with short words, and long "feet" with long words.

The correlation, as the coefficient shows, is not perfect. Barrie's prose has the fewest syllables per word in the table, next to the blank verse of "The Princess." But his average foot, though short, is not the shortest. Ruskin's "Modern Painters" comes next in word-length, but is shortest in foot-length. Spencer has both the longest foot-length and word-length. Howells' *L. L. H.*, Webster, and Huxley's Preface, on the other hand, which have the same average foot-length, show considerable variety of word-length.

Choice of words is partly dependent on the nature of the subject, but to a large extent it is an outcome of the writer's personality. It may be wholly a matter of individual taste whether in a certain context one shall write, "man," "human being," "gentleman," "immortal soul," "old boy," "chap," or "fellow." He may know all these words, but his selection will be dependent on his feelings, his mood and his training.

Flaubert's maxim, that for every position in a sentence there is but one right word, is a proposition, like the dogma of predestination in general, that cannot be proved or disproved. It is true that having once begun a phrase in a particular way a writer is bound to continue in the same form of construction, and having written one kind of word another of a certain kind is expected to follow. But within these limits his liberty is great. The actually written word holds the field by right of possession, and rarely does a reader take the trouble to re-think the thought in different language. It is the writer's privilege to express the thought as it is in his own rather than in the reader's mind. The reader may sometimes say that he himself would not have written so, but he cannot say that the writer has not written what he intended.

Something of the individual liberty of the writer is well illustrated in the following couple of sentences from Thackeray's "Vanity Fair":

"Love was Miss Amelia Sedley's last tutoress, and it was amazing what progress our young lady made under that popular teacher. In

<sup>1</sup> Thorndike, *Mental and Social Measurements*, p. 123, 1904.

the course of fifteen or eighteen months' daily attention to this eminent finishing governess, what a deal of secrets Amelia learned."

There are, no doubt, subtle differences of meaning between "Miss Amelia Sedley," "our young lady" and plain "Amelia"; between "tutress," "popular teacher" and "eminent finishing governess." But who will say that mere sound did not play an important part in determining the selection of these synonyms? "It sounds better," is a principle of rhetoric often invoked by school-children. Perhaps their reason is more nearly right than their reproving teachers usually admit. Madame de Stael is said to have taken great pleasure in listening to meaningless verses. "That is what I call poetry," she would say; "it is delicious and so much the more that it does not convey a single idea to me."

Prof. James refers to the uncritical way in which meaningless combinations of words in prose are often read.<sup>1</sup> The illusion of a meaning, he thinks, is due to the correctness of the grammatical structure and to the fact that the words belong to the same special vocabulary, in the same language. A conventional rhythm seems also to contribute to the effect. In the example he quotes from a newspaper reporter: "The birds filled the tree-tops with their morning song, making the air moist, cool and pleasant," it seems that the reporter was bound to have an evenly divided sentence with a rise and a suspension of the voice in the middle. Had he put a full stop after "song," omitted "making" and supplied a copula for his second sentence, he would have written sense, but his tune would have been gone. The presence of the tune induces the reader to overlook such a minor slip as that of bird-songs making the air moist. The three adjectives at the close of the sentence are additional evidence that the writer was being led by a preconceived rhythm.

Arrangement of words is another means of controlling rhythm in prose. The order of words in a sentence is in large measure fixed by the conventionalities of syntax. It is more rigidly prescribed in analytical languages like English and French than in inflectional languages like Greek and Latin. In the former, the order of the words is depended upon to show the grammatical relations, an office that in the latter is performed by word-endings. Transpositions in the inflectional languages produce changes of emphasis without confusing grammatical relations. "Romulus Romam condidit" may be said in six different ways—with every possible transposition of the words. The meaning in each case is clear; the emphasis different. In English the subject of the verb must as a rule precede it in order to be known as the subject.

<sup>1</sup> Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, p. 263.



This fixedness of the order of words in English may, however, easily be exaggerated. There is no lack of clearness in this sentence of Carlyle's, "Him Heaven had kneaded of much more potent stuff," nor would there be in a different transposition like, "Of much more potent stuff had Heaven kneaded him." Anthony Trollope writes, "Her it was his custom to visit early in the afternoon"; which might also be written, "To visit her early in the afternoon was his custom," or "His custom was to visit her early in the afternoon."

The general principle underlying the order in which words occur in a sentence is, that the portion of thought most vivid in the speaker's or writer's mind tends to get itself uttered first. The order of words in expression, moreover, tends to conform to the order of perception. "Since it often happens that some striking detail arrests the attention first, while the more important event only shows later, or an obvious effect is more apparent than its hidden cause, so the same order is more effective in language discourse."<sup>1</sup> The instant of conception and utterance is the important moment in expression. Individuality is stamped upon the thought at this moment, and one of the marks of this individuality is the order in which the words are produced.

The importance of the order of words has been recognized by both ancient and modern rhetoricians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus claimed that the choice of words was not of as much importance as their arrangement. The ancients taught that the order of words should be determined by the more or less harmonious collocation of the letters at the end and beginning of words that follow each other, by the rhythmic movement of successive long and short syllables, and by effects of euphony of which the ear alone is competent to judge.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of the transition from thought to thought has an influence in helping or hindering the rhythm of prose. The reader requires sequence of time in narration, some definite order of space relationship in description, the relation of cause and effect, of subordination and coördination or of unfolding and explanation of concepts. The presence of such clearly perceived ties produces smoothness and easily moving style. Their absence results in incoherency. Ellipses, digressions, collateral ideas check the flow of thought. Rhythm becomes impossible.

Not only in the choice and arrangement of his words and in his method of joining thought with thought has the writer of prose individual liberty, but he may modify the very form and substance of his thought to suit his purpose. It is often a matter of no conse-

<sup>1</sup> Lotze, *Mikr.* Bk. IV, ch. 3. (trans. by Hamilton and Jones, 1886.)

<sup>2</sup> Weil, "Order of Words," p. 11.

quence to him what the particular character of a proposition in a given place in his discourse shall be. What he is interested in is the further thought to which it leads. It may make no difference to him whether he say, "A full moon shone in the heavens," or "It was a bright moonlight night," or "The earth was suffused with a kind of weak daylight." The point he wishes to make is that a certain thing could be seen. So he attain his end, it does not much matter whether the statement that gets him there be active or passive, literal or figurative, or whether he use one figure rather than another.

In his use of figures he is not, however, free from all limitations, as is often rashly assumed. He must obey certain natural associations. Material images more or less luminous arise spontaneously in the mind with every thought and furnish its vestment.<sup>1</sup> There is no creation of metaphors in good writing; there is but a limited selection.

The true metaphor, which is a naming by one term of two concepts, arises in the mind at the moment of utterance because of a resemblance between the two concepts in some essential particular and an actual blending of the two.<sup>2</sup> When the poet says, "fear chalked her face," or "I stole from court cat-footed through the town," there has been no deliberate putting together of distinct images. The two ideas came together originally and have not been separated.

Artificial figures affect the sensitive reader as evidence of insincerity. Their use for the sake of rhythm only adds to the impression that there is an attempt at imposition. A writer on nature subjects has the sentence, "All the eastern sky is glowing amber; westward riding high, the moon stares from the empyrean of cold azure washed with silver, a disc of polished brass." We feel pretty sure the writer of that did not see all the images in the relations in which he puts them in his sentence. If he insist that he did, we must conclude that his mind works in ways that are exceptional and abnormal. The particular figure to be used cannot be prescribed or predicted from the outside. There is a large field for individual variation, but the associated images must be recognized as occurring together in some considerable number of human minds. There is no hesitation generally in naming metaphors like "hair shot through with sunset spikes of gold," and lips "with musical curves," false and strained.

<sup>1</sup> Emerson, *Nature*, Chapter II.

<sup>2</sup> Buck, "Metaphor, a Study in the Psychology of Rhetoric," 1890.

The rhythms that have occupied our attention thus far have been phonetic. Accentual rhythm is indeed the external form of thought rhythm, the significant in thought coinciding with the phonetically accented. But there are thought rhythms not so closely connected with sound rhythm. Rhythms of this sort may be called logical. The rhythmical units are thoughts repeated in form or substance, or changing in a regular way. It will be convenient to introduce this part of our subject by reference to a language other than English in which the principles of logical rhythm have been to some extent recognized and formulated.

Biblical scholars have termed the logical rhythm of the Bible "parallelism of members." This is a rhythm over and above that accentual rhythm of the Bible already referred to. The Hebrew text of the Bible is elaborately punctuated to indicate syntactical and logical groupings of words.<sup>1</sup> The characters used for punctuating are called accents, but are rather of the nature of musical notes to guide the public reader. Different degrees of coherence and of separation are indicated by different characters. This system of punctuation was first instituted in the poetical books but was applied later to the prose books also.

The principle of parallelism predominates in the poetical books. The parallelism may be of several kinds. The first and second members may state the same thought in different words; the second member may state a thought antithetical to the first; the second member may echo or supplement the first. The parallelism may also subsist among three members. In such case all three may be coordinate expressions of the same thought, or the last two may supplement the first, or the first two may be coordinate and supplemented by the third. The main divisions in all these cases are indicated by the principal accent or punctuation mark.

Examples of these parallelisms are:

Jehovah, rebuke me not in thine anger ||  
Neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure.

A soft answer turneth away wrath ||  
But a grievous word bringeth up anger.

Life he asked of thee; thou has given it him: ||  
Length of days forever and ever.

They have hands but they handle not |  
Feet have they but they walk not ||  
Neither speak they through their throat.

<sup>1</sup> Wickes, *Accents of the Prose Books of the Bible*, 1881.  
" " *Poetical* " " " " 1887.

Each member of each group is further subdivided and punctuated to show its syntactical and logical structure. These points of the second order are placed approximately at the phonetic middle of each clause, tending to produce evenly balanced groups of sounds, and in some cases where adherence to the logical grouping of the words would result in an unsymmetrical division, the accent is shifted to a more agreeable position.

In this subdivision of the clauses, phrasal sections are marked out corresponding to the phrasal sections we have already noted in English. The principles of division are similar. When the subject precedes, it is generally marked off from the rest of the sentence:

“And the earth | was waste and void.”

When the object precedes, which implies that it is to be especially emphasized, it is marked off:

“A laughing stock | has God made me.”

Adverbial and prepositional phrases at the beginning of a sentence are set off:

“As for the man | he found no helpmate.”

Turning now to English, we find that balance of clauses and phrases, as it is called, differs from the parallelism of the Bible only in the fact that the principles underlying coordination and subordination of the members in the modern language are of greater subtlety. The relation of part to part is of a more intellectual character; the connecting links are more finely discriminated.

In the “Euphuism” of the sixteenth century, which marks the beginning of the formation of an English prose style<sup>1</sup> parallelism and balance ran riot. Besides alliteration, consonance, rhyme and plays upon words, we find a profusion of twin phrases and parallel clauses, and the most elaborate antithesis of well-balanced sentences. The artificiality of the euphuistic style is what most impresses a modern reader. But the same devices as those employed there may be found more or less in all artistic prose.

We may take for example the first paragraph of Macaulay’s *Essay on Boswell’s “Life of Johnson.”*<sup>1</sup>

“The *Life of Johnson* is assuredly a great—a very great work. Homer is not more decidedly the first of heroic poets, Shakespeare is not more decidedly the first of dramatists, Demosthenes is not more decidedly the first of orators, than Boswell is the first of biog-

<sup>1</sup> Garnett, “English Prose from Elizabeth to Victoria,” p. 4, 1891.

raphers. He has no second. He has distanced all his competitors so decidedly that it is not worth while to place them. Eclipse is first, and the rest nowhere."

The first sentence contains repetition in the predicate. The rhythm of thought in the second sentence, consisting of clauses of the same form but of different, though analogous, meaning, is obvious. The fourth sentence would in Biblical style be expressed without the correlatives "so—that." These words in the English sentence disguise but do not destroy the parallelism. The fifth sentence is distinctly balanced.

It may be thought that Macaulay is exceptionally fond of these effects. But open a book by a very different sort of writer, at random. Let it be Stevenson's "Amateur Emigrant." The chapter happens to be "Steerage Types." The first sentence of the first paragraph contains repetition of the same part of speech. The second sentence is, "Even in these rags and tatters, the man twinkled all over with impudence like a sham piece of jewelry | and I have heard him offer a situation to one of his fellow passengers with the air of a lord." Here the second member states specifically what the first has expressed in general terms. This corresponds to the form of Biblical parallelism named "synonymous,"

"O Jehovah, my God, thou art very great,  
Thou art clothed with honor and majesty."

The third sentence is, "Nothing could overlie such a fellow; | a kind of base success was written on his brow." This is of the same kind as the preceding. The fourth sentence: "He was then in his ill days; | but I can imagine him in Congress with his mouth full of bombast and sawder," is antithetical. The next two sentences are respectively synonymous and antithetical: "As we moved in the same circle, | I was brought necessarily into his society." "I do not think I ever heard him say anything that was true, kind or interesting, | but there was entertainment in the man's demeanor." The last sentence of the paragraph is simple and the only one that does not contain balance or parallelism.

If it be objected that between the members of the parallel clauses that have been cited as examples, a variety of logical relationships may be discriminated, and is, in fact, indicated by the connecting particles, it should be observed that such logical relations exist between the members of the Biblical parallel groups also, although the connecting particles are absent. The explicit statement of the logical relation between consecutive clauses is even in modern English largely a matter of taste with the writer. The essential thing is that the

relation be there. But connectives indicating condition, cause, consequence, etc., are not wholly lacking in Biblical parallelism. Condition, for instance, is expressed in,

"Except Jehovah keep the city,  
The watchman waketh but in vain."

Causal relation is expressed in,

"I have not turned aside from thy judgments,  
For thou has taught me."

In

Thou are my hiding place and my shield  
I hope in thy word."

The causal relation is just as clearly given without a connective.

Repetitions of the same form of phrase with different but allied meaning constitute another order of thought rhythm. A celebrated passage of Burke's will illustrate this:

"Never, never more shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiments and heroic enterprise is gone. It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage while it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil by losing all its grossness."

The same type of word or word-group recurring—verb, noun, adjective, or noun with adjective—gives another rhythmic effect. The last sentence of Ingersoll's lecture on "Domestic Happiness" may be quoted as an example:

"I would rather have *lived and died unnoticed and unknown*, except by those who loved me, and gone down into the *voiceless silence* of the *dreamless dust*, than to have been that *imperial impersonation* of *force and murder* who covered Europe with *blood and tears*."

Orations are more artificial than other forms of prose. But we find the same kind of rhythm in the quietest sort of writing. Scott, for instance, has:

"The sun was setting upon one of the *rich, glassy glades* of that forest which we have mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. Hundreds of *broad-headed, short-stemmed, wide-branched oaks*," etc.—"in some places they were intermingled with *beeches, hollies* and *copsewood* of various descriptions so closely as totally to intercept the *level beams* of the *sinking sun*."

And in the still more placid writing of Howells' "London Films" we have:

"It was having apparently the time of its life, and really the place was enchanting with its *close-cropped, daisy-starred* lawns, and the gay figures of polo players coming home from a *distant field* in the *pale dusk* of a *brilliant day* of *early June*."

The rhythm of parallelism may be further seen in proverbs and catch-phrases, which are intended to strike the attention and be remembered. "Man proposes, God disposes." "Words are the counters of the wise and the money of the fools." "Charity creates much of the misery it relieves, but does not relieve all the misery it creates." "The greatest happiness of the greatest number." "High life, below stairs." In all these illustrations, it is evident, phonetic rhythm accompanies thought rhythm at every step.

An attempt has been made to show a characteristic rhythm of judgments for different writers by counting the number of predications in each sentence and finding the average per sentence in a large number of periods.<sup>1</sup> The average of predications per sentence in 500 periods of any author who has "achieved a style," according to Gerwig, is approximately the average of his whole book. He gives a record of his count for 100 representative authors. The figures showing a pretty uniform average of predications per sentence in Macaulay during a long period of years, are here reproduced:

	Date.	Number of Periods.	Av. Pred. per Period.	Per cent. of Simp. sent.
ROYAL SOC. OF LIT.....	1823	100	2.03	44
DANTE .....	1824	100	2.15	38
MILTON .....	1825	895	2.07	38
MACHIAVELLI .....	1827	693	1.88	47
ESSAY ON HISTORY.....	1828	719	2.18	40
DRYDEN .....	1828	100	2.65	29
D'ARBLAY .....	1843	918	2.31	32
ADDISON .....	1843	1331	2.22	32
ATTERBURY .....	1853	240	2.35	34
BUNYAN .....	1854	245	2.19	31
GOLDSMITH .....	1856	263	2.29	33
			2.17	36

Since these figures represent only explicit predications, they do not really give us a census of *judgments* in these works, for there are various ways of expressing a judgment while avoiding explicit predication. A judgment may be uttered in the one word "Rain!" and according to the intonation it may mean, "The rain is falling,"

<sup>1</sup> Gerwig, "On the Decrease of Predication, etc." U. of N. Studies, vol. II, No. 1, 1894.

"The rain will soon fall," "I fear it may rain," etc.<sup>1</sup> Explicit predication may be avoided by the use of absolute constructions—"Caesar having reached the Rubicon"; by appositives—"Caesar, a Roman, general"; by conjunctions without copulas—"Caesar was a Roman and the conqueror of Gaul"; by prepositions instead of conjunctions, copulas or conjunctions with copulas—"Caesar was a Roman with few equals in military genius"; by phrases for clauses, by suggestive words for phrases, by present and past participles. A uniform average of predications in successive sections of a prose work, therefore, must be considered as indicating a rhythm composed of judgments, indeed, but not a rhythm formed of all the judgments.

Sherman has found that every writer has a characteristic sentence rhythm throughout his works.<sup>2</sup> Historically the English sentence has been diminishing in length from the pre-Elizabethan age to the present time. Fabian, the earliest writer studied, has an average sentence length of 63.02 words; Spenser's average is 49.82; Hooker's, 41.40; Macaulay's, 22.45; Channing's, 25.73; Emerson's, 20.58.

The constancy of the average sentence length in successive sections of a given writer's prose may be seen in the following tables taken from Sherman's "Analytics of Literature."

DE QUINCEY. Average Sentence Length in Words.

---

1st 100.....	29.74	12th 100.....	34.42
2d ".....	38.62	13th ".....	29.57
3d ".....	29.82	14th ".....	38.58
4th ".....	31.22	15th ".....	35.32
5th ".....	34.21	16th ".....	40.29
6th ".....	29.09	17th ".....	39.29
7th ".....	30.39	18th ".....	38.12
8th ".....	32.93	19th ".....	31.24
9th ".....	33.92	20th ".....	30.76
10th ".....	32.88	21st ".....	33.57
11th ".....	34.09	22d ".....	32.09

---

The average of all the periods is 33.25; the mode is about 33.

The averages for each thousand consecutive sentences of Macaulay's "History of England," are as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 460, 1894.

<sup>2</sup> Sherman. *Analytics of Literature*, 1893.



## HISTORY OF ENGLAND. Average Sentence Length.

---

26.09	23.00	22.21	20.54
24.21	25.33	25.06	25.01
24.20	21.76	22.33	24.97
23.51	21.59	24.81	22.92
24.99	24.10	24.05	23.71
22.13	19.62	21.81	23.26
22.36	21.11	23.39	22.81
20.85	25.58	22.39	23.91
21.08	25.86	23.17	24.92
23.81	23.81	24.03	25.28
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
23.33	23.18	23.32	23.73

---

The variability of the length of the sentence, within each series, however, is great, in modern authors. Macaulay's long sentences are very long. Three consecutive paragraphs taken at random from Newman's "Historical Sketches," show the following sentence lengths:

26 — 41 — 34 — 36 — 19 — 21 — 19 — 18  
 28 — 9 — 61 — 40 — 30 — 31 — 37  
 45 — 32 — 92

The last four sentences of the first paragraph are so nearly equal in length that they form a rhythmical group. The last sentence seems abnormally long. But such great variability as we see here is more apparent than real, for the position of the full stop is arbitrarily determined. Another writer would be just as likely to make three sentences of that long one, punctuating with periods where Newman uses the colon, semi-colon, and comma with dash. There is good reason, in fact, for considering the paragraph rather than the sentence the true unit of discourse, since the only positive rule for pointing off sentences is to choose the longer breaks in the sense.<sup>1</sup> Statements that would be independent sentences if standing alone are often united into one sentence when they are parts of a paragraph. A writer sees the topics of his discourse as hazy paragraphs, which he proceeds to analyze and define in sentences.

There is in some authors a marked tendency toward uniformity in length of paragraphs. Macaulay was found by Lewis to have the greatest amount of paragraph rhythm. His "History of England" gave the following averages per volume: 258.11, 251.52, 325.44, 336.60, 306.90. Authors of regular methods show a general tendency toward approximate uniformity in the paragraph averages of different sections of their works.

<sup>1</sup> Bain, "English Composition," § 157, 1886.

The foregoing studies of prose rhythm point to the conclusion that style and rhythm in prose are to a very large extent identical. Rhythm in prose plays the same part that voice, gesture and facial expression play in oral speech. And just as we practically never have expressionless speech, so we never have rhythmless or styleless prose.

Writers on Rhetoric differ in their use of the term "style." Spencer, Lewis, and Hodgson, for example, mean by the word simply "the mode of handling language for a purpose, whatever the purpose may be and whatever the occasion."<sup>1</sup> Prof. Genung, on the other hand, speaks of styleless writing and quotes a passage conveying statistical information in illustration.<sup>2</sup> "I have stated the taxable value of all the property of Texas," it runs, "at six hundred and three millions. Let me enumerate, in round numbers, a few of the items which go to make up that sum. The land is counted at about two hundred and forty-seven millions," etc., etc. It is a dry statement of fact. Nevertheless, it may safely be asserted that few men having the same information to impart would give it in just the same way.

The passage quoted by Prof. Genung was called styleless by him, probably because there is in it a very low degree of emotional excitement. But the writer of the passage evidently takes a stand personally toward his subject when he says "I have stated" and "Let me enumerate." There was no fatal necessity for him to put his sentences in the active rather than the passive voice, or vice versa, or with one end foremost rather than the other, or to use the particular words he uses, or to connect or fail to connect his sentences as he does. Writing that is more than mere cataloguing cannot help having style, though the style may be conventional.

If it be maintained that a manner of writing not sufficiently peculiar to serve to characterize the writer from all other men does not deserve to be called "style," we may reply that of most men the most striking peculiarity is conventionality. Their gait, their gesture, their intonation, and their rhythm are, to the eyes of all but a few friends, conventional.

Style is elevated above conventionality and made individual mainly by the pressure of emotion in the writer, and the natural result of strong emotion is rhythmical expression. Heightened emotional pressure causes repetition of words.<sup>3</sup> The machinery of expression becomes inadequate to carry off the excess of matter suddenly crowded upon it. There is temporary damming up of the channels, with

<sup>1</sup> Hodgson, *Outcast Essays and Verse*, p. 220, 1881.

<sup>2</sup> Genung, *Practical Rhetoric*, p. 13, 1899.

<sup>3</sup> Hoeffding, *Vierteljahrschrift f. Wiss. Phil.*, 1890. XIV, S. 185.

consequent strong out-break, followed by a lull and a repetition of the damming up process.<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon may be likened to the bubbling of water from a narrow-necked bottle. As a result we get expressions that are only excited stuttering like "No, no, no, no!" rhetorical explosions like the classical, "Abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit," Chatham's "I am astonished, I am shocked to hear such principles confessed, to hear them avowed in this house and in this country," and the more complex rhythms of poetry and prose.

The effect of rhythm in language is to lock the parts together into a unity and thus to facilitate comprehension. It economizes attention, for it assists the reader in putting emphasis where it is due. It is often found that writers who are difficult to read become easy after they have been heard in oral discourse. Their peculiar mode of vocal accentuation is imperfectly suggested in their writing, but the voice once having been heard, its remembered rhythm thereafter guides the reader. The experience here referred to is especially common with writing in foreign languages.

The need of having the "swing" of a sentence in order to understand it may be illustrated by an example. Ask someone to read the following sentence aloud without previous examination: "Now, any fact, whether of arithmetic, or geography, or grammar, which is not led up to and into out of something which has previously occupied a significant position in the child's life for its own sake, is forced into this position."<sup>2</sup> The half dozen particles, "up, to, and, into, out, of," coming together usually cause a halt or a stumble. But as soon as it becomes clear that the accents are on "up," "in," and "out," there is no difficulty in reading and understanding the sentence.

Spencer has suggested that the excellence of a style might be measured by the rate of a reader's comprehension. The rate of comprehension, again, it would seem, should be shown by the speed with which a piece of writing is read aloud. A few tests of this kind were made by the writer, as follows:

"Sesame and Lilies," "Red Rover," the "Essay on Boswell," "Modern Painters," and "The Old Pacific Capital," have different rhythms as indicated in Tables I and II. "Red Rover" is least rhythmical, "Old Pacific Capital," most. "Sesame and Lilies" is less rhythmical than "Modern Painters." The predominant rhythm of "Old Pacific

<sup>1</sup> Spencer, *First Principles*, Chapter: Rhythm of Motion.

<sup>2</sup> Dewey: *The Child and the Curriculum*; Contrib. to Ed. v. Chicago, p. 32, 1902.

Capital" is duple; in "Red Rover" and "Essay on Boswell" it is triple. "Modern Painters" is more duple than "Sesame and Lilies" and has less long feet.

About 500 words of each of these selections were read aloud by (J) at a rate of speed which he was told to make as nearly as possible normal; that is, natural or easy. He was timed with a stop-watch. The figures in the table are calculated for exactly 500 words.

J. (Reading aloud.)

---

S. & L.....	2 min., 57.1 sec.
R. R. ....	2 " 46.4 "
E. o. B.....	2 " 31.8 "
M. P. ....	2 " 36.4 "
O. P. C.....	2 " 28 "

---

The same selections were read by (F), and as there seemed to be a tendency to read the later selections faster, the last two were changed about.

F. (Reading aloud.)

---

S. & L.....	3 min., 1.2 sec.
R. R. ....	2 " 47 "
E. o. B.....	2 " 36.6 "
O. P. C.....	2 " 32.9 "
M. P. ....	2 " 36.4 "

---

After reading them all (F.) read S. & L., again, in  
2 min., 43.7 sec.

It appears from these tests that "Sesame and Lilies" with its long feet and irregular movement was read more slowly than "Modern Painters" with its great amount of duple rhythm. Stevenson's style, so often referred to as "light," appears literally to go quickly.

The three Kipling stories were tested in the same way. These differ according to Tables I and II, "In the Matter of a Private." containing the greatest amount of duple rhythm, "The Man Who Was." the least. The readers were (A. L.), (B.) and (L.).

---

	A. L.	B.	L.
I. M. P.....	151.09 sec.	154.05 sec.	169.95 sec.
I. K. M.....	152.83 "	156.85 "	165.95 "
M. W. W.....	160.60 "	160.60 "	170.50 "

---

"The Man Who Was." was read slowest by all three. "In the Matter of a Private" was read quickest by two. The results from

this test agree, on the whole, with those from the reading of (J.) and (F.) in indicating that duple rhythm moves faster than other rhythms, and that much rhythm conduces to speed in reading.

Strongly marked rhythm, as it is an outcome of emotion, also stirs up feeling in the reader or listener. Just as a loud cry suggests the emotional state of the one who utters it, so marked rhythm in language implying that speech is going on under high emotional pressure, immediately excites an interest in the emotion-arousing thought. The rhythmically expressed thought gets a hearing, for those to whom it is addressed share in anticipation the excitement of the thinker.

Rhythmless writing is even more difficult to find than styleless writing, for thought is by its nature rhythmical and so must its expression be. "Like a bird's life it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is expressed in a sentence and every sentence closed by a period."<sup>1</sup> Children just beginning to write articulately, necessarily fall into such a simple sentence rhythm. "Dear Uncle ——," writes a six-year-old, "It made me happy to receive your letter. This afternoon I was going to pick some violets for you but it rained. I have a surprise to tell you when you come. Father was down west last week. He was away a long time. Can you come soon. I have another surprise for you for supper. It made me smile too when mother read your letter." The rhythm here is, indeed, fragmentary, rudimentary and disturbed as compared with that displayed by a mature writer.

As an illustration of weak rhythm the following sentence by Addison may be taken: "In the next place we may observe that where the words are not monosyllables, we often make them so, as much as lies in our power, by our rapidity of pronunciation." The words that have to be accented in this sentence are mainly poor in content—they add little to what is already in the mind. In the clause, "we often make them so as much as lies in our power," the only words unmistakably requiring an accent are "make" and "power;" the rest is rhythmically structureless. It is, of course, possible with a little distortion of the natural mode of reading to accent other words, but the effect is disagreeable, for the mind abhors a vacuum. Unrhythmical writing is loose and undecided. Rhythmical writing implies a consciousness of one's purpose and a mastery of one's meanings.

This brings us to another condition of rhythmical writing,—the

<sup>1</sup> James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, p. 243.

possession by the writer of a complex thought as a whole. There can be only the crudest and most elementary sort of rhythm in the writing of one whose thought comes in dribblets. A complex thought grasped as a unit is, in fact, another aspect of that which was referred to above as pressure of emotion. The pent-up energy that issues in repetitions, parallelisms, balance, etc., also produces phonetic rhythm, for there is an impatience in that state of mind of insignificant words. Accents then follow one another unerringly and there is no vacillation or ambiguity.

## VITA.

The writer was born Dec. 25, 1872, in Filipova, Russian Poland. He received his primary education in the public schools of Rochester, N. Y.; the degree of Ph.B. at the University of Rochester in 1895; M.A. at Columbia in 1900. He won the Sherman Scholarship in Political Economy at Rochester. From 1897 to 1903 he was an instructor in the Rochester High School. He studied at the University of Berlin during the year 1903-04. In 1904-05 he continued his graduate studies in Psychology, Sociology and Economics at Columbia. The instructors to whom he is especially indebted are Profs. Gilmore and Morey of the University of Rochester, Cattell, Strong, Giddings and Clark of Columbia, and Stumpf of Berlin.





# MEDIEVAL HELLENISM

BY  
LOUISE ROPES LOOMIS, A. M.

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

WICKERSHAM PRESS  
LANCASTER, PA.  
1906



# MEDIEVAL HELLENISM

BY  
LOUISE ROPES LOOMIS, A. M.

PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

WICKERSHAM PRESS  
LANCASTER, PA.

1906

D



## PREFACE

---

THE essay here presented in independent form was originally intended to fill the place of a general introduction to a study of the Greek Renaissance in Italy. Shortcomings which would have seemed grave in the main treatise, might, it was hoped, appear less flagrant in the prefatory sketch affixed to a more detailed and thorough body of work. Unfortunately it has been found impossible within the limit of time allowed for the preparation of a doctor's dissertation to advance further than the beginning of the central chapters of the projected discussion. Accordingly it is now thought expedient to publish separately the introductory matter in order to fulfil the requirements for the degree, with the expectation that the whole of the contemplated work will be issued later.

It is with considerable diffidence, nevertheless, that this slight and inadequate discussion of a broad and complex subject is presented for judgment solely upon its own merits. How slight and how inadequate it is, and how unfit to stand alone the author is regretfully aware. If it prove in any way useful or suggestive as a partial enumeration of facts not often brought together it will have accomplished every desired end.

The writer is glad of the opportunity to express her enduring obligation to Professor James Harvey Robinson of Columbia University for direction and counsel in all her work

for several years past, and likewise her gratitude to Professor George Lincoln Burr of Cornell University for additional criticism and advice upon this present undertaking.

LOUISE ROPES LOOMIS.

AUGUST, 1906.

# CONTENTS.

	PAGE
CHAPTER I. The Greek language in the Middle Ages.	
1. Decline in the study of Greek until the tenth century.....	8-11
2. Sources for medieval knowledge of the Greek tongue.	
a. Greek-speaking peoples in the West.	
(1) Western travellers to the Orient.....	11-19
(2) Greek visitors to the West .....	19-28
Failure of ecclesiastical efforts to train Greek mis- sionaries.	
(3) Greek colonies in South Italy .....	28-32
b. Fragments of Greek in Latin literature.	
(1) General works and church rituals .....	32-35
(2) Latin grammars.	
(a) Pre-medieval works: Donatus, Priscian, Isidore.	35-37
(b) Twelfth century grammarians: Alexander of Ville Dieu, Eberhard of Bethune.....	38-40
(c) Roger Bacon .....	40-45
Conclusion: General ignorance of and indifference to the Greek lan- guage .....	45-48
CHAPTER II. Greek literature in the Middle Ages.	
1. Narrative literature.	
a. Esop's Fables .....	49-50
b. Mythological tales .....	50-53
c. Versions of Homer.	
(1) Ilias Latina. ....	53-55
(2) Dictys the Cretan .....	55-57
(3) Dares the Phrygian .....	58-59
d. Orestes Tragoedia .....	59-61
e. The Alexander legend.....	61-62
2. Philosophy.	
a. The older philosophers and Plato .....	62-65
b. Aristotle.	
(1) The process of translation .....	66-74
(2) The influence of Aristotle .....	74-79
3. Theology .....	79-83
4. Science .....	83-86

	PAGE
Conclusion: The medieval estimate of Greek achievement as illustrated by Dante.....	86-88
CHAPTER III. The fourteenth century humanists.	
1 Petrarch and Boccaccio.	
a. Petrarch's attempt to learn Greek.....	89-92
b. Boccaccio's lessons in Greek and the translation of Homer.	92-101
2. The generation after Petrarch.	
a. Literary activity at Florence .....	102-103
b. Salutati as a Greek scholar.....	103-109
Conclusion: Growth of a broader interest in the classic literatures.....	110



## CHAPTER I

THE Greek of the classic period is to modern imagination an old and familiar acquaintance. We have long been versed in the outlines of his politics, his art and his literature. We have passed judgment again and again upon his fitful patriotism, his restless ambition, his versatility and his humor, his love of beauty and vigorous thinking, and his talent for viewing a question impartially on both sides. We have heard the music of his language in prose and verse. We are now unearthing the remains of the very houses in which he lived and the temples where he paid honor to his gods. We are learning to describe in detail the treasure vaults of Homeric kings and the hillside theatres where latter-day democracies sat to witness the tragedies of Euripides. Indeed we have read so much of what the men of those ages said of themselves and their institutions and have looked upon so many of their monuments, that from it all we have derived a fairly exact conception, such as it is, of the achievements and temper of the whole race. We feel that we should not find ourselves among total strangers were we on a sudden set down in the tent of Achilles or before the speaker's platform in the Athenian assembly.

Now and again in some medieval chronicle or tale of ancient days we confront a figure that bears a well-known Greek name, but whose form and character by some mysterious process have been altered almost beyond recognition. The classic Greek of our experience is keen-witted, self-reliant, self-possessed, the Greek to whom the writer of the

Middle Ages introduces us is more simple-minded and devout, above all more romantic. He wears frequently a title or a dress that seems to us curiously anomalous. We have fancied ourselves not ignorant of the ways about Ilium, but Emperor Priam, Duke Hector and their liege knights are not the warriors who used to meet us there. We have surely never seen before the amorous Prince Troilus and his love Cressid of whom this new historian has so much to say. Can Atlas, the great astrologer, Prometheus, the successful scientist and Hercules, the social reformer, clad in the garb of doctors of the Sorbonne, can they be the heroes of the mythical wondertales we have loved from childhood? Who is the Philosopher or his pupil, the son of Nectanebus, conqueror of the natural and supernatural world? An unearthly glamor hangs around the two, making it difficult to identify them with any Greeks who lived in the hard, practical daylight of the fourth century. Some of our favorite names this twelfth century author does not appear to know at all, Leonidas, Themistocles or Pericles. Of others he recounts extraordinary fables, unlike anything we have hitherto heard regarding them. Greek art of every sort apparently means little to him, for he does not mention it among the redoubtable attainments of the race. On the other hand, he makes much of certain portions of Greek philosophy which in our esteem occupy usually a somewhat secondary place. Of it all he speaks with assurance too, as confident as we that his information is adequate and correct. He is eight hundred years nearer to that Hellenic world than we. What material had he different from ours to give him ideas of it so inconsistent with our own? Where did the Middle Ages get its knowledge of Greece?

The Romans, as everyone knows, were pupils of the Greeks in most departments of learning. Their instruction was obtained largely at first hand from Greek teachers

brought to the West or from the famous schools of Rhodes and Athens. Until the fourth century of our era the study of the works of the chief Attic poets, orators and historians in their original tongue formed an important part of the training of every educated gentleman. But during the course of the fourth and fifth centuries there took place throughout the Western provinces a gradual dissolution of the order of civilization which the Roman Empire had established and so long preserved. Standards of religion and conduct changed, forms of government gave way, a new and cruder race wrested the dominion from the hands of the cultivated, leisure classes of the old society. The incentives and the instruments for the acquisition of culture slowly disappeared.<sup>1</sup> Secular schools, both public and private, closed for want of protection and support, and teachers grew constantly rarer and less efficient. A dense and widespread ignorance followed the period of political and social disintegration. The deterioration of taste that marked the few litterati that remained made impossible any fresh appeal to artistic sensibility or intellectual enthusiasm. Even in churches and convents education was commonly reduced to instruction in reading and writing and in the use of a limited number of Latin works that bore upon religion. Only here and there did a clerk undertake to learn enough Greek to read and translate a treatise of a Greek father or to carry on communication with the Eastern branch of the Church. An exceptional scholar of this kind was occasionally employed by king or noble to negotiate a marriage with an Oriental princess or to transact some other diplomatic errand at the stately court by the Bosphorus.

During the sixth and early seventh centuries the only

<sup>1</sup> In this brief summary of the decline of classic culture until the time of Charlemagne I have made especial use of a recent study of the subject by M. Roger, *L'Enseignement des Lettres Classiques d'Ausone à Alcuin*.

schools of Western Europe to keep alive a genuine zeal for classic culture were the Irish.<sup>1</sup> Founded by missionaries from Gaul and Britain in the fifth century when learning had not yet quite vanished from its ancient seats, and secure by reason of their remoteness from the wars and tumults that distracted the continent, they continued to send forth preachers and reformers trained not only along strictly theological lines but also to some extent in the broad fields of general literature. Their acquaintance with the classic authors was confined apparently to the Latin. Their knowledge of Greek was scanty and fragmentary, deduced in all probability from Greek quotations and references in Latin works and glosses. In the year 669, however, Theodore of Tarsus was appointed archbishop of Canterbury and came to England bringing his friend Hadrian, a monk from North Africa, to superintend the reorganization of English clerical schools.<sup>2</sup> Through their influence the leadership in the intellectual world passed for the time to England, and Greek was taught side by side with Latin at Canterbury and York. The foremost English scholars of the generations immediately succeeding, Bede and Aldhelm, were conversant with authorities in both languages. From the English schools Greek was likewise transplanted to Ireland and flourished there, when its short-lived renaissance in England was over. Alcuin and his fellow countrymen of the later eighth century who aided Charlemagne to revive the study of letters in his empire possessed little or no Greek, but Sedulius Scotus and Erigena were Hellenists of considerable ability and in their day extended the renown of Irish scholarship over Europe.

But with the passing of the ninth century two changes were taking place which were to result in a still greater

<sup>1</sup> Roger, chs. vi and vii. Cf. Traube, *O Roma Nobilis*, pp. 353 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Roger, ch. viii and ch. x, pt. vi.

diminution in the number of such occasional scholars. The Irish monastic schools were feeling at last the demoralizing effects of barbarian invasions and fast decaying into inactivity and uselessness. On the other hand the chief remaining motive for the continuation of the cultivation of Greek was disappearing in the steadily widening schism between the Eastern and the Western Churches. To the jealousy and hostility naturally ensuing from differences in race and civilization and from rival claims to the leadership of Christendom, was added now the bitterness of religious divisions. The suspicion of heresy became to the Western mind more and more firmly attached to everything connected with the farther end of the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup> Even political and commercial intercourse dwindled for a time. The two halves of the Christian world proceeded on diverging ways with less and less regard to one another, the Greeks scornful of the barbarity and grossness of the Teutonic kingdoms, the Latins despising the luxury and refinement of the Byzantines, thoroughly content with the growing estrangement and with their own crude Latinity.<sup>2</sup>

Thus from the tenth century onward the sources from which a knowledge of the Greek language could be acquired and the motives for its acquisition were extraordinarily few. Now and then a pilgrim or wayfarer from Germany or Italy made the journey to the East to win spiritual merit or to

<sup>1</sup> As late as the time of the Renaissance Theodore of Besa wrote: "Si on eust voulu croire nos maistres (of the University of Paris), estudier le Grec et se mesler tant soit peu de l'Hebreu estoit une des plus grandes hérésies du monde." Quoted by Roger, p. 389, n. 2.

<sup>2</sup> The embassy of Liutprand in 968 marked a special effort on the part of Otto I. to come to an understanding with the Eastern Emperor, particularly on the subject of the disputed lands in South Italy. The spirit in which Liutprand viewed the Oriental court after this visit is clearly displayed in his vivacious report. An English translation is included in Henderson, *Medieval Documents*, p. 442, *et seq.* For original see Liutprand, *Opera*, ed Dümmler, pp. 136 *et seq.*

satisfy an adventurous curiosity, and returning brought with him tales of strange experiences and a smattering of foreign tongues and, possibly, a manuscript or two which in the course of time he might laboriously translate.<sup>1</sup> Such was Ulric or Udalric, abbot of the monastery at Freising, who in the middle of the eleventh century visited Greece and the Holy Land and carried back a copy of the Greek romance of Alexander ascribed to Pseudo-Callisthenes, which in the leisure hours of after years he put into Latin,<sup>2</sup> Such was probably James, a clerk of Venice, who in the early twelfth century translated parts of the *Organon* of Aristotle for the benefit of the schoolmen.<sup>3</sup> Such also was the jurist, John Burgundio of Pisa, at one time employed by Barbarossa in the East, who at the instigation of Pope Eugenius IV translated various homilies of Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus.<sup>4</sup> Such again was William Gap, a monkish physician of Paris, who in 1167 went to Constantinople in quest of Greek manuscripts for Odo, abbot of St. Denis, and succeeded in procuring a life of that Dionysius whom the convent claimed as patron saint by Michael Syncellus, patriarch of Jerusalem, and also an anonymous life of the philosopher Secundus. A fellow monk put the biography of Dionysius into Latin soon after Gap's return and dedicated

<sup>1</sup> For a considerable list of such Greek scholars see Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, Bk. vi, ch. xxvi-xxxii.

<sup>2</sup> Cramer, *De Græcis Mediæ Œvi Studiis*, p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Our actual information concerning James is limited to that contained in a sentence inserted in the Chronicle of Robert de Mont St. Michel for the year 1128: "Jacobus clericus de Venecia transtulit de Greco in Latinum quosdam libros Aristotelis et commentatus est; scilicet Topica, Anal. priores et posteriores et Elencos; quamvis antiquior translatio super eosdem libros haberetur." Pertz, *Mon. Ger. Scriptores*, vol. vi, p. 489. The last clause has led to search for older translations, but none have yet been found. Cousin looked fruitlessly through the manuscripts of the Bibliothèque National. *Ouvrages Inédits*, p. liv.

<sup>4</sup> Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 72. Sandys, p. 536.

it to abbot Odo; the other Gap himself worked upon in later years when abbot in Odo's place.<sup>1</sup>

A growing dissatisfaction with the current Latin versions of Aristotle and an ambition to know him more and better were characteristics of the intellectual situation at the opening of the thirteenth century. At the same time the temporary occupation of the Eastern Empire by the crusaders encouraged passage between the two divisions of Christendom. In 1205 Pope Innocent III in the name of the new emperor, Baldwin invited the masters and students of the University of Paris to betake themselves to Greece to revive the study of letters in the land where it first arose.<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards a slight movement of scholars toward Greece seems actually to have taken place. Athens was in ruins, a desolate wreck of her former self, but John of Basingstoke, archdeacon of Leicester, studied there and "saw and heard from the wise Greek doctors things unknown to the Latins." He brought home to England several Greek texts, in particular a "Greek Donatus" or manual of grammar, which he afterwards translated. He likewise informed his friend Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, of the existence of the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," a work understood to be a Greek rendering of an ancient Hebrew original, and to contain irrefutable proofs in the shape of ancient Messianic prophecies of the truth of Christianity. Grosseteste was aroused by the news to send a messenger to Greece after the

<sup>1</sup> Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 46. *Hist. Litt. de la France*, vol. xiv, pp. 374-6. Sandys, p. 534.

<sup>2</sup> " . . . quatinus in Greciam accedentes ibi studeatis litterarum studium reformare, unde noscitur exordium habuisse, . . . non tedeat plerosque vestrum ad terram argento et auro gemmisque refertam, frumento, vino et oleo stabilitam et bonorum omnium copiis affluentem accedere, ut ad illius honorem et gloriam a quo est omnis scientie donum sibi et aliis ibidem proficiant." Denifle, *Chartularium*, vol. i, p. 63.

Testaments and to have a translation made of them.<sup>1</sup> At the same time he learned to read a little Greek himself, and superintended the preparation of versions from the Greek of the letters of St. Ignatius and of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> The manuscripts came perhaps from John of Basingstoke. The translators were a small number of other monks who had traveled abroad, including one or two Greek sojourners in English cloisters.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Hic magister I(ohannes) intimaverat episcopo Lincolniensi Roberto, quod quando studuit Athenis viderat et audierat ab peritis Grecorum doctoribus quedam Latinis incognita. Inter que reperit duodecim patriarcharum, filiorum videlicet Iacob, testamenta; que constat esse de substantia Bibliothecae, sed per invidiam Iudeorum dudum fuisse abscondita, propter manifestas, que in eisdem patent, de Christo prophetias. Unde idem episcopus misit in Greciam et cum ea habuisset, transtulit de Greco in Latinum et quedam alia. . . . Memoratus insuper I(ohannes) quoddam scriptum transtulit de Greco in Latinum, in quo artificiose et compendiose tota vis grammaticae continetur; quod idem magister Donatum Grecorum appellavit . . . . item aliud scriptum quod ab Atheniensibus habuit." Matthew Paris, *Chron. Mai.*, vol. v, pp. 284-6.

<sup>2</sup> On Grosseteste's own knowledge of Greek, Roger Bacon says: "Sed non bene scivit linguas ut transferret, nisi circa ultimum vite sue quando vocavit Grecos et fecit libros Grammaticae Grece de Grecia et aliis congregari. Sed isti pauca transtulerunt." Bacon, *Op. Tert.*, p. 91. See also *Comp. Phil.*, p. 472. *Gk. Grammar*, p. lvii. But that Grosseteste was actually able at one time to read Greek with some enjoyment and to make a rough translation of the gist of a book is proved by a letter of his own to the abbot and monks of Peterborough: "Quiescens hac septimana proxima paululum ab exteriorum tumultu, quadam eisdem septimane die lectioni parumper vacans incidi in quandam conscriptionem de vita monachorum que eam decenter extollit; et quia vestro studio credidi gratum fore si quod ibidem intelligere potui vobiscum communicarem, non verba que ibidem inveni, quia alterius quam Latine sunt lingue, sed extractum pro modulo meo verborum sensum, adiectis alicubi paucis ad dilucidationem in hanc paginam redigens, vobis destinare curavi." Grosseteste, *Epistola*, p. 173. See also Sandys, pp. 554-5. Jourdain, p. 140. For mention of a Greek psalter said to have belonged to Grosseteste, see James, *Ancient Libraries*, p. 528.

<sup>3</sup> "Illum igitur gloriosum tractatum (the above-mentioned Testaments) ad robur fidei Christiane et ad maiorem Iudeorum confusionem transtulit plene et evidenter episcopus memoratus de Greco, verbo ad verbum, in Latinum, coadiutante magistro Nicolao Greco, clerico abbatis Sancti Albani." Matthew Paris, *Chron. Mai.* vol. iv, p. 233. One of the fifteenth century humanists criticises the rendering of



In fact it appears for a time a part of the official policy of the Dominican order to keep a few of its promising men trained in Greek both to carry on the work of propagandism in the East and to aid in theological and philosophical translations at home.<sup>1</sup> Of particular importance in their day were the little group of linguists gathered about the great Dominican schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, at Paris. The best known of these was William, a native of Moerbeka in Brabant. After studying for some time in Greece he served as Greek secretary at the great ecumenical Council of Lyons in 1274, where he took part in the chanting of the Nicene Creed in Greek, repeating three times the phrase obnoxious to the Eastern churchmen.<sup>2</sup> Like others of his time he drew a distinction between contemporary Greeks who deserved only to be treated with rigor as degenerate schismatics and the

the Ethics. After speaking of a translation from the Arabic he continues: "Altera haec posterior et novior a Britanno quodam traducta, cuius etiam premium legimus, in quo et Fratrem se Ordinis Predicatorum scribit et rogatu confratrum de his transferendis laborem suscepisse." He condemns the version as bungling and inaccurate. Bruni, *Epistiole*, vol. i, p. 140.

<sup>1</sup> See the encyclical letter of Humbert, master-general of the Dominican order in 1255: "Quod si quis inspirante dei gracia cor suum invenerit secundum voluntatem gubernantis paratum ad linguam arabicam, hebraycam, grecam seu aliam barbaram addiscendam, ex quo sibi mercedem adquirere possit in opere salutari tempore opportuno, sive eciam repererit se dispositum ad exeundum castra proprie nacionis, transiturus ad provinciam Terre Sancte seu Grece vel alias vicinas infidelibus . . . precor et moneo ut statum animi sui circa hoc mihi scribere non omittat." *Mon. Ord. Frat. Praed.*, vol. v, pp. 19-20. Also printed in Martene, *Thes. Nov. Anec.*, vol. iv, col. 1708. As early as 1239 Greece had been included among the Dominican provinces, organized along with other outlying regions, such as Poland, Dacia and Palestine. *Mon. Ord. Praed.*, vol. iii, pp. 11, 13, 18, etc. Cf. *Hist. Litt. de la France*, vol. xix, p. 342. The Franciscans were active in thirteenth century negotiations for a union of the Greek and Latin churches. "Minoritas insuper qui tanti operis (ecclesiastical negotiations) strenui erant administri atque apocrisiariorum pontificiorum munere fungebantur," etc. Raynaldus, 1273, cap. 50, p. 320. See references to their part in the movement in Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, vol. vi, pp. 119-163 *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio*, vol. xxiv, pp. 64-5.

progenitors of the race who had achieved so much that was worth investigation and respect. Both in Paris, Rome and elsewhere he carried on the process of translating with vigor, producing versions of "all the books of (Aristotle's) Natural and Moral Philosophy at the request of brother Thomas," and also of "the books of Proclus and some other things," including a commentary on Aristotle by Simplicius, the *De Prognosticationibus* of Hippocrates and the *De Alimentis* of Galen.<sup>1</sup> "In translating these works from the Greek," he remarks in his preface to Galen, "I have hoped that my labor might serve to furnish some new light to the Latins, and if in this book I have attained my desire I offer thanks to Him who suffered me to finish it."<sup>2</sup> "Let the reader understand," he says in a note to his rendering of Simplicius, "that the Greek text was exceedingly corrupt and that in many passages I could extract no meaning from it. I have done what I could; it was better to have it thus imperfect than not at all."<sup>3</sup> In 1277 he was appointed archbishop of Corinth and spent his last years in an energetic endeavor to convert his province to orthodoxy.

Associated with him in the work of translating at Paris were Henry, also a Dominican monk of Brabant, and Thomas

<sup>1</sup> The following notice of William is given in a thirteenth century list of distinguished Dominicans at Paris: "Fr. Wilhelmus Brabantinus, Corinthiensis, transtulit omnes libros naturalis et moralis philosophie de greco in latinum ad instantiam fratris Thome. Idem transtulit libros Procli et quedam alia." *Archiv. für Litt. u. Kirch. Gesch.*, 1886, vol. ii, p. 226. See further Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 67-70.

<sup>2</sup> "In his que per me transferuntur ex Greco operibus hoc intendere consuevi, ut Latinitati luminis aliquid adiiciat labor meus, quem finem si in hoc opere attigi, illi gratias habeo agere qui dedit et consummare." Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. iii, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> "Sic etiam qui hoc opus inspexerit, exemplar grecum valde fuisse corruptum, et in multis locis nullum subiectum potui ex littera trahere; feci tamen quod potui; melius erat sic corruptum habere quam nihil." Quoted by Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 73.

of Cantimpré.<sup>1</sup> It is clear that Aquinas toward the end of his life possessed two or more different versions of several treatises of Aristotle, all derived directly from the Greek, which he compared and discussed with the aim of arriving more surely at the original meaning.<sup>2</sup> A little more translating was accomplished by other Latin prelates in charge of Eastern churches during the brief period of Western dominion, a few of whom whiled away some hours of exile in struggling over Greek books, chiefly ecclesiastical. But their finished productions were too faulty and obscure to gain currency and for the most part perished unobserved.<sup>3</sup> With the return of the Greek emperors to Constantinople and the collapse of the precarious fabric of Latin political ascendancy the clerical Hellenists disappear almost entirely.

The general drift of travel towards the Orient, accelerated by the revival of commerce as well as by the continuation of the crusades, attracted for the most part characters with no literary aspirations whatever. The merchant who plied between Marseilles, Genoa or Venice and the Levant, the soldier or freebooter who marched to the relief of the Holy Sepulchre had as a rule neither the tastes nor the education to dispose them to a search after intellectual riches. The more learned among the Latins came to save, convert and teach, not to be taught.<sup>4</sup> The Greeks growing ever more

<sup>1</sup> Jourdain, *op. cit.*, p. 66. *Archiv. für Litt. u. Kirch. Gesch.*, 1886, vol. ii, p. 227. Sandys, p. 564.

<sup>2</sup> Jourdain, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Traversari, *Epistolæ*, vol. i, p. ccxviii.

<sup>4</sup> A curious exception to the ordinary religious leader in his attitude toward the Greek world, was the mystic, Joachim of Fiore. In 1258 thirty errors from "The Everlasting Gospel," a book based upon his teaching, were condemned at Paris. Among these errors were the following: "Quartus est quod recessus ecclesie Grecorum ab ecclesia Romana fuit a Spiritu Sancto. . . . Sextus est quod populus Grecus magis ambulat secundum Spiritum Sanctum quam populus Latinus. . . . Septimus quod sicut Filius operatur salutem populi Latini sive populi Romani, quia ipsum representat, sic Spiritus Sanctus operatur salutem populi Greci, quia ipsum representat." Denifle, *Chartularium*, vol. i, p. 273.

sore and resentful under their rough handling held themselves severely aloof, where they could not actively resist.<sup>1</sup> One finds, therefore, but scanty trace of Greek influences upon the ordinary traveler. Only here and there upon a slip of parchment was preserved an ill-constructed glossary of Greek words for every-day use, or an abbreviated phrase-book of requests in colloquial dialect, for food, drink, shelter and other necessities.<sup>2</sup> The wide acquaintance with the fundamentals of one another's language which might have been expected from so long a period of frequent intercommunication did not take place. The alienation of spirit was too complete. What fragments of a Greek vocabulary were acquired by the usual wayfarer belonged, moreover, to the degenerate Romaic of the day, and did little to qualify their possessor to cope with a page from the classics.<sup>3</sup> To the end of the Middle Ages crusader and merchant continued to

<sup>1</sup> The Greek historians of the crusading period supply countless illustrations of this feeling. Nicetas, who describes from his own experience the sack of Constantinople in 1204, characterizes the Latin soldier as follows: "φωνὴ ἀσύμφωνος Ἑλλησι, γνώμη φιλοχρήματος, ὀφθαλμοὶ ἀπαιδαγωγῆτος, γαστήρ ἀκόρεστος, ὀργίλος καὶ δριμεὲς ψυχὴ καὶ χεὶρ διφῶσα τὸ ξίφος διὰ παντός." *De Rebus Post Captam Urbem Gestis*. Migne, vol. 139, p. 988. In a lament over a statue of Helen melted down by the crusaders for its bronze, he denounces the illiterate barbarians who are ignorant of Homer: "Ἄλλως τε ποῦ παρ' ἀγραμμάτοις βαρβάροις καὶ τέλεον ἀναλφαβήτοις ἀνάγνωσις καὶ γνῶσις τῶν ἐπὶ σοὶ ῥαψωδῆντων ἐκείνων ἐπῶν.

Οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἐνκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς  
τοιγ' ὁ ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν.  
Ἀλῶς ἀθανάτησι θεαῖς εἰς ὧπα ἔοικεν."

*De Statuis quas Francipoli Destruxerunt*, Migne, *ibid.*, p. 1054.

<sup>2</sup> Greek-Latin glossaries are occasionally mentioned in catalogues of medieval libraries. There was one at Rheims in the tenth or eleventh century, one in the monastery of St. Emmeramus at Ratisbon about the same period, one in the library of Corbie at the opening of the thirteenth century. Gottlieb, *Mittelalt. Bib.*, p. 342. Becker, *Cat. Bib. Antiq.*, pp. 128, 283. The library at Chartres in the twelfth century contained an "Alphabetum grece et orientale." Maitre, *Ecoles Episcopales*, p. 289. A suggestive specimen of a glossary of this sort is printed in Goetz and Gundermann, *Glossæ Latinogræcæ*, Preface.

<sup>3</sup> On popular Greek see Gidel, *Nouvelles Etudes*, pp. 253-6.

find camping ground and market in the Byzantine empire. They marched there, fought there, bought and sold and owned houses and land there, they lived and died there,—but they cared not to learn more than the inevitable minimum of its speech and they saw no value in its learning and its ancient manuscripts.<sup>1</sup> From the few Dominican scholars of the thirteenth century who sought the East for knowledge we hear of hardly another until we arrive at the humanists.

Rarely in medieval chronicles do we read of the appearance of Greeks in Western lands. At long intervals an official delegation from the Byzantine emperor attended the papal court or the sessions of a church council. In the spring of 1095 Alexis Comnenus sent envoys to the Synod of Placentia to plead for Christian aid against the encroaching hordes of Turks, and thereby contributed to bring about the determination of the Pope to preach the crusade at Clermont in the autumn.<sup>2</sup> Upon the recovery of Constantinople in 1261 from the allies who had proved more terrible than foes, Michael Palæologus became alarmed by threats of a new crusade against his dominions and opened negotiations again with the Pope, offering to recognize the spiritual supremacy of the Holy See in return for its political countenance and favor.<sup>3</sup> The negotiations culminated in the great council which met at Lyons in 1274, where the Greek patriarch, the metropolitan of Nicæa and several high officials of the Byzantine court appeared to represent the

<sup>1</sup> On the triumphal march through the streets of Constantinople some of the crusaders carried inkhorns, pens and manuscripts to show their derision of a nation of scribes. "Οἱ δὲ γραφέας δόνακας καὶ δοχεῖα μέλανος φέροντες τόμοις τὴν χεῖρα ἐδίδουσιν ὡς γραμματεῖς ἡμᾶς τωθάζοντες." Nicetas, *De Rebus Post Captam*, etc., *Migne*, vol. 139, p. 980.

<sup>2</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. vi, p. 262.

<sup>3</sup> For a full account of the negotiations and their results see Gibbon, vol. vi, pp. 470-4. Hefele, vol. vi, pp. 119-163. Raynaldus, 1264-1282 *passim*. For the Council of Lyons see Mansi, vol. xxiv, pp. 37 *et seq.*

emperor and to tender in his name an oath of fidelity to Rome and its dogmas. At the council all was harmony. William of Moerbeka and a Franciscan who also understood Greek acted as interpreters.<sup>1</sup> At the close of the ceremonies of reconciliation the *Te Deum* was intoned in solemn rejoicing and the Greek legates were admitted to seats among the Roman cardinals. But the joy was short lived. In Byzantium the Greek bishops, supported by the nation as a whole, refused to admit the necessity for such an ignominious surrender of principles and defied the authority of the emperor. Succeeding popes added to the embarrassment of the friends of the union by insisting upon proofs of absolute submission such as the government found it impossible to give. At the death of Palaeologus in 1282 all pretense of maintaining his unpopular policy was abandoned and the proceedings of the Council of Lyons were as though they had never been. During the fourteenth century, however, as often as the triumphs of the Moslem drove the Greek court into a temporary panic, emissaries were despatched again to the Pope to discuss once more the proposition of an ecclesiastical union and an offensive league against the infidels.<sup>2</sup> The half-heartedness of these overtures was frequently recognized and the reception accorded them was not always cordial. As a political expedient to gain the assistance of the West they failed of substantial results. But in other connections we shall meet some of these later envoys again.

On other infrequent occasions when Greeks visited the West they were usually bound upon some private, particular errand and with its accomplishment vanished, making but

<sup>1</sup> *Cf. supra* p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> As Gibbon has it, "In the four last centuries of the Greek emperors their friendly or hostile aspect toward the Pope and the Latins may be observed as the thermometer of their prosperity or distress, as the scale of the rise and fall of the barbarian dynasties." Vol. vii, p. 83.

slight impression upon the alien society around them. In the early eleventh century Greek craftsmen were employed at Rome to cast the bronze doors of the basilica of "St. Paul beyond the Walls" and inscribed in Greek letters the names of the prophets whose figures decorated the panels.<sup>1</sup> Toward the end of the twelfth century Isaac Angelus, son of the chancellor of the Emperor Manuel, "was in Paris attending upon the schools that through their teaching he might learn the language and ways of the Latins." On his return to the East he headed a successful revolution against a usurper of the throne and was himself crowned Emperor Isaac II.<sup>2</sup> A few years later comes a strange tale of the arrival at the court of King John of "certain Greek philosophers of grave and venerable aspect and bearing" from Athens, who proposed to convince the monarch of the errors of the Latin creed but were unceremoniously ordered to keep silence on the subject and to leave England.<sup>3</sup> In a few instances a Greek remained in the West long enough to be of actual literary service. Allusion has already been made to the "Nicholas Grecus," who as a monk in the abbey of St. Albans assisted Bishop Grosseteste in translating Aristotle's Ethics and certain religious works.<sup>4</sup> He was apparently a

<sup>1</sup> Sandys, p. 500.

<sup>2</sup> The chronicle ascribed to Benedict of Peterborough gives a full account of Isaac's fortunes. After describing the tyranny of the usurper, Andronicus, and his cruelty to Isaac's father it says, "Et habuit tertium filium, clericum sapientem, quem Greci nominabant Sacwize, Latine autem Ysakus; qui tempore persecutionis in transmarinis partibus Parisius commorans scholas frequentabat, ut in doctrinis Latinorum linguam et mores illorum disceret," etc. *Chronicle*, vol. i, pp. 255-261.

<sup>3</sup> "Quidam philosophi Greci, vultu et gestu severi et venerabiles, tertio vel quarto anno regni eiusdem regis I(ohannis) in Angliam ab Athenis venientes curiam regis adierunt, sperantes eum et alios per consequens occidentales in arcum pravum in articulis fidei convertisse . . . Et sic imposito eis silentio vacui recesserunt et confusi." Matthew Paris, *Hist. Angl.*, vol. iii, p. 64.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *supra* p. 14 and n. 3.

person of unusual attainments, one of the few Greek scholars to share in the parsimonious praise dealt out by Roger Bacon to his contemporaries. Two generations earlier a converted Saracen, who was also an inmate of an English monastery, made himself useful in a similar way, translating the Celestial and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite for John of Salisbury, in an attempt to improve upon the older version of Erigena.<sup>1</sup> We find John of Salisbury writing to him for an explanation of the word "ousia" as employed by Ambrose. "I have found the word a stumbling block," he says, "which none of our masters can remove, because they are ignorant of Greek."<sup>2</sup>

With the thirteenth century began a series of curiously futile and for the most part perfunctory efforts on the part of princes and popes to bring Greek scholars or teachers to the West for political or missionary purposes. Shortly after the events of 1204 Philip Augustus is said to have established and endowed at Paris a college of Constantinople for the benefit of students from the Greek empire, in order, as the historian suggests, that "they might gradually forget their ancient, traditional antipathy to the Latins and be convinced of their culture and magnanimity, and on returning home might publish abroad the Latin virtues to the great

<sup>1</sup>The Saracen had difficulty in converting the Greek into accurate and yet easy Latin. In his version of the Celestial Hierarchy he hit upon the device of writing as one the two or three Latin words which he sometimes needed to convey the meaning of a single Greek word. "Sepe autem, ubi duas vel tres dictiones Latinas pro una Greca posui, eas quasi unam coniunxi: non quod unam dictionem eas esse vellem, sed ut plenior intellectus fieret, et quantum elegantie ex inopia Latine locutionis tractatus iste perderet appareret." John of Salisbury, *Epist.* cxlix, *Migne*, vol. 199, p. 144. But in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy he abandoned the scheme, "et alicubi sensum potius quam verba sum secutus." *Op. cit.*, p. 260, *Epist.* ccxxx.

<sup>2</sup>"Verbi obstaculum reperi, quod nullus magistrorum nostrorum sufficit amovere, qui Grece lingue expertes sunt." *Op. cit.*, p. 162, *Epist.* clxix.



renown of the Latin name."<sup>1</sup> The plan was not devoid of a certain statesmanship but there is no record that any one ever profited by it. In 1362 a solitary officer, Master Ivan of Navarra, was found the one inhabitant of the buildings and was induced to make over the property for nine years to the the founders of the College de la Marche. In 1374 the university finally appropriated the whole for its own uses.<sup>2</sup> In 1248 Pope Innocent IV in a letter to the Chancellor of Paris unfolded a scheme by which ten young men versed in Arabic and other Eastern tongues should be supported by yearly contributions from the churches and monasteries of France while they studied at the university, "so that becoming learned in Holy Writ which teaches the ways of the Commandments of the Lord they may in turn instruct others in regions beyond the sea into salvation."<sup>3</sup> For forty

<sup>1</sup> "Post expugnatam Constantinopolim a Francis et Venetis sacro foedere iunctis, Philipo Aug. rege Lutetie conditum est collegium Constantinopolitanum ad ripam Sequane prope forum Malbertinum, nescio in arcano imperii consilio ut Grecorum liberi Lutetiam venientes una cum lingua latina paulatim vetus illud et patrium in Latinos odium deponerent, eorumque humanitatem et benignitatem experti, ad suos reversi non sine magno latini nominis incremento virtutes illas passim predicarent: ac velut obsides habiti qui, si quid parentes et affines greca levitate adversus Latinos molirentur, ipsi adolescentes Lutetia conclusi fuissent." Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 49, note. Taken from Bulaeus (*Hist. Univ. Paris.*, vol. iii, p. 10), who quotes from Filesacus, *De Statutis Theologiae*. Filesacus lived in the sixteenth century and his authority for the account is not known. Doubts of his reliability have been expressed by writers since Bulaeus, in fact the actual existence of the college at any time has been questioned. See Budinszky, pp. 70-72. Denifle makes no mention of the college whatever in his great *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*. Rashdall has a short paragraph on the subject accepting substantially the story of Filesacus, vol. i, p. 486.

<sup>2</sup> Budinszky, pp. 71-2. (Based on Bulaeus, vol. iv, pp. 364-374.)

<sup>3</sup> "Quosdam pueros tam in arabica quam in aliis linguis orientalium partium peritos Parisius mitti disposuimus ad studendum, ut in sacra pagina docente vias mandatorum Domini eruditi alios in ultramarinis partibus erudiant ad salutem. Ne igitur iidem pueri, qui iam sunt decem Parisius, ab incepto studio pro necessariorum defectu desistere compellantur mandamus, etc." Denifle, *Chartularium*, vol. i, p. 212.

years thereafter occasional letters from popes to chancellors urging greater diligence in the collecting of the sums needful for the "ten poor transmarine clerks" at Paris testify to some persistence of papal interest in the project, and to the actual presence of such clerks in the university.<sup>1</sup> After 1286 one hears no more of the matter.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to say how far results were fruitful in the missionary field. It is of more concern to our special subject to note that in the middle of the thirteenth century there were beside the two or three Dominican scholars from Greece these other young men who spoke the Oriental languages at Paris.

The next stirring of the Western conscience on the subject of religious propagandism produced a modification in methods. Possibly the failure of previous projects as well as of the religious union accomplished by the Council of Lyons may have given rise to doubts as to the reliability of Greeks as missionaries to their own countrymen. Oriental teachers were now to be brought from abroad to furnish the necessary linguistic training but the missionaries themselves were to be true born sons of the Roman Church. In the latter years of the century Raymond Lull, the philosopher and enthusiast, obtained from King James of Aragon an endowment for a convent at Palma in the island of Majorca where thirteen brothers might study Arabic in preparation for missionary careers among the Saracens.<sup>3</sup> During the excitement which

<sup>1</sup> Denifle, *Chart.* vol. i, pp. 212, 372, 638. The same documents are quoted in Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 225-7.

<sup>2</sup> We know of one later instance of the attendance of a Greek at Paris. Peter Philargi, a Cretan by birth, studied both there and at Oxford toward the latter part of the fourteenth century. He became identified with the West and was finally elected pope Alexander V by the Council of Pisa.

<sup>3</sup> For a good, brief account of Lull see Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, vol. i. p. 28, *et seq.* Lea, *History of the Inquisition*, vol. iii, p. 578, *et seq.* King James of Aragon appears to have taken an exceptional interest for a layman in the problem of converting the East. He was the one prince to attend the sessions of the Council of Lyons. Hefele, vol. vi, p. 132.

followed the tidings of the fall of St. John d'Acre he went about Italy appealing to princes and prelates to substitute schools of Oriental languages where men might be trained to convert infidels, for the armed expeditions which destroyed much and profited little for the redemption of souls. He addressed formal letters to King Philip of France, to an ecclesiastical friend at the French court and to the University of Paris urging with intense earnestness the foundation by royal munificence of "a school of Arabic, Tartar and Greek where we might learn the speech of our adversaries, who are likewise God's, and then through preaching and teaching might overcome their errors by the sword of truth and make of them a nation acceptable to God and convert them from enemies to friends." "All the virtue contained in the books of the Greeks and the Arabs," he pleads, "will become known to you when you understand their tongues without an interpreter."<sup>1</sup> An ally on this subject appeared in the person of

<sup>1</sup>"... fundaretur studium Arabicum, Tartaricum et Grecum, ut nos linguas adversariorum Dei et nostrorum docti predicando et docendo illos possimus in gladio veritatis eorum vincere falsitates et reddere populum Deo acceptabilem et inimicos convertere in amicos . . . Quid habebunt boni Greci et Arabes in voluminibus suis quin sit tibi notum, cum sine interprete linguas eorum intellexeritis?" Denifle, *Chart.*, vol. ii, p. 84. All three letters are printed in Martene, *Thesaurus*, vol. i, pp. 1315-1319. A more eloquent plea for a missionary knowledge of Greek and Hebrew, made by Roger Bacon from his cell at Paris, passed quite unheeded. "Nam multi Greci et Chaldei et Armeni et Syri et Arabes et aliarum linguarum nationes subiiciuntur Ecclesie Latinorum cum quibus habet multa ordinare et illis varia mandare. Sed non possunt hec rite pertractari et, ut oportet, utiliter nisi Latini scirent linguarum huiusmodi rationem. Cuius signum est quod omnes dicte nationes vacillant fide et moribus et negligunt ordines Ecclesie salutare, quia persuasionem sinceram non recipiunt in lingua materna." *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, p. 118. "Tertio linguarum cognitio necessaria est Latinis propter conversionem infidelium. Nam in manibus Latinorum residet potestas convertendi. Et ideo pereunt Iudei inter nos infiniti quia nullus eis scit predicare nec scripturas interpretari in lingua eorum nec conferre cum eis nec disputare . . . Deinde Greci et Rutheni et multi alii schismatici similiter in errore perdurant quia non predicatur eis veritas in eorum lingua . . . Nec valet bellum contra eos quoniam aliquando confunditur Ecclesia in bello Christianorum, ut ultra mare sepe accidit,

the government lawyer, Peter Dubois. In his book "De Recuperatione Terre Sancte," put forth in 1306 he argued that no gains of the crusades could be permanent while East and West were separated by such barriers of language and religion. He advocated therefore the establishment of schools for both sexes where Greek, Arabic and other Oriental tongues should be taught, and physicians, teachers and priests should be prepared to spread in different ways the Latin faith.<sup>1</sup>

To return to Lull, some years passed without a tangible result of his exertions. Everywhere his orthodoxy and fervor were admitted but assistance more substantial than testimonials of character was hard to obtain. At length in the summer of 1310 the chapter general of the Dominican order, meeting at Placentia, passed a resolution which must have given him encouragement. It bore the form of a request to the master of the order to set up in some province schools of Hebrew, Greek and Arabic and to permit the brethren of each province to send one student to each school along with the proper contribution for the support of the undertaking.<sup>2</sup> In 1311 the old man made his way to the

et maxime in ultimo exercitu, scilicet domini Regis Francie ut totus mundus (scit). . . . Nec sic convertuntur sed occiduntur et mittuntur in infernum. Residui vero qui supersunt post bella filii eorum irritantur magis ac magis contra fidem Christianam propter istas guerras et in infinitum a fide Christi elongantur et inflamman- tur ut omnia mala que possunt faciant Christianis . . . Preterea fides ingressa non est in hunc mundum per arma sed per simplicitatem predicationis, ut manifestum est . . . O quam considerandum esset hoc negotium, et timendum est ne Deus requirata Latinis quod ipsi negligunt linguas ut sic negligant predicationem fidei!" *Op. cit.*, pp. 120-122.

<sup>1</sup> See De Recuperatione, p. 49 *et seq.* The plan is expanded in some detail.

<sup>2</sup> "Rogamus magistrum Ordinis quod ipse de tribus studiis Hebraico, Greco et Arabico provideat in aliqua provincia, et cum fuerint ordinata ad quodlibet illorum quolibet provincia studentem aptum et intelligentem mittere possit cum contributione decenti." *Mon. Ord. Praed.* vol. iv, p. 50. Denifle, *Chart.* vol. ii, p. 143. Martene *Thesaurus*, vol. iv, p. 1927.

church council assembling at Vienne hoping for further action there. He won his victory in a decree passed in the spring of 1312 directing the establishment of schools of Oriental languages in connection with the Roman Curia and the Universities of Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca, "that in each place Catholic teachers may be appointed who have an adequate understanding of Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Chaldee, two men adept in each tongue,—these to preside over the schools, translate books from their own speech faithfully into Latin, teach the languages diligently to others and by painstaking instruction infuse them with knowledge," the expense to be met by contributions levied upon the churches and monasteries of the various countries.<sup>1</sup> The chief motive was, of course, missionary, the new translations of Oriental literature being mentioned incidentally as worthy subjects of occupation for the spare time of the professors.

How much effect the decree had upon the universities is difficult to decide in the defective condition of the records. Some small attempts at compliance were made certainly by Oxford and Paris. A few years after the meeting of the council funds were collected in England for the support of a converted Jew teaching the Hebrew and Greek languages at Oxford.<sup>2</sup> In 1319 and 1320 French churches were sending remittances to Paris for the use of another renegade Jew who was offering instruction in Hebrew and Chaldee.<sup>3</sup> In 1326

<sup>1</sup> "Ut in quolibet locorum ipsorum teneantur viri catholici sufficientem habentes hebraice, grece, arabice et chaldaice linguarum notitiam, duo videlicet uniuscuiusque lingue periti, qui scolas regant inibi, et libros de linguis ipsis in latinum fideliter transferentes, alios linguas ipsas sollicito doceant, earumque peritiam studiosa in illos instructione transfundant." Denifle *Chart.* vol. ii, p. 155. Friedberg in *Corp. Jur. Can.*, Clemen. V, tit. I, cap. 1, gives the text of the whole decree but prefers to omit the word "grece" from the list of languages. Denifle includes it on the ground that John XXII mentioned Greek with the rest in his letter on the decree, July 1326.

<sup>2</sup> Rashdall, vol. ii, p. 459, note 4.

<sup>3</sup> Denifle, *Chart.* vol. ii, pp. 228, 237.

Pope John XXII wrote to Hugo, Bishop of Paris, to inquire how far the ordinance of the Council of Vienne was being observed, how many teachers of the four languages had been appointed, how many students were attending their lectures and what sums had been raised for their maintenance.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately the bishop's reply is lost. The Parisian archives show no other sign of attention to the decree for a century more. In 1421 we find allusions to the sad vicissitudes of one Paul de Bonnefoy, also a converted Jew and a doctor of Hebrew and Chaldee, who for lack of remuneration for his services was in want of food and clothing for his wife and children. Henry V of England during his stay in Paris had come to his relief with fifty francs and had promised him fifty more. In an appeal to Henry to remember his promise, the authorities declared that though the council ordered the appointment of several doctors of Greek and Hebrew, it was all that a single one could do to make a living by honorable means.<sup>2</sup> In 1424 the faculty of theology contributed sixteen soldi toward Paul's salary.<sup>3</sup> With this item disappears all mention of the Council of Vienne.<sup>4</sup> Its commands had fallen on indifferent ears and had remained practically fruitless. The West as a whole cared little for teachers from the East, paid them grudgingly or half starved them when they came.

More perhaps was done during the same centuries to keep

<sup>1</sup> Denifle, *Chart.* vol. ii, p. 293-4.

<sup>2</sup> "Cum ex antiqua ordinatione debeant esse in Universitate doctores Hebrei et Greci et de presenti solum sit unus doctor Hebreus, qui propter iniquitatem temporis vix potest victum et vestitum honeste continuare, etc." Denifle, *Chart.* vol. iv. pp. 394-5 and 401.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 430.

<sup>4</sup> In 1430 the Gallic nation demanded the appointment of teachers of Greek, Hebrew and Chaldee but made no reference to any missionary purpose nor to the Council of Vienne. It seems reasonable to connect this action with the rise of a humanist sentiment in France. *Ibid.*, p. 505.

the knowledge of the Greek language from total extinction by colonies of Greek descent settled in the South. From the period of the iconoclastic persecutions of the ninth and tenth centuries and the flight to South Italy and Sicily of Byzantine Christians who refused to resign their images, Greek became again a living tongue in certain districts as it is yet to this day in a few mountain hamlets of Apulia and Calabria. Greek monks entered Italian monasteries or formed new congregations following the rule of St. Basil and subject in many cases to the patriarch at Constantinople. Over two hundred of these are said to have been in existence by the eleventh century.<sup>1</sup> In 1098 after conferring upon Duke Roger the temporal control of the kingdom of Sicily, Pope Urban II called an ecclesiastical synod at Bari to settle the affairs of the Church, and somewhat rashly entered into a debate with the Southern bishops over the nature of the Procession of the Holy Ghost.<sup>2</sup> The bishops defended the Greek doctrine with ability and Urban might have found himself embarrassed by their logic, had not Anselm of Canterbury been at hand to save the situation by an array of irrefutable arguments for the Roman cause. From that date the Italian churches, as a whole, yielded obedience to the See of Peter. In many, however, the liturgy was still performed in Greek and certain customs of the Greek Church were preserved, such as the use of unleavened bread in the sacrifice.<sup>3</sup> From them in time came ardent promoters of the union of the Greek and Latin communions. Even into Benedict's own

<sup>1</sup> Tozer, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 10, pp. 38-9.

<sup>2</sup> Hefele, vol. v, pp. 253-4.

<sup>3</sup> In 1426 the humanist Barbaro discovered a monastery in Tusculanum, "ubi a Graecis sacerdotibus ritu Graeco colitur Deus; quo in loco multa vetustatis monumenta Graecis et Latinis litteris illustrata invenimus; et ibi fere nemo est qui litteraturae Graecae expers sit." Barbaro, *Centotrenta Lettere*, p. 70. Greek was employed in liturgies until the seventeenth century when Sixtus IV decreed that all church services should be in Latin.

convent at Monte Cassino the influence penetrated and once a year mass was celebrated in both languages.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover Basilian traditions favored literary employment for the monks, though the long separation from the centre of Greek activity at Constantinople inevitably resulted in a slow deterioration of the grade of work done in these remote outposts. They were not, however, aggressive bodies. They neither proselytized to any extent nor invited outsiders to their schools. As a consequence their influence in keeping Greek alive in the West was not much felt beyond their own boundaries. Only here and there a little translating was done or a little instruction imparted to one who voluntarily sought them. Alfano, who became archbishop of Salerno toward the close of the eleventh century, left behind a version of the treatise on Human Nature by Nemesius.<sup>2</sup> Nicholas of Tarentum at the beginning of the thirteenth century served as interpreter to the cardinal sent by Innocent III to discuss at Athens, Thessalonica and Constantinople, the ever vexed problem of church union. In 1207 he copied out for the cardinal a Greek text of the Donation of Constantine from a manuscript "in the great Palace in Constantinople." He was the author of various argumentative works on theological and metaphysical topics and translated several of his compositions into Latin.<sup>3</sup> Roger Bacon in the last years of the century mentions the possibility of learning

<sup>1</sup> Cramer, vol. i, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 72.

<sup>3</sup> A note on his copy of the Donation of Constantine ends as follows: "Τέλος τῆς διαθήκης καὶ διατάξεως τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ ἐν ἀγίοις Κωνσταντίνου, ἥ τις ἐγράφη παρὰ Νικολάου Ὑδρουντίνου ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ Παλατίῳ ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει . . . . τῇ προτροπῇ τοῦ κυροῦ Βενεδίκτου τοῦ Καρδινάλιου καὶ τοποτηρητοῦ Ἰννοκεντίου τοῦ τρίτου Πάπα· ὧς ἦν γὰρ τότε ὁ προρηθεὶς Νικολάος ἐξελληνιστὴς καὶ ἑρμηνεὺς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Καρδινάλιου καὶ τῶν Γραικῶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν περὶ δογμάτων διαλέξεσιν." Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. i, p. 295. See also Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Graec.*, vol. i, pp. 25, 60-2.



Greek in South Italy from people who used it as their ordinary speech.<sup>1</sup> In the fourteenth century Barlaam, a Basilian monk from Calabria, was the one Italian whom Petrarch could secure to teach him to read Plato.<sup>2</sup>

Beside its religious centres South Italy contained the most famous for many years of all European schools of medicine, the assemblage of lay doctors at Salerno. Even before the middle of the eleventh century some of the works of Galen and Hippocrates were utilized in old Latin translations but their influence on the crude and barbarous methods in vogue was slight. With the medical revival of the latter half of the century and the adoption of more enlightened systems of therapeutics there appear traces of a more direct acquaintance with the Greek masters, enough to justify perhaps the assumption that the teachers were consulting texts of the original.<sup>3</sup> Adelard of Bath, a traveller in the South during the first half of the twelfth century speaks of hearing a Greek philosopher lecture near Salerno on magnetic attraction, a subject for which the yet untranslated works of Aristotle must have been consulted.<sup>4</sup> In the thirteenth century Thaddeus of Florence delivered a celebrated series of medical discourses at Bologna which constituted in reality the founding of a scientific medical school in the city. He is said to have based his doctrines largely on the Arab writers but to have referred at times to the original Greek.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bacon, *Opus Tert.*, p. 33; *Greek Grammar*, p. 31. According to Bacon, Grosseteste sent for monks from South Italy to help in his translations "quorum aliqui in Anglia usque ad hec tempora sunt superstites." *Comp. Stud.*, p. 434; Tiraboschi, *Stor. d. Lett. Ital.*, vol. iv, pt. ii, p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> See *infra*, p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 78-9.

<sup>4</sup> Adelard, *De Eodem et Diverso*. Quoted by Rashdall, vol. i, p. 8, n. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 236 and n. 3. Bandini ascribes to Thaddeus a translation of the Ethics of Aristotle. *Bib. Leop.*, vol. iii, p. 188.

From the South Italian groups of either lay or clerical scholars Frederic II, Emperor of Germany and King of Naples, obtained the "select men skilled in utterance in both languages" who translated afresh the logical and mathematical works of Aristotle for presentation to the Universities of Paris and Bologna.<sup>1</sup> Under Manfred, Bartholomew of Messina, a member of the court prepared a version of Aristotle's *Magna Moralia* and dedicated it to his royal patron.<sup>2</sup> In the next century Paolo Perugino collected at Naples a famous library of Greek as well as Latin manuscripts for Robert, King of Sicily and Jerusalem.<sup>3</sup> Thus as a figure in a king's household, a scientific lecture room or a convent library, the Greek scholar never completely disappeared from South Italy. One had to seek him in his home, however, to find or even to hear of him. He counted for practically nothing as a literary stimulus to the rest of Europe.

Nevertheless the men of the Middle Ages were not entirely confined in their knowledge of Greek to the fragments brought from the South or East by their contemporaries. Many a provincial clerk who had never in his life spoken with one who had seen Athens or Byzantium was yet able to

<sup>1</sup> Frederic's letter to the masters and scholars of Bologna gives his reasons for procuring the new translation: "Dum liborum ergo volumina, quorum multifarie multisque modis distincta chirographastrarum armaria divitiarum locupletant, sedula meditatione revolvimus et accurata contemplatione pensamus compilationes varie ab Aristotele aliisque Philosophis sub grecis arabicisque vocabulis antiquitus edite in sermocinalibus et mathematicis disciplinis nostris aliquando sensibus occurrerunt. Quas adhuc originalium dictionibus confertas et vetustarum vestium quas eis etas prima concesserat, operimento contextas vel hominis defectus aut operis ad Latine lingue notitiam non perduxit. Volentes igitur ut veneranda tantorum operum similis auctoritas apud nos non absque commodo omnis vocis organo traducte innotescat, ea per viros electos et in utriusque lingue prolatione peritos instantur iussimus verborum fideliter servata virginitate transferri." *Traversari*, vol. i, p. civ.

<sup>2</sup> Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 71. Tiraboschi, vol. iv. pt. I, p. 162.

<sup>3</sup> Nollac, *Pétrarque*, p. 322.

give a tone of erudition to his book by a few Greek words or phrases, rightly or wrongly spelled, or by allusion to Greek derivations.<sup>1</sup> Something might be extracted from the pages of Latin literature. Certain of the classic writers, Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and others, had employed occasionally a Greek noun or adjective to express an idea which had no satisfactory equivalent in Latin, or had quoted a clause or a line from an admired Greek model. The compilers and commentators of the fifth and sixth centuries furnished information in a more didactic and explicit form. Fulgentius, for example, a clerical scholar of that later age, had drawn up in the shape of a concise encyclopedia the legends of Hellenic gods and heroes, and had explained with unhesitating reliance upon the imagination the inner significance of their names.<sup>2</sup> Macrobius, Servius and others of their type

<sup>1</sup> Roger Bacon gives a list of nearly three hundred Greek words which he says were in general use in his day, words which had been borrowed by the Romans centuries before, such as abyssus, agon, antidotum, basis, calamus, etc. He includes mistakenly some that are not Greek, imber, legio, margarita. He adds special lists of seventy-five ecclesiastical and forty scientific terms—*anathema*, *angelus*, *apostolus*, *baptizo*, *Catholicus*, *deus*, *diabolus*, *alphabetum*, *problema*, *analytica*, *geometrica*. *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 441-444. Of course the multitude who used the commoner words did so without any consciousness of their difference from the Latin, but scholars recognized them as non-Latin and discussed their origin and composition. They were often inclined like Bacon himself to classify as Greek any words that appeared foreign, *e. g.* "Bar grece filius latine dicitur." Abelard, in Cousin, p. 375. "Pascha non sicut quidam estimant grecum nomen est, sed hebreum." Anonymous sermon of the twelfth century. Quoted in Bandini, *Bib. Leop.*, vol. i, p. 417. See *infra*, p. 40, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> I quote two typical passages. In his account of the history and functions of Neptune he remarks, "quem ideo Graece etiam Posidona nuncupant, quasi ποσειδῶνα εἰδὼν, quod nos Latine facientem imaginem dicimus: illa videlicet ratione quod hoc solum elementum imagines in se formet spectantium." *Mythologicon* in *Mythographi*, vol. ii, p. 37. "Bellorophonta posuerunt quasi βουληφοροῦντα, quod nos Latine sapientiae consiliatorem dicimus . . . At vero Bellorophon, id est bona consultatio, qualem equum sedet nisi Pegasus? quasi pegaseon, id est fontem aeternum. Sapientia enim bonae consultationis aeternus fons est." *Op. cit.*, pp. 102-3.

offered to a diligent searcher numerous similar illustrations of Greek lore.<sup>1</sup>

Much else had been preserved in various ways by the church. The writings of the early fathers, Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome, contained numerous terms taken from the theological and philosophical Greek of their time. Here and there even in the North a Greek liturgy or chant survived from the days when the Eastern and Western Churches were one and their languages interchangeable. Down to the Revolution a Greek mass was celebrated annually in the chapel of St. Denis in Paris in honor of the nationality of its reputed founder.<sup>2</sup> For many centuries it was common on Good Friday to chant in the churches the following verse:

“Ἄγιος ὁ θεός  
ἄγιος ἰσχυρός  
ἄγιος ἀθάνατος  
ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς.”<sup>3</sup>

Otto, Bishop of Freising in the twelfth century, ascribes the custom to a deliverance from an earthquake by the singing of the hymn in the reign of Theodosius.<sup>4</sup> A peculiarly potent and solemn character might well have been attributed to the mysterious syllables. At Rome, Arles and St. Gall the Gloria, Credo and Paternoster were sung in Greek at certain services.<sup>5</sup> The Kyrie Æleison resounded always and

<sup>1</sup> “Tres modi locutionum sunt, quos characteres Graeci vocant ἰσχυροίς, qui tenuis, Addossos qui moderatus, Adhos qui validus intelligitur. Tribus modis carmen inducitur. Est enim modus arammaticos, est ammaticos, est myctos. Arammaticos est in quo personae inducuntur. Ammaticos qui et διασ κοι dicitur in quo Poeta solus loquitur. Myctos est ex utraque constans.” From an eleventh century manuscript of Servius’ Commentary on Vergil. Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. ii, pp. 345-6.

<sup>2</sup> Egger, *L’Hellénisme en France*, vol. i, p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Cramer, vol. i, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Otto Freis., *Chronicon*, p. 207.

<sup>5</sup> Cramer, vol. ii, p. 16. Gidel, *Nouvelles Etudes*, pp. 227-8.

everywhere. The ritual for the consecration of a church edifice required that the officiating bishop draw both the Greek and Latin alphabets with his staff in the earth outside the door.<sup>1</sup> In Bacon's time the bishops were frequently so ignorant of the forms of the Greek letters that, as he complains, the rite was constantly desecrated by the insertion of irrelevant or meaningless signs.<sup>2</sup>

A rather more extensive and varied store of information could be derived from a discriminating use of certain standard text-books, in particular the Latin grammars. Donatus, the author of the fourth century treatise which served as the foundation of most language study in the Middle Ages, often cited Greek forms in his exposition of the rules of Latin inflection and derivation.<sup>3</sup> In his concluding summary of rhetorical devices and figures of speech he introduced a bristling array of polysyllabic terms taken from the Greek grammarians, accompanying each with definition and illustration. The youthful student of the first division of the trivium doubtless looked in blank dismay at words such as cacosyntheta, perissologia, episynaliphe, homoeoteleuton. But the perserving searcher after knowledge might extract from his Donatus some conception of a few simple rules for the formation of Greek nouns and the meaning of various prepositions and roots in composition. He would find less light on the Greek verb which seems to have been ordinarily

<sup>1</sup> A sort of mystical or magical interest attached to the Greek alphabet which was studied by men who knew nothing of Greek. Vincent of Beauvais gives the forms of the alphabet and explains the hidden significance of certain letters. T stands for human life, Θ means death, "nam iudices eandem literam apponebant ad eorum nomina quos supplicio afficiebant, et dicitur tetha apothoy tana-thom, id est a morte." T reminds one of the shape of the Lord's cross, A and Ω were applied by Christ to himself. *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 65.

<sup>2</sup> Bacon, *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, pp. 117-8. *Gk. Grammar*, pp. 25, 83, and lxxiii.

<sup>3</sup> See Donatus, *Ars Grammatica*, *passim*.

regarded as too unlike the Latin to be profitable for comparison.

Yet more could be gained by an intelligent perusal of the second grammatical classic of the age, the *Institutiones* of Priscian, an elaborate work in eighteen books, composed at the opening of the sixth century. The author lived and taught for some years in Constantinople and said of himself that he but put into Latin the principles which he had learned from the Greek grammarians.<sup>1</sup> He referred constantly to these models, especially Dyscolus and Herodian. His allusions to Greek usage were throughout exceedingly numerous and exact. Under favorable circumstances one might cull enough from these pages to construct most of the Greek rules for noun declension and to have ideas on the treatment of verb stems and on certain departments of syntax. Illustrative quotations from Greek writers, chiefly Homer, Thucydides, Plato, Demosthenes and the dramatists, were introduced plentifully in the last book and invited to exercise of ingenuity in reading. In short with a fairly accurate copy of Priscian in his hands any scholar with a taste for linguistics could by a moderate amount of exertion collect those odds and ends of Greek lore which surprise the modern reader of a twelfth century composition and which at first sight seem to indicate a real grasp of the language. Before wondering, however, why the mass of students remained so ignorant one must remember that the average scribe was too careless or too clumsy to copy exactly what

<sup>1</sup>"Conatus sum pro viribus rem arduam quidem, sed officio professionis non indebitam, supra nominatorum praecepta virorum quae congrua sunt visa in Latinum transferre sermonem, collectis etiam omnibus fere, quaecumque necessaria nostrorum quoque inveniuntur artium commentariis grammaticorum, quod gratum fore credidi temperamentum, si ex utriusque linguae moderatoribus elegantiora in unum coeant corpus meo labore faciente, quia nec vituperandum me esse credo si eos imitor qui principatum inter scriptores Graios artis grammaticae possident." Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae*, pp. 1-2.

he did not understand, and that in consequence the average text was marred by gaps and illegibilities or downright errors, particularly in the reproduction of letters in an unknown alphabet. A word or an ending here and there was doubtless all that the ordinary reader deciphered out of the obscurity.<sup>1</sup>

A century after Priscian, Isidore, Bishop of Seville, reduced all necessary knowledge to the compass of an encyclopedia of twenty books, which was likewise to become one of the popular storehouses of medieval learning. A resident of Spain, he knew snatches of the colloquial Greek of his day, and declared that in addition to the four ancient dialects there was another "the common, in which everyone speaks."<sup>2</sup> His first book, which treated of grammar, contained the Greek alphabet, a collection of Greek metrical terms and signs and a few illustrations of Greek parts of speech. Otherwhere scattered through his chapters were Greek derivations, some sufficiently correct, others as fantastic as that of the word sibyl, constructed from an Aeolic Σίβης, God, and βουλή, a person who explains the will of God to men,<sup>3</sup> or again that of the word elephant from λόφος, "because he is shaped like a mountain."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For errors in a tenth century copy of Priscian, see Thurot, *Notices* pp. 66-7. Bacon speaks of a common mistake in copying and reading Priscian, taking ὁ αὐτός as ὁλίτος. *Gk. Grammar*, p. 164.

<sup>2</sup> "κοινή, id est mista sive communis, qua omnes utuntur." Isidore, *Etymologiae* col. 326.

<sup>3</sup> "Proinde igitur, quia divinam voluntatem hominibus interpretari solebant, Sibylle nominate sunt." *Ibid.*, col. 309. The deterioration of even these poor Greek forms through the incapacity of medieval scribes is illustrated by a passage from Vincent of Beauvais, who in the thirteenth century repeated this derivation. With him Σίβης has become sibos and βουλή, belen. "Nam sibos Eolico sermone deus, belen Greci mentem nuncupant." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii, cap. 102. Note also Mathew Paris' version of this same derivation, *Chron. Mai.*, vol. i, p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> "Quod formam montis preferat. Grece enim mons λόφος dicitur." *Etymologiae*, col. 436.

The example set by Donatus, Priscian, Isidore and others of broadening the view of Latin grammar by frequent reference to the Greek was followed by the authors of the metrical text-books of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which to a considerable extent superseded the older works in general favor. Alexander, a Frenchman from Ville Dieu, about the year 1200 composed a *Doctrinale* in hexameter verse which soon enjoyed a wide vogue in the schools of Northern Europe.<sup>1</sup> In the opening lines he announced his purpose of writing especially for the "new little clerks . . . and even to boys the greater part will be plain."<sup>2</sup> Yet he felt obliged to insert in places the standard Greek illustrations reproduced from the older grammars. He supplied doggerel rules for case endings in the singular number, omitting as a rule any consideration of the plural.

"With nominative in e the Greek has genitive es,  
The fourth case em or en, and the rest as the nominative,  
With nominative in os, the genitive then is the same,  
Or changes to oy in Greek, (for example melos and meloy)  
With om in the fourth case, os in the fifth, and o in the last."<sup>3</sup>

He gave a hasty word to Greek verbs and syntax, mentioned a few derivations and crowned all with the customary

<sup>1</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 436.

<sup>2</sup> "Scribere clericulis paro *Doctrinale* novellis . . .

Si pueri primo nequeant attendere plene,  
hic tamen attendet, qui doctoris vice fungens,  
atque legens pueris laica lingua reserabit;  
Et pueris etiam pars maxima plana patebit."

Alexander de Villa Dei, *Doctrinale*, p. 7, lines 1, 7-10.

<sup>3</sup> "Cum dedit e Grecus recto, tenet es genitivus,  
Em aut en quartus; recto reliquos sociamus,  
Cum Greci rectus tenet os, par est genitivus,  
Vel dat oy Grecus (melos et meloy tibi testis)  
Quartus on, os quintus, o tertius atque supremus."

*Doctrinale*, lines 338-342.



list of rhetorical terms, homozeugis, efflexegesis and the like, which he ingeniously contrived to fit into the meter. One perceives that these disjointed, futile bits of Greek lore had become the traditional accompaniments of any compendium of the Latin language.<sup>1</sup> They had ceased to be accurate, had ceased, one would suppose, to be edifying but they were still preserved.

A Flemish contemporary of Alexander, Eberhard of Bethune, was the author of a grammatical poem in hexameters and elegiacs, which boasted the title *Grecismus* and included a chapter devoted particularly to Greek derivations. According to his own slightly grandiloquent description it told "what were the voices of Greece and of Latium and what meaning they bore."<sup>2</sup> Before the close of the fourteenth century it was prescribed by some of the leading universities of Europe for the course in grammar.<sup>3</sup> A rough translation of a few lines will indicate the character of the work.

"Universal is catha, from that is catholic,  
And auricalcon proves to us that calcon is a torch.  
En signifies the contrary, and hence elencus comes.  
The goat is called egle, therefrom the eclogue takes its name.  
Lectos in Greek is quiet rest, we have Allecto thence,  
And melody we say because melos itself is sweet.

<sup>1</sup>The proper names which garnished the illustrative sentences were a part of this Greek tradition. Almost never were they medieval or even Roman. "Concesso quod tu melior sis quam Plato" (*Doctrinale* line, 1543), is a simple example. Socrates was a name often employed.

<sup>2</sup>"Grecismus recitat, peperit quas Grecia voces  
Quas Latium dat, que significata ferant."

Eberhard, *Carmen de Versificatione*;

quoted in Gottlieb, *Mittelalt. Bib.*, p. 445.

<sup>3</sup>The *Grecismus* and *Doctrinale* were prescribed as grammatical text-books by the university statutes of 1328 at Toulouse, of 1366, at Paris, and of 1389, at Vienne. Thurot, p. 102, n. 5.

Then morphos signifies a change, hence metamorphoses,  
Orge the tilling of the soil, we get Georgics so.”<sup>1</sup>

The material was drawn in part apparently from Priscian and the fanciful etymologies of Isidore.

The end of the thirteenth century, indeed, saw the composition of a true Greek Grammar written in Latin for the instruction of Latins, a serious attempt at a comprehensive discussion of all the fundamentals of the language from the Western standpoint. Roger Bacon, the sturdy philosopher and educational critic, had long urged the desirability of reviving the study of the more ancient tongues, especially Greek and Hebrew. Alone among the scholars of his day he persistently asserted the folly of a state of complacent satisfaction with translations and the need of a working knowledge of Greek if one would understand even the principles of Latin.<sup>2</sup> Some time during the latter years of his life he composed a manual of Greek grammar of considerable length, if we may judge by the proportions of the fragment which survives. Two out of its three parts were devoted to a

<sup>1</sup>“Universale catha; fit catholicus inde;  
Atque fecem calcon auricalcon probat esse.  
En contra signat; hinc et elencus erit.  
Est egle capra; hinc egloga nomen habet.  
Est lectos requies; Allecto dicitur inde,  
Estque melos dulcis ac inde melodia dicas,  
Immutat morphos; hinc metamorphoseos.  
Orge cultura est; dic inde Georgica nasci.”

Quoted by Thurot, pp. 109-110.

The following lines show how Latin or Hebrew words might be taken as Greek:

“Estque bonum manon; immanis comprobat illud.  
Dic pitos esse viam; dicas hinc compita nasci.  
Quod bar filius est probat illud Bartholomeus,  
Sabbata sunt requies; probat hoc Iudeus Apella,”

*Ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> Bacon, *Op. Maius*, vol. iii, pp. 80, *et seq.* *Op. Tert.*, pp. 88, *et seq.*

painstaking treatment of orthography, prosody and accentuation, and included a list of correct forms of Greek words used in Latin, *azymus*, *amethystus*, *basyleus*, *gymnasium*,<sup>1</sup> another list of words which in the author's opinion should be written with an aspirated letter, *Achademia*, *Athlas*, *methaphora*, *thanathos*,<sup>2</sup> and a long array of quotations from Latin poets to illustrate the right and wrong accentuation of Greek derivatives.<sup>3</sup> Texts of the *Paternoster*, *Ave Maria*, *Credo*, *Magnificat*, *Nunc Dimittis* and *Benedictus* were given in Greek, in a Latin transliteration, and in the usual Latin version for use as reading lessons.<sup>4</sup> Interspersed among all this matter were full discussions of general rules, Greek usage being interpreted as far as possible by the Latin. Constant reference was made to Priscian and the influence of his method and spirit was patent throughout.<sup>5</sup> The third section dealing with the subject of inflections is now unfortunately much mutilated. The part treating of the first and second declensions and the simpler forms of the third is lost, together with that which contained the conjugation of the *μ* paradigm *τίθημι*, following on the conjugation of the *ω* model, *τύπτω*. Everything that may have come afterwards is also gone, including any disquisitions upon syntax.<sup>6</sup>

The sources for Bacon's exceptional knowledge of Greek have been always problematic. He offers no explanation

<sup>1</sup> Bacon, *Gk. Grammar*, pp. 61-78.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 133-140.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-128.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17-24.

<sup>5</sup> See continual allusions to Priscian in the *Grammar*, "Sicut Priscianus docet," p. 4, "Secundum Priscianum," p. 5, etc. He was also indebted often where he did not expressly say so.

<sup>6</sup> A somewhat similar, though less systematic and still less complete exposition of Bacon's ideas on Greek etymology and prosody, with criticisms on the prevalent errors of the time, may be found in *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 432-519.

for his attainments, so that one is driven to conjecture with the aid of a few vague hints. A peculiarly careful and successful study of a clear text of Priscian gave him much. He drew suggestions also from Donatus, Isidore, Bede and other writers on language. Aside from these, the common property of any medieval scholar, he evidently had access to rarer authority. He probably did not know Herodian at first hand, in spite of the two quotations he boasted from the Alexandrian grammarian,<sup>1</sup> but he assuredly was familiar with some later Byzantine manual some one of the small grammatical catechisms or "Erotemata," which presented the rules of earlier philologists in a condensed and abridged form. His paradigms are those of the Byzantine schools, comprehending certain rarely used nouns and the verb *τίπτω*. The latter he conjugates through all imaginable forms, placing *ἐάν* before the subjunctive mood as did the Byzantines.<sup>2</sup> His reading material, the Paternoster, Ave and Creed, is the same as that commonly employed in the Greek text-books. The Creed, is the Eastern Creed and lacks the clause, "*καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ*."<sup>3</sup> Finally he refers now and again explicitly to a "grecus," and in his chapters on inflection, where Priscian failed him and a Greek manual would be practically his only guide, he quotes occasionally fragments of questions and answers.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps he had seen the "Greek Donatus" brought back from Athens by John of Basingstoke. He

<sup>1</sup> *Gk. Grammar*, pp. 46 and 55.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. lx, *et seq.* Cf. Heiberg, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, vol. ix, pp. 472, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Gk. Grammar*, p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> "Si sequare grecos auctores in grammatica eorum." *Op. cit.* p. 165. "Et si grecus querat ποσα σχηματα dicemus tria, απλουν, quod est simplex, συνθετον, quod est compositum, παρασυνθετον, quod est decompositum," etc., p. 152. "Querit igitur grecus τιπτω, ποιον μερους λεγον εστι; ρηματος ποιας εγκλίσεως; οριστικης," etc. p. 173. He describes the "morem grecum," mode of instruction by questions and answers, p. 171.

certainly knew Grosseteste, and mentions the "books on Greek grammar" which had been imported by him from the East.<sup>1</sup> The pronunciation which he gives for the Greek of the Paternoster, Ave and other extracts proves also that he had heard the spoken Greek of the day with its tendency toward slighting the distinction between vowel sounds.<sup>2</sup> He may have listened to Basingstoke or some other travelled monk who worked for Grosseteste, or to some one of the Oriental clerks studying in Paris.

The sum of Bacon's achievements in Greek is, therefore, considerable. He had a fair comprehension of the rules of etymology and probably of syntax as formulated by Greek philologists of his own or an earlier time. He could declare emphatically that a treatise on grammar, attributed by many of his contemporaries to Aristotle, was the product of some Latin author who wrote "out of his own head," not from the Greek standpoint at all but as a bungling, ill-taught Westerner.<sup>3</sup> Of his own Grammar he could say that it was a simple, introductory hand-book, designed to enable the student merely to understand Greek allusions in Latin

<sup>1</sup> *Op. Tert.*, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup> I quote an example from the *Magnificat*:

"Kathile dunastas apo thronon ke ypsose tapinus pinontas eneplesen  
καθεῖλε δυνάστας ἀπὸ θρόνων καὶ ὑψωσε ταπεινὸς πεινῶντας ἐνεπλήσεν  
agathon ke plutuntas exapestile kenus, antelaueto israil pedos autu  
ἀγαθὸν καὶ πλουτοῦντας εξαπέστειλε κενούς, ἀντελάβετο Ἰσραὴλ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ  
mnistine eleus kathos elalise pros tus pateras imon to Auraam ke to  
μνησθῆναι ἐλέους καθὼς ἐλάλησε πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν τῷ αβραάμ καὶ τῷ  
spermati autu eos eonos." *Gk. Grammar*, p. 21.  
σπέρματι αὐτοῦ ἕως αἰῶνος."

<sup>3</sup> "Non potest esse Aristotelis ut estimatur a pluribus, nec alicuius greci, quia non traditur greca grammatica secundum formam grecam, immo magis secundum latinam; licet aliqua greca aliquando ibi tangantur. Sed constat grecam grammaticam more greci ab autoribus tradi. Non igitur fuit hic tractatus factus in greco, nec a greco translatus, sed aliquis latinus ipsum ex proprio capite compilavit. . . Instrui indiget in grammaticae rudimentis." *Gk. Grammar*, p. 57.

writers, to be followed and supplemented by a larger work.<sup>1</sup>

But in spite of his acquaintance with the structure and paraphernalia of the language Bacon gives no indication in his works of any ability to read Greek outside of grammars and dictionaries. He finds grave fault with current translations of Aristotle or of the Scriptures, but he bases his strictures on the well known incompetence of the translators or on the corruption and contradiction of Latin texts rather than on flaws detected by comparison with a Greek original. In short his proficiency, remarkable as it is, seems, for all he reveals to the contrary, to have extended scarcely beyond what he calls the third degree of knowledge, namely, the power to read and comprehend the references to Greek contained in the works of philosophers, theologians and grammarians, and to practice the rules of inflection. It stops distinctly short of the first and second degrees, which indeed he himself declares to be out of the reach of all but a few among the Greeks, the power to use the language freely and correctly as one's mother tongue and the power to translate from it accurately and clearly.<sup>2</sup> As far as I am aware there

<sup>1</sup> "Hic tractatus est introductorius in grammaticam grecam quam in maiori tractatu meo poterunt perspicere studiosi. Nec est necessitas latino revolvere omnes coniugaciones ut intelligat textum latinum in omni facultate, cum expositionibus sanctorum et philosophorum et autorum grammaticæ et poetarum et ceterorum sapientum, pro qua expositione facio tractatum istum." *Op. cit.*, pp. 171-2.

<sup>2</sup> "Nam consideret vestra sapientia quod in linguarum cognitione sunt tria; scilicet ut homo sciat legere et intelligere ea que Latini tractant in expositione theologie et philosophie et lingue Latine . . . Sed aliud est in linguarum cognitione, scilicet ut homo sit ita peritus quod sciat transferre . . . Tertium vero est difficultus utroque, scilicet quod homo loquatur linguam alienam sicut suam." *Op. Tert.*, pp. 65-6. "Sed tertius gradus hic eligendus est qui facillimus est habenti doctorem, scilicet ut sciamus de his quantum sufficit ad intelligendum, que requirit Latinitas in hac parte. Et vis huius rei stat in hoc: ut homo sciat legere grecum et hebreum et cetera, et ut secundum formam Donati sciat accidentia partium orationis." *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 433-4.

is no proof that Bacon ever read any Greek beside textbooks. His grammar and his chapters elsewhere on the use of Greek miss the flavor and variety which citations from a wider literature would have supplied. As a stimulus to a more general study of the language his grammar, as far as one can now tell, was a failure. A few copies of it were made in the course of time. One dating from the fourteenth century found its way to Oxford, another to Cambridge, a third of the sixteenth century to the library at Douai, but they all lay forgotten and unread.<sup>1</sup> Even the existence of the book was doubted by scholars until within the last few years. It is valuable, accordingly, not as a source of information drawn upon by the Middle Ages, but as an indication of the amount of knowledge which it was possible in that period for one man of tireless enthusiasm to obtain.

The foregoing pages suggest briefly the main channels by which a knowledge of the Greek tongue was conveyed to the

<sup>1</sup> *Gk. Grammar*, pp. lxx, lxvi, lxx, lxxi. A fifteenth century catalogue of the library of St. Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, contains a notice of "pars quedam grammaticæ grece Baconis," included in a volume of mathematical tables given to the Abbey by one John of London. This John may perhaps be identified with Bacon's promising pupil of the same name. James, pp. 325, lxxiv lxxvii. In 1344 the English prelate, Richard de Bury, wrote a pleasant little treatise on books. In one chapter he dilates upon the desirability of a study of Greek. His language reminds the reader of Bacon's, although the reasons he urges in support of his opinion are more literary in character and less philological. "What would Vergil, the greatest poet of the Latins, have done if he had not plundered Theocritus, Lucretius and Homer, or ploughed with their heifer? . . . The creeds we chant are the sweat of the Greeks, declared in their councils and confirmed by the martyrdom of many . . . We draw this conclusion from what has been said, namely, that the ignorance of the Greek language is at this day highly injurious to the study of the Latins, without which the doctrines of either the ancient Christians or Gentiles cannot be comprehended." After a reference to the inefficacy of the decree of the Council of Vienne he concludes with the statement that he has at least provided Greek and Hebrew grammars for the use of his scholars. *Philobiblion*, cap. x, pp. 70-2. It is not impossible that the author had been procuring copies of Bacon's works. But he does not himself seem to have learned Greek from them, and no record as yet has shown that any of his pupils did.

West in the Middle Ages and the extent and character of this knowledge. The modern student of the situation is struck most perhaps by the almost absolute dearth among the greatest scholars of ability or inclination to read Greek. Library catalogues joined to the mention of an ancient manuscript the phrase, "Greca sunt, non describuntur." University doctors lecturing upon texts in law or philosophy passed over quotations with the comment, "Grecum est, non legitur." A limited acquaintance with Greek roots derived principally through grammars and etymologies was not rare in literary circles. Greek titles gave an air to compositions in Latin; witness the *Rhetorimachia* of Anselm of Bisate, the *Metalogicus* and *Polycraticon* of John of Salisbury, the *Philobiblion* of Richard de Bury, the *Megacosmus* and *Microcosmus* of Bernard Silvester of Tours and numerous others. Students of etymology were captivated by the opportunity of exercising their fancy in juggling with derivations. Gervais of Tilbury found in the word *Academy* "the sorrow of the people."<sup>2</sup> Matthew Paris ascribed to the Athenians a claim to immortality in their very name.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Et non solum nocivum est, valde verecundum est, quando inter omnes sapientes Latinorum prelati et principes non inveniunt unum hominem qui unam literam Arabicam vel Grecam sciat interpretari nec uni nuntio respondere, sicut aliquando accidit." Bacon, *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, p. 120. Philip of Harveng, abbot of Bonne-Espérance in the twelfth century, a great lover of literature, writes to a friend: "Cum enim pluribus et dissimilibus linguis Deus uti velit diversas hominum nationes . . . eam linguam, nisi fallor quodam reverentie et amoris privilegio vult preferri, quam versari inter sacra ecclesiastica et ad posteros literis vult transferri. Unde etsi Hebraea et Greca eo date sunt ordine patribus ab antiquo, tamen quia non usu sed fama sola ad nos quasi veniunt de longinquo, eisdem valefacto ad Latinam presentem noster utcumque se applicat intellectus." *Epistola*, xvii. *Migne*, vol. 203, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> He derived it probably from ἀχος ὄημον. See Egger, vol. i, p. 85.

<sup>3</sup> He makes the word *Anthenian* from ἀ privative and θάνατος. *Chron. Mai.*, vol. v, p. 286. He may have derived the suggestion from Fulgentius, who says, "Minerva denique et ἀθήνη grece dicitur, quasi ἀθάνατος πάρεθεις, id est immor-



Nevertheless it seems safe to say that hardly a scholar who had not lived in the South or East ever acquired the skill to read Greek at all, as we understand the term, or to translate. Greek manuscripts were not copied in the cloisters. The few that were unearthed when the humanists of the fifteenth century set about the search were chiefly of ancient or Oriental origin with the exception of the crude bilingual glossaries.<sup>1</sup> The patois in which the Venetian trader chaffered over his wares when he touched at an Eastern port or the crusader asked for a night's lodging on the road was as far to all intents and purposes from the Greek of the classics as is the garbled Hindustanee of the casual Indian civilian from the language of the Vedas.<sup>2</sup> What little was accomplished in the study and interpretation of ancient texts was mainly the work of a small number of churchmen who studied for special motives abroad or hired the services of an Oriental to translate certain didactic or religious books particularly

*talis virgo, quia sapientia nec mori poterit nec corrumpi.*" *Mythologicon*, in *Mythographi*, vol. ii, p. 68. Bacon, who touches on so many phases of this subject, has some curious examples of confused derivations in the dictionaries of Hugutio, Brito and Papias, *e. g.* "Hugutio et Brito errant horribiliter in hoc nomine idiota. Dicunt enim quod dicitur ab idus, quod est divisio, et iota, quod est litera alphabeti, quasi divisus a literis et illiteratus; vel ab idus et ota, quod est auris, quasi divisus ab aure, quia quod audit non intelligit; vel ab othis, quod est mos, et idos, quod est proprium, quasi ignorans morem proprie terre et gentis. Sed absurda sunt hec et falsa. Nam idion est proprium, a quo idioma, id est proprietas loquendi, et idiotas, qui naturali sensu et propria lingua contentus est, et sic et idiota sicut scribit Beda, Act. quarto. etc." *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 460-1.

<sup>1</sup> Egger, vol. i, p. 44. *Cf. supra*, p. 18. Greek manuscripts in the monasteries were frequently psalters. See examples in Becker, *Catalogi*, pp. 172 and 267, Omont, *Fac-Similés*, passim. A Greek copy of the Epistles of Paul was at Corbie in the thirteenth century, (Becker, p. 283.) and one of the Octoteuch at Christ Church, Canterbury. (James, p. I, xxxvi.)

<sup>2</sup> "Multi vero inveniuntur qui sciunt loqui Grecum et Arabicum et Hebreum inter Latinos, sed paucissimi sunt qui sciunt rationem grammaticæ ipsius, nec sciunt docere eam: tentavi enim permultos. Sicut enim laici loquuntur linguas quas ad-discunt et nesciunt rationem grammaticæ, sic est de istis." Bacon, *Op. Tert.*, p.

desired by scholars of the West. These translators, as a rule, comprehended too dimly the tongue with which they were dealing to make their versions lucid or idiomatic.<sup>1</sup> Finally the reputation of Greek as a singularly difficult language tended to discourage any incipient interest in a subject so formidable of approach.<sup>2</sup> No incentive offered for its cultivation was effective or lasting. A new enthusiasm and a different attitude of mind were needed before Greek should once more be read and loved by men of letters throughout the West.

<sup>1</sup> The following extract illustrates the style of one of the most prominent translators, William of Moerbeka. "Omnia utique ex Providentia erunt et malum habet locum in entibus. Quare et faciunt dii malum sed tanquam bonum, et cognoscunt, ut omnium unialem habentes cognitionem, impartibiliter quidem partibulum, boniformiter autem malorum, unialiter autem multitudinis. Alia enim anime cognitio et alia intellectualis nature, alia deorum ipsorum: hic quidem omni ἀποκίνητος, id est ex se mobilis; hic autem eternalis cognitio, hic autem indicibilis et unialis, ipso uno omnia et cognoscens et producens." From Proclus, *De Malorum Subsistentia*. Quoted in *Hist. Litt. de la France*, vol. xxi, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> Priscian alludes to the inflections of the Greek verb in a way to daunt the hardest. *Inst. Gram.*, vol. i, pp. 420, 442, 445-7. etc. Bacon in his grammar remarks, "Coniugaciones vero non omnes ponam in hoc tractatu, sicut a principio dictum est, propter gravitatem multitudinis earum et superfluum difficultatem intelligendi eas, quia novicius addiscens grecas coniugaciones vix unam recipiet patienter, et quia hic tractatus est introductorius in grammaticam grecam." *Gk. Grammar*, p. 171. A thirteenth century characterization of Arabic, Greek and Latin runs as follows, "tedium verbositatis arabice, implicationis grece, paucitas quoque exarationis latine." *Hist. Litt. de la France*, vol. xxi, p. 144.

## CHAPTER II

OF the contents of Greek literature, the history, science, philosophy and art of the Hellenic race, the West possessed all this time certain imperfect, disconnected fragments. In a broad sense of course, the Middle Ages could not feel the power of Roman learning and civilization nor yield obedience to the dogmas of the church without thereby submitting unconsciously to the Greek intellect which had been the teacher of republican and imperial Rome, and had formulated the theology of the early fathers. But Greek influences of that larger and subtler type were practically unrecognized and do not concern us here. A more conscious, if not always more direct acquaintance with Greek letters remained as a part of the Latin literary inheritance and of that we have now to speak.<sup>1</sup>

Certain unforgettable myths and stories, certain stirring portions of history and tradition were preserved from the treasure houses of Greek imagination and remodelled to suit medieval purposes and standards of taste. In the former class stood Esop's Fables, which had a wide circulation in a tenth century prose paraphrase of the Augustan verse of Phaedrus. The author of this later version assumed the name of Romulus and prefaced his book with a dedication to a supposititious son, Tyberinus, doubtless to give the

<sup>1</sup> The relations of later Byzantine literature, martyrology and romance to the Western world form a separate subject and cannot be discussed here. A suggestive short essay is Döllinger, *Akad. Vorträge*, vol. i, pp. 163-186, translated into English in Döllinger's, *Studies in European History*. On the Greek Physiologus see Gidel, *Nouvelles Études*, pp. 401-443.

whole a classical atmosphere. Accordingly the work was sometimes assigned to Romulus Augustulus, the last Western Emperor. In the course of the verseloving twelfth century many of these and similar tales were put back into Latin or vernacular poetry.<sup>1</sup> The lady Marie de France retold them in French rhyme, informing us the while that King Henry, "who loved them much," had turned them into English.<sup>2</sup> They were used to lighten the tedium of sermons where rough wit was not considered out of place.<sup>3</sup> Boccaccio relates that Robert, King of Jerusalem, was in boyhood first aroused to any show of interest in literature by a sagacious tutor who put into his hands the Fables of Esop.<sup>4</sup>

From the time of St. Augustine and Orosius every chronicler who introduced his narrative with a sweeping survey of the world's development previous to his own generation included in the account certain data which represented Greek history. The deeds of gods and heroes of the epic age and

<sup>1</sup> Walter Anglicus and Alexander Neckam were authors of versions in Latin elegiacs. Neckam's Esop is in Du Meril, *Poésies Inédites*, pp. 169 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "Ysope apele on icest liure  
Qu'il translata et sut escrire;  
De greu en latin le torna  
Li rois Henris qui mult ama  
Le translata puis en englois,  
Et ion l'ai rimé en françois,  
Si com gel trouai proprement."

Hervieux, *Fabulistes Latines*, vol. i, p. 616.

<sup>3</sup> Vincent of Beauvais, the encyclopedist of the thirteenth century, gives a resumé of twenty-nine of these fables and adds the comment: "Hec de fabulis esopi exerpere volui, quas et si forte plurium liceat (?) in sermonibus publicis recitare, quod et nonnulli prudentium faciunt propter audientium tedia relevanda, qui talibus delectantur; simul et propter integumenta subiunctaque aliquid edificationis habere videntur. Nunquam tamen nisi caute et parce id estimo faciendum, ne qui verbis sacris ad luctum penitentiae deque devotionem provocari debent, ipsi per huiusmodi nugas in risum magis atque lasciviam dissolvantur." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xiv, cap. 9. Hecker, *Boccaccio-funde*, p. 218.

the exploits of Alexander of Macedon were principally emphasized. The time between was treated chiefly as the age of the philosophers. The politics of Hellenic city states would naturally prove baffling to the monkish recluse or the feudal knight and were therefore for the most part passed over with scarcely a word. Even the Persian wars and the age of Pericles were slighted or altogether ignored.<sup>1</sup> The works of the Attic historians were unknown.<sup>2</sup> Information

<sup>1</sup> Orosius, who wrote about 415 A. D. and was used as an authority on ancient history during the whole medieval period, knew something of the older historians, Pausanias and Strabo, and gives a fairly elaborate account of Greek history. But even he confuses the chronology and events of the fifth century. *Historiarum*, lib. ii, pp. 44, *et seq.*, 52, *et seq.* Isidore of Seville in his *Chronicon* speaks of the Minotaur, the Gorgon, the siege of Troy. He then enumerates the names of the lawgivers, Lycurgus and Solon, the philosophers and poets, Pythagoras, Pindar, Eschylus, Herodotus, Socrates and Plato and proceeds to the reign of Alexander. *Migne*, vol. 83, pp. 1027-1035. Ekkehard of Aura, the author of the great chronicle of the eleventh century, makes hardly a mention of events between Troy and Philip and Alexander. *Migne*, vol. 154, pp. 507-605. Otto of Freising, who wrote in the twelfth century and took especial pains with the earlier part of his narrative, confounds the incidents of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. The latter he describes as another attempt of the Persians to ruin Athens. *Chronicon*, p. 79. In the next century the voluminous history of Vincent of Beauvais rehearses at length the fables of Cecrops, Io, the judgment of Paris, relates a moral anecdote regarding Pisistratus and various episodes of the fifth century wars and the career of Themistocles. There is no attempt at explanation of motive or causal sequence, simply a series of marvellous or edifying tales. *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii and iv.

<sup>2</sup> Even their names were largely forgotten. Vincent of Beauvais who gives us the most diffuse of medieval accounts of Greece and who alludes to ancient writers when he can, says not a word of Herodotus or Thucydides. He speaks of Xenophon as the pupil of Socrates, and adds, "Xenophon (ut dictum est) vitam Persarum VIII voluminibus describens, polenta et cardamo et sale ac pane Persas asserit victitare." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 67. In his notice of Artaxerxes, "Huius anno regni VIII annotatur in cronicis Eusebii Cyri regis ascensus quem scribit Xenophon, sed nec librum umquam illum vidisse me memini, nec quis ascensus iste fuerit uspiam legi. Hieronymus dicit quod Xenophon vitam Cyri in VIII voluminibus descripsit." *Ibid.*, cap. 64. As to Plutarch Vincent knew that he wrote a letter to Trajan on the duties of a prince and a treatise on moderation among magistrates, "qui inscribitur archigrammatio." *Ibid.*, lib. xi, cap. 48.

was culled where it could be from Latin authors, chiefly those of the later Empire.<sup>1</sup> But simple as well as learned might know of Hercules and Jason and Atlas who bore the skies upon his shoulders. Those who could not read might hear the minstrel sing of them along with Tristan or Roland of Huon of Bordeaux.<sup>2</sup> As scientific a student as Roger Bacon accepted the myths and attempted to rationalize them by stripping away the supernatural elements.<sup>3</sup> They were a part of the common intellectual property of the age as they had been of the age before. Especially popular were the

<sup>1</sup> The authorities quoted by Vincent of Beauvais for his Greek narrative are Eusebius, Augustine, Orosius, Dares, Helinand (a lost work), Pliny, Cicero, Aulus Gellius, Symmachus, Boethius, Horace, Seneca, Justinus, Solinus, Jerome, Tertullian, Lactantius, Macrobius, Pseudo-Callisthenes, Marcian, Hermes Trismegistus.

<sup>2</sup> A list of Greek themes celebrated in medieval song is given in a French poetic romance of the thirteenth century, entitled *Flamenca*. An assembly of minstrels at a royal feast are singing in turn.

" Quar l'us comtet de Priamus,	L'us dis de Catmus quan fugi
E l'autre diz de Piramus;	Et de Tebas con las basti,
L'us contet de la bell' Elena	L'autre contava de Jason
Com Paris l'enquer, pois l'aumena;	E del dragon que non hac son.
L'autres comtava d'Ulises,	L'us comte d'Alcide sa forsa,
L'autre d'Ector et d'Achilles,	L'autre con tornet en sa forsa
L'autre comtava d'Eneas	Phillis per amor Demophon;
E de Dido consi remas	L'un dis com neguet en la fon
Per lui dolenta e mesquina; . . .	Lo belz Narcis quan s'i miret;
L'us contet d'Apollonices,	L'us dis de Pluto con emblet
De Tideu e d'Etidiocles;	Sa bella mollier ad Orpheu; . . .
L'autre comtava d'Apolloine	L'autre comtet con Dedalus
Consi retenc Tyr de Sidoine;	Sanp ben volar et d'Icarus
L'us comtet del rei Alexandri,	Co neguet per sa leujaria."
L'autre d'Ero et de Leandri;	Flamenca, lines 613-697, pp. 20-2

For a suggestive discussion of Greek influences in medieval, imaginative literature, see *Floire et Blanceflor*, p. cvii, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, pt. II, pp. 53 *et seq.* In Bacon's judgment the real Atlas was an enthusiastic astronomer, Prometheus a scientist and inventor, etc. In order to reconcile the stories of Apollo with probability, the god is divided into several different persons of the same name who lived at different eras. One Apollo was a dextrous musician, another a surgeon, etc.

cycles of tales which centered about the Trojan War. Poet-mongers and romancers took the ancient narratives, colored them through with medieval sentiment, read into them medieval ideas, and embellished them with fanciful additions.<sup>1</sup> The love story of Troilus and Cressida was perhaps the most successful product of medieval invention working on bare hints furnished by the Homeric episodes of Chryseis and Briseis. Ambitious nations, following the example of Rome herself, traced their descent from heroes who had figured in the great contest on the Scamandrian plain.<sup>2</sup> In the twelfth century Benedict of St. Maur told the tale of Troy in thirty thousand lines of French verse which a hundred years afterward Guido Colonna translated into Latin. In the fourteenth century Boccaccio repeated portions of it in Italian, Barbour and Henryson in Scotch, and Chaucer opened his poem of "Troilus and Criseyde" with the words,

"It is well wist how the Grekes stronge  
In armes with a thousand shippes wente  
To Troye-wardes, and the citee longe  
Assegeden neigh ten yeer er they stente,  
And in diverse wyse and oon entente,  
The ravishing to wreken of Eleyne  
By Paris doon they wroughten al hir peyne."<sup>3</sup>

Not, of course, that the Middle Ages read Homer or any Greek poet, even in direct translations. The best of their knowledge of the epic legends came from late Latin abridg-

<sup>1</sup> See Saintsbury, *Flourishing of Romance*, pp. 174-186, Joly, *Benoit de Sainte-More*, vol. i, passim.

<sup>2</sup> For genealogy of the Franks see Fredegarius, *Migne*, vol. 71, p. 577. Ekkehard of Aura, *Migne*, vol. 154, pp. 713-5. Vincent of Beauvais, *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii. cap. 66. For the British pedigree see Henry of Huntingdon, *Hist. Anglorum*, p. 13, Matthew Paris, *Chron. Mai.*, vol. i, pp. 16-22.

<sup>3</sup> *Troilus and Criseyde*, Bk. I, stanza 9. For another reference to the Trojan tale in one of the best known medieval poems see *Floire et Blanceflor* pp. 19-20.

ments of translations, the worst from actual forgeries or fabrications with no foundation in any Greek original.<sup>1</sup> Considerable scattered information was derived also from Vergil, Ovid, Statius and other Latin poets. The nearest approach to a true reproduction of the Iliad was a composition of ten hundred and seventy lines in Latin hexameter, sometimes mysteriously known as "Pindarus Thebanus," at other times as "Ilias Latina," or, most commonly of all, as simply "Homerus."<sup>2</sup> The initial letters of the first eight and last eight lines form the acrostic, "Italicus scripsit." The author is, therefore, now identified with a Silius Italicus of the age of Nero, who composed an epic on the Punic war. The first three hundred and forty-three lines are an abridgment of the three opening books of the Iliad. The remaining seven hundred and twenty-seven summarize the last twenty-one books, closing with eight lines of invocation to Phoebus, Pallas and Calliope. The narrative is consequently so compressed as to be in the main little more than an arid catalogue of events. Motives, connections, details of situation and character, the greater part of what gives life and meaning

<sup>1</sup> Vincent of Beauvais relates in all faith the story from Valerius Maximus to the effect that Homer died of mortification over his inability to solve a riddle propounded by some derisive Athenian fishermen. He adds: "Fuerunt autem qui Homerum synonymum Platoni fuisse putaverunt propter eloquentiam et pectoris latitudinem" (*Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii, cap. 87), a sort of medieval equivalent for the Bacon-Shakespeare theory.

<sup>2</sup> "Sequitur in ordine Statium Homerus,  
Qui nunc usitatus est, sed non ille verus;  
Nam ille Grecus extitit Greceque scribebat,  
Sequentemque Vergilium Eneidos habebat,  
Qui principalis extitit poeta Latinorum;  
Sic et Homerus claruit in studiis Grecorum.  
Hic itaque Vergilium precedere deberet,  
Si Latine quispiam hunc editum haberet.

Sed apud Grecos remanens  
nondum est translatus.  
Hinc minori locus est hic  
Homero datus,  
Quem Pindarus philosophus fertur transtulisse  
Latinisque doctoribus in  
metrum convertisse."

Hugo von Trimberg of the thirteenth century. Quoted by Comparetti, *Vergil in the Middle Ages*, p. 167, n. 2. Joly, vol. i, pp. 151-5. Becker, *Catalogi*, index.



to the ancient story, are perforce omitted. Only here and there at a sentimental passage the writer pauses and expands his treatment even beyond Homer's, dwelling upon the point with manifest zest and a profusion of cheap conventionalities.<sup>1</sup> The proportions of the original are, consequently, altogether lost. Occasionally appears an actual departure from the Greek narrative, as when, in agreement with the later versions, Achilles is made to drag the dead Hector three times around the Trojan walls and Priam's stealthy errand to ransom his son's body becomes a public mission performed before the eyes of all the Greek chieftains.<sup>2</sup> The medieval reader, however, could but take the poem as a true and adequate rendering of Homer himself. Petrarch was the first to declare that there must be more in the great classic than what this furnished.

As companion pieces to the *Ilias Latina* were two other works upon the Trojan theme, which professed to be records of eye witnesses present at the siege and in that respect superior to the conceits of a blind bard who by all accounts lived at least a century later and derived his information

<sup>1</sup> Take, for example, the account of the grief of Chryses over the loss of his daughter:

"Nam quondam Chryses, solemnī tempora vitta  
Implicitus, rapte flevit solatia nate,  
Invisosque dies invisaque tempora noctis  
Egit et assiduis implevit questibus auras . . .  
Contemptus repetit Phœbeia templa sacerdos  
Squalidaque infestis maerens secatur unguibus ora  
Dilaceratque comas annosae pectora plangit."

*Poet. Lat. Min.*, vol. iii, pp. 8-9, lines 13-16, 27-29.

<sup>2</sup> "Hunc animi nondum satiatus Achilles  
Deligat ad currum pedibusque exsanguia membra  
Ter circum muros victor trahit."

*Op. cit.*, p. 56, lines 997-9.

"Mirantur Danaum procures, miratur et ipse  
Æacides animum miseri senis."

*Ibid.*, p. 57, lines 1025-6.

through hearsay.<sup>1</sup> The medieval public was completely hoodwinked by these professions. Its confidence in the testimony of Dictys the Cretan and Dares the Phrygian was perfect, and the delusion was one of the last to be dispelled after the Middle Ages were over. The story of Dictys was manufactured probably during the fourth century and may have had some basis in a late Greek original.<sup>2</sup> According to the preface, Dictys of Crete, a friend of Idomeneus and Merion, accompanied those princes to Troy and at their bidding kept a register of the events of the war, inscribing it on tablets in the Phoenician letters to which he was accustomed. At his death he ordered the tablets to be buried with him. There they remained sealed up in his tomb until an earthquake in the reign of Nero uncovered them and wandering shepherds carried them to the Roman governor. At Nero's command they were translated first into Greek, and afterwards into Latin.<sup>3</sup>

The history introduced with such convincing credentials of authenticity comprised six books of fair length, written in crabbed and pedantic Latin prose, and recounted the whole story of the Trojan doom from the rape of Helen to the death of Ulysses by the hand of his son Telegonus. The incidents of the Iliad formed a part of the second and third books, the wanderings of Ulysses were described with those of other heroes in the sixth. Obviously, therefore, the greater portion of the material was gathered from other sources than Homer, some possibly from ancient cyclic poets whose works

<sup>1</sup> "An Homero credendum, qui post multos annos natus est, quam bellum hoc gestum fuisset: de qua re Athenis iudicium fuit cum pro insano Homerus haberetur quod deos cum hominibus belligerasse descripsit." Introductory epistle to Dares the Phrygian, *Dictys Cret.*, p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> On the other hand the Greek rendering may be the later. At all events Dictys was known in Greek at Byzantium through the Middle Ages. Teuffel-Schwabe, *Hist. of Roman Lit.*, vol. ii, pp. 375-8. Joly, vol. i, pp. 168-171.

<sup>3</sup> *Dictys Cretensis*, pp. 15-18.

have now disappeared. In spite of his grave faults Dictys is an abler and more interesting writer than "Pindar the Theban." He is concise but as a rule he provides more than enumerations of episodes and names. Yet he is quite as devoid of artistic sense and modifies the Homeric narrative even more freely. Taking as a test his treatment of a scene to which we have already referred in speaking of the *Ilias Latina*, the visit of Priam to Achilles, one is impressed by the more glaring failure of Dictys to apprehend the force and dramatic quality of the simple Greek description.<sup>1</sup> To his mind the thing is not made enough of. More harrowing touches and a little love interest are needed. A family procession takes the place of the solitary figure of the broken old king. A crowd of Greek leaders look on and offer advice. The conversation is prolonged into an elaborate argument over the original causes of the war.<sup>2</sup> The medieval student might get from Dictys some idea of the outlines of the Greek legend but nothing of its spirit.

<sup>1</sup> Joly, (vol. i, pp. 164-6), criticises more fully Dicty's version of this same scene.

<sup>2</sup> I quote part of the narrative: "At lucis principio, Priamus lugubri veste miserabile tectus, cui dolor non decus regium, non ullam tanti nominis atque fame speciem reliquam fecerat, manibus vultuque supplicibus ad Achillem venit: quocum Andromacha, non minor quam in Priamo miseratio: ea quippe deformata multiplici modo, Astyanacta, quem nonnulli Scamandrum appellabant, et Laodamanta, parvulos admodum filios, pre se habens, regi adiumentum deprecandi aderat, qui moeroribus senisque decrepitis filie Polyxene humeris innitebatur: sequebantur vehicula plena auri atque argenti precioseque vestis, cum super murum despectantes Troiani comitatum regis oculis prosequerentur: quo viso repente silentium ex admiratione oritur. Ac mox reges avidi noscere causas adventus eius procedunt obvium. Priamus ubi ad se tendi videt protinus in os ruit, pulverem atque alia humi purgamenta capiti aspergens: dein orat uti miserati fortunas suas, precatores secum ad Achillem veniant. Eius etatem fortunamque recordatus Nestor dolet: contra Ulysses maledictis insequi et commemorare que ad Troiam in consilio ante sumtum bellum ipse adversum legatos dixerat. Ea postquam Achilli nuntiata sunt, per Automedontem adversum iri iubet, ipse retinens gremio urnam cum Patrocli ossibus." *Dict. Cret.*, pp. 204-5.

The history of Dares the Phrygian was written, probably, during a later century to offset Dictys.<sup>1</sup> The guarantee prefixed to it was nothing less than a letter from Cornelius Nepos to his friend Sallust describing the discovery of the manuscript of Dares at Athens and his own translation of it into Latin.<sup>2</sup> The work itself contained the express statement that the author had been at Troy until its downfall, had taken part in some of the battles and had talked with the Greeks.<sup>3</sup> Other valuable proofs of genuineness were not wanting, such as personal descriptions of prominent characters on both sides, exact statistics as to numbers killed in battle, data as to the precise duration of the siege in years, months and days.<sup>4</sup> The story of a Trojan partisan, it gave of course the Trojan point of view, as "Homerus" and Dictys gave the Grecian. On this ground it appealed particularly to the fancy of the Western nations who claimed descent from Trojan refugees. It possessed, moreover, the virtue of thoroughness, so gratifying to the medieval mind. It went back for its beginning to the Argonautic expedition, and traced from that point down the growth of hostility

<sup>1</sup> Teuffel-Schwabe, vol. ii, pp. 493-4; Saintsbury, pp. 167-177; Taylor, *Classical Heritage*, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> "Cum multa Athenis studiosissime agerem, inveni historiam Daretis Phrygii ipsius manu scriptam, ut titulus indicat, quam de Grecis et Troianis memorie mandavit, quam ego summo amore complexus continuo transtuli." *Dict. Cret.*, p. 293. This letter was accepted as implicitly as the history. See Vincent of Beauvais, *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii, cap. 62.

<sup>3</sup> "Dares Phrygius qui hanc historiam scripsit ait se militasse usque dum Troia capta est: hos se vidisse cum inducie essent, partim prelio interfuisse. A Dardanibus audisse qua facie et natura fuissent Castor et Pollux," etc. *Dict. Cret.*, p. 308.

<sup>4</sup> "Helenam similem illis, formosam, animi simplicis, blandam, cruribus optimis, notam inter duo supercilia habentem, ore pusillo. Priamum regem Troianorum vultu pulchro, magnum, voce suavi, aquilino corpore . . . Achillem pectorosum, ore venusto, membris valentibus et magnis, bene crispatum, clementem, in armis acerrimum, vultu hilari, dapsilem, capillo myrteo." *Dict. Cret.*, pp. 308-310.

between Greeks and Asiatics. It justified the rape of Helen as a retaliation for the earlier theft of the Trojan princess Hesione. Having these characteristics in its favor it was more popular than Dictys, though as a literary performance it was considerably more insignificant and degenerate.<sup>1</sup> It was less than a quarter as long, notwithstanding the greater length of time which it strove to cover. In a breathless kind of haste it pressed on through a succession of short, abrupt, monotonous sentences.<sup>2</sup> It altered or rearranged the facts of the classic story so unscrupulously that one concludes that the author was writing from hazy memories without exerting himself to consult his books. Not only were tawdry additions made and a pseudo-romantic coloring given to the whole, but the order and motives of fundamental incidents were changed. The momentous wrath of Achilles occurred a year after Hector's death, and was occasioned by his failure to obtain Polyxena. Eneas and Anchises were traitors, and opened to the Greeks at last the Scaean gate which was marked by the painted head of a horse. The process of garbling and distortion could scarcely be carried further.<sup>3</sup>

Another composition stood to the Middle Ages for the tragedy literature of Eschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. It bore the title "Orestis Tragoedia," and was ordinarily as-

<sup>1</sup> In Becker's list of catalogues of medieval libraries twenty-one manuscripts of Homer are mentioned, twenty-two of Dares and three of Dictys. Each copy of Dictys was bound with either Homer or Dares. See Becker, index, *Cf. Comparetti*, pp. 244-5.

<sup>2</sup> The death and burial of Hector are thus disposed of. "Hector Achillis femur sauciat. Ille dolore accepto magis eum persequi coepit nec destitit nisi occideret . . . Nox prelium dirimit. Achilles de bello saucius redit. Noctu Troiani Hectorem lamentantur. Postera die Troilus Troianos educit contra Grecorum exercitum . . . Priamus Hectorem suo more ante portam sepelivit, cui ludos funebres facit." *Dict. Cret.*, p. 322.

<sup>3</sup> Still another less known version of the tale of Troy was called *Perioikæ* or *Periochæ*, and was attributed to Ausonius. Petrarch possessed a copy. Nollac, *Pétrarque*, pp. 171, 321.

cribed to either Horace or Lucan.<sup>1</sup> It was, however, a purely narrative poem in plain hexameter verse of less than one thousand lines.<sup>2</sup> It covered the whole subject of the Orestean trilogy, the return of Agamemnon, his murder by the hand of Clytemnestra and Egisthus, the vengeance of Orestes, his persecution by the Furies and his final deliverance through the judgment of the high court of Athens. The style was energetic, even forcible in passages. There was, on the other hand, no appreciation of character, nothing in fact but a rude, blunt account of the brutal incidents of the old saga.<sup>3</sup> Like the Trojan histories it was worthless in

<sup>1</sup> It is now supposed by some scholars to be the work of the African poet Dracontius, who lived in the latter part of the fifth century and wrote other pieces on Biblical and classical subjects. Teuffel-Schwabe, vol. ii, p. 506.

<sup>2</sup> Yet the author apparently had some idea of the meaning of the term "tragedy," for he says in lines 13 and 14:

"Te rogo, Melpomene, tragicis descende cothurnis  
Et pede dactylico resonante quiescat iambus."

*Poet. Lat. Min.*, vol. v, p. 220.

But medieval writers often found difficulty in deciding upon the exact meaning of the terms tragedy and comedy. A sentence in Donatus gave rise to many conjectures and misunderstandings. "Sunt . . . alia sono masculina, intellectu feminina, ut Eunuchus comœdia, Orestes tragoedia." *Ars Gram.*, p. 375. A gloss of the tenth century thus interpreted the passage: "Intellectu feminina, quia cum dico Eunuchus, intelligo artem comedie, hoc est carmen aptum comesationi. Adeo autem usus est hanc artem Eunuchus ut proprio nomine illius illo tempore intelligeretur sua ars. Similiter Orestes cum dico, intelligo artem tragedie pro sedula usitatione illius." Thurot, pp. 67-8. For knowledge of Aristotle's Poetics, see *infra*, p. 74, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> As an example of the rugged qualities of the style at its best I quote lines 700-717, describing the appearance of Orestes and Pylades before the guilty pair:

"Securi stipuere rei, terretur Egistus;  
'Non ego promisi Danaïs per secla quietem?  
Nullus ad Argolicos moveat qui bella remansit  
Hectore consumto, Troia pereunte sub armis.'  
Dicebat regina furens irata ministris:  
'Vindico, sic vivam mecumque senescat Egistus.'  
Talia dum loquitur quasi vindex seva minata,  
Una puellarum male concita currit anhelans;

comparison with the originals which it represented. Yet like them it served to keep the West from forgetting entirely the nomenclature of the world of Greek imagination.<sup>1</sup>

As widely known as the legends of Troy and Mycenae, and as confidently accepted as reliable history, was the marvelous tale of the exploits of Alexander, commonly attributed to his comrade, Callisthenes.<sup>2</sup> In reality it was probably a compendium, drawn up at least as early as the second century after Christ, of the Oriental myths then current regarding the meteoric career of the youthful Macedonian. Stories of portents and miracles which in their conception had nothing to do with Alexander were later inserted to increase the wonder of the total effect. Magic and witchcraft, the water of life and the earthly paradise, golden temples and jeweled palaces, trees and birds that spoke, peoples of uncouth shapes and weird customs, criminal intrigues and ruthless warfare, all this extraordinary web of invention was

'Venit Orestes,' ait, sed statim credita non est.  
Dum dubitant somnumque putant et vana locutam,  
Apparet violentus atrox Pylades in aula,  
Qualis in hoste fuit trux irrevocabilis Aïax,  
Hectora dum peteret clipeo septemplice tectus:  
Ore fremens et fronte minax mucrone coruscus  
Intonat auctores scelerum; 'Crudelibus ausis  
Regnantis nunc usque truces evadere iustas  
Sperastis vos posse manus ? modo seva luetis  
Supplicia scelerum non una morte pereunti !'

*Poet. Lat. Min.*, vol. v, pp. 250-1.

<sup>1</sup> A piece of dramatic composition which preserved some traditions of the later Attic stage was the anonymous comedy of manners, *Querolus*. It was modeled, however, more directly upon Plautus than upon any Greek writer, as the author himself implies. See *Querolus*, ed. Havet, p. 187, line 7. It had but a limited circulation.

<sup>2</sup> The narrative of Pseudo-Callisthenes is incorporated almost bodily into the Chronicle of Ekkehard of Aura (*Migne*, vol. 154, pp. 563-602), and into the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais (lib. v). It is abridged in many other histories.

interspersed liberally with philosophic maxims of Eastern sages and religious precepts of the Hebrews. The appeal of the whole to medieval credulity and love of the fantastic, as well as to medieval weakness for moralizing, was irresistible. No single man, with the possible exception of Charlemagne, was so much written about or played so brilliantly the part of a hero to the Middle Ages as did this pagan Greek who died of a drunken carouse a thousand years before the Middle Ages began.<sup>1</sup> Many a great man has been misconstrued by later generations, but few certainly have ever received so amazing a glorification, so vast a fame for words and deeds so absolutely opposed in spirit to all that they actually did and said in life.

A second department of Greek thought of which the Middle Ages knew partly through report, partly through more or less imperfect paraphrases and translations, was its philosophy. Here again curious isolated fragments were transmitted and given a disproportionate weight of influence while most of that which went before or after was totally

<sup>1</sup> See Pseudo-Callisthenes, included in Arriani *Anabasis*, ed. Didot. The number and variety of modern reprints of medieval versions of the Alexander legend suggest the extent of its popularity. Syriac and Ethiopic versions are given in the two volumes edited by Budge, *Alexander the Great*, 1889, and *Life and Exploits of Alexander*, 1896. For a thirteenth century Persian account see *Sikandar Nama e barā*, tr. Clarke, London, 1881; for an Italian rendering, *Collezione di Opere Inedite o Rare dei primi tre secoli della lingua*, vol. 32; Spanish, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. 57, pp. 147-224; Dutch, *Bibliotheek van Middelnederlandsche Letterkunde*, No. 2; French, Stuttgart, *Literarischer Verein Bibliothek*, vol. 13; German, *op. cit.*, vols. 154 and 183. Several English fragments are in *Early English Text Society Publications*, extra series, vols. 1, 31 and 47. See also Sir Gilbert Hay's *Buik of King Alexander the Conquerour*, ed. Herrmann, Berlin, 1898. A Scotch version is contained in *Bannatyne Club Publications*, vol. 47. For general discussions of the role of the Alexander story see among others, Meyer, *Alexandre le Grand dans la Littérature Française du Moyen Age*; Noldeke, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alexander Romans*, Wien, *Akad. Philos.-Hist. Classe*, vol. 38; Saintsbury, *Flourishing of Romance*, ch. iv, Morley, *English Writers*, vol. iii, pp. 286-303.



lost.<sup>1</sup> The names of the seven sages were frequently quoted and certain vague allusions connected Thales with theories regarding a fluid origin of the universe, and Pythagoras with a system of mathematics or of music.<sup>2</sup> Socrates' name lingered as that of the teacher of Plato and Aristotle and the victim of a mysterious death by poison.<sup>3</sup> Plato himself was revered, but in the main blindly in deference to the respect expressed for his doctrines by Cicero, Augustine and other Latins. His influence on the growth of the early Christian dogma of the λόγος, or on the metaphysical concepts of Dionysius the Areopagite, Augustine and Boethius was not appreciated, but he was understood to have been more spiritual or Christian in his tendencies than any other

<sup>1</sup>A summary of the greater part of what was known or believed about the Greek philosophers was given in the Polycraticus of John of Salisbury. *Migne*, vol. 199, pp. 642-649. Vincent of Beauvais was more garrulous in the retailing of dubious anecdotes. *Spec. Hist. passim*. In this connection mention may be made of a thirteenth century Latin translation of the Hypotyposes of Sextus Empiricus, a sceptic philosopher who lived in the third century. The manuscript was discovered and described by Jourdain, *Excursions*, pp. 206 *et seq.* No traces of its influence have been observed.

<sup>2</sup>"Si ergo sapientiam cuiusque Plato commendat aut Socrates, Aristoteles acumen ingenii, Cicero dicendi copiam, mathematice studium Pythagoras . . . quidni credat?" John of Salis. *Poly.*, lib. iii, cap. 5, *Migne*, vol. 199, p. 484, Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iii, cap. 119, and lib. iv, cap. 23-6.

<sup>3</sup>I quote a few extracts from the most careful students of things Greek. "Et primus quidem Socrates universam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque mores flexisse memoratur, cum ante illum omnes physicis, id est rebus naturalibus perscrutandis maximam operam dederint." John of Salisbury, *Poly.*, lib. vii, cap. 5, p. 664. Otto of Freising referring to Plato remarks, "qui prefati Aristotelis non solum apud Socratem condiscipulus, sed et post mortem Socratis preceptor fuit." *Chron.* p. 69. He imagines that Socrates' death may have been a suicide due to despondency or troublous times. *Ibid.* p. 80. Vincent of Beauvais knows that Socrates was condemned to die but suggests that he drank poison without waiting for an executioner, "aut amore popularis glorie aut timore maioris pene." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 66. Later in the paragraph he quotes as from Lactantius, "Socrates se nihil scire dixit, nisi hoc ipsum quod nihil sciret: huic achademie disciplina insonavit, si tamen disciplina dici potest in qua ignorantia et dicitur et docetur."

pagan Greek and for that reason was sometimes said to have studied under Jeremiah, in Egypt.<sup>1</sup> The fact of his disagreement with Aristotle on the nature of universals was undoubtedly the item most generally known concerning him, and the knowledge added zest to the long scholastic controversy of the Middle Ages. Indeed men who opposed Aristotle for any cause whatever were apt to proclaim an allegiance to Plato none the less ardent for resting upon a basis of partisan and unreasoning faith rather than of understanding.

<sup>1</sup> The story of Plato's intercourse with Jeremiah can be traced back to Augustine, who attributes it to Ambrose (*Retractionum*, lib. ii, cap. 30, p. 136), but who in another passage remarks, "diligenter subputata temporum ratio quae chronica historia continetur Platonem indicat a tempore quo prophetavit Hieremias centum ferme annos postea natum fuisse." (*De Civit. Dei.*, lib. viii, cap. 11, pp. 371-2). The question of Plato's relation to Judaism was not, however, considered settled.—"Quorum alter (Plato) de potentia, sapientia, bonitate creatoris ac genitura mundi creationeque hominis tam luculenter, tam sapienter, tam vicine veritati disputat, ut ob hoc a quibusdam ex nostris Hieremiam in Egypto audivisse et ab eo de fide nostra imbutus fuisse credatur . . . Omnia enim que de divina natura humana ratione investigari possunt invenerunt, exceptis his in quibus summa salus consistit, que per gratiam Iesu Christi a mansuetis corde cognoscuntur. Unde Augustinus: 'In principio erat verbum,' et omnia que in profundissimo sermone evangelista prosequitur usque ad illum locum ubi de mysteriis incarnationis agere incipit, in Platone se invenisse dicit." Otto of Freising, *Chron.*, pp. 68-70. Otto himself does not believe in the Egyptian story, because, as he also explains, Plato lived too long after the prophet. Vincent of Beauvais is of the same opinion on that point, but argues that Plato might well have known the Hebrew Scriptures through an interpreter. In support of this idea he cites several passages in the *Timaeus*; "et maxime illud quod et me plurimum adducit ut plene assentiar Platonem illorum librorum expertem non fuisse, quod Plato illa verba Domini ad Moysen, 'Ego sum qui sum,' vehementer tenuit et diligentissime commendavit." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 75. Cf. Bacon. *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, p. 72. Philip de Harveng has yet another theory regarding the Egyptian journey. "Audierat (Plato) forte quod Moyses, qui in Egypto natus fuerat et nutritus, omni sapientia Egyptiorum, sicut divina refert pagina, fuerat eruditus; et super hac sapientia idem Plato non mediocriter curiosus ad investigandum eam factus est." *Epistolae*, iv, *Migne*, vol. 203, p. 32. Theodoric of Chartres in the twelfth century wrote "De Sex Dierum Operibus" in an effort to reconcile the Biblical account of the creation with the theories of the *Timaeus*. Sandys, p. 513.

The only work of Plato which had anything approaching a wide circulation was the *Timæus* in the translation of Chalcidius. The dialogue had furnished much material for mystical exposition in the time of the Neo-Platonists and was taken up again by scholars after the beginning of the twelfth century.<sup>1</sup> About 1160 Evericus Aristippus, a Sicilian arch-deacon, prepared Latin versions of the *Phædo* and *Meno*, a few copies of which slowly found their way to the libraries of great convents or universities but in that seclusion lay practically undiscovered.<sup>2</sup> Plato continued to be a person about whom inquisitive minds were intensely but vainly curious.<sup>3</sup> His works were among the earliest to be translated by the Hellenists of the fifteenth century.

<sup>1</sup> "Timeus plato" is mentioned in a catalogue of a library of the tenth or eleventh century. Becker, p. 131. But Abelard did not know it. "Platonis opera non cognovit latinitas nostra." Cousin, *Ouvrages Indits*, p. xlv. Willam of Conches, a pupil of Bernard of Chartres, wrote a commentary on the *Timæus* before 1150. Theodoric of Chartres, mentioned in the note just preceding, was a contemporary. Bernard Silvester of Tours, in the same century, wrote two philosophical treatises founded on the *Timæus*. Otto of Freising was familiar with it. *Chronicon*, p. 365. Extracts from a twelfth-century commentary ascribed to Honoré of Autun are given in Cousin, *op. cit.*, appendix, pp. 648-656. On the influence of Plato upon twelfth-century thought, see Poole, *Illustrations of Med. Thought*, pp. 124 *et seq.*, 167 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Rashdall, vol. ii, p. 744. Paris catalogues of 1250 and 1290 mention versions of the *Phædo*. An Oxford Ms. of 1423 contains the translation of the *Phædo* and *Meno*. Vincent of Beauvais, speaking of the doctrines of Pythagoras, says: "et multa alia que Plato in libris suis et maxime in *Fedrone* Thimeoque prosequitur." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 25. But neither Dante nor Petrarch were acquainted with more than the *Timæus*. In 1393 Salutato, Chancellor of Florence and learned student of the classics, wrote to Andrea Giusti of Volterra: "Ceterum audio quod in bibliotheca Predicatorum est liber Platonis qui inscribitur *Phedon*. Rogo perquiras et magnitudinem libri declares, ut si possibile fuerit, faciam exemplari." Salutato, *Epist.*, vol. ii, pp. 444 and 449. Nothing is now known of the library where the book was said to be, nor of the copy which Salutato tried to procure.

<sup>3</sup> Vincent of Beauvais gives a list of Plato's works, which he says were called by the names of Plato's teachers. "Hinc sunt libri eius appellati *Thimeus*, *Phedron*, *Gorgias*, *Pitagoras*, quorum primum et ultimum transtulit Cicero in *Phedronis*

The history of the role of Aristotle in the Middle Ages is far more complicated and can be given only in brief summary here. The man who made him known to the earlier centuries was Boethius, the scholar of the court of Theodoric. A great part of his work he based upon Aristotle, translating directly from the Greek an introduction to the peripatetic philosophy, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, also the two first divisions of the *Organon*, *De Interpretatione* and *Categoriae*, and composing treatises of his own upon the other four sections of the *Organon*, *De Syllogismis Categoricalis*, *De Syllogismis Hypotheticis*, *De Differentiis Topicis* and *De Divisionibus*.<sup>1</sup> The most popular of all his writings, the *Consolation of Philosophy*, in spirit undeniably Platonic, was Aristotelian in form and style. At the very outset therefore, the Middle Ages inherited more material for a study of Aristotle than for one of Plato. Moreover the subject of which this Aristotle treated in his masterful fashion was logic, toward which for various reasons the medieval thinker was especially attracted. Alcuin, Erigena and other scholars of the Carolingian age studied the writings of Boethius, though they admitted no extraordinary authority in the

*dialogo.*" *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 77. Among Plato's direct disciples he includes Apuleius, Plotinus and the mythical Hermes Trismegistus. *Op. cit.*, lib. v, cap. 6 and 8. Certain writings attributed to Trismegistus, curious compounds of fable mysticism and popular philosophy, had been translated from the Greek by Apuleius, and were known to a few. Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. ii, p. 652, and iii, pp. 333-4.

<sup>1</sup>Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. xxiv-xxvi; Rashdall, vol. i, p. 37, vol. ii, p. 744; Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 52-58. These translations of Boethius comprised what was later known as the Old Logic, in distinction from the versions of the other parts of the *Organon*, which were entitled the New Logic. They were couched in better Latin than the medieval renderings. For the opinion of one of the ablest of the early humanists, see Bruni, *Epist.*, vol. i, p. 139: "Nullam enim Boetii interpretationem habemus preterquam Porphyrii et Predicamentorum et Perihermenias librorum, quos si accurate leges, videbis summum illum virum sine ullis ineptiis libros illos transtulisse. Textus est nitidus et planus et Greco respondens."

voice that spoke through them. Abelard surrendered himself with more abandon to the guidance of the Greek sage.<sup>1</sup> He advocated what he conceived to be the Aristotelian theory of ideas, in opposition to both the Realist and the Nominalist tenets then in vogue. He composed commentaries or glosses upon the books of Aristotle which he had read, and upon the Aristotelian treatises of Boethius. He exerted the power of his influence in the schools to increase the prestige of Aristotle's name and to mark him out as the chief of the philosophers of the past.<sup>2</sup>

Before the death of Abelard translations of the other portions of the Organon were being carried into Northern Europe from the South. James, the Venetian clerk already mentioned, is usually credited with their authorship.<sup>3</sup> Whatever their source they were eagerly received in learned circles and rapidly disseminated. Men like John of Salisbury, but a few years younger than Abelard, analyzed and commented upon them and to some extent introduced them into the schools.<sup>4</sup> Within a few more years aid from an unexpected quarter made the philosophic and scientific works of the

<sup>1</sup> For the extent of Abelard's knowledge of Aristotle, see Rashdall, vol. i, p. 37; Cousin, *Ouvrages Inédits*, pp. li-liv. Cousin quotes an explicit statement from a Ms. "Aristotelis enim duos tantum, Predicamentorum scilicet et Peri Ermenias, libros usus adhuc Latinorum cognovit."

<sup>2</sup> John of Salisbury about this time begins the protest against over-subservience to Aristotle. "Nec tamen Aristotelem ubique plane aut sensisse aut dixisse protestor, ut sacrosanctum sit, quidquid scripsit." *Metalogicus*, lib. iv, cap. 27. *Migne*, vol. 199, p. 932. He himself, however, says: "sed cum singuli suis meritis splendeant, omnes se Aristotelis adorare vestigia gloriantur, adeo quidem ut commune omnium philosophorum nomen preeminentia quadam sibi proprium fecerit. Nam et antonomatice, id est excellenter, philosophus appellatur." *Op. cit.*, lib. ii, cap. 16. *Migne*, p. 873.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, p. 12. Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 21-42. Rashdall, vol. i, p. 61.

<sup>4</sup> The *Metalogicus* of John of Salisbury, lib. iii and iv, (*Migne*, vol. 199, pp. 892-930.) contains analyses of the contents of the Categories, De Interpretatione, Topics, First and Second Analytics, and Elenchi Sophistici. Otto of Freising names all these in his list of the works of Aristotle. *Chronicon*. p. 68.

master also accessible to the Latin world.<sup>1</sup> For over four centuries the Arabs who ruled in Bagdad over Western Asia and Northern Africa had possessed their own versions of Aristotle, Hippocrates and certain other Greek scientists, versions in some cases taken directly from the Greek, in others from Syriac translations constructed in earlier times by the Nestorians.<sup>2</sup> A knowledge of this Arabic-Greek lore had been transported by the Moslem conquerors to Spain, where small centres of study were gradually formed among the heterogeneous population of the peninsular. Arabic doctors expounded the theories of the Greek philosopher and worked out vast systems of Aristotelianism modified more or less by the precepts of Islam. Alfarabius, Avicenna, Averroes and the Jewish teacher, Moses Maimonides, were especially renowned for the profundity of their erudition and the skill of their interpretations. Toward the close of the twelfth century students from the North, drawn by rumors of wisdom to be gained from sources hitherto unsuspected, began to make their way to Toledo and Salamanca to learn what more they could of Aristotle in this new guise. Shortly after the year 1200 Latin translations from the Arabic of various long forgotten books began to appear in Paris, the *Physics*, *De Caelo et Mundo*, *De Historia Animalium*, followed by the *Ethics*, *Metaphysics* and some smaller works. Michael the Scot, Herman the German and Gerard of Cremona, wandering clerks of diverse nationalities, won particular reputation by their versions of Aristotle and of the paraphrases and commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes.<sup>3</sup> The actual process of translation was

<sup>1</sup> A small collection of axioms ascribed to Bede had given some hint as to the character of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Rashdall, vol. i, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> For a fuller account of the Arab schools and the communication of their learning to Northern Europe see Rashdall, vol. i, pp. 351, *et seq.* Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, pt. I and pt. II, chs. I and II.

<sup>3</sup> On these three men see Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 120-147. Bacon gives us

commonly carried on by the collaboration of a Christian from the North with a Saracen or converted Jew of the South, the latter turning the Arabic text into Spanish or some other vernacular dialect intelligible to both, the former putting the vernacular into Latin.<sup>1</sup> Often neither one comprehended the subject under discussion or the technical value of the terms employed. At times the Arabic manuscript proved corrupt or enigmatical or a Latin equivalent could not be recalled. Occasionally in sheer desperation an Arabic word or two was incorporated directly into the Latin page. Thus the sense of the final product was frequently obscure, here and there buried entirely under a hopeless tangle of words. Proper names in particular were apt to take on unrecognizable forms, the Greek names having been altered first to

the fullest contemporary criticism of their work. "Unde cum per Gerardum Cremonensem et Michaelum Scotum et Aluredum Anglicum et Heremannum Alemannum et Wilhelmum Flemingum data sit nobis copia translationum de omni scientia accidit tanta falsitas in eorum operibus quod nullus sufficit admirari. . . . Omnes enim fuerunt temporibus nostris, ita quod aliqui iuvenes adhuc fuerunt contemporanei Gerardo Cremonensi, qui fuit antiquior inter illos. Heremannus quidem Alemannus adhuc vivit episcopus, cui fui valde familiaris. Qui mihi sciscitanti eum de libris logice quibusdam, quos habuit transferendos in Arabico, dixit ore rotundo quod nescivit logicam et ideo non ausus fuit transferre. Et certe si logicam nescivit, non potuit alias scire scientias, sicut decet. Nec Arabicum bene scivit, ut confessus est, quia magis fuit adiutor translationum quam translator; quia Sarascenos tenuit secum in Hispania qui fuerunt in suis translationibus principales. Similiter Michael Scotus ascripsit sibi translationes multas. Sed certum est quod Andreas quidam Iudeus plus laboravit in his. Unde Michaelus, sicut Heremannus, retulit, nec scivit scientias neque linguas. Et sic de aliis." *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 471-2.

<sup>1</sup> See note above. Cf. extract from the dedication of a Latin version of Avicenna, *De Anima*, addressed to the Archbishop of Toledo by "Ioannes Avendehut Israëlitica philosophus." "Hunc igitur librum vobis precipientibus et me singula verba vulgariter proferente et Dominico Archidiacono singula in Latinum converte, ex Arabico translatus in quo quidquid Aristoteles dixit libro suo de anima et de sensu et sensato et de intellectu et intellectu ab autore libri scias esse collectum." Jourdain, *Recherches*, pp. 449-456. See also incident of the finding of a Spanish word in a Latin translation by Herman the German, Bacon, *Comp. Stud.*, pp. 467-8. *Op. Tert.*, p. 91, *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, p. 82.

suit Syriac or Arabic rules of nomenclature or to meet the limitations of the Arabic alphabet.<sup>1</sup> Identities were therefore readily confounded or lost sight of altogether. As a whole the Arab-Latin translations were unsatisfactory even to the unexacting scholar of the day. They obtained only until they could be gradually supplanted by others taken straight from the Greek.<sup>2</sup>

It was not long before such translations began to appear. We have already in another connection made mention of the version of the Nicomachean Ethics composed under the direction of Robert Grosseteste of England.<sup>3</sup> From South Italy Frederick II sent copies of renderings made by Sicilian clerks at his munificent court.<sup>4</sup> Scholars in various places stimulated by the increasing demand of the universities and the increased facilities for intercourse with Greek-speaking people set about the work with varying success.<sup>5</sup> The general superiority of these productions over the Arab-Latin versions was soon acknowledged. Albertus Magnus, comparing a reading in a Greek-Latin translation of the De

<sup>1</sup> Hipparchus in these versions was usually called Abraxis. Albertus Magnus, who relied upon an Arab-Latin rendering of the De Cælo et Mundo, speaks of Thales of Miletus as "Belus natus de Ephesio, que civitas Arabice vocatur Humor." Xenophanes of Colophon is disguised as Malvoconensis. Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Jourdain's *Recherches*, appendix, contains a number of illustrative extracts from manuscripts of these versions. So far as I know none were ever printed in full. Herman the German, in the preface to his translation of the Rhetoric, says plainly, "Nec miretur quisquam vel indignetur de difficultate vel ruditate translationis, nam multo difficilior et rudior ex Greco in Arabicum est translata. Ita quod Alfarabius qui plurimum conatus est ex Rhetorica aliquid intellectum glosando elicere, multa exempla Greca propter ipsorum obscuritatem pertransiens derelinquit . . . Sane tamen eis (the faultfinders) consulo ut malint hos codices habere sic translatos quam habere derelictos." *Recherches*, p. 139.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> See *supra*, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> "In diebus illis legebantur Parisiis libelli quidam ab Aristotele, ut dicebantur, compositi, qui docebant metaphysicam, delati de novo a Constantinopoli et a Greco in Latinum translati." William the Breton, *De Gestis Philippi Aug.*, 1209. *Recueil des Hist.*, vol. xvii, p. 84.



Anima with the same passage in an Arab-Latin, remarks that he believes the former to be erroneous, but that he has found Greek-Latin versions as a rule so much more reliable that he will abide by this even here.<sup>1</sup> Thomas Aquinas before his death in 1274 owned one or more Greek-Latin versions of almost all of the works of Aristotle.<sup>2</sup> Those which he sanctioned were thenceforth considered final and authoritative until the men of the fifteenth century set about to improve them.<sup>3</sup> In style they were slavishly literal, bald and unidiom-

<sup>1</sup> "Quod autem hec vera sint que dicta sunt testatur Aristotelis translatio Arabica que sic dicit . . . Greca autem translatio discordat ab hac et, ut puto, est mendosa. Habet enim sic. . . . Sed quia in multis invenimus Grecas emendatiores quam Arabicas translationes, ideo et hoc sustinentes dicimus." *De Anima*, lib. i, tract. i, cap. 4, *Opp.*, vol. v, p. 124.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*, pp. 15-17.

<sup>3</sup> A few rare instances are found of translations made during the century and a quarter after St. Thomas, e. g., a version of the Economics by Durand of Auvergne, with the assistance of an archbishop and a bishop from Greece, finished in the first year of Boniface VIII. Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 72. Roger Bacon has caustic comments to make on all the translations of his day. "Certus igitur sum quod melius esset Latinis quod sapientia Aristotelis non esset translata, quam tali obscuritate et perversitate tradita, sicut eis qui ponuntur ibi triginta vel quadraginta annos; et quanto plus laborant, tanto minus sciunt, sicut ego probavi in omnibus qui libris Aristotelis adhererunt." *Comp. Stud.*, p. 469. Cf. *Op. Tert.* p. 33. But on Bacon's attitude see Mandonnet, p. liv, u. 3. For an instance of mistranslation see *Op. Tert.*, p. 75 et seq. One meets little other criticism on Aquinas' versions until one comes to Petrarch. "Equidem fateor me stylo viri illius (Aristotle) qualis est nobis, non admodum delectari, quamvis eum in sermone proprio et ducem et copiosum et ornatum fuisse Grecis testibus et Tullio auctore didicerim, antequam ignorantie sententia condemnarer. Sed interpretum ruditate vel invidia ad nos durus scaberque pervenit, ut nec ad plenum mulcere aures possit nec herere memorie quo fit ut interdum Aristotelis mentem non illius sed suis verbis exprimere et audienti gratius et promptius sit loquenti." *De Ignorantia Sui*, *Opp.*, p. 1051. One of the fifteenth-century humanists thus expresses his opinion: "At enim in Ethicis et Physicis quid tandem est preter ineptias meras? Non verba in his Latina, non dicendi figura, non eruditio litterarum; preterea ab ipso Greca male accepta complura. Hec a Boetio longe absunt, viro in utraque lingua docto et eleganti. Nunquam ille architectonicam, nunquam eutrapeliam, nunquam bomolchos, nunquam agricolas, quorum vocabula in Latino habemus, Grece reliquisset. Nunquam tristitiam pro dolore posuisset, nunquam honestum cum bono, eligere cum expetere confudisset. . . Equidem si in pictura

atic, occasionally misleading or actually unintelligible.<sup>1</sup> But if a word from the original must now and then be incorporated into the translation it was better Greek than Arabic. Proper names, at least, regained their rightful aspect. Numerous mistakes in rendering were corrected. Unreadable as these versions seemed to later generations they were removed by fewer degrees from Aristotle than their Arab-Latin or Arab-Syriac predecessors.<sup>2</sup> They represented as we have said,

Jotti (Giotto) quis facem proiiceret, pati non possem. Quid ergo existimas mihi accidere cum Aristotelis libros omni pictura preciosiores tanta traductionis fece coinquinari videam? an non commoveri? an non turbari?" Bruni, *Epist.*, vol. i, pp. 139-140.

<sup>1</sup> Their literalness in some cases made them useful later as aids in correcting defective Greek texts. Cf. the following note on a Florentine Ms. of the Politics, Rhetoric and Ethics, written by Franciscus Victorius, nephew of Petrus Victorius, a fifteenth century collator of Greek and Latin Mss. "Hic est liber ille veteris translationis nonnullorum librorum Aristotelis, cuius sepe mentionem fecit Petrus Victorius; precique autem in epistola ad studiosos artis dicendi in commentarios suos in tres libros Aristotelis de arte dicendi affirmat huius auxilio se usum fuisse in corrigendis libris illis temporum ac librariorum incuria deformatis. Cum enim hec translatio multis antea seculis confecta fuerit, quo tempore libri Aristotelis integriores emendatioresque erant, auctorque ipsius, quicumque ille fuerit, negotium cum multa fide administraverit, ac ne verborum quidem ordinem variaverit, inde se cognovisse Victorius narrat quam scripturam in suo exemplari ille habuerit." Traversari, vol. i, p. clvi.

<sup>2</sup> The following extracts show different versions of a passage from the opening of the treatise, De Caelo et Mundo. They are preceded by the Greek text:

<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Arab-Latin, No. 1.</i>	<i>Arab-Latin, No. 2.</i>	<i>Greek-Latin used by Aquinas.</i>
<p>“Ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη σχεδὸν ἡ πλεῖστη φαίνεται περὶ τε σώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ τούτων οὕσα πάθη καὶ τὰς κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσαι τῆς τούτης οὐσίας εἰσὶν· τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνεστώτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δ' ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἔχοντων εἰσὶν.</p>	<p>“Maxima cognitio nature et scientia demonstrans ipsam est in corporibus et in aliis magnitudinibus et in passionibus et motibus earum et in principiis cuiuslibet quod assimilatur isti nature. Etiam naturalium rerum quedam sunt corpus et magnitudo, et quedam habent corpus et magnitudinem et quedam sunt principia habentium corpora et magnitudinem.</p>	<p>“Summa cognitionis nature et scientie ipsam significantis in corporibus existit, et in reliquis magnitudinibus et impressionibus et in motibus eorum et in principiis omnium que etiam huic nature sunt similia; quod est quia rerum naturalium quedam sunt que sunt corpus, et alia sunt que sunt principia rerum que habent corpora et magnitudinem.</p>	<p>“De natura scientia fere plurima videtur circa corpora et magnitudines et horum existens passiones et motus, adhuc autem circa principia quecumque talis substantie sunt. Natura enim constantium hec quidem sunt corpora et magnitudines; hec autem habent corpus et magnitudinem; hec autem principia habentium sunt.</p>

(Note 2 continued from preceding page.)

Συνεχὲς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ  
τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαι-  
ρετά, σῶμα δὲ τὸ πάντῃ  
καίρετόν· μεγέθους δὲ  
ὃ μὲν ἐφ' ἑν γραμμῇ, τὸ  
ἑπὶ δύο ἐπίπεδον, τὸ  
ἑπὶ τρία σῶμα· καὶ  
ἄρ' αὐτὰ οὐκ ἐστὶν  
ἄλλο μέγεθος διὰ τὸ τὰ  
ρία πάντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ  
ρις πάντῃ. καθάπερ  
ἄρ' φασὶ οἱ πυθαγόρειοι,  
ὅτι πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα  
οἷς τρισὶν ὄρισται·  
ἐλευτῇ γὰρ καὶ μέσον  
αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν  
χειρὶ τὸν τοῦ παντός,  
αὐτὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος·  
ἰδὲ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως  
ἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους  
κεῖνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς  
γιοστείας χρώμεθα τῶν  
ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ.  
Ἀποδίδομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς  
ροσσηγορίας τὸν τρόπον  
οὗτον· τὰ γὰρ δύο  
ὡφ' μὲν λέγομεν καὶ  
τῆς δύο ἀμφοτέρους,  
ἀντας δ' οὐ λέγομεν,  
λλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν  
ζήτην τὴν προσηγορίαν  
μὲν πρῶτον. ταῦτα  
ὥσπερ εἰρηται, διὰ τὸ  
ἵν' φύσιν αὐτὴν οὕτως  
πάγειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν.”  
Aquinas, *Opera*, ed.  
eo XIII, vol. iii, pp.  
and 5.

Et continuum qui-  
dem est igitur quod est  
divisibile secundum  
omnes mensuras: mag-  
nitudinis vero quod est  
unius mensurae, est  
linea: quod duarum,  
superficies, trium autem  
corpus, et post istam  
nulla mensura est.  
Omnia enim sunt tria  
et divisa in tres men-  
suras et similiter; in-  
quiunt Pythagorici,  
quod omnino res ter-  
minantur tribus men-  
suris, fine, medio et  
principio; et hoc est  
numerus cuiuslibet et  
est demonstrans trini-  
tatem rerum. Et non  
invenimus istum nume-  
rum nisi ex natura et  
sustinemus ipsum quasi  
nobis legem, et secun-  
dum istum numerum  
tenemur magnificare  
Deum creatorem re-  
motum a modis crea-  
turarum et etiam ap-  
pellamus istum nume-  
rum secundum hunc  
inodum: dico quod  
numeramus duos nu-  
meros duo, et duos  
viros duos viros, et non  
dicimus omnes. Sed  
hoc omne non dicitur  
nisi de tribus et per  
ipsum nominantur tria.  
Primo et hoc fuit dic-  
tum, quoniam natura  
naturata ita fecit, et  
nos sequimur ita suum  
opus, sicut prius nar-  
ravimus.”

Jourdain, *Recherches*,  
pp. 407-8.

Et continuum qui-  
dem separabile est in  
res suscipientes divi-  
sionem receptione que  
semper est. Corpus  
vero divisibile est in  
omnes divisiones; mag-  
nitudines autem que-  
cumque habentes divi-  
sionem unam sunt  
linee, et que duas habet  
est superficies, et que  
tres habet est corpus.  
Post ista autem non  
erit magnitudo alia,  
quoniam res omnes  
sunt tres et dividuntur  
in tres dimensiones; et  
similiter quidam dicunt  
Pythagorici quod totum  
et res terminantur tri-  
bus dimensionibus, fine  
scilicet, medio et prin-  
cipio; et hic quidem  
est numerus omnis rei,  
et significat trinitatem  
rerum. Nos vero non  
extraximus hunc nu-  
merum nisi ex natura  
rerum et retinimus  
ipsum similem legi  
earum, et per hunc  
quidem numerum ad-  
hibuimus nos ipsos  
magnificare Deum  
unum creatorem emi-  
nentem proprietatibus  
eorum que sunt creata.  
Nos autem nominavi-  
mus hunc numerum  
hoc modo, ut dicamus  
quia nominantur duo  
numeri duo numeri, et  
duo viri duo viri, et non  
dicimus omnes neque  
toti, quia ponimus sem-  
per et omne et totum  
supra tria imprimis.  
Nos autem invenimus  
illud ita, quoniam na-  
tura taliter facit, et  
imitamur nos eius  
operationem, sicut nar-  
ravimus nuper.”

Jourdain, *Recherches*,  
pp. 408-409.

Continuum quidem  
igitur est, quod divi-  
sibile in semper divi-  
sibilia, corpus autem,  
quod omniquaeque di-  
visibile. Magnitudinis  
autem que quidem ad  
unum, linea; que au-  
tem ad duo, planum;  
que autem ad tria, cor-  
pus. Et preter has non  
est alia magnitudo,  
propter tria omnia esse  
et ipsum ter omniqua-  
que. Quemadmodum  
enim aiunt et Pytha-  
gorici, totum et omnia  
tribus determinata sunt.  
Consummatio enim et  
medium et principium  
numerus habent eum  
qui omnis; hec autem  
qui trinitatis est. Prop-  
ter quod a natura ac-  
cipientes tanquam leges  
illius et ad sanctifica-  
tiones deorum hoc  
utimur numero. As-  
signamus autem et ap-  
pellationes secundum  
modum hunc. Que  
enim duo ambo dici-  
mus, et duos ambo;  
omnes autem non dici-  
mus sed de tribus hanc  
appellationem dicimus  
primum. Hoc autem  
quemadmodum dictum  
est, propter naturam  
ipsam sic inducentem  
sequimur.”

Aquinas, *Opera*, ed.  
Leo XIII, vol. iii, pp.  
4 and 5.

almost the whole range of Aristotle's writings. Portions of certain works, such as the last books of the *Metaphysics*, one or two smaller treatises on unpopular subjects, such as the *Poetics*, were omitted.<sup>1</sup>

Thus to the thirteenth century came the revelation of Aristotle's manifold resources as a teacher, not only of logic and dialectic, but of all conceivable branches of metaphysics and

<sup>1</sup>"Quinquaginta etiam libros (Aristotle) fecit de animalibus preclaros, ut Plinius dicit octavo *Naturalium* et vidi in Greco; sed Latini non habent nisi decem novem libellos miseros imperfectos. De *Metaphysica* non legunt Latini nisi quod habent de decem libellis, cum multi alii sint et de illis decem deficiunt in translatione quam legunt multa capitula et quasi lineae infinite." Bacon, *Comp. Stud.*, p. 473. Aquinas before his death knew twelve books of the *Metaphysics*. The *Poetics* was represented by a translation of Herman the German of an Arabic abridgment by Alfarabius. See Herman's preface in Jourdain, *Recherches*, p. 142, and comments on the work by Bacon. *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, pp. 33, 85-88, *Gk. Grammar*, p. 28; also Bacon's reference to Herman's excuse for not translating the *Poetics* in full, *supra*, p. 68, n. 3. Averroes had defined tragedy as the art of blaming and comedy as the art of praising, Egger, vol. i, p. 58. With those definitions in mind it was naturally difficult to get much meaning from Aristotle's literary masterpiece.

A list of the works of Aristotle is given by the encyclopedist, Vincent of Beauvais. "De arte logica libros Cathégoriarum, id est Predicamentorum, et secundum quosdam libros Sex Principiorum (apocryphal), libros quoque Periermenias et libros Analeticorum et Posteriorum Topicorum et Elencorum. Porro de phisica, id est naturali scientia, libros edidit de Phisico Auditū, de Generatione et Corruptione, de Anima, de Sensu et Sensato, de Memoria, de Reminiscentia, de Somno et Vigilia, de Morte et Vita, de Vegetabilibus et etiam de Animalibus secundum quosdam, et de Quattuor Elementis (apocryphal); libros quoque Metheorum et Methaphisicorum. Extat etiam liber qui dicitur Perspectiva Aristotelis (apocryphal) et alius, ut fertur, qui dicitur Rhetorica eiusdem, et est ipsius epistola ad Alexandrum de Dieta Servanda (apocryphal). De his autem ipsius libris exerspsi plurima in prima et secunda parte istius operis: preter hoc etiam scripsit libros Ethicorum quattuor, quorum flores morales in hoc loco inserere volui." He also believes that Aristotle composed a tract "De Matrimonio." *Spec. Hist.*, lib. iv, cap. 84. He forgets to mention the book, "De Coelo et Mundo," from which he quotes elsewhere. He apparently did not know the *Politics* or the *Economics*, both of which had been used by Albertus and Thomas, and was aware of the *Rhetoric* only through hearsay. Cf. the list of the works of Aristotle in the library of Augustine's Abbey, Canterbury, James, pp. 307-317, 349-353, etc. Mandonnet, pp. xxvii-xl.

natural science. At first, however, the attitude of the Church toward this influx of pagan learning was doubtful, even hostile.<sup>1</sup> The Arab-Latin versions which appeared in Paris after 1200 were accompanied by the glosses and commentaries of Arabian scholars, especially of Avicenna and Averroes. These brought out unmistakably the non-Christian elements in peripatetic philosophy, the doctrines of the eternity of matter and the unity of the active intellect, and expressly denied the possibility of corporal resurrection or even of individual immortality. Certain pseudo-Aristotelian works, in particular the Neo-Platonic *Liber de Causis*, which laid more stress upon such points than Aristotle himself had ever cared to do, became current at the same time and increased the uneasiness with which the Church regarded the movement. Fears seemed speedily justified by the almost simultaneous appearance of doctors at Paris, who began to inculcate seriously certain dreaded philosophical heresies. In 1210 an ecclesiastical council met in the city, which burned the writings of one heterodox thinker, David de Dinant, exhumed the body and excommunicated the soul of another, Almaric, consigned to death or imprisonment a group of Almaric's disciples, and forbade the reading in public or private of Aristotle's books on natural philosophy or the commentaries upon them.<sup>2</sup> In 1215 the papal legate Robert de Courçon drew up a body of statutes for the Masters of Arts at Paris. These provided that lectures should be given on the *Logic* and, if desired, on the *Ethics* of Aristotle, but

<sup>1</sup> For a more precise account of the agitation over Aristotle see Rashdall, vol. i, p. 353 *et seq.* For an interesting allusion by Bacon to the feeling of the period see extract quoted by Rashdall, vol. ii, p. 754.

<sup>2</sup> " . . . nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur Parisius publice vel secreto, et hoc sub pena excommunicationis inhibemus." Denifle, *Chart.*, vol. i, p. 70. A list of condemned heretical tenets is given, *ibid.*, pp. 71-2. For account of the episode see William the Breton, *Recueil des Hist.*, vol. xvii, pp. 82-4.

none upon the Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy or any paraphrases of them, nor upon the works of the heretics or of Averroes.<sup>1</sup> In 1231 Gregory IX ordered penance for a number of masters and students who had been reading the prohibited volumes. Shortly afterwards, however, he appointed a commission to examine and expurgate the same and to collect parts that might safely and profitably be given to the schools.<sup>2</sup>

From this time on alarm died down. Heresy was temporarily suppressed. The difference between Aristotle and his interpreters or imitators was slowly recognized and the injustice of including all under the same indiscriminate ban. William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris from 1228, did not hesitate to use the proscribed books nor to defend the true Aristotle from the charges brought against him. Alexander Hales, the pride of the Franciscan school, drew freely from all the writings of the philosopher which came in his way. A few years later Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were utilizing the wisdom of the Greek as the scientific foundation for the most exact and comprehensive system of Catholic theology yet conceived.<sup>3</sup> By their efforts Aristotle was introduced to the world anew in Christian guise, supplied

<sup>1</sup> "Et quod legant libros Aristotelis de dialecta tam de veteri quam de nova in scholis ordinarie et non ad cursum . . . Non legant festivis diebus nisi philosophos et rhetoricas et quadruvalia et barbarismum et Ethicam, si placet, et quartum Topichorum. Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphisica et de naturali philosophia, nec summe de eisdem, aut de doctrina magis ri David de Dinant, aut Amalrici heretici, aut Mauricii Hispani." Denifle, *Chart.*, vol. i, pp. 78-9.

<sup>2</sup> "Ceterum cum sicut intelleximus libri naturalium, qui Parisius in Concilio provinciali fuere prohibiti, quedam utilia et inutilia continere dicantur, ne utile per inutile vitietur, discretionis vestre . . . mandamus, quatinus libros ipsos examinantes sicut convenit subtiliter et prudenter, que ibi erronea seu scandalii vel offendentis legentibus inveneritis illativa penitus resecatis ut que sunt suspecta remotis incunctanter ac inoffense in reliquis studeatur." Denifle, *Chart.*, vol. i, pp. 143-4.

<sup>3</sup> Mandonnet, pp. xlv *et seq.*

with Christian interpretations to replace the Mohammedan or Jewish or pagan commentaries which had first discredited him. Thenceforth an attack upon the authority of Aristotle came to be regarded as an attack upon the faith of Aquinas, the accepted theologian of the church. Even the excesses of the later Averroists who persisted in retaining the Arabic commentators and brought down again the condemnation of the Church upon their heads did not seriously impair the growing prestige of the "Philosopher."<sup>1</sup> A list of text-books studied in 1255 under the Parisian Faculty of Arts contained the greater part of the translated works, the books on Logic, Ethics, Physics, Metaphysics, *De Animalibus*, *De Coelo et Mundo*, the first and fourth books of the *Meteorics*, *De Anima*, *De Generatione*, *De Sensu et Sensato*, *De Somno et Vigilia*, *De Plantis*,<sup>2</sup> *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, *De Morte et Vita*.<sup>3</sup> Some were the subjects of regular lectures throughout the year, others were read on festivals or saints' days. In 1366 a body of regulations for the university drawn up by two cardinal legates prescribed almost all of these same books for the degree in Arts.<sup>4</sup> The German universities as they arose copied in the main the curriculum, as they did the organization, of Paris. Allusions in their records to customs at Paris and elsewhere show that occasionally lectures were given on portions of Aristotle not included in the foregoing, official lists, namely the *Politics*, *Economics* and *Rhetoric*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For best account of the disturbances of the later thirteenth century, see Mandonnet, p. lxi, and thereafter through the book.

<sup>2</sup> *De Plantis* is still included in editions of Aristotle, though probably spurious.

<sup>3</sup> Denifle, *Chart.*, vol. i, p. 278.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 145.

<sup>5</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 440. For influence of the *Politics* on some of the treatises on government of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, e. g., on the *De Regimine Principum* of Gilles de Paris, see Sandys, p. 565 and n. 3.

In Church and University, accordingly, the influence of Aristotle and Aquinas was dominant from the middle of the thirteenth century to the last of the fifteenth.<sup>1</sup> Whether the student toiled in the elementary subjects of logic and dialectic or in the more advanced fields of science, philosophy or metaphysics Aristotle was ever before him as ultimate authority and guide. Originality of speculation was abashed by reverence for Aristotle's omniscience.<sup>2</sup> Only as one entered upon certain professional courses in law or theology did one leave Aristotle behind, although even the *Summa Theologiae* was not without reminders of the master of the knowledge of antiquity. Medical schools of the South took Aristotle's physiological treatises as a basis for their study of anatomy.<sup>3</sup> A few daring and independent thinkers of the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus and William of Occam, ventured to assail both Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle and the theory of universals expounded by Aristotle. The former they declared to be a deliberate misconstruction of the whole trend of peripatetic philosophy, the latter they

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately for these later generations they failed to imitate the two great schoolmen, Albertus and Aquinas, in the sturdy independence of judgment which they had preserved in dealing with Aristotle. Albertus had not hesitated to say bluntly, "Dicet autem fortasse aliquis nos Aristotelem non intellexisse, et ideo non consentire verbis eius; vel quod forte ex certa scientia contradicamus ei quantum ad hominem et non quantum ad rei veritatem. Et ad illum dicimus, quod qui credit Aristotelem fuisse deum, ille debet credere quod nunquam erravit. Si autem credit ipsum esse hominem, tunc procul dubio errare potuit sicut et nos." *Physic*, lib. viii, tract. i, cap. 14; *Opera*, vol. iii, p. 553. Aquinas' dictum on the matter of authority is well known. "Studium philosophie non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum." *De Caelo*, lib. i, lect. 22; *Opera*, vol. iii, p. 91.

<sup>2</sup> Through all this period Aristotle is frequently exalted as almost more than human, e. g., Richard de Bury, a scholar of exceptional intelligence, writes about 1344 of him as one "of gigantic mind, in whom it pleased Nature to try how great a portion of reason she could admit into mortality, and whom the Most High made but little inferior to the angels." *Philobiblion*, cap. x, p. 69.

<sup>3</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 235.



denounced as impracticable realism. In its place they advocated a new nominalism opposed as completely to Plato as to the Stagirite. But their arguments appealed only to radical or impressionable circles and failed to shake the resolution of the Church and the leading continental universities to stand immovably by the leaders whom they had chosen. In these great conservative institutions a barren and pedantic subservience to authority took the place of the hopefulness and promise of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The baneful overestimate of the deference due to Aristotle affected scholarship in Paris as late as 1629, when the Parlement there assembled forbade any attack upon his theories under pain of death.<sup>1</sup>

We cannot omit entirely all mention of medieval translations of the works of the Greek fathers of the Church prized in many cases far above any relics of the earlier and profaner literature. The Vulgate was itself, of course, a translation from the Greek reputed to be the work of St. Jerome and commonly looked upon as verbally inspired like the original.<sup>2</sup> Naturally also discussions of important themes by eminent Eastern divines in the days when the Roman Empire yet held East and West together were often turned into Latin for the benefit of the congregations that understood only the Roman tongue. Jerome and his contemporary, the priest Rufinus, accomplished the most of such

<sup>1</sup> It is not possible here to discuss the medieval legends of Aristotle as magician or lover of womankind. Such legends were late in growth, and were not as a rule repeated by the historians; in fact, were never accepted so seriously as the older myths. See for references Comparetti, pp. 327 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "In his omnibus Donatum non sequimur quia fortiore in Divinis Scripturis auctoritatem tenemus. Corticem enim, silicem, stirpem et diem communis generis esse non negamus. Radicem vero et finem et pinum feminini generis esse Scripturarum auctoritate docemur." Smaragdus, the grammarian. Quoted in Thurot, *Notices*, p. 81. Now and then one finds a bolder attitude of criticism as in Abelard and Bacon. Nicholas de Lyra wrote a "Tractatus de Differentia Hebraice et Latine Translationis." Bandini, *Bib. Leop.*, vol. iii, p. 93.

work in their generation.<sup>1</sup> Jerome did something to redeem the name of Origen from utter reprobation by translating many of his homelies on books of the Old and New Testaments. He furthermore composed free paraphrases of the Chronicle and other minor works of Eusebius and of several treatises of Philo. Rufinus, applying himself yet more industriously, performed an inestimable service for medieval students by furnishing them with Latin renderings of Josephus' *De Bello Judaico*, Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, St. Basil's *Hexaemeron* and *Regulae* and numerous sermons of Origen, Gregory Nazianzen and Pamphilus the Martyr.

Ecclesiastical treatises were still translated, though at longer intervals, during the period between the fall of the Western Empire and the final severance of connection with the church at Constantinople. In several instances the authors were monks who remained anonymous and the dates of their compositions are hard to fix. We hear, however, that in the early sixth century Cassiodorus, the minister of Theodoric, sought to complete the History of Eusebius by ordering translations of the Greek church writers, Socrates, Sozomenus and Theodoret and then by casting the results into one composite narrative, known thereafter as the *Historia Tripartita*.<sup>2</sup> Dionysius Exiguus, a Scythian, who became in later life a Roman abbot and a friend of Cassiodorus, contributed versions of an epistle of Cyril of Alexandria, a life of St. Pachomius, two or three works of Proclus and Gregory of Nyssa and, most important of all, the canons and decrees of the early church councils.<sup>3</sup> In the ninth century Erigena prepared a rendering of the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Dionysius

<sup>1</sup> The *Kirchen Lexikon* on Hieronymus and Rufinus gives convenient summaries.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* on Cassiodorus. The *Historia Tripartita* is included among the works of Cassiodorus in *Migne*, vol. 69. See his own preface, pp. 879-882.

<sup>3</sup> See Dionysius Exiguus, *Opera*, *Migne*, vol. 67; in particular, pp. 141-2.

the Areopagite, perhaps the most influential, single Greek addition to the library of Roman theology. Anastasius, keeper of the papal archives under Nicholas I and John VIII, put into Latin the Chronography of Nicephorus and miscellaneous works by George Syncellus, Theophanes and other theologians.<sup>1</sup>

In the eleventh century the library of the monastery at Monte Cassino possessed the version of the *Regula Basilii*, a collection of sermons by Gregory Nazianzen, Josephus, Origen on the Canticles and Chrysostom's *De Reparatione Lapsi*, *Dialogus cum Alberico Diacono* and *Dialogus de Miraculis*.<sup>2</sup> In the twelfth century Burgundio, the Pisan lawyer, translated for Eugene III the homilies of Chrysostom on Matthew and on John, one hundred chapters from the disquisition *De Orthodoxa Fide* by John Damascene, perhaps also the Apologetics of Gregory Nazianzen and other patristic writings.<sup>3</sup> John of Salisbury procured a new version of Dionysius the Areopagite, including both the *Celestial* and *Ecclesiastical Hierarchies*.<sup>4</sup> A few more sporadic translations from Greek theologians were produced in the thirteenth century in spite of the prevalent craze for Aristotle. Grosseteste gave an impulse to this as well as to

<sup>1</sup> *Kirchen Lexikon*. Also Gregorovius, *History of Rome*, vol. iii, p. 150. For Erigena, see Poole, *Illustrations of Med. Thought*, pp. 53 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> Muratori, *Rer. Ital. Scrip.*, vol. iv, pp. 473-4.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, p. 12 Gidel, *Nouvelles Etudes*, p. 235. Traversari, vol. i, pp. ccxvii, ccxviii. Burgundio's translations, like others of the time, were later sharply criticized by the humanists for their inelegance. "Ego antea Augustinum legebam, nunc est in manibus Io. Chrysostomus. Legi nonnulla eius opuscula et sermones omni cum venustate translata; nunc vero alia percurro longe inferioris eloquentie, prout varii translatore fuerunt . . . Prestant lxxviii Homelie in Evangelium Ioannis, quarum si interpres fuisset eloquens, nil doctius, nil gravius, nil magnificentius legisset. Sed is fuit Pisanus quidam, qui se fatetur in Prologo de verbo ad verbum transferre; nec tanta est translatoris inconcinnitas, quin mirum in modum eluceat facundia auctoris." Poggio, *Epistolae*, vol. i, pp. 30-31.

<sup>4</sup> See *supra*, p. 22.

scientific work.<sup>1</sup> Vincent of Beauvais was able to make out impressive lists of the books of famous Eastern churchmen which he had seen in Latin, seven miscellaneous treatises by Clement of Alexandria, a voluminous collection of Origen's homilies on the parts of the Bible, ten compositions in prose and verse by Gregory Nazianzen, four special discourses by Chrysostom, beside numerous sermons.<sup>2</sup> Works like these appealed, of course, to the better read among the clergy, and copies of one or more were to be found in almost every well-stocked convent library.<sup>3</sup> Chrysostom and Gregory Nazianzen were apparently the most preferred of the theologians.

<sup>1</sup> See *supra*, pp. 13-14, "Similiter libri doctorum magnorum, ut beatorum Dionysii, Basillii, Iohannis Chrysostomi, Iohannis Damasceni et aliorum multorum deficiunt; quorum tamen aliquos dominus Robertus prefatus episcopus vertit in Latinum, et alii quosdam alios ante eum; cuius opus est valde gratum theologis." Bacon, *Op. Mai.*, vol. iii, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> The titles which he gives are as follows: Clement of Alexandria, *Stromatus* (*Stromata*), *Adversus Gentiles*, *De Ieiunio Disputatio*, a work beginning "Quisnam ille dives sit qui salvetur," *De Obtrectatione*, *De Canonibus Ecclesiasticis*, *Adversus eos qui Iudeorum sequuntur errorem*. *Spec. Hist.*, lib. xi, cap. 126. Of Origen, seventeen homilies on Genesis, thirteen on Exodus, sixteen on Leviticus, twenty-eight on Numbers, twenty-six on Joshua, nine on Judges, five on the thirty-sixth Psalm, two on the thirty-seventh, two on the thirty-eighth, nine on Isaiah, fourteen on Jeremiah, fourteen on Ezekiel, twenty-six on Matthew, thirty-eight on Luke, ten on the Epistle to the Romans, with tracts on Job, the Canticles, John and others. *Op. cit.*, lib. xii, cap. 11. Of Gregory Nazianzen, a poem on the death of Caesar's brother, encomia in verse of the Maccabees, Cyprian, Athanasius and the philosopher Maximus, invectives against the same Maximus, Eunomius and the Emperor Julian, *Hexameron* on Marriage and Virginity, *De Spiritu Sancto*. *Op. cit.*, lib. xv, cap. 90. Of Chrysostom, "Quod nemo leditur nisi a semetipso," *De Reparatione Lapsi*, *De Compunctione Cordis*, *Commentary on Matthew*, ninety homilies on Matthew, eighty-eight on John, thirty-four on the Epistle to the Hebrews, seven in eulogy of St. Paul, and thirty selected sermons. "Sup. Matheus in modum commentariorum li. ii. De his tamen dubito an sint Iohannis illius Crisostomi licet ei ascribantur, an forte alterius Iohannis nescio cuius. Nam et inveniuntur alias omelie Iohannis Crisostomi super Matheum xc, que tamen raro inveniuntur omnes simul sed tantum xxv que apud nos sunt." *Op. cit.*, lib. xviii, cap. 42. Cf. James, pp. 40-41.

<sup>3</sup> See Becker, Index, James, *passim*.

In spite of all defence, Clement and Origen lay to most minds under a cloud of heterodoxy, and their names were less often mentioned.<sup>1</sup> Josephus and Eusebius were relied upon as sources by every serious historian.

From Vincent's pages one may also learn how much the hagiography of the Middle Ages was enriched by Eastern traditions. Lives of Greek saints, their miracles and sufferings, are there liberally interspersed among similar accounts of their Western brethren. The collection of martyr legends compiled by the Byzantine statesman, Simon Metaphrastes, and translated by monks of Southern Italy, was doubtless the source of Vincent's information.<sup>2</sup> Tales like these of angelic heroism in the face of demoniacal persecution fired the reader's imagination as thoroughly as did the secular histories of the fortitude of Trojan warriors or of the conquering Alexander. The element of the marvelous, the moral lessons of courage and endurance and faith in unseen powers were present in all. The most popular Western version of the martyrology was the Golden Legend of Jacques de Voragine, written not far from the time when Vincent was accumulating material for his ponderous encyclopedia.

Barely an allusion can be made to the Greek science, exclusive of Aristotle's, which penetrated to the Middle Ages. The names of a few Greek mathematicians were preserved and associated with unsubstantial epigrams or anecdotes, but any real knowledge of their works was for the most part lost. Adelard of Bath, who about 1130 made a tour of

<sup>1</sup> For influence of Origen's teaching in shaping the medieval theory of lunacy as demoniacal possession see Döllinger, *Akad. Vorträge*, vol. i, p. 182, *Studies*, p. 183.

<sup>2</sup> For a suggestive brief account of the influence of Greek martyrology on the West see Döllinger, *Akad. Vorträge*, pp. 180-2. This subject belongs properly under the heading of later Byzantine contributions to the Middle Ages, and as such cannot be treated adequately here.

Arab schools in Spain, Egypt and Asia Minor, translated Euclid from the Arabic into Latin, and before the end of the century Gerard of Cremona composed a similar version of the *Almagest* of Ptolemy. Both works soon came into general use in the schools, but they were followed by no others of their kind.<sup>1</sup> The one branch of science in which a certain continuity of study of the Greek authors was maintained was medicine. The *Therapeutics* of Galen, the *Aphorisms*, *De Herbis* and *De Concordia* of Hippocrates existed in Latin form in very early times.<sup>2</sup> From the Dark Ages onward considerable ignorance and barbarity prevailed in the teaching and practice of medicine, but during the eleventh century there took place a reform traditionally associated with the name of Constantinus Africanus, an Italian. He is said to have crossed the Mediterranean to North Africa, and after an absence of years to have brought back with him a knowledge of Greek and Arabic and fresh texts of the Greek writers on the healing arts.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the actual events which brought the reform about, the result was assuredly an

<sup>1</sup> Rashdall, vol. i, p. 442. Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. iii, col. 312:

“Langue doit estre refrenée :  
Car nous lisons dans Tholomé  
Une parole moult honeste  
Au comencier de s'Almageste,  
Que sages est cis qui met paine  
A ce que sa langue se refraine.”

Roman de la Rose, ll. 7780, *et seq.*; ed. Michel, vol. i, p. 234. On Gerard of Cremona, see also *supra*, p. 68. Some brief excerpts on astronomy were translated from the original of Ptolemy during the twelfth century, but no other entire work. Bandini, *Bib. Leop.*, vol. ii, p. 398.

<sup>2</sup> See sixth century references to Hippocrates and Galen in Latin. Gidel, p. 203.

<sup>3</sup> For account of the works and translations of Constantinus, see Muratori, *Rev. Ital. Script.*, vol. iv, p. 455. For account of the whole movement with detailed references, see Rashdall, vol. i, pp. 79-82, and especially Paine, *Medicine, Encyclopedia Britannica*. The chief original contribution of the Arabs to medical progress was in the department of pharmacy.

increase in the value put upon the authority of the Greek physicians and their Arabian interpreters. John of Salisbury in the next century spoke petulantly of young doctors who came back from Salerno or Montpellier, bragging of Galen and Hippocrates and dinning into every one's ears the outlandish words they had picked up.<sup>1</sup> William of Moerbeka added to his translations of Aristotle one each of Galen and Hippocrates.<sup>2</sup> Vincent of Beauvais quoted from several of the works of Hippocrates and enumerated twenty-five treatises attributed to Galen, *De Complexionibus*, *De Anatomia*, *De Regimine Sanitatis*, *Libri Diademiarum*, *De Perfectis Medicinis*, *Passionarium*, *Antidotarium* and others.<sup>3</sup> In Dante's time the title *Aphorisms* had become a synonym for the medical art.<sup>4</sup> In brief, the best of medieval medical knowledge was Greek, and medical enlightenment was de-

<sup>1</sup> "Alli autem suum in philosophia intuentes defectum, Salernum vel ad Montepessulanum profecti, facti sunt clientuli medicorum, et repente quales fuerant philosophi, tales in momento medici eruperunt. Fallacibus enim referti experimentis in brevi redeunt, sedulo exercentes quod didicerunt. Hippocratem ostentant aut Galenum: verba proferunt inaudita: ad omnia suos loquuntur aphorismos: et mentes humanas, velut afflatas tonitruis sic percellunt nominibus inauditis." *Met. log.*, lib. i, cap. 4; *Migne*, vol. 199, p. 830. A catalogue of the library at Durham in the twelfth century includes a number of medical books; among others, three of Galen's works and two of Hippocrates', e. g., "liber Ypocrates peri tio noxon nosematon," (*περὶ τῶν ὀξέων νοσημάτων*). Becker, p. 244. The library of Christ Church, Canterbury, near the end of the thirteenth century possessed about sixty volumes of medical treatises and commentaries, with six different works of Hippocrates and seven of Galen. James, pp. 55-62, 81. As Galen grew more popular there was an attempt, as there had been in the case of Plato, to connect him with Christianity. "Ipse (Galen) fuit coetaneus Christo et dicitur in Chronicis quod ipse audiens miracula que faciebat Christus de sanatione infirmorum venit ad ipsum, postea in reditu mortuus est in itinere unde dicitur quod sepulcrum eius est in Sicilia." From comment on Galen of early fifteenth century. Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Lat.*, vol. iii, p. 28.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Spec. Hist.*, lib. xi, cap. 92.

<sup>4</sup> *Paradiso*, canto xi, l. 4. Cf. the list of works prescribed for the license in medicine at Montpellier, in 1309. Rashdall, vol. ii, pt. i, pp. 123-4.

pendent upon adherence to Greek precepts and example. The physicians of the Middle Ages made no advance in skill or wisdom beyond their teachers. Hippocrates and Galen were the safest and most respected guides until the seventeenth century brought a renewal of original investigation and discovery.

In closing our fragmentary sketch of what was known of the Greeks and their works during the Middle Ages we note once more that in spite of an almost universal ignorance of their language considerable information was obtained through divers channels.<sup>1</sup> Some came from the Roman writers of antiquity who took their inspiration from the models furnished them by Hellas, some from later paraphrases or translations. The latter, however, were for the most part made after the decay of literary taste in the West rendered impossible any true artistic sympathy on the part of the translator. Flights of fancy or romance were accepted as literal history. The clarity, the subtlety and the buoyancy of Greek thought were dulled, compressed and recast to suit a simpleminded, unanalytic age. The spirit of what was known was therefore largely misunderstood, and much that was needed to give coherence or seriousness to Greek achievement was forgotten altogether. Many noble names were lost or connected vaguely with an uncomprehended greatness or cheapened by association with trivialities.

As final illustration we observe the attitude toward the Greek past of the supreme, literary artist who lived when the Middle Ages were drawing toward their close. Dante cannot grant to any pagan a place even among the saving pains of Purgatory. In Hell they all abide without hope of change, but those who lived honorably without sin save that of ignorance are in the first circle free from torment, "neither sad

<sup>1</sup> See summary in *Körting*, vol. iii, pp. 88 *et seq.*, 205-6.



nor glad." Foremost in the distinguished company is "Homer, the sovereign poet," "that Lord of the loftiest song which above the others as an eagle flies," "that Greek whom the muses suckled more than any other ever."<sup>1</sup> No second Hellenic poet, however, ranks among the five greatest. The other four are Horace, Ovid, Lucan and Vergil. A little apart is Aristotle, "the Master of those who know, seated amid the philosophic family; all regard him, all do him honor."<sup>2</sup> Near him stand Socrates and Plato, Democritus, "who ascribes the world to chance," Diogenes, Anaxagoras and Thales, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Zeno, Dioscorides, "the good collector of the qualities," Orpheus, Euclid, "the geometer," Ptolemy, Hippocrates, Avicenna, Galen, and Averroes, "who made the great comment."<sup>3</sup> Not far distant are Euripides, Antiphon, Simonides, Agathon, "and many other Greeks who of old adorned their brows with laurel."<sup>4</sup> These make up the number that Dante chooses to commemorate for attainments in literature.

In the same quiet field are certain others who have won repose by heroic lives, Electra, Hector, Antigone, Deiphile and Argia, Ismene, "sad even as she was," Hypsipyle, "who showed Langia," "the daughter of Tiresias and Thetis, and Deidamia with her sisters."<sup>5</sup> Other regions of the *Inferno* contain Greeks who deserve a more tragic fate. In the wailing whirlwind of carnal sinners are Paris and Helen, "for whom so long a time of ill revolved," and Achilles, "who at

<sup>1</sup> *Inferno*, Canto iv, ll. 88, 95, 96. *Purgatorio*, Canto xxii, ll. 101-2. The translation is Charles Eliot Norton's. Reverence like this here expressed for Homer was of course learned from the Latin classics. Dante could never have paid that tribute from knowledge only of Dictys or Dares or Pindar the Theban.

<sup>2</sup> *Inferno*, Canto iv, ll. 131-3.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 136, 142, 144.

<sup>4</sup> *Purgatorio*, canto xxii, ll. 107-8.

<sup>5</sup> *Purgatorio*, canto xxii, ll. 111-114.

the end fought with love."<sup>1</sup> Under the rain of fire in the seventh circle a scornful, obdurate soul is Capaneus, one of the seven kings who besieged Thebes.<sup>2</sup> Another proud shade who beneath the scourge of demons will not shed a tear is Jason, "who by courage and by wit despoiled the Colchians of their ram," and deceived and left Hypsipyle.<sup>3</sup> Swathed in the flames of the eighth pit are Ulysses and Diomed, "together in punishment as of old in wrath. Within their flame they groan for the ambush of the horse that made the gate whence the gentle seed of the Romans issued forth. Within it they lament for the artifice whereby the dead Deidamia still mourns for Achilles, and there for the Palladium they bear the penalty."<sup>4</sup> Inferno is equipped with features of the Greek underworld described in the Eneid, Pluto, Cerberus, the Styx and the Lethe, and with the famous monstrosities of the Gorgon, the Furies and the Minotaur. In general the attitude of Dante is more sober, more moral, more independent than that of the ordinary medieval reader. The valor of a warrior is not sufficient atonement for treachery or lust. Even Alexander suffers among the cruel tyrants in the river of blood.<sup>5</sup> But Dante's range of knowledge and of interest is as limited as that of his predecessors for many generations. The familiar tales of the old mythology, a philosophical system or two comprise, to his mind, the story of the Greek race. The men who mean the most to him, who are alive to him, are Jason, Paris and Ulysses, Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>1</sup> *Inferno*, canto v, ll. 64-66. The reference here is to the current story of Achilles' infatuation for Polyxena.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, canto xiv, l. 43 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, canto xviii, ll. 86-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, canto xxvi, ll. 56 *et seq.*

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, canto xii, l. 107.

### CHAPTER III

WE have chosen the Divine Comedy as our final illustration of medieval opinion of the Greek past, although that opinion continued to be prevalent even in Italy for a century and more after the Comedy was written. But the generation following Dante included a man of scholarship and ambition who undertook to inaugurate a new epoch in Greek as in Latin letters and whose name must be mentioned with special distinction in any account of the progress of learning in the West. In the generation before Dante, Roger Bacon had written wistfully of the lost wisdom of the Greeks which none of the Latins could regain and had laboriously compiled his grammar to make possible again the study of the Greek language, but his arguments and his toil were unknown beyond a narrow circle and empty of results. With Petrarch we arrive at one who actually set on foot a definite movement which was not entirely to cease until its end had been accomplished and Homer, Sophocles, and Plato were read again in their own tongue in Western Europe.

The story of Petrarch's efforts to study Greek has been told over more than once in recent years.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, only necessary to recapitulate it briefly here. From Cicero, his literary master, he early learned to prefer Plato to Aristotle and having acquired a Greek text of certain of the dialogues he yearned to read it.<sup>2</sup> The Timaeus in the old

<sup>1</sup> For fullest account see Nollac, *Pétrarque et l'Humanisme*, ch. viii. Cf. also Voigt, *Wiederbelebung des class. Alterthums*, vol. i, pp. 50 *et seq.*, vol. ii, pp. 105-9. Körting, vol. i, pp. 472-480.

<sup>2</sup> "A maioribus Plato, Aristoteles laudatur a pluribus." *De Ignorantia, Opp.*, p. 1053.

version of Chalcidius he found tantalizingly inadequate. In 1339 and again in 1342 one Barlaam, a Calabrian monk, who had lived in Constantinople and ranked as a scholar of great erudition, came on church business as representative of the Eastern emperor to the papal court at Avignon.<sup>1</sup> During his second sojourn Petrarch arranged for lessons in Greek, the manuscript of Plato to serve as textbook. The lessons, however, were of short duration. Before the year was over Barlaam on Petrarch's own recommendation was consecrated bishop of Gerazzo in Calabria and left Avignon for his new charge.<sup>2</sup> Petrarch still hoped that the work might be resumed at some future opportunity, but before that became possible Barlaam died. In Naples he was the friend of Paolo Perugino, the librarian of Robert, King of Sicily, and had supplied him with various information on Greek customs and legends.<sup>3</sup> But if one may judge from the scantiness of Petrarch's acquisitions Barlaam was not a successful teacher. To begin with he possessed but an indifferent command of Latin, and employed the lesson hours in practicing Latin conversation with his pupil quite as often as in initiating the pupil

<sup>1</sup> Boccaccio describes him as "corpore pusillum, pregrandem tamen scientia, et Grecis literis adeo eruditum ut imperatorum et principum Grecorum atque doctorum hominum privilegia haberet testantia ne dum his temporibus apud Grecos esse, sed nec a multis seculis citra fuisse virum tam insigni tamque grandi scientia preditum." Boccaccio had heard that he had written some books but had never seen them. *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xv, cap. 6, Hecker, *Boccaccio-funde*, p. 271. On Barlaam's career see Hefele, vol. vi, pp. 649 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "Barlaam nostrum mihi mors abstulit, et ut verum fatear, illum ego mihi prius abstuleram. Iacturam meam, dum honori eius consulerem, non aspexi; itaque dum ad Episcopum scandentem sublevo magistrum perdidi, sub quo militare coeperam magna cum spe." Letter to Sigeros, *De Reb. Fam.*, Fracasetti, vol. ii, p. 474.

<sup>3</sup> Boccaccio referring to Perugino says, "Et si usquam curiosissimus fuit homo in perquirendis, iussu etiam sui principis, peregrinis undecumque libris, hystoriis et poeticiis operibus, iste fuit: et ob id singulari amicitia Barlae iunctus, que a Latinis habere non poterat, eo medio innumera exausit a Grecis." *De Gen. Deor.* lib. xv, cap. 6, Cf. also Introd. to *De Gen. Deor.*, Hecker, pp. 271, 165.

into the rudiments of Greek.<sup>1</sup> In the second place he was destitute of sympathy of feeling or imagination. In training he was preëminently a theologian and mathematician of a rather hard type; in philosophy he belonged to the conservative Aristotelian school.<sup>2</sup> He evidently had no share in Petrarch's anxiety to read Plato and could tell him little of Plato's doctrines.<sup>3</sup> At the end of the lessons Petrarch apparently had advanced hardly beyond the alphabet. The Greek words which he copied in after years into his manuscripts were drawn, rather than written, in a large hesitating hand and full of mistakes.<sup>4</sup> Before a page of Greek text he was practically as helpless as ever.<sup>5</sup>

Eleven years later one Nicholas Sigeros was sent to Avignon by the Byzantine emperor to resume the discussion of terms for a reunion of the Eastern and Western churches. On his return to Constantinople he sent back to Petrarch a manuscript of Homer in the original. Petrarch was transported with joy, and begged his friend to procure for him

<sup>1</sup> "Sed erat ille vir ut locupletissimus Grece, sic Romane facundie pauperrimus, et qui ingenio agilis enunciandis tamen affectibus laboraret. Itaque vicissim et ego fines suos, illo duce, trepide subibam, et ille post me sepe nostris in finibus oberrabat, quamquam stabiliore vestigio." *De Reb. Fam.* Fracassetti, vol. ii, p. 474.

<sup>2</sup> The biographical preface to a denunciation of the heresy of Barlaam by John Cantacuzene describes him as "ὁργάνου μὲν καὶ τινων ἐτέρων Ἀριστοτελικῶν ὑπῆρχε γεγυμνασμένος, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν μαθημάτων, οὐδ' ἄκροισ δακτύλοις, ὅ φασι, γεγευμένος." Bandini, *Cat. Codd. Graec.*, vol. i, p. 342.

<sup>3</sup> Nollhac, pp. 327-8.

<sup>4</sup> Nollhac, pp. 366-7.

<sup>5</sup> A few relics of Barlaam's teachings are preserved by Boccaccio, who learned them from Petrarch or Paolo Perugino and carefully treasured and repeated them. *E. g.*, concerning the genealogies of the gods he quotes Barlaam as saying, "neminem insignem virum principatu aut preëminentia alia tota in Grecia, insulis et litoribus premonstratis, eo fuisse seculo quo hec fatuitas viguit, qui ab aliquo deorum huiusmodi duxisse originem non monstraret." *De Gen. Deor.*, Introd., Hecker, p. 165.

also copies of Hesiod and Euripides.<sup>1</sup> Nothing more came, however. Petrarch was sadly obliged to confess that though he had two mighty shades of the past, Homer and Plato, dwelling beneath his roof, they were dumb to him.<sup>2</sup>

In later years Petrarch did not speak again of attempting himself to study Greek. But he threw himself ardently into a scheme which promised to make the contents of one of his

<sup>1</sup> "Et quoniam petitionis successus petendi parit audaciam, mitte si vacat Hesiodum, mitte, precor, Euripidem." *De Reb. Fam.*, Fracasetti, vol. ii, p. 475. From Barlaam Petrarch seems to have heard a little of Euripides whom he accordingly puts next to Homer, "alterum ab Homero poetice Graie lumen Euripidem." *De Remed.*, *Opp.*, p. 212. Later, having learned perhaps somewhat more from Pilato, both Boccaccio and Petrarch allude to the tragedy "Polidorus," which they ascribe to Euripides. Petrarch quotes a sentiment from the "Tresphontes" of Euripides. He refers also, but less definitely, to Sophocles. Hortis, *Studi.*, p. 387.

<sup>2</sup> Writing to Sigeros, he says, "Etsi enim ubicumque sis, de tanto gaudeam amico, viva tamen illa tua vox, que discendi sitim, qua me teneri non dissimulo, posset vel accendere vel lenire, minime aures meas ferit, sine qua Homerus tuus apud me mutus, imo vero ego apud illum surdus sum. Gaudeo tamen vel aspectu solo et sepe illum amplexus ac suspirans dico: 'O magne vir, quam cupide te audirem!' Sed aurium mearum aliam mors obstruxit, aliam longinquitas invisa terrarum. Tibi quidem pro eximia liberalitate gratias ago. Erat mihi domi, dictu mirum, ab occasu veniens olim Plato philosophorum princeps, ut nosti, . . . nunc tandem tuo munere, vir insignis, philosophorum principi poetarum Graius princeps accessit. Quis tantis non gaudeat et gloriatur hospitibus? . . . Neque preterea mihi spes eripitur etate hac profectus in literis vestris, in quibus etate ultima profecisse adeo cernimus Catonem." *De Reb. Fam.*, Fracasetti, vol. ii, pp. 474-475. The curious mingling in Petrarch's mind of traditional deference for Homer and a more intimate and jealous love for Vergil are shown in the letter addressed by him a few years afterward to Homer. There the Greek poet is conceived to be a somewhat irascible great personage, uneasy lest his rightful meed of glory be withheld from him. Petrarch artfully defends Vergil from blame for his failure to mention the name of Homer in the Eneid. *De Reb. Fam.*, Fracasetti, vol. iii, pp. 293-304. The letter is partially translated into English in Robinson and Rolfe, *Petrarch*, pp. 253-261. The same jealous pride for the Roman name prompted perhaps Petrarch's indignant denial of the claim made by "quosdam levissimos Grecorum" of the superiority of Alexander's generalship over that of any Roman; "videlicet non tot duces egregios tot prudentium ac fortium virorum millia uni furioso adolescenti potuisse resistere." *Apol. con. Gall.*, *Opp.*, p. 1076.

precious manuscripts intelligible. In the winter of 1358-9 he met at Padua a Calabrian adventurer, Leo, or Leontio, Pilato, who spoke Greek, and professed to be a native of Thessalonica and a pupil of Barlaam. "In appearance," as Boccaccio reports, "he was an unprepossessing fellow, with coarse face, shaggy beard and rough, black hair, given to brooding thoughts, rude and uncultivated in his ways." He knew little Latin, but claimed a profound acquaintance with Greek literature, and especially with history and ancient legendary lore.<sup>1</sup> Petrarch seized the opportunity to have Pilato make for him a specimen translation of the first five books of the Iliad, and communicated the news of his discovery to his friend Boccaccio.<sup>2</sup> During the spring and summer of 1359 the two laid plans to turn the valuable find to the greatest possible advantage. As a result Boccaccio invited Pilato to Florence, and installed him there as a teacher of Greek and a translator of Homer. For a short time at least he was salaried by the university as a public lecturer.<sup>3</sup>

No account of the lectures has come down to us. They

<sup>1</sup> "Post hos et Leontium Pylatum, Thessalonicensem virum et, ut ipse asserit, predicti Barlae auditorem, persepe deduco (as authority for statements in *De Gen. Deor.*). Qui quidem aspectu horridus homo est, turpi facie, barba prolixa et capillitio nigro et meditatione occupatus assidua, moribus incultus nec satis urbanus homo, verum, uti experientia notum fecit, literarum Grecarum doctissimus et quodam modo Grecarum hystoriarum atque fabularum arcivum inexhaustum, esto Latinarum non satis adhuc instructus sit." *De Gen. Deor.*, lib., xv, cap. 6. Hecker, p. 272. On Pilato, see Voigt, vol. ii, pp. 109-112.

<sup>2</sup> Nollac, pp. 339-354.

<sup>3</sup> There are no documents to prove this outside of Boccaccio's own explicit statement: ". . . et maximo labore meo curavi ut inter doctores Florentini studii susciperetur, ei ex publico mercede apposita . . . Ipse insuper fui, qui ut legerentur publice Omeri libri operatus sum." *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xv, cap. 7. Hecker, p. 277. The same assertion is repeated in Manetti's life of Boccaccio, written in the early fifteenth century: ". . . atque ita curavit ut publica mercede ad legendos codices Grecos publice conduceretur: quod ei primo in civitate nostra contigisse dicitur ut Grece ibidem publice legeret." Manetti, *Vite del Dante*, p. 146.

were probably soon abandoned, if ever actually begun. But for almost three years Boccaccio entertained his uncouth instructor in his own house, keeping diligent record of the words of wisdom which he let fall, and holding him continually at work upon a Latin rendering of the Iliad and Odyssey.<sup>1</sup> In his first enthusiasm he begged Petrarch to send down his text of Plato that Pilato might work upon that also, but Petrarch discreetly refused to burden the man with a second masterpiece until he had completed the first.<sup>2</sup> Before the three years had quite elapsed Pilato finished the translation of Homer and departed, 'convinced, apparently, of the profitableness of a literary profession. On a trip to the East a little later he procured some Greek manuscripts and took ship again for Italy, bringing them with him. Petrarch and Boccaccio anxiously awaited his return. But while standing on the ship's deck during a storm he was struck and killed by lightning. Petrarch, who was then in Venice, had the shabby volumes which were found among the luggage examined to see if they included a Euripides or a Sophocles.<sup>3</sup> These books were perhaps the same that Boccaccio later brought to Florence,<sup>4</sup> the same perhaps that served in time as texts for the school of Chrysoloras.

<sup>1</sup> "Nam eum legentem Omerum et mecum singulari amicitia conversantem fere tribus annis audiui, nec infinitis ab eo recitatis, urgente etiam alia cura animum, acrior suffecisset memoria, ni cedula commendassem." *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xv, cap. 6. Hecker, p. 272.

<sup>2</sup> "Sed videndum vobis est ne hos duos tantos principes Graiorum uno fasce convolvere iniuriosius sit et mortales humeros pregravat divinatorum pondus ingeniorum." *Var.*, Fracassetti, vol. iii, p. 371.

<sup>3</sup> "Supellex horridula et squalentes libelli, hinc nautarum fide, hinc propria tuli inopia evasere. Inquiri faciam an sit in eis Euripides Sophoclesque et alii, quos mihi quesitum se spoponderat." *De Reb. Sen., Opp.*, p. 807.

<sup>4</sup> "Non multo post maiori Grecarum literarum aviditate tractus suis sumptibus, quamquam inopia premeretur, non modo Homeri libros sed nonnullos etiam codices Grecos in Etruria(m) atque in patriam e media, ut aiunt, Grecia (Boccaccio) reportavit; quod ante cum nullus fecisse dicebatur ut in Etruriam Greca volumina retulisset." Manetti, p. 146.



The work of Pilato was twofold. He gave Boccaccio lessons in Greek and translated Homer. But although Boccaccio was an assiduous and eager student, he made slow progress. What knowledge he gained was of the simple, uncritical, medieval kind. At the conclusion of his studies with Pilato he could copy a Greek word or a Greek line into his books, and, chief joy of all, he could expound and manipulate derivations. The longest passage which he ventured to transcribe was the well known hexameter distich on the birthplace of Homer. This he inserted both in the *Vita di Dante* and in the *Genealogia Deorum*, remarking magnificently that he remembered reading it in an antique Greek poem with which all scholars were familiar.<sup>1</sup> To his critics he protested that he did not employ these Greek phrases in any spirit of ostentation, but that he had worked long to acquire his skill and that he should not now be begrudged a little hard earned credit.<sup>2</sup> His aptitude for etymology he displayed more frequently. Where the formation was obvious he was apt to be roughly correct, where it was not, imagination took the place of knowledge. A few instances are sufficient to show the quality of his attainments. In one passage he repudiates vehemently the idea that the word, poetry, is derived from a commonplace verb, meaning to make. No, it is an ancient Greek term applied first to the melodious sound of verse, and means in Latin, "exquisita

<sup>1</sup> The form is not exactly the same in both passages. See Hecker, pp. 153-4. The lines were perhaps appended to the Greek text of Homer: "Quod ego etiam testari vetustissimo Greco carmine satis inter eruditos vulgato legisse menini." *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xiv, cap. 19. Hecker, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> "Fabulas Grecorum scripsisse, quarum hic liber plenissimus est, a nemine ostentationis causa factum dicitur; paucos inseruisse versiculos Grecis literis scriptis lacessitur . . . Michi autem irascuntur nonnulli, si preter nostro evo solitum Latinis Greca carmina misceo, et ex labore meo pauculum glorie summo." *Op. cit.*, lib. xv, cap. 7, Hecker, pp. 277-8.

locutio."<sup>1</sup> In a letter to a friend in the Augustinian order he explains the hidden sense of certain proper names used by himself in his Eclogues. Alcestus is the title for a strong king, for "Alce" is valor and "aestus" is heat.<sup>2</sup> Lycidas is a tyrant, from "lyco," a wolf, Dorilus an unhappy captive, from "doris," bitterness.<sup>3</sup> Olimpia is derived from "olimos," meaning shining or clear. Camalos (perhaps Amalos) means dull or slothful; the significance of Therapon the author has forgotten until he looks up the book in which he found it.<sup>4</sup> The fact which strikes one amongst all this erudition is that nowhere does Boccaccio reveal by word or sign that he has read a Greek book. His knowledge of things Greek excels that of his predecessors in quantity but not in kind. He possesses a larger fund of scraps of etymological and mythological information and he is acquainted with a new Latin version of Homer.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Cuius quidem poesis nomen non inde exortum est, unde plurimi minus advertenter existimant, scilicet a ποιο, pois, quod idem sonat quod fingo, fingis: quin immo a poetes, vetustissimum Grecorum vocabulum, Latine sonans exquisita locutio," etc. *De Gen. Deor*, lib. xiv, cap. 7. Hecker, p. 210.

<sup>2</sup> "Alce, quod est virtus, et estus, quod est fervor." *Lettere*, pp. 269-70.

<sup>3</sup> "Lycidam a lyco denomino, qui Latine lupus est . . . Doris quod amaritudo sonat." *Op. cit.*, p. 271.

<sup>4</sup> Olimpia, "ab Olimpos Grece, quod splendidum seu lucidum Latine sonat et inde coelum . . . Camalos Greci, Latine sonat hebes vel torpens, eo quod in eo demonstrentur mores torpentis servi. Therapon, huius significatum non pono, quia non memini, nisi iterum revisam librum ex quo de ceteris sumpsi, et ideo ignoscas. Scis hominis memoriam labilem esse et potissime serum." *Op. cit.*, p. 273.

<sup>5</sup> An illustration of the discussion aroused by some of Pilato's mythological teachings is given in the following extract. "Dicebat enim Leontius a Barlaam, Calabro, preceptore suo, et ab aliis eruditis viris in talibus audisse sepius temporibus Phoronei, Argivorum regis, qui anno mundi.  $\overline{\text{m}}$ . ccclxxxv. regnare cepit, Museum, quem ex inventoribus carminum unum diximus, insignem apud Grecos fuisse virum, et eodem fere tempore floruisse Lynum, de quibus adhuc fama satis celebris est, que eos apud nos etiam testatur sacris prefuisse veterum; et his etiam Orpheus additur Trax, et ob id primi creduntur theologi. Paulus autem Perusi-

The Homer of Pilato has never been printed in full. The first book of the Iliad and the first of the Odyssey have been recently published in the appendix to a large volume on the Latin writings of Boccaccio and from these one must judge the character of the whole.<sup>1</sup> During the course of the work Petrarch wrote begging to be allowed one word of advice, not to make the translation too literal.<sup>2</sup> His warning was evidently fruitless. Pilato had not the training nor capacity to attempt anything artistic. A strictly word for word reproduction was all that lay within his compass. His style can hardly be appreciated without the reading of one or two typical extracts. We quote accordingly from his account of the visit of the heralds to the tent of Achilles to take away Briseis.

nus longe iuniorem poesim esse dicebat, non mutatis auctoribus, asserens Orpheum, qui ex antiquis inventoribus, scribitur unus, temporibus Laumedontis Trojanorum regis, claruisse, qui evo Euristei, regis Mecenarum, apud Troyanos imperium gessit, circa annos mundi. m. dcccx., eumque Orpheum ex Argonautis fuisse, et non solum successorem Museo, sed eiusdem Musei Eiumolphi filii fuisse magistrum; quod etiam in libro temporum testatur Eusebius. Ex quo patet, ut dictum est, longe iuniorem quam diceretur apud Grecos esse poesim. Attamen ad hoc respondebat Leontius arbitrari a doctis Grecis plures fuisse Orpheos atque Museos, verum illum veterem Museo veteri atque Lino contemporaneum Grecum fuisse, ubi Trax iunior predicatur. Sane quoniam iunior hic Bachi orgia adinvenit et Menadum nocturnos cetus, et multa circa veterum sacra innovavit, et plurimum oratione valuit, ex quibus apud coevos ingentis existimationis fuit, a posteris primus creditus est Orpheus." I. c. Pilato argues that poetry was earlier among the Greeks than among the Hebrews, Perugino that Moses was a poet before any Greek was. Boccaccio is inclined to agree with Pilato. *De Gen. Deor.*, lib. xiv, cap. 8. Hecker, pp. 213-4.

<sup>1</sup> Hortis Studj, pp. 543 *et seq.* Nolzhaq quotes a few short passages with Petrarch's comments on them.

<sup>2</sup> "Unum sane iam hinc premonuisse velim, ne post factum siluisse poeniteat; nam si ad verbum, ut dicis, soluta oratione res agenda est, de hoc ipso loquentem Hieronymum audite . . . 'Si cui,' inquit, 'non videtur lingue gratiam interpretatione mutari, Homerum ad verbum exprimat in Latinum; plus aliquid dicam: eundem in sua lingua prose verbis interpretetur: videbit ordinem ridiculum et poetam eloquentissimum vix loquentem.' Hec dixi ut, dum tempus est, videas ne tantus labor irritus sit." *Epis. Var.*, Fracassetti, vol. iii, p. 370.

"Isti nolentes iverunt ad litus maris sine fece  
 Mirmidonum ad tendas et naves venerunt.  
 Hunc invenerunt in tenda et in nave nigra  
 Sedentem neque istos videns gravit (sic) fuit Achilles,  
 Isti autem pertimuerunt et verecundabant de rege,  
 Steterunt neque ipsum vocabant neque loquebantur.  
 Postquam hic scivit suis in sensibus vocavit ;  
 'Gaudete precones, Iovis nuntii atque et hominum,  
 Prope venite, non mihi vos causales sed Agamemnon,  
 Qui vos misit Briseidis causa puelle.  
 Sed eya, divine Patrocle, abstrahe puellam  
 Et ipsis des ferre. Hi ipsi testes sint  
 Ad deos beatos et ad mortales homines  
 Et ad imperatorem crudelem, si quando postea  
 Opus mei fiet mortalem morbum expelles ;  
 Aliis certe hic corruptibilibus sensibus cremabitur,  
 Neque scit intelligere simul ante et post,  
 Ut ei in navibus salvi pugnent Greci.'"<sup>1</sup>

Again from the description of the reception of Athena by Telemachus.

"Hec sentiens procatoribus simul sedens aspexit Athenam,  
 Ivit autem versus vestibulum, redarguit se in animo  
 Forensem diu in januis stare. Iuxta autem stans  
 Manum cepit dexteram et recepit ferream lanceam,  
 Et ipsam vocans verbis pennosis loquebatur ;  
 'Ave amice, nobiscum amicaberis, nam postea  
 Cenam cum finieris sermocinaberis cuius tibi opportunitas.'  
 Sic cum dixit precessit. Hec autem sequebatur Pallas Athena.  
 Isti autem quando iam intra fuerunt domum altam  
 Lanceam certe erexit ferens in columna longa  
 Vagina lancearum intus benefacta ubi alie  
 Lancee Ulixis talasifronos stabant multe,  
 Ipsarum (ipsam) autem in throno sedem (sedere) fecit ducens sub  
 pannum cum extenderat,

<sup>1</sup> Hortis, pp. 553-4. *Iliad*, A, ll. 329-346.

Bonum varium, sub autem scabellum pedibus fuit,  
 Penes autem ipsam curram posuit depictum extra alios.  
 Procatores ne forensis consultatus rumore congregationis  
 Cena sine delectatione se haberet, superbis cum advenerat,  
 Ac ut ipsum de patre absente interrogaret.  
 Cherniva pedisequa fudibili fudit ferens  
 Bono aureo supra argenteum lebetem,  
 Ut lavarentur: ante autem benefactam extendit mensam."<sup>1</sup>

As these lines show there was no effort to preserve sense or rhythm,<sup>2</sup> no feeling for genuine equivalents, nothing but a succession of words neither wholly Greek nor Latin.<sup>3</sup>

Nearly seven years passed from the time when Petrarch first planned the undertaking before he received his own copies of the completed work. Thenceforth both he and Boccaccio studied their Homers diligently, and alluded to them frequently in later writings.<sup>4</sup> Petrarch's manuscripts

<sup>1</sup> Hortis, p. 566. *Odyssey*, *u*, ll. 118-138.

<sup>2</sup> The two lines of hexameter quoted by Petrarch in the dialogue, *De Contemptu Mundi*, are perhaps his own remodelling of Pilato's version. They occur neither in Pilato's original, nor in any medieval Homeric poem. ". . . de te non minus proprie quam de Bellerophonte illud Homericum dici posset,

'Qui miser in campis errabat Aleis

Ipse suum cor edens, hominum vestigia vitans.'

Petrarch, *Opp.*, p. 357. The Greek reference is *Iliad*, Z, ll. 200-201.

<sup>3</sup> Homeric epithets are exactly and cumbrously reproduced. Achilles is "pedivelox," "acutuspedes, divinus." Hortis, p. 545, l. 58; p. 547, l. 121. Agamemnon, "ample regnans," p. 554, l. 357. Telemachus, "scientificus," p. 569, l. 213. Chryseis, "pulchram genas," or in another reading, "pulchras genas habentem," p. 548, l. 143. The Argives, "bene ocreati," "enea habentium indumenta," p. 544, l. 17, p. 571, l. 286. Among the gods Zeus is "capram lactantis," "delectanti in tonitruis," "nubium agregator," p. 550, l. 222, p. 556, l. 421, p. 558, l. 511. Hera, "canis oculos habens" "bovina oculos dulcis," "ferens albe (alba) brachia," p. 550, l. 225, p. 560, l. 568, p. 560, l. 572. Dawn, "erigenia rubeum digitum dies," p. 557, l. 477. Words which defy translation are incorporated outright, *e. g.*, "elicopeda puella," p. 546, l. 98, "hechibolo Apollini," p. 556, l. 439, "glauopsis Athena," p. 563, l. 44, "Mercurium certe diactoron Argiphontem," p. 565, l. 84.

<sup>4</sup> See for Petrarch, Nohac, pp. 349-350, Körting, vol. i, pp. 476-8; for Boccaccio, Hortis, pp. 371-2.

of the Iliad and Odyssey, closely annotated in his own hand, are still in preservation at Paris. The comments vary in character from explanations of difficult words by synonym and definition, or of dark passages by notes on Greek mythology and customs, to moral and religious criticisms on Homeric ethics and theology.<sup>1</sup> They serve to demonstrate again, if further demonstration were needed, Pilato's inadequacy as teacher and translator, Petrarch's zeal in the new pursuit, his consciousness of the importance of the achievement, and at the same time his failure to apprehend the poet's spirit through such a medium. One can hardly blame him that he shows no perception of the freshness and human interest of the epic story, and that he tries to compensate for the barbarity of the style by finding didactic and allegorical meanings in the simplest sentences. One cannot wonder that no outburst of delight follows his first reading or that a few years later we should discover him saying that Demosthenes had been succeeded by Cicero, Homer by Vergil, and that the later comers had equalled or excelled their models.<sup>2</sup> The lines of another sonnet writer four centuries afterward might have been his.

<sup>1</sup> For interesting and full citations see Nollac, pp. 355-366. Pilato must at times have given his imagination full swing, as in his elaborate discussion of the reasons why Homer began the catalogue of ships with the contingent from Boeotia, *op. cit.*, p. 356, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> "Ergo post Platonem atque Aristotelem de rebus omnem philosophie partem spectantibus Varro et Cicero scribere ausi sunt. Post Demosthenem de rebus ad eloquentiam pertinentibus Cicero idem, post Homerum poetice scribere ausus est. Maro; et uterque quem sequebatur aut attigit aut transcendit." He goes on to compare Latin historians, lawgivers, mathematicians, theologians with Greek to the advantage of the former, and ends: "Denique Grecos et ingenio et stylo frequenter vicimus et frequenter equavimus; imo, si quid credimus Ciceroni, semper vicimus ubi annisi sumus." *Rer. Senil., Opp.*, p. 913. This letter was written about 1370. Whether the words express more disappointment or relief might be hard to determine.

"Standing aloof in giant ignorance,  
Of thee I hear and of the Cyclades,  
As one who sits ashore and longs perchance  
To visit dolphin-coral in deep seas."<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless he never abandoned the task of studying and commenting upon the treasured pages. If early tradition be true, death, when it came, found him busy in his library over Pilato's *Odyssey*.<sup>2</sup>

The part of Petrarch and Boccaccio in the revival of Greek scholarship in the West may be briefly summarized as follows. They were the first men of influence to feel an ambition to read Greek literature in the original, and to express that ambition in words that made a lasting impression. They were also the first to inquire after artistic masterpieces heretofore ignored, after Homer and Euripides, as well as more didactic authors. They aimed to be humanists in Greek as in Latin. Against the overwhelming dominance of Aristotle they sought to oppose Plato. Their actual accomplishments fell far short of their desires. They never learned to read Greek. They knew but one new author in translation, Homer. Their stock of laboriously acquired information, linguistic and historical, was dubious in quality, soon to become totally discredited. They concluded by pronouncing Greek culture at its best inferior to Latin. But they set the fashion in literary circles of longing for more knowledge. They reminded Western Europe after generations of satisfied ignorance of what it had forgotten. They reintroduced Homer to Italy. The poverty of their translation was a stimulus to the production of a better in the following century. In short they gave the starting impulse to the movement which was to restore Greek literature in its original form to a place in the education of every cultivated European.

<sup>1</sup> Keats, *To Homer*.

<sup>2</sup> Nollhac, pp. 348-9.

Petrarch and Boccaccio died within a few years of one another, but the renewed and broader interest in the classics lived on in men who had felt their influence. Giovanni Malpaghini of Ravenna, in youth Petrarch's favorite pupil, set out twice on a quest through Italy for an opportunity to study Greek, hoping to discover a second Barlaam or Pilato.<sup>1</sup> Failing in this he became a teacher of Latin rhetoric and belles-lettres in Padua, perpetuating there the ideals of literary taste and earnestness which he had inherited from Petrarch.<sup>2</sup> Luigi Marsigli of the convent of San Spirito held a position in Florence corresponding to that of Malpaghini in Padua. A great admirer of Petrarch, he had continually on his lips the names which Petrarch had honored, Cicero, Vergil, Seneca. Among the younger students whom he inspired with a love for the classic past were some who were later to bring about the final revival of Greek in Florence.

Indeed, during the latter years of the fourteenth century,

<sup>1</sup> He even proposed a journey to Constantinople, but was dissuaded by Petrarch, who thought there was more likelihood of finding a satisfactory teacher in Italy. See a letter of introduction which Petrarch gave him at the time of his second expedition: "In primis autem literas Greecas sitit et senile Catonis desiderium, vixdum pubes, anticipat . . . Neu forsitan mireris, habet ista precipitatio rationis velum, cum enim primum illi animus fuisset recto calle Constantinopolim proficisci, edoctus a me Greciam, ut olim ditissimam, sic nunc omnis longe inopem discipline, hoc uno mihi credito, non omisit iter propositum sed inflexit, cumque ex me sepius audisset aliquot Graie lingue doctissimos homines nostra etate Calabriam habuisse, nominatim duos, Barlaam monachum ac Leonem seu Leontium. Quorum uterque mihi perfamiliaris, primus etiam et magister fuerat profecissetque aliquid fortasse, ni mors invidisset. Statuit Calabrum littus invisere et Italie plagam illam que magna olim Grecia dicta est. . . . Quod desperat apud Grecos, non diffidit apud Calabros inveniri posse." *Rer. Senil., Opp.*, p. 887.

<sup>2</sup> His reputation as a traveller, perhaps, once made his friend Salutato appeal to him on a question of Greek usage. "Demum habent Greci pluralem numerum duplicem; unum qui de duobus, alterum quem dicunt de pluribus significare. Quo, precor, si Grece sciveris ac voles loqui, quo, precor, plurali, dimetro vel polymetro, quempiam honoris gratia compellabis." Salutato, *Epist.*, vol. ii, pp. 473-4. It is doubtful if Malpaghini was able to answer so simple an inquiry.



Florence, in her season of freedom and prosperity, was the centre of intellectual activity of all kinds. Her architects and painters had begun the beautifying of the city with monuments of every description, the promise of still better things to come. The majestic dome of Santa Maria del Fiore was just rising beside the Arno. Many of her leading citizens were keenly interested in antiquities and artistic and literary subjects. Beside the serious meetings of scholars in the convent of San Spirito there were brilliant gatherings of poets and litterati in the gardens of the pleasure villas outside the walls. Wealthy young aristocrats, like Roberto Rossi, Palla Strozzi and Jacopo da Scarperia, applied themselves to the cultivation of the liberal arts, collecting enthusiastically manuscripts, coins and ancient carvings, stopping at no pains or expense to increase their own information or to add a gem to the museums of the republic. Nicolo Niccoli, the eldest son of a well-to-do merchant, caught the fever, abandoned his father's business and broke with his family in order to devote himself unreservedly to intellectual pursuits. Through Marsigli he was introduced to a study of the Latin classics. Whatever he could spare from his income he thenceforth spent on manuscripts, and by unwearying diligence he became the expert copyist and correlator of texts, the authority on correct readings, and the ablest detector of literary corruption of his day.

The man whose writings reveal most fully the culture of the later fourteenth century and who stood as the leader and patron of the whole literary movement in Florence, is Coluccio Salutati, for over thirty years chancellor of the republic, author of numerous state papers and works on historical, philosophical and moral subjects. Toward the end of Petrarch's life Salutati exchanged a few letters with him chiefly on political matters. At news of his death he composed an extravagant eulogy to his memory, setting him

above all the writers whom antiquity or "arrogant Greece" could boast.<sup>1</sup> He held Petrarch always in peculiar veneration and showed the effects of his influence in various ways. His Latin style was Petrarch's considerably exaggerated. An upright, laborious student of letters he lacked the sensitiveness of feeling and taste that marked the father of humanism. Even his correspondence is elaborate, oratorical, pompous, fairly loaded down with classic allusions and quotations. On the other hand, he shared with Petrarch in certain invaluable scholarly virtues, an unflagging energy in the search for lost masterpieces, a disgust for half informed teachers, careless librarians, bungling copyists and obscure and crude translators. In 1392 he wrote twice to Antonio Loschi, an acquaintance who had travelled in the East, pressing upon him the duty of rewriting Pilato's version of Homer. He should not be daunted by its barbarity, but should systematically set about recasting and polishing the phraseology until he obtained a product truly Homeric in diction as well as in thought. Nor should he be too literal nor too careful to make each Latin line match precisely with the Greek, but in the interests of art he should vary the cold narrative with interrogations and exclamations, adding or leaving out at discretion to make the story more attractive. Finally he would do well to write the whole in sonorous prose instead of attempting verse.<sup>2</sup> In these instructions

<sup>1</sup> "Et cum insolens Grecia se anteponeret in ceteris Latio vel equaret, in ethicis impar se vinci a Seneca fatebatur. Nos autem habemus quem possimus et antiquitati et ipsi Grecie non dicam obicere sed preferre: unum hunc Franciscum Petrarcam," &c. *Salutato, Epist.*, vol. i, p. 182.

<sup>2</sup> "Nec te terreat insulsa nimis illa translatio et quod nichil in ipsa secundum verba suave sit. Res velim, non verba, consideres; illas oportet extollas et ornes et tum propriis, tum novatis verbis comas, talemque vocabulorum splendorem adicias, quod non inventionem solum, nonque sententiis sed verbis etiam Homericum illud quod omnes cogitamus exhibeas atque sones.....Non etiam verbo verbum, sicut inquit Flaccus,

'curabis reddere fidus  
Interpres.'

for the new rendering of Homer there speaks already the reaction of spirit from the medieval slavish subservience to an original. The original, in Salutato's view, was to be altered and amended to suit a modern sense of style. With an allowance for differences in the standards of the times, Salutato's Homer might have reminded us of Pope's. Apparently Loschi never attempted it.

Salutato himself on one occasion tried his hand at re-touching a translation from the Greek. A copy of Plutarch, "De Remediis Irae," which had recently been put into Latin by one Simon, Archbishop of Thebes, stirred his indignation by the awkwardness and obscurity of its wording. Writing to the cardinal to whom he was indebted for the book he remarks, that one cannot, however, expect better from a Greek at a time when Latins themselves can scarcely aim at more than being grammatical. "We have," he says, "in this age no Cicero, Jerome, Rufinus, Ambrose, Chalcidius, Cassiodorus, Evagrius or Boethius to make us translations so polished and graceful that they are equal to the originals both in beauty and clarity. Still I am grateful to the good man who has given us Plutarch in whatever form. Would that we possessed other works of the same philosopher even in as poor a shape!" He adds that he has endeavored to turn this

nec carmini carmen connumerare. Denique cunctis debitam tribues maiestatem si soluta mutatis vel additis coniunctionibus nectes, si frigidiuscula tum exclamationibus, tum interrogando quasi quibusdam accendes igniculis; si denique poteris, inventa commutans vel omittens aliquid aut addens, seriem efficere gratiorem; et demum si primo nitaris tum magis propria, tum mage splendentia vel sonora vocabula, quam interpres ille fecerit, et ea eadem ipsa prosa non versibus in eandem sententiam adhibere. Hec satis." *Epist.*, vol. ii, pp. 356-7. The second letter on the subject was written two months later, assuring Loschi that he could perform the task satisfactorily if he only would. *Ibid.*, pp. 398-9. Later Salutato composed an invective against Loschi in return for his attack on Florence.

<sup>1</sup> "Misit mihi benignitas tua libellum Plutarchi De Remediis Ire, quem olim de Greco transtulit in Latinum iussione tua vir multe venerationis, Simon, archi-

semi-Greek version into true Latin, enlivening the monotony of the argument with exclamations and questions,—his unfailing remedy for inelegance and dullness. Fortunately or unfortunately no more of this work than Salutato's description of it has ever been printed.

Not only was he concerned with improving the quality of existing translations from the Greek, but once at least he contemplated the making of an original Latin version of a Greek book hitherto unknown. The renown of the library of Juan Fernandez de Heredia, grand master of the Knights of Jerusalem, had reached him, and he composed a letter of great length and ponderousness to inquire after lost writings of the historians which might be contained therein. He wishes it understood that he does not refer to the well known works of men like Eusebius, Cassiodorus, Josephus, Bede, Orosius, the thirty books of Livy or the Gallic and Civil Wars of Cæsar. But he is on a search for the rest of Livy, Trogus Pompeius and Quintus Curtius' "De Gestis Alexandri Macedoniae." Furthermore, he has heard that Don Juan Fernandez has had a translation made of forty-eight of Plutarch's Lives from ancient into vulgar Greek and thence into Spanish. He begs that a copy may be sent him. He may, perhaps, transfer it from Spanish into Latin. In return

episcopus Thebanus, quem tractatum avide discurrens mecum indignari cepi, tantam esse illius translationis obscuritatem tamque horrido stilo compositam, quod nulla prorsus alliceret suavitate lectorem, nec facile pateret quid nobis tantus philosophus tradidisset. . . . Nec tamen est ab hominis Greci professione requirendum Latinum eloquium, hac presertim etate qua vix supra puram grammaticam elevamur etiam nos Latini. Non sunt hoc tempore Cicerones, Hieronymi, Rufini, Ambrosii vel Chalcidii, non Cassiodori, non Evagrii, non Boetii, quorum translationes tante sunt venustatis atque dulcedinis, quod nichil possit ornatus vel perspicuitatis in his que transtulerunt desiderari. Habeo tamen illi optimo viro gratias qui nobis qualitercumque Plutarchum dedit. Utinam et cetera eiusdem philosophi vel taliter haberemus!" Salutato, *Epist.*, vol. ii, pp. 480-483. (Evagrius of Antioch [fl. c., 380] was reputed to be the author of the Latin version of the "Vita S. Antonii.")

he will gladly lend the grand master his Latin version of the *Odyssey* and anything else from his own shelves which the other may care to see.<sup>1</sup> The answer of Don Juan Fernandez has not been preserved. That Salutato's quest was in part successful may be inferred from the presence in Florentine libraries in after years of several manuscripts of an Italian rendering of Plutarch's *Lives*, the heading to which states that the book was first put into vulgar Greek by a Greek philosopher at Rhodes, thence into Aragonese by a Dominican bishop, learned in science, history and languages, at the behest of "Don Freyre Giovanni Ferrando di Eredia, by the grace of God master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem."<sup>2</sup> We may conjecture that Salutato found the labor of inter-

<sup>1</sup> "Nec peto communes istos quos habemus, Eusebium, Cassiodorum, Iosephum, Egesippum, Historias scholasticas, Bedam, Orosium, Iustinum, Eutropium, Paulum Diaconum, tres Titi Livii Decades, Salustii, Catilinarum et Iugurthinum, non Anneum Senecam, qui Florus inscribitur, non abbreviationem Titi Livii, non modernorum nugas, Specula videlicet historialia, Satyram Paulini, Martini Chronicas et si qua alia nostris his duobus edita seculis fuerit unquam tibi cura videndi; non etiam Suetonium de duodecim Cesaribus, non historicos illos, qui incipientes ab Adriano usque in Numerianum omnes Cesares Augustos atque tyrannos stylo non incongruo descripserunt, Spartianus, Capitolinus, Gallicanus, Lampridius, Trebellius, et Vopiscus: non commentarios Caii Cesaris de bello Gallico, quos multi non mediocriter errantes, ut arbitror, Iulio Celso tribuunt; non etiam communes illos de bello Civili, sed si quos alios videris aut habes, et presertim si de Tito Livio plus alicubi scias esse quam triginta libros. Si Trogum Pompeium vidisti vel habes aut unquam ubi sit percepisti et an totum repereris Q. Curtium de Gestis Alexandri Macedonie. Nimis equidem diminutum habemus. De historiis etiam Salustii, si qua unquam bella civilia, que Suetonius scripsisse creditur vel historias Claudii Cesaris inspexisti. Sed in Livio magis et cordaliter serves. Ceterum scio quod de Greco in Grecum vulgare et de hoc in Aragonicum Plutarchum de Historia xxxviii ducum et virorum illustrium interpretari feceris: habeo quidem rubricarum maximam partem. Cupio, si fieri potest, hunc librum videre; forte quidem transferam in Latinum. Ego autem habeo translationem *Odyssee* Homeri in Latino, quem librum audio te quesisse. Si iusseris, mittam hunc tibi et quicquid me habere senseris quod tibi placeat plus quam libenter." *Epist.*, vol. ii, pp. 299-301.

<sup>2</sup> Traversari, vol. i, p. ccxciv.

preting the Spanish more difficult than he had imagined, and bade some subordinate translate the whole into Italian, possibly still intending ultimately to carry it on from Italian into Latin. But there is no proof that the final metamorphosis was ever accomplished.

Like his predecessors, Salutato took delight in exercising ingenuity on Greek derivations. His knowledge of roots he derived from Boccaccio and the older sources for etymology, and he thought it not undignified to enliven the seriousness of a state letter with a happy play upon words. In a congratulatory epistle to Carlo di Durazzo, king of Naples, he reminds him that his name Carolus is compounded of "charis" and "olon," that is, "altogether gracious."<sup>1</sup> In a note to the chancellor of Bologna he remarks that he is amazed to hear that "melanconia," "that black humor," could ever lay hold of him.<sup>2</sup> In more sober vein he addresses to the bishop of Recanati and Macerata an expostulation on the news that the prelate has ordered the word "evangelium" to be spelled and pronounced "euvangelium" throughout his diocese. Salutato would like to know the authority for any such form. He has discovered none in the old authors. He is aware of the enigmatical lines in the *Grecismus* of Eberhard of Bethune,

"Good is 'eu,' and thence is 'evangelium';  
Evil, 'evan,' and thence is 'evangelium.'"

and of the fact that some texts spell "evangelium" of the first line with two u's, but he has no great respect for Eber-

<sup>1</sup> "Karolus enim a charis Grece, Latine gratia, et olon, totus, dicitur, hoc est totus graciosus." *Epist.*, vol. ii, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup> "Respondisti michi, frater optime, te melanconia perfusum meam litteram recepisse, in quo miratus sum, videns quod humor ille niger, talem enim quod et Grecum vocabulum sonat, physici volunt, te potuerit, ut scribis, plurimum occupare." *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 298.

hard.<sup>1</sup> "'Eu,' as Eberhard tells us and as every one says, is Greek, and means in Latin, good. 'Aggelos' is messenger, and with a change of the first g into n serves among us Latins as the word angel, hence 'evangelium,' which is, good tidings. I can see no reason nor necessity for inserting the second u, nor can the authority of Priscian or Donatus or any other be cited to support it."<sup>2</sup> The Greeks, he goes on to argue, never had a diphthong ending in u vowel. U after another vowel was always u consonant, or v with the sound of the Eolic digamma. They said Thesevs, not Theseus. The correct pronunciation of "evangelium" is with e vowel succeeded by u consonant. So Balbus and Brito, in their ecclesiastical treatises, and all learned scholars wrote the word. If the bishop's informer persists in his opinion he should advance proofs at once. However, Salutato would be glad to hear if the bishop has ever found the word "evangelium" in a malevolent sense as implied in the second line quoted from the Grecismus. "I know that 'Evan' is Bacchus; I know that 'Evantes' are Bacchantes, or frenzied, as 'evari' is 'bacchari,' to be in frenzy, but how 'evangelium' can be made to assume a similar meaning I would give much to know."<sup>3</sup> The problem remained insoluble.

<sup>1</sup>*Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 187-9. This is a curious letter, but it is impossible to quote more than short extracts.

"Euque bonum signat et ab hoc evangelium dic;  
Perversum sit evan: hinc fit evangelium." *Epist.*, vol. ii, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup>"Eu quidem, ut ille vult et omnes dicunt, Grecum est et bonum Latine significat. Aggelos autem nuncius est, qui apud nos, mutata penes Latinos prima g in n, angelus facit: inde evangelium, hoc est bonum annuncium. Nam interponi illam u nescio rationem videre vel necessitatem; nec id fieri debere potest auctoritate Prisciani vel Donati aut alterius demonstrari." *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>"Scio quod Evan Bacchus est: scio quod evantes idem est quod bacchantes et insanientes, sicut evari, bacchari vel insanire; sed qualiter ad hoc deducatur evangelium multifacerem edoceri." *Ibid.*, p. 189.

Of Greek itself, as one may readily gather from passages such as these, Salutato knew no more and probably less than Boccaccio. He and his generation represent no advance in actual knowledge or achievement. They stand simply as preservers of the tradition which Petrarch and Boccaccio handed on to them. Ignorant of Greek, they lamented their deficiencies and did what seemed possible to remedy them."<sup>1</sup> Concerned most of all with the gradual revival of the Latin classics, they did not forget that the source of Latin culture was the Greek and that the Greek too must be recovered in due time. Malpaghini, Marsigli, Niccoli, Salutato were all too old to learn the new language and to explore the new realms of thought when the opportunity finally came, but they had prepared another generation to profit by the privileges which they could not use. It was through the special exertions of Niccoli and Salutato in 1395 that Chrysoloras came to Florence.

<sup>1</sup> Salutato, *Epist.*, vol. i, pp. 51-2.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY.

---

References to Migne are to the *Patrologiæ*, Series Latina, except where the Series Græca is indicated.

- Abelard. *Ouvrages Inédits*, ed. Cousin. Paris, 1836. (Collection de Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de France.)
- Albertus Magnus. *Opera Omnia*, ed. Borgnet, 38 vols. Paris, 1890-1899.
- Alexander of Ville Dieu (de Villa Dei). *Doctrinale*, ed. Reichlung. Berlin, 1893. (*Monumenta Germaniæ Pædagogica*, vol. 12.)
- Augustine. *De Civitate Dei*. Bonn, 1888. (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, vol. 30.)
- Libri *Retractationum*. Bonn, 1902. (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, vol. 36.)
- Bacon, Roger. *The Greek Grammar of Roger Bacon, and a Fragment of his Hebrew Grammar*, ed. Nolan. Cambridge, 1902.
- Opera Quædam Hactenus Inedita*, ed. Brewer. London, 1859. (Master of the Rolls Series, vol. 15.)
- Opus Maius*, ed. Bridges. Vols. 1 and 2, Oxford, 1897; vol. 3, London, 1900.
- Bandini, A. M. *Bibliotheca Leopoldina Laurentiana seu Catalogus Manuscriptorum qui iussu Petri Leopoldi Arch. Austr. . . . in Laurentianam translati sunt*, 3 vols. Florence, 1791-1793.
- Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibliothecæ Mediceæ Laurentianæ*, 5 vols. Florence, 1774-1778.
- Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliothecæ Mediceæ Laurentianæ Varia Continens Opera Græcorum Patrum*, 2 vols. Florence, 1764-1768.
- Barbaro, Francesco. *Centotrenta Lettere Inedite*, ed. Sabbadini. Salerno, 1884.
- Becker, Gustavus. *Catalogi Bibliothecarum Antiqui*. Bonn, 1885.
- Benedict of Peterborough. *Gesta Regis Henrici II. et Richardi I.*, ed. Stubbs, 2 vols. London, 1867. (Master of the Rolls Series.)
- ✓ Bikélas, Demetrius. *Die Griechen des Mittelalters und ihr Einfluss auf die europäische Cultur*, tr. from the Greek by Wagner. Gütersloh, 1878.
- Boccaccio. *Lettere Edite e Inedite*, ed. Corazzini. Florence, 1877.
- Boutaric, E. *Vincent de Beauvais et la Connaissance de l'Antiquité Classique au Treizième Siècle. Revue des Questions Historiques*, vol. 17, 1875, pp. 5-57.
- Bracciolini, Poggio. *Epistolæ*, ed. de Tonellis, vol. 1. Florence, 1832.
- Bruni, Leonardi (Aretini). *Epistolarum Libri viii*, ed. Mehus, 2 vols. Florence, 1741.

- Budge, E. A. W. *Alexander the Great*. Cambridge, 1889. (Syriac Version.)  
*Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great*. London, 1896. (Ethiopic Version.)
- Budinszky, A. *Die Universität Paris und die Fremden an derselben im Mittelalter*. Berlin, 1876.
- Bury, J. B. *History of the later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene*, 2 vols. London, 1889.
- Cassiodorus. *Historia Tripartita*, Migne, vol. 69, cols. 879 *et seq.*
- Comparetti, D. *Vergil in the Middle Ages*, tr. Benecke. London, 1895.
- Cramer, F. *De Græcis Medii Ævi Studiis*, 2 vols. Stralsund, 1849 1853.
- Dante. *La Divina Commedia*, ed. Moore. Oxford, 1900.  
*The Divine Comedy*, tr. Norton, 3 vols. Cambridge, 1892.
- Denifle and Chatelain. *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*. 4 vols. Paris, 1889-1897.
- Denifle and Ehrle. *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters*. Berlin.
- Dictys Cretensis et Dares Phrygius. *De Bello Trojano*. London, 1825. (Delphin and Variorum Classics, vol. 1.)
- Dionysius Exiguus. *Opera*, Migne, vol. 67, cols. 9-520.
- ✓ Döllinger, J. J. von. *Einfluss der Griechischen Literatur und Cultur auf die Abendländische Welt im Mittelalter*. Akademische Vorträge, vol. 1. Munich, 1890, pp. 163-186.
- Donatus. *Ars Grammatica*, ed. Keil. Leipzig, 1864. (Grammatici Latini, vol. 4.)
- Dracontius. *Orestis Tragœdia*, *Poetæ Latini Minores*, ed. Bæhrens, vol. 5. Leipzig, 1883, pp. 218-261.
- Dubois, Pierre. *De Recuperatione Terre Sancte*, ed. Langlois. Paris, 1891. (Collection de Textes pour servir a l'étude et a l'enseignement de l'Histoire.)
- Du Méril, E. *Poésies Inédites du Moyen Age*. Paris, 1854.
- Egger, E. *L'Hellénisme en France*, 2 vols. Paris, 1869.
- Ekkehard of Aura (Uraugensis). *Chronicon Universale*, Migne, vol. 154, cols. 459-1060.
- Flamenca. *Le Roman de Flamenca*, ed. Meyer. Paris, 1865.
- Floire et Blanceflor, ed. du Méril. Paris, 1856. (Bibliothèque Elzevirienne.)
- Fredegarius. *Historia Francorum Epitomata*, Migne, vol. 71, cols. 575-604.
- Friedberg, E. *Corpus Iuris Canonici*, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1881.
- Gibbon, E. *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Bury, 7 vols. London, 1896-1900.
- Gidel, C. *Nouvelles Études sur la Littérature Grecque Moderne*. Paris, 1878.
- Gœtz and Gundermann. *Glossæ Latinogræcæ et Græcolatinæ*. Leipzig, 1888. (Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum, vol. 2.)
- Gottlieb, J. *Über Mittelalterliche Bibliotheken*. Leipzig, 1890.
- Gregorovius, F. *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, tr. Hamilton, 7 vols. London, 1894-1900.

- Grosseteste, Robert. *Epistolæ*, ed. Luard. London, 1861. (Master of the Rolls Series, vol. 25.)
- Hecker, O. *Boccaccio-Funde*. Braunschweig, 1902.
- Hefele, C. J. von. *Conciliengeschichte*, 9 vols. Freiburg, 1873-1890.
- Heiberg, J. L. *Die Griechische Grammatik Roger Bacon's*. Byzantinische Zeitschrift, vol. 9, 1900, pp. 47 *et seq.*
- Henry of Huntingdon. *Historia Anglorum*, London, 1879. (Master of the Rolls Series, vol. 74.)
- Hervieux, L. *Les Fabulistes Latins depuis le Siècle d'Auguste jusqu'à la Fin du Moyen Age*. Paris, 1884.
- Histoire Littéraire de la France, 32 vols. Paris, 1733-1898.
- Hortis, A. *Studj sulle Opere Latine del Boccaccio*, Trieste, 1879.
- Isidore of Seville (*Hispalensis*). *Chronicon*. Migne, vol. 83, cols. 963-1017.
- Etymologiarum Libri xx*, Migne, vol. 82, cols. 73-728.
- James, M. R. *The Ancient Libraries of Canterbury and Dover*. Cambridge, 1903.
- John of Salisbury. *Opera*, Migne, vol. 199, cols. 1-1038.
- Joly, A. *Benoit de Sainte-More et le Roman de Troie*, 2 vols. Paris, 1870.
- Jourdain, A. *Recherches Critiques sur l'Age et l'Origine des Traductions Latines d'Aristote et sur les Commentaires Grecs ou Arabes employés par les Docteurs Scolastiques*. Paris, 1843.
- Jourdain, C. *Excursions Historiques et Philosophiques a travers le Moyen Age*. Paris, 1888.
- Kirchen Lexikon, ed. Hergenröther and Kaulen, 12 vols. Freiburg, 1882-1901.
- Körting, G. *Geschichte der Literatur Italiens im Zeitalter der Renaissance*, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1878-1884.
- Lea, H. *History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, 3 vols. New York, 1900.
- Leclerc and Renan. *Histoire Littéraire de la France au Quatorzième Siècle*, 2 vols. Paris, 1865.
- ✓ Le Roux, J. D. *La France en Orient au XIV<sup>e</sup> Siècle*. (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, vols. 44 and 45.)
- Mandonnet, P. *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme Latin au XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, Freiburg, 1899. (*Collectanea Friburgensia*, vol. 8.)
- Manetti, Gianozzo. *Vite del Dante, del Petrarca, del Boccaccio*, ed. and tr. into Italian by Granata, Messina, 1838.
- Mansi, G. D. *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, 37 vols. Florence, 1759-1905.
- Martene and Durand. *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, 5 vols. Paris, 1717.
- Meyer, Paul. *Alexandre le Grand dans la Littérature Française du Moyen Age*, 2 vols. Paris, 1886. (Bibliothèque Française du Moyen Age, vols. 4 and 5).
- Muratorius, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 25 vols. Milan, 1723.
- Mythographi Latini, C. Iul. Hyginus, Fab. Planciades Fulgentius, Lactantius Placidus, Albricus Philosophus, ed. Muncker, 2 vols. Amsterdam, 1681.
- Nicetas Choniates. *Opera*, Migne, Series Graeca, vols. 139-140.
- ✓ Nollac, P. de. *Pétrarque et l'Humanisme*. Paris, 1892. (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, vol. 91.)

- Omont, H. *Fac Similés des plus Anciens Manuscrits Grecs en Onciale et en Minuscule de la Bibliothèque Nationale.* Paris, 1892.
- Orosius, Paulus. *Historiarum adversum Paganos Libri XII*, ed. Zangemeister. Leipzig, 1889. (Teubner Text.)
- Otto of Freising. *Chronicon.* ed. Pertz. Hanover, 1867. (Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in Usum Scholarum.)
- Paris, Matthew. *Chronica Majora*, ed. Luard, 7 vols. (Master of the Rolls Series, No. 57.)
- Historia Anglorum, sive, ut vulgo dicitur, Historia Minor*, ed. Madden, 3 vols. (Master of the Rolls Series, No. 44.)
- Payne, J. F. *Medicine*, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 8th edition.
- Petrarch, *Epistolæ de Rebus Familiaribus et Variæ*, ed. Fracassetti, 3 vols. Florence, 1859-1863.
- Opera quae extant omnia.* Basle, 1581.
- Philip of Harveng. *Epistolæ*, Migne, vol. 203, cols. 1-180.
- Poole, R. L. *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought in the Departments of Theology and Ecclesiastical Politics.* London, 1884.
- Priscian, *Institutionum Grammaticarum Libri XVIII*, ed. Keil, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1855. (Grammatici Latini, vols. 2 and 3.)
- Pseudo, Callisthenes. *Βίος 'Αλεξάνδρου*, ed. Muller, with Latin version, in Arriani, *Anabasis et Indica.* Paris, 1846.
- Querolus, ed. and tr. into French by Havet. Paris, 1880.
- Rashdall, H. *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 2 vols. Oxford, 1895.
- Reichert, B. *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Prædicatorum Historica*, vols. 1-6. Rome, 1897-.
- Renan, E. *Averroès et l'Averroïsme.* Paris, 1861.
- Richard de Bury. *Philobiblion*, in Eng. translation. London, 1832.
- Robert of Mont St. Michel (de Monte), *Cronica.* Mon. Ger. Scriptores, ed. Pertz, vol. 6, pp. 480-535.
- Robinson and Rolfe. *Petrarch; the first modern scholar and man of letters.* New York, 1899.
- Roger, M. *L'Enseignement des Lettres Classiques d'Ausone a Alcuin.* Paris, 1905.
- Roman de la Rose*, ed. Michel, 2 vols. Paris, 1864.
- Saintsbury, G. *The Flourishing of Romance and the Rise of Allegory.* New York, 1897. (Periods of European Literature, vol. 2.)
- Salutato, Coluccio. *Epistolario*, ed. Novati, 3 vols. Rome, 1891. (Fonti per la Storia d'Italia, vols. 15-17.)
- ✓ Sandys, J. E. *History of Classical Scholarship from the sixth century, B. C., to the end of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1903.
- Silius, Italicus. *Ilias Latina.* Poetae Latini Minores, ed. Baehrens, vol. 3. Leipzig, 1881, pp. 1-59.
- ✓ Taylor, H. O. *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages.* New York, 1901.

- Teuffel-Schwabe. History of Roman Literature, tr. Warr, 2 vols. London. 1892.
- Thomas Aquinas. Opera Omnia, published by order of Leo XIII, vols. 1-5. Rome, 1882.
- Thurot, C. Notices et Extraits de Divers Manuscrits Latins pour Servir a l'Histoire des Doctrines Grammaticales au Moyen Age. Paris, 1868. (Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Imperiale, vol. 22, pt. 2.)
- Tiraboschi, G. Storia della Letteratura Italiana, 9 vols. in 20. Florence, 1805-1813.
- Tozer, H. F. The Greek-speaking Population of Southern Italy, Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 10, 1889.
- Traube, L. O Roma Nobilis; Philologische Untersuchungen aus dem Mittelalter, Abhandlungen, Bayer-Akad. der Wissensch. Philosoph.-Philolog. Classe, vol. 19, 1892, pp. 353 *et seq.*
- Traversari, Ambrogio. Latinae Epistolæ, ed. Mehus, with Vita eiusdem Ambrosii, 2 vols. Florence, 1759.
- Vincent of Beauvais. Speculum Historiale, editio princeps. 2 vols. Strasburg, 14-
- Voigt, G. Die Wiederbelebung des Classischen Alterthums, 2 vols. Berlin, 1893.
- William the Breton (Armoricus). Gesta Philippi Augusti, Recueil des Historiens des Gaules, vol. 17, pp. 62-116.



## VITA

---

THE author of the foregoing essay was graduated with the degree of A. B. from Wellesley College in 1897. During the years 1898-1901 she held the position of Instructor in Classics and History at Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington. From 1901 to 1905 she pursued graduate work at Columbia University, receiving the degree of A. M. in 1902. In the summer of 1904 she spent two months in study in the library of the British Museum. In January, 1904, she was appointed Assistant in History at Barnard College, and during the year 1904-5 she served as Lecturer in History in the same institution. Since 1905 she has been Warden of Sage College and Lecturer in History in Cornell University.













# LUTHER'S TABLE TALK

A Critical Study

BY

PRESERVED SMITH, A. M.

*Sometime Instructor in Political Science at Williams College*

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1907









# LUTHER'S TABLE TALK

A Critical Study

BY

PRESERVED SMITH, A. M.

*Sometime Instructor in Political Science at Williams College*

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE  
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1907

D

**COPYRIGHT, 1907**  
**BY**  
**PRESERVED SMITH**

## PREFACE

THE following study aims to give a picture of the environment in which Luther and his guests conversed and of the men who noted down the sayings of the master. Each of these reporters was a source from whom others copied until practically all the sayings were united, after several stages of transcription, into great collections by various editors. We might compare the process of accumulation to that by which many springs pour their waters into the same great river, the original notebooks corresponding to the springs, the first copies to tributary streams, and the final editions to large rivers. From an account of this process, as little technical as possible, we naturally come to an appreciation of the literary and historical value of the Table Talk, treating it in a manner which is illustrative as well as critical.

Among many friends and scholars who have helped me with criticism and suggestion, I must thank especially those to whose constant interest I owe the most—Professor J. H. Robinson, Professor J. T. Shotwell, both of Columbia University, and my father, the Rev. H. P. Smith, D. D.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	5
I. LUTHER AND HIS GUESTS . . . . .	9
II. THE EARLIER REPORTERS OF THE TABLE TALK .	15
III. THE YOUNGER GROUP . . . . .	29
IV. THE SOURCES . . . . .	38
V. THE COLLECTIONS . . . . .	51
VI. THE PRINTED EDITIONS OF THE TABLE TALK .	63
VII. THE TRANSLATIONS . . . . .	76
VIII. THE TABLE TALK IN LITERATURE . . . .	85
IX. THE TABLE TALK IN HISTORY. . . . .	99
APPENDIX. THE LITERATURE . . . . .	III



## CHAPTER I

### LUTHER AND HIS GUESTS

IN the old town of Wittenberg the traveler may still see Luther's house looking much as it did three hundred and eighty years ago when he moved into it after his marriage. The veneration of posterity has restored it to the style of Luther's time and filled it with memorials of its famous occupant; pictures of Martin and Käthe on the walls; the old *cathedra* in the *aula* or lecture room; the bench on which Luther often used to sit with his wife, looking out on the neat garden in front.

The house had once been the Augustinian Monastery, and as such Luther's home for several years while he was a member of the order; but the progress of the reformed teaching had left it without occupants for some time before it became the dwelling of the ex-monk and his wife with their numerous dependents and guests. Here the reformer spent the happiest and most peaceful part of his career. The storm and stress of the previous years had given place to a period of comparative calm which was to last the rest of his life. The awful struggle in his own soul, the fierce revolt against the abuse of indulgences, the brave stand at Augsburg, the heroism of Worms, the imprisonment in the Wartburg and the perturbations of the Peasants' Revolt, all had passed. When Luther and his bride took possession of their home in June, 1525, they had before them twenty busy, useful years, years of comparative quiet and domestic happiness.

One cannot say years of domestic privacy. The Luthers kept open house and entertained not only their poor relatives such as old "Muhme Lehne" and their nieces, but many students as well, to say nothing of the distinguished strangers who visited Wittenberg. The table was always full. At the head the large form and strong face of the master would be conspicuous. He was a man of many moods, and his strong personality forced them on his guests, who took their cue from him, maintaining silence or talking seriously or jocosely as he set the example. At times he was lost in thought over some weighty problem of theology, or the vexatious attacks of the "Papists" or "Ranters," and again he was "happy in mind, joking with his friends." Near him we see the staid and dignified Schiefer, or the mournful Schlaginhaufen, intent upon his sins, or the irascible countenance of Cordatus. A strongly built woman, comely<sup>1</sup> in spite of her snub nose, serves the meal with the assistance of her female relatives, frequently participating in the conversation, occasionally the butt of an innocent joke from her husband, and sometimes quarrelling with the students who kept Luther from his dinner with their interminable questions. Let us hear from one of those present what a meal was like at Luther's table:<sup>2</sup>

As our Doctor often took weighty and deep thoughts with him to table, sometimes during the whole meal he would maintain the silence of the cloister, so that no word was spoken; nevertheless at suitable times he let himself be very merry, so that we were accustomed to call his sayings the con-

<sup>1</sup> Luther once thought her "wunderhübsch." Köstlin, *Martin Luther*, i, 764.

<sup>2</sup> Mathesius, *Luther Histories*, xii, 133a, quoted by Kroker, *Luthers Tischreden in der Mathesischen Sammlung*, Einleitung, p. 11. Cf. Köstlin, ii, 488, Anm. 1.



diments of the meal, which were pleasanter to us than all spices and delicate food.

If he wished to get us to speak he would make a beginning: What's the news? The first time we let the remark pass, but if he said again: Ye Prelates, what's the news in the land? then the old men would begin to talk. Doctor Wolf Severus [Schiefer] a travelled man of the world who had been the preceptor of his Roman Majesty's children, often was the first to introduce a subject, unless there was a stranger present.

If the conversation was animated, it was nevertheless conducted with decent propriety and courtesy, and the others would not take their turn at it until the Doctor spoke. Often good questions on the Bible would be propounded, which he solved finely, satisfactorily and concisely, and if any one took exception to any part, he would even suffer that and refute him with a proper answer. Often honorable people from the University were present, and then fine things were said and stories told.

Occasionally Luther would dictate something to one of the disciples. This was usually "some precious material in the interpretation of the Bible" such as the exegesis of the twenty-third Psalm which Rörer recorded one evening and had printed.<sup>1</sup>

Cordatus claims the honor of being the first to conceive

<sup>1</sup> Seckendorf, *Comment. Hist. de Lutherismo*, iii, 134. Seidemann, *Lauterbachs Tagebuch von 1538*, p. xiii. That this practice was common among the other disciples may be seen from Aurifaber's Introduction to his edition of the sermons: "These sermons have never been printed but by me, John Aurifaber, from the written books of honorable and blessed persons, such as M. Vitus Dietrich of Nürnberg, Item M. Georgius Rorarius, M. Antonius Lauterbach, and Herr Philip Fabricius (who took them from the holy mouth of Luther as he preached)." Quoted by Seidemann from the Eisleben edition of the *Sämmtliche Werke*, ii, 145b. These sermons were largely expositions of Scripture. Cf. also Seidemann, *ibid.*, p. 165; Bindseil's *Colloquia*, iii, 158.

the brilliant idea, so fruitful in later results, of taking down not only special pieces, but the general run of Luther's conversation. At first he had some compunctions about the propriety of making notes at his host's table, but habit overcame them. He says:

I was also aware that it was an audacious offence for me to write down everything I heard whenever I stood before the table or sat at it as a guest, but the advantage of the thing overcame my shame. Moreover the Doctor never showed, even by a word, that what I did displeased him. Nay more, I made the way for others, who dared to do the same thing, especially M. Vitus Dietrich and J. Turbicida [Schlaginhaufen] whose crumbs, as I hope, I shall join to mine, for the whole collection of pious sayings will be pleasing to me.<sup>1</sup>

The same reporter speaks of a notebook in which he kept the precious sayings, and Dietrich says that the notes were taken on the spot, just as if the disciples had been in the classroom.<sup>2</sup> Still more explicitly Schlaginhaufen observes: "I took this down while we were eating, after a funeral."<sup>3</sup>

Little discrimination was shown by the students who sat around notebook in hand, eager to catch and transmit to posterity the gems which dropped from their master's lips, "which they esteemed more highly than the oracles of Apollo."<sup>4</sup> Nothing was too trivial for them, and occasionally the humor of the situation would strike Luther.

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *Cordatus Tagebuch*, no. 133a. The Latin at the end is incorrect, but this seems to be the sense; it is "M. Vitus Dietrich et J. Turbicida quorum micæ (ut spero) illis meis conjunxero, omnis multitudo piorum gratis mihi erit."

<sup>2</sup> Dietrich, p. 165b. "Sequuntur anno 1533 excerpta inter colloquendum." Quoted by Preger, *Luthers Tischreden aus den Jahren 1531 und 1532 nach den Aufzeichnungen von Joh. Schlaginhaufen*, Einl., xiv.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 465.

<sup>4</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 24, quoting Cordatus.

Once when a widower sent a messenger to Luther asking him for assistance in the selection of a wife, the master, after the departure of the messenger, turned to his disciple with a laugh, and said: "For Heaven's sake, Schlaginhaufen, put that down, too!" Schlaginhaufen himself records the incident.<sup>1</sup>

In this connection it naturally occurs to us to ask whether Luther really disliked the practice of notetaking or not. In spite of the assertion of Cordatus that Luther never showed even by a word that he was displeased with his disciples' assiduity, it is certain that at times he regretted it. He was aware that he was exhibited to the world in *négligé*. "In St. Augustine's books," he says, "one finds many words which flesh and blood have spoken, and I must confess that I speak many words which are not God's words, both when I preach and at table."<sup>2</sup> Again he was probably thinking of the Table Talk when he said:

I pray my pious thieves, for Christ's sake, not to let themselves lightly publish anything of mine (albeit I know they do it with an upright, loyal heart) either during my lifetime or after my death. . . . I repeatedly pray them not to bear the burden and danger of such a work without my public consent.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 292.

<sup>2</sup> Hauspostille on the Gospel for the Sunday Jubilate. Walch: *Luthers Sämmtliche Werke*, xxi, p. 1248. Cf. also his preface to the "Little Sermons to a Friend," Walch, xii, p. 2375: "As we are men, there are many passages which are human and savor of the flesh. For when we are alone and dispute, we often get angry and God laughs at the extraordinary wisdom we display towards him. I believe he derives amusement from such fools as teach him how he should reign, as I often have done and still do." This preface to the *Conciunculae*, which appeared in 1537, was inserted by Cordatus as a preface to his Notes (Wrampelmeyer, *Einl.*, p. 41). It may have been that Cordatus was the friend to whom it was addressed.

<sup>3</sup> Walch, *Conciones quaedam D. Mart. Luth.*, xx, 2373.

At times he complained specifically and bitterly of conversations published by his friends; but he never seems to have interfered with any one during the many years in which a large number of men wrote down his sayings in his presence.

Melanchthon, however, on one occasion rebuked the indiscriminate zeal of Cordatus. The reprimand is recorded by the disciple on whom it apparently had not the slightest effect. He tells the story as follows:

I wrote in my notebook these words: Luther to Melanchthon: "Thou art an orator in writing but not in speaking." For the candor of both the speaker and the listener pleased me. Melanchthon wished to persuade him not to answer a book edited by the pastor of Cologne, whom Luther calls Meuchler von Trasen. But what I wrote did not please Philip, and so when he had asked again and again for my notebook, wherein I was accustomed to write what I heard, at length I gave it to him, and when he had read a little in it he wrote this couplet:

Omnia non prodest, Cordate, inscribere chartis,  
Sed quaedam tacitum dissimulare decet.

With quite unconscious humor Cordatus adds in the next section that he was confounded by Philip's poetry.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E. g., in the *Conciunculae* quoted above, where he complains bitterly that his friends have published *sermones quos ipsum sub coena et prandiiis effudisse* during his illness at Schmalkald.

<sup>2</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 133. The Latin, as generally in Cordatus, is confused, but the point is perfectly clear.

## CHAPTER II

### THE EARLIER REPORTERS OF THE TABLE TALK

LUTHER's life may naturally be divided into two periods by his marriage in June, 1525. Each period has its own character, sharply marked off from the other, and each has much internal unity. Nine-tenths of his political activity fell within the first period; it was a constant and fierce struggle; and by the time it was over the victory had been won and the great revolt from Rome was well under way. The second period was one of comparative quiet, of domestic experience, hospitality, preaching, teaching and writing; not less interesting than the more active part of Luther's career, but interesting in a different way. It is not so much the operation of a great political force as the significance of a great man's private life which now engages our attention.

With the exception of a doubtful note or two of Cordatus, all the records we have of the Table Talk fall within the second period. During these twenty years no less than a dozen men followed the practice of reporting their hero's words as he spoke them at table.<sup>1</sup> A list of these men at

<sup>1</sup> We know who took notes partly from the extant records, partly from references, especially the lists of their sources given by two collectors of Table Talk, Mathesius (*Luther Histories*, xii, 131b, quoted by Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 13) and Aurifaber (preface to his printed edition, reprinted by Walch, *op. cit.*, xxii, 40-55). These lists give the names of three men who did not take notes: Rörer (Förstemann-Bindseil, *Deutsche Tischreden*, vol. iv, p. xvi; Lösche, *Analecta Lutherana*, p. 10), Ferdinand a Maugis (Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xii; Köstlin, *op. cit.*, ii, 618), and Weber (Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 15). Besides the

this point will greatly clarify our subsequent discussion, especially if we put opposite the name of each the dates within which his notes were taken.

1. Conrad Cordatus. 1524-1537.<sup>1</sup>
2. Veit Dietrich (Theodoricus). 1529-1535.
3. Johan Schlaginhaufen (or Schlainhauffen, *alias* Turbicida, *alias* Ochloplectes, *alias* Typtochlios). 1531-1532.
4. Anton Lauterbach. 1531-1539.<sup>1</sup>
5. Hieronymus Weller. 1527-1538.
6. Antonius Corvinus. 1532.
7. Johannes Mathesius. 1540.
8. Kaspar Heydenreich (variously spelled). 1541-1543.
9. Hieronymus Besold. 1541-1546.
10. Magister Plato. 1540-1541.
11. Johannes Stolz (Stolsius). 1542-1546.
12. Johannes Aurifaber (Goldschmidt). 1545-1546.<sup>2</sup>

men mentioned in Mathesius' and Aurifaber's lists, we know that Cordatus (whose notebook is extant) took notes and that Corvinus probably did (Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 342). Others who have sometimes been thought to have taken notes, but who did not, are: Mörlin (Fürstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. xix; Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 15), Schiefer (Lingke, *Merkwürdige Reisegeschichte Luthers*, 1769, Einl., p. 3; Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xii; Lösche, *op. cit.*, p. 9), Jonas (Kawerau, *Briefe d. J. Jonas in Quellengesch. Sachsens*, vol. 15, p. 104; F. S. Keil, *Merkwürdige Lebensumstände Luthers*, pt. i, p. 161), and Melanchthon (*Corpus Reformatorum*, xx, 519-608; Lösche, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 19; Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. 34-37).

<sup>1</sup> A very few notes of Cordatus and Lauterbach can be assigned to dates later than those given opposite their names, taken on their visits to Wittenberg.

<sup>2</sup> The notes of Cordatus, Dietrich, Schlaginhaufen and Lauterbach are extant in something like their original form. The notes of Mathesius, Weller, Heydenreich, Besold and Plato are preserved (each notebook by itself) in the Mathesian collection. Corvinus is known only in one note copied by Schlaginhaufen. The notes of Stolz and Aurifaber have become indistinguishably merged in the collection of the latter.

The twelve men just enumerated fall into two distinct groups, the notes of six falling within the first fourteen years of the period and those of the others within the last six years. Cordatus and Lauterbach, to be sure, who are included in the first group, took notes on their visits to Wittenberg after 1540, but these sayings are few and unimportant. It is convenient to give a short account of the individual reporters of each group, in order to get a clear picture of the environment in which they worked.

The years 1525-39, within which the first group took notes, were active and important, though their importance has been overshadowed by the great events of the eight years immediately preceding. Every one who knows the name of Luther, knows of the 95 Theses and the Diet of Worms, and the translation of the Bible. Only second to these in Luther's fame stand the appearance before the Cardinal Legate at Augsburg, the burning of Pope Leo's Bull and the Canon Law, and the three great pamphlets of 1520. All of these<sup>1</sup> came before his marriage. We might compare Luther's career to that of a conqueror in which the events and labors just spoken of are the great battles by which a new country is subdued. The work which follows is less showy, but not less difficult; Luther's problem was no longer to conquer new territory, but to consolidate and organize what had been already won.

Thus we see his efforts in these years were chiefly absorbed in regulating and developing the church he had founded; and in protecting it first from the inroads of Zwingli and the Swiss, and then from the internal strife which threatened it with schism. The two Diets of Speyer, the Diet of Augsburg of 1530, the Articles of Marburg,

<sup>1</sup> The translation of the New Testament was done by 1522, and that of the Old Testament under way, though not completed till 1534.

the Religious Peace of Nuremberg, and the Wittenberg Concord mark successive stages of Luther's participation in the evolution of Protestantism. Towards the end of the period the bigamy of Philip of Hesse begins to weigh heavily upon him. His writings are no longer the trumpet calls to arms which we hear in the "Appeal to the Christian Nobility" and "The Babylonian Captivity," but the catechism and the hymns which did so much to put the services of the Church on a solid foundation. His domestic life, though disturbed by fear of the plague in 1527, was happy, and marked by the birth of several children.

The first of the reporters, Conrad Cordatus, was about seven years older than Luther, having been born at Weissenbach in Austria in 1476. After a number of years spent in wandering and studying theology in several places, during which he lost a lucrative ecclesiastical office in 1517 by joining the revolt against Rome, he finally came to Wittenberg in 1524, and spent a year with Luther. Returning home he was imprisoned on account of his religion for nine months, but escaped and returned to Wittenberg in 1526. From this time on he was practically a dependent of Luther's, who several times got him positions which he could not hold. The first of these was to teach in the new Academy founded by Duke Frederick II of Saxe-Weimarn and Brieg. The venture was not a success, however, and when the Academy failed, Cordatus was again without occupa-

<sup>1</sup> A short biography is given by Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, Einl. The sources for his life have been collected by Götze in *Jahresb. d. Altmärk. Vereins f. Gesch. u. Alterthumskunde*, vol. xiv, p. 57 *et seq.* (1861). His *Deutsch Postille* or Sermons preached at Niemergk, 1534, were published with a preface by Melanchthon in 1554. Kolde, *Anal. Luth.*, publishes some of his letters to Melanchthon. Much material is found in his Notebook of the *Tischreden*. Cf. Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no 1536, &c.



tion, and, after a short visit to his home, returned to Wittenberg in 1528. In 1529 he was called to be second pastor at Zwickau; but a sharp altercation with the burgo-master and Council caused him to leave "that Babel" two years later. For ten or twelve months (after August, 1531) he was Luther's guest; then he obtained an inferior position at Niembergk which he filled till 1537, when his hot temper got him into trouble again.<sup>1</sup>

While at Niembergk he maintained constant intercourse with Wittenberg, and some of his notes prove that he was still Luther's guest at times.<sup>2</sup> In 1536 he got into a dispute with Melanchthon, whom he called, with characteristic violence, "a crab crawling on the cross."<sup>3</sup>

In 1537 he was called to Eisleben, and from that time on filled several positions at a distance from Wittenberg, until his death, soon after that of Luther, in 1546.

In reporting Luther's sayings he showed more zeal than judgment, writing down whatever came in his way, whether he heard it himself or learned it from some one else. He may have begun the practice as early as 1524, but he did not take many notes until 1532, when he spent a year with Luther between his pastorates at Zwickau and Niembergk. After his call to Niembergk in 1533 he made occasional visits to Wittenberg, during which he took some notes, closing the record in 1537, when he went to Eisleben.

His intimacy with Luther is proved by anecdotes of which the notebook is full. He affectionately relates that

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 1462. He complains of his hard life at Niembergk and Luther comforts him.

<sup>2</sup> These dates, however, are uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> Kolde, *Anal. Luth.*, p. 279. Cf. Köstlin, ii, 455. They were afterwards reconciled and Melanchthon edited his sermons.

Luther often offered him his silver goblets in case of need. Again when he and Hausmann were sitting with Luther, the master remarked that a gift of 200 gulden would not please him so much as their company.<sup>1</sup> The pair resembled each other in fearlessness and violence. Luther well characterized Cordatus (and unconsciously himself) when he said: "When God needs a legate who shall set forth his affairs strongly and dare to correct the vicious, he uses the wrath of some person like Cordatus, a man hard in speech and temper."<sup>2</sup>

His irascibility must have made him at times an unpleasant guest. He was generally on bad terms with Käthe, and sometimes with his fellow guests. One day the conversation waxed so interesting that Luther forgot to eat. When Käthe tried to recall her husband to mundane affairs he replied with some warmth that she ought to say the Lord's prayer before she spoke. "Then I," demurely observes Cordatus, "tried to bring him back to the former subject of conversation by asking him about Campanus and his redundant style."<sup>3</sup>

When Luther, to his regret, could not help his friend Hausmann with a small loan, Cordatus had the bad grace to ask him why he had just let Käthe buy a garden, to which Luther replies, rather weakly, that he could not withstand her prayers and tears.<sup>4</sup> Again Cordatus records a biting remark about Käthe's loquacity. "He called the long speeches of his wife 'a woman's sermons' (*mulierum praedicationes*), because she would constantly interrupt his

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, nos. 56 and 57. Cf. for other anecdotes nos. 989, 1408, 253, 133a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., p. 13 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. III, IIIa, IIIb.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

best sayings. And Dr. Jonas has the same virtue [? of interrupting]." <sup>1</sup>

Occasionally Luther felt called upon to administer a mild rebuke, as when Cordatus asks for an explanation of the expression *concupiscentia oculorum*. Again Luther tells him plainly, "You wish to be master and perchance to be praised, and thus you are tempted." <sup>2</sup>

Cordatus was middle-aged before he knew Luther. Dietrich, on the other hand, was a mere youth when he first met him. Born at Nuremberg, 1506, he came to Wittenberg in 1522, <sup>3</sup> with the intention of studying medicine, a vocation which Luther <sup>4</sup> induced him to abandon for theology. In 1527 he became a sort of amanuensis to Luther, accompanying him in this capacity to Koburg in 1530, and thence to the Diet of Augsburg in the same year. <sup>5</sup> He lived at Luther's house from 1529 to 1534, leaving in this year partly, perhaps, on account of a quarrel with Käthe, <sup>6</sup> but also doubtless because he was contemplating marriage, which took place in the next year. He was called to the pastorate of St. Sebald, in Nuremberg, in May, 1535, by the Council of that city. In this position he still maintained close relations with Luther and Melanchthon. In 1537

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, no. 120. Jonas reciprocated by calling him a fire-brand. *Corpus Reformatorum*, iii, 1500.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 74, 75, 115, 116, 161, 162.

<sup>3</sup> This date is given by Kroker, Einl., p. 8. Herzog in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* gives 1527. My account is taken partly from Herzog, partly from Köstlin, and partly from Kroker, who used the unpublished *Tagebuch* and corrected some errors in previous accounts. A Life by Storbel came out in 1772. His correspondence is in *Corpus Reformatorum*.

<sup>4</sup> Dietrich, fol. 186, quoted by Köstlin, ii, p. 200, note 1, "*vocatio quae me a medicina ad theologiam vocaverat.*"

<sup>5</sup> Köstlin, ii, 514, 523. Herzog is in error in *Allg. Deut. Bib.*

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Kroker, Einl., 8.

he subscribed to the Schmalkaldic Articles on behalf of his Church. Ten years later he attended the Colloquium at Regensburg.

Dietrich was drawn into several theological quarrels.<sup>1</sup> Like Cordatus, he was a quick-tempered man, and took any contradiction of his views much to heart. His last years were embittered by the triumph of his enemies and broken by ill-health. He died at Nuremberg in March, 1549.

He wrote little of his own, but was an active editor and translator of Luther's writings.<sup>2</sup> His own notes and the copies he made from those of others are extant either in their original form or in copious extracts.<sup>3</sup> They testify his constant attendance on his master. He nursed him through the severe illness which attacked Luther in 1530, after the Diet of Augsburg. If we may believe the man of God, this affliction was due to the direct interposition of the devil, whom he saw in the form of a fiery snake hanging from the roof of a neighboring tower. With his habitual shiftiness, however, the old Serpent changed his form into that of a star when Luther endeavored to point him out to his disciple.<sup>4</sup>

Johann Schlaginhaufen, a native of Neunberg in the Upper Palatinate, makes his first appearance in May, 1520, when he matriculated at Wittenberg.<sup>5</sup> He was ap-

<sup>1</sup> The first of these was on the question of private *vs.* general absolution, Osiander supporting the former and Dietrich the latter. The second was on the elevation of the Elements. The restoration of this practice at Nuremberg, 1549, broke his health.

<sup>2</sup> Herzog, *loc. cit.* Cf. Köstlin, ii, 157.

<sup>3</sup> His notes are not printed. Seidemann prepared them for the press and his copy was used by Köstlin. Cf. *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Dietrich, fol. 143, quoted by Köstlin, ii, 206.

<sup>5</sup> G. Bossert, in *Ztschr. f. kirch. Wiss.*, 1887, p. 354 *et seq.* New material on his life added by Preger, Einl., p. vi.

parently slow of study, for the next time he emerges, eleven years later, he is still a student, and a table companion of Luther besides, as we know from his notes of 1531 and 1532. In the latter year he was employed at Zahna, a mile from Wittenberg, whence he kept up an intimate relation with his former host. Ill-health and poverty clouded his sojourn here, which was, however, short, as he was called in December, 1533, to the more promising field of Köthen, as pastor of St. Jacob. Prince Wolfgang of Anhalt-Köthen made him superintendent, but did not support him in the plan of church visitation he attempted to introduce. This complicated the situation, and being still troubled by ill-health and small means, he sought another position, and obtained, at Luther's recommendation, the pastorate of Wörlitz. Here his health improved, his compensation was more adequate, and his plans of church visitation and remodelling the service on that of Wittenberg worked smoothly and successfully.

With his friend Helt, Schlaginhaufen went to Schmalkalden in 1537 as a representative of his church, for which he subscribed to the Articles. He then went home with Luther, who was suffering terribly from the stone, from which he hardly expected to recover, but of which he was suddenly relieved at Tambach. The disciple carried the news of his master's recovery back to the Prince, who had stayed behind, and was so full of it that, as he galloped into the town, he shouted triumphantly to the Papal Nuncio, whom he saw looking out of a window, *Lutherus vivit!*<sup>1</sup>

The date of Schlaginhaufen's death, which must have been later than 1549,<sup>2</sup> is not precisely known. His authen-

<sup>1</sup> Köstlin, ii, 399, 400.

<sup>2</sup> As we know from a letter of Jonas to Chancellor Rabe, in Kawerau, *Briefwechsel d. J. Jonas*, ii, 287.

tic literary remains are confined to a sermon, in a rousing style, preserved in the archives at Zerbst, and a book of *Tischreden* which we possess in a copy possibly made by his son-in-law, J. Obendorfer of Köthen.<sup>1</sup>

Schlaginhaufen won a place in Luther's household by many a little service gladly performed in return for his entertainment, for which he was too poor to pay. It is pleasant to believe that he got along with Käthe and the children better than some of the other guests. When Luther fainted, at the election of Rector, May 1, 1532, Käthe sent the little girl to notify him first, and then Melancthon and Jonas.<sup>2</sup>

The poor fellow was much troubled with melancholy, which took the form of unceasing lamentation over his sins. Luther, whose own early struggles had given him a fellow-feeling for his disciples, was wondrous kind and patient in comforting him. When Schlaginhaufen fainted on December 31, 1531, Luther indulged in a violent invective against the malice of Satan, and prescribed various methods of foiling him. When restored to a semi-conscious state, the victim of the diabolic machination could only groan out "My sins! my sins!" but a quarter of an hour more of exhortation and ghostly comfort finally enabled him to rise and go home.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bossert attributes to him a witty satire on Eck, written 1530, entitled *Eckii Dedolati ad Caesaream Maiestatem Oratio*. (Cf. Pirckheimer's *Gehobelte Eck* or "Rounded-off Corner.") This was probably not his however, but by a writer with a similar name—Schlahinhaufen. Cf. Preger, Einl., vi *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> Preger, no. 77. He obtained the degree of master at an unknown date. Cf. *ibid.*, no. 323.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, p. 57. Cf. Luther's letter to him Mar. 10, 1534, De Wette, *Luther's Briefe*, vi, 148, wrongly quoted by Preger as Mar. 10, 1532, De Wette, iv, 494.

We now come to Anton Lauterbach, the most copious of all the notetakers, as well as one of the most energetic of later editors. Born at Stolpen in 1502, of well-to-do parents, he matriculated at Leipzig in the summer-semester of 1517 as of the "Meissen" nation.<sup>1</sup> He came to Wittenberg in September, 1521,<sup>2</sup> for a short visit, but he did not become a regular student there until April, 1529. He gives us much the same testimony as Luther on the prevalent lack of Biblical teaching. "I was a bachelor before I ever heard any text from the Bible, which was a mighty scarce book in those days."<sup>3</sup> He took his master's degree at Wittenberg, and became a frequenter of Luther's table in 1531.

In 1533 Lauterbach was called to fill the office of deacon at Leisnig; but a quarrel with the pastor caused him to seek, and obtain, a similar position at Wittenberg.<sup>4</sup> Here he was married, in the same year, to a nun named Agnes, and probably lived with his father-in-law, at least for a while. He was, however, a frequent guest at Luther's, if not a constant boarder for many years. During 1538, especially, he noted sayings of Luther for almost every day. He had similar *Tagebücher*, though not so full, for other years.

His regular connection with Luther was terminated in

<sup>1</sup> His father may have been the burgomaster of that name. My account is taken mostly from Seidemann, Einl., p. v *et seq.*—an elliptical series of references to authorities, with a few words thrown in here and there. Anton tells an interesting story of his father and Tetzl. Bindseil, iii, 248.

<sup>2</sup> If he is not mistaken in saying so; he may have confused the date, or 1521 may be a slip for 1541.

<sup>3</sup> Note in Bindseil, i, 136 (not in Dresden MS.).

<sup>4</sup> In 1536. See De Wette, iv, 583, 672; v, 37, with Kroker, Einl., 9 Anm.

July, 1539, when he himself was called to Pirna, an event which he relates in the following terms:

When Master Anthonius Lauterbach was called away by the Senator of Pirna, he bade adieu to his teachers, and asked that he might be kept as deacon still. Doctor M. Luther answered: "It seemed good to God to call thee to the pastorate of Pirna, and thou doest well that thou obeyest, and although we would willingly keep thee here, we may not act contrary to his will."<sup>1</sup>

He returned to Wittenberg once a year to see his old hero, and take down a few more of his precious words.<sup>2</sup> After a long and acceptable ministry in Pirna he died there in 1569.<sup>3</sup>

Lauterbach's hobby was recording, collecting and arranging Luther's sayings. Käthe's shrewd remark<sup>4</sup> that of all the disciples whom Luther taught gratis Lauterbach profited the most, was fully justified, at least if we may judge by the quantity of material which he has left us. He took notes himself pretty constantly from 1531-1539, and also on the short visits he later made to Wittenberg. Besides his own notes he made a large collection of the notes of his fellow-students. Finally he endeavored to blend all these sayings into one great collection, a piece of work which, in spite of repeated efforts, he could never complete to his own satisfaction. No less than four redactions of such a collection have come down to us, one of which was the basis of the famous edition of Aurifaber.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bindseil, iii, 127.

<sup>2</sup> Proved by notes of his taken in these years.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, p. viii. His bust may be still seen over the sacristy.

<sup>4</sup> Kroker, no. 332.

<sup>5</sup> For his notebooks, see *infra*, chapter iv; for his collections, chapter v.



Hieronymus Weller was born at Freiberg in 1499. He studied twice at Wittenberg, the second time in 1525, when, under Luther's influence, he changed from Jurisprudence to Theology. In 1527 he came into Luther's house, where he lived until 1536, when his marriage with Anna am Steig necessitated his setting up housekeeping for himself. In May, 1538, he left Wittenberg to become court preacher to the Prince of Anhalt and Dessau; in 1539 he was called to his native place as Professor of Theology, in which situation he lived until his death in 1572.<sup>1</sup>

Weller is a less conspicuous and a less amiable figure than some of Luther's other guests. He took little part in the conversation, scarcely any of his remarks having been recorded. On one occasion he is "consoled" by Luther in a way somewhat disparaging to his character, and on another the company reflects rather severely on his cowardice.<sup>2</sup> His notes must have fallen between 1528 and 1537. A considerable number of them have come down to us,<sup>3</sup> but they are of little value, as they were taken in a slovenly way, and mixed at random with notes copied from others, especially from Lauterbach.

Antonius Corvinus is known to us only through one note which Schlaginhaufen says he copied from him.<sup>4</sup> It is an explanation of what the remission of sins is. If he really took notes, they were probably few, especially as he was never long at Wittenberg.

Born at Marburg, 1501,<sup>5</sup> he first appears to history as

<sup>1</sup> Kroker, Einl., 10.

<sup>2</sup> Seidemann, pp. 71, 141.

<sup>3</sup> At least if Kroker is right in identifying sections 4 and 8 of his publication with Weller's notes.

<sup>4</sup> Preger, no. 342.

<sup>5</sup> My account of Corvinus is taken partly from the *Allg. Deut. Bib.*, partly from Kroker, Einl., p. 11. Corvinus wrote an account of Eras-

a monk in the cloisters of Rigdagshausen and Loccum, where he probably obtained his education. The attraction of Luther's teaching brought him to Wittenberg for a short time in 1525. We see him in Marburg in 1526 as preacher and professor in the new University of that city. Later he became connected with Philip of Hesse, and took part in the Conventions of Ziegenhain (1532), Cassel (1535), where Melancthon and Bucer had a disputation, and Schmalkalden (1537). He was active in propagating the Reformation beyond the borders of Hesse, for which the enemies of the new faith imprisoned him from 1549 to 1553. Shortly after his release, at the intercession of Duke Albert of Prussia, he died.

mus's attempt to reconcile the two Churches about 1533. It is described as "impartial and conciliatory," which is hard to believe when we learn that Luther wrote an introduction to it. Köstlin, ii, 320.

## CHAPTER III

### THE YOUNGER GROUP OF REPORTERS

IN spite of domestic sorrow and increasing ill-health, the last years of Luther's life show no relaxation of that indomitable spirit and energy which had characterized the vigor of his young manhood. Vexed by the bigamy of Philip, and the use made of it by the "Papists," and worried by the illness of Melanchthon in 1540, the religious conferences at Worms and Regensburg in 1541 and the measures necessary to discipline the Reformed Church made severe demands upon his strength in the following years. He found time, however, to revise his translation of the Bible, and to produce a number of polemic and homiletic works. His sufferings from the stone became constantly worse, and his feelings were harrowed, at first by the dangerous illness of his wife in 1540, and still more by the death of his favorite child, Magdalene, at the age of thirteen, in 1542. We find him as active as ever in the last year of his life, and only a few weeks before his death in February, 1546, he undertook a journey to Eisleben.

One by one all the young men who had been accustomed to take notes at his table left him, and for a while, at the end of 1539, there was a time when his conversations were not reported at all, which one would think would have been a great relief to him. Other students soon appeared, however, to renew the practice, and Lauterbach and Cordatus made occasional visits during which they would improve the convivial hour by collecting a few notes in their old way.

Luther probably entertained his students gratuitously.

There is never any mention of board bills in the Table Talk, and when Luther speaks of a financial transaction between a student and himself, the student is usually the beneficiary.<sup>1</sup> Doubtless some of them, as Dietrich, Lauterbach, and Auri-faber, paid for their entertainment in services as secretaries. The relation of *famulus* is one which has lasted to the present day, and is immortalized in the person of Faust's Wagner. Other students, as perhaps poor Schlaginhaufen, may have been taken for charity, and so expected to be ready to do odd jobs in return: possibly Cordatus would have been kept as a well-known theologian and sufferer for the Protestant cause. Luther's carelessness and generosity in money matters is well established; but he may have taken something from those of his guests who could afford it, rather however, in the way of gifts, than of stipulated rent or board.<sup>2</sup>

Of the younger group of reporters, Johannes Mathesius, who was to rival Lauterbach in the diligence with which he collected Luther's Table Talk, and to surpass him in the discrimination with which he arranged it, was first on the scene. His father was a Councilor of Rochlitz, where he was born in 1504.<sup>3</sup> Johann attended the so-called "trivial"

<sup>1</sup> As where he records having paid something to have a student's room done over. *Hausrechnung*, De Wette, *op. cit.*, vi, 328. This shows that Plato (the student in question) roomed as well as boarded with Luther.

<sup>2</sup> Köstlin, ii, 498 *et seq.*, gives a full account of Luther's means of support, chief of which was his salary from the Elector of 300 florins besides something "in kind." He also made a profit from his garden and brewery and received occasional gifts. The translator of Köstlin (Chas. Scribner & Sons), whose name is not given, says that Luther, like other professors, took boarders for pay. I am unable to find this in the original. Professor Calvin Thomas kindly informs me that it was unusual for poor students to pay; and it may be that the practice of entertaining them was a survival of the old monastic custom.

<sup>3</sup> His life, which I have consulted, was published by G. Lösche under

school, (i. e. school in which the elements or *Trivium* were taught), and, after 1521, the Latin school at Nuremberg. During the years 1523-1525 he studied at Ingolstadt, from whence he drifted into Bavaria, where he became converted to the Protestant cause. The renown of Luther and Melanchthon drew him to Wittenberg in 1529, but he did not, at this time, come into close relations with his teachers. In 1530 he was called as *Baccalaureus* to the school at Altenberg, and in 1532 was promoted to the headmastership of the Latin school at Joachimsthal, a mining town which had recently sprung up. Although his beneficent activity in this position drew many scholars and spread the fame of the school and its head, he had always felt a preference for the clerical calling, and when about thirty-five years old the opportunity came to him to follow his inclination. The providential means of fulfilling his pious wishes was a lucky speculation in mines<sup>1</sup> which by 1540 had enabled him to realize enough to re-enter Wittenberg as a theological student. The recommendations of Jonas and Rörer got him the much-prized honor of a seat at Luther's table.

Mathesius has been called, though incorrectly, Luther's *famulus*.<sup>2</sup> How long he was his guest is not certainly known, but probably no longer than from May to November, which is the period covered by his notes of the Table Talk. That he was still occasionally invited to Luther's

the title, *Johannes Mathesius. Ein Lebens- und Sittenbild aus der Reformationzeit* (last edition 1904). The same scholar published his *Ausgewählte Werke*, 4 Bd., Prag, 1904 (2d edition). Short lives of Mathesius are given in Kroker, Einl., p. 11 *et seq.*, and Lösche, *Anal.*, p. 7 *et seq.*

<sup>1</sup> He became a partner in the lucrative mining business of Matthes Sax in 1538.

<sup>2</sup> Lösche, *Anal.*, p. 7, n. 4; Kroker, p. 11 *et seq.*

table, we know from the fact that in the lectures he later gave on Luther's life, he sometimes relates anecdotes of his hero's conversations from the years 1541 and 1542.<sup>1</sup> The reason he had to leave the house in November was due to the circumstance that he had collected a number of pupils to tutor. At first Luther kindly took the pupils with the master, boarding as many as four at one time, but when Mathesius added still others he saw he had to draw the line somewhere and the promising boarding school left the house to seek some less inspiring, if more expensive, refectory.<sup>2</sup>

After taking the degree of master in September, 1540, he spent nineteen months more in study, and then returned to Joachimsthal in the capacity of deacon. He visited Luther in the spring of 1545 and later became pastor of the church at Joachimsthal, where he died in October, 1565. During his later life he made a collection of *Tischreden* taken down by others, and added them to his own.

We have already seen in what enthusiastic terms he speaks of the privilege of eating with Luther, and hearing him converse.<sup>3</sup> His statement, made long afterwards in a sermon, that the disciples would not speak until spoken to, and that then it was usually Schiefer who answered for the company, is curiously borne out in his notes. He hardly ever mentions himself or any of the younger men as saying a word; the name of Schiefer however, appears often. We observe too, that a greater number of jokes are recorded in his notes than in any of the earlier notebooks, a pleasant proof that Luther was not weighed down

<sup>1</sup> The *Luther Histories*. Out of 32 pages, 26 are devoted to anecdotes of the year 1540, 4 to 1541, and 2 to 1542.

<sup>2</sup> Kroker, Einl., p. 40, quoting *Luth. Hist.*, xiv, 165b, and xvii, 209. See also Kroker, no. 167.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, p. 10.

by the cares of his declining years, and an incidental indication of the increasing reverence in which he was held. The first reporters had noted down only serious remarks, now facetious, even damaging ones, are considered worthy of record.<sup>1</sup>

He himself was less zealous in taking notes at first than he was afterwards, and occasionally missed a good chance, as we see in an anecdote in a sermon he preached many years later. He relates there that on Whitsuntide, 1540, he heard Luther recount the story of his life up to the Diet of Worms. Of this story, which impressed itself so deeply on his memory, there is nothing in the *Tischreden*.<sup>2</sup>

Kaspar Heydenreich, another of the reporters, was born in Freiberg, 1516. He was the successor of Mathesius in the headmastership at Joachimsthal in 1540, but resigned this position in 1541, and went to Wittenberg, where he took the degree of master on September 15 of the same year. On October 24, 1543, he was called to the position of court preacher to the Duchess Katharina, widow of Henry the Pious, whose residence was Freiberg. He followed her later to Torgau, where he became superintendent. Here he died in his seventieth year in 1586. A considerable number of his notes falling between 1541 and 1543 found their way later into the Mathesian collection.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For jokes, see Kroker, nos. 3, 27, 90, 94, 95, 96, 99, &c. We also see Luther's preoccupation with Philip's bigamy during this period. Cf. *ibid.*, nos. 181, 182, 188, 189, 200, 206, 210, &c.

<sup>2</sup> *Luther Histories*, xiii, 147a. (Quoted by Kroker.) It is possible, of course, that he may have been mistaken in the date.

<sup>3</sup> A short notice of his life is found in Kroker, Einl., p. 13. His authority is K. G. Dietmann: *Die gesamte der ungeänderten Augsp. Confession zugethane Priesterschaft in dem Churfürstenthum Sachsen*. Bd. 4, p. 738.

Hieronymus Besold was born at Nuremberg about 1520. He came to Wittenberg to study in 1537 and attached himself to Melanchthon with whom he soon became a favorite. He did not begin his notes until after 1540, however, and only a few of them, belonging to the year 1544, have survived, in the Mathesian Collection. He was still Luther's guest at the time of the Reformer's death, after which he went to board with Melanchthon. Through the recommendation of the latter, he obtained a position at Nuremberg in November, 1546. His career was checkered, due to his varying attitude on the Interim. In 1555 he took the opinion contrary to that of his father-in-law, Osiander, and signed the *Confessio Anti-Osiandrina*. In 1562 he was carried off by the plague.<sup>1</sup>

He completed the work, left unfinished by Dietrich's death, of editing the *Enarationes in Genesin*. His notes are of little value. It is painful to discover that he was, like Cordatus and Dietrich, on bad terms with Käthe, whom he considered a "domineering, avaricious woman," and of whom he stood in awe at first. Later their relations improved, and Käthe used him to perform some little household commissions, a willing return on his part, for the hospitality shown him.<sup>2</sup>

Of Master Plato, whom Mathesius speaks of as one who took notes after him, we know but little. He was probably Georgius Plato Hamburgensis who took his master's degree at Wittenberg, September, 1537. Luther speaks of paying five florins to renovate his room in 1542, which would indicate that he not only boarded but lodged with

<sup>1</sup> Förstemann-Bindseil, vol. iv, p. xiv; Kroker, Einl., p. 13. Only 19 sayings are attributed to him. (Kroker, nos. 260-271.)

<sup>2</sup> Köstlin, ii, 496.



his professor. His notes fall in 1540. He followed the bad practice which we discovered in Cordatus, of introducing the notes of others freely among his own, taking Mathe-sius especially as a source from whom to copy. We know his record in three copies, one that used by Melanchthon later in giving his lectures. Luther speaks of him as an ardent opponent of the Papacy.<sup>1</sup>

Johannes Stolz was a Wittenberger by birth. He was matriculated as a student at that university in the winter-semester of 1533-1534. In 1537 he went with Jacob Schenk to Freiburg, but soon returned. He took his master's degree at Wittenberg, September 18, 1539, and three days later was called to the pastorate at Jessen, but shortly after returned to Wittenberg as docent. In 1546 he was dean of the Philosophical Faculty. In 1548 he was court preacher at Weimar. He died late in 1558 or in 1559. His notes have become indistinguishably lost in the Aurifaber collection. They must have fallen between 1542 and 1546 when he was with Luther.<sup>2</sup>

Johannes Aurifaber, the last of the reporters, and the first and most famous of the editors of the *Tischreden*, was born in the county of Mansfeld, about 1519. In 1537 he was sent to Wittenberg by the help of Count Albrecht Michael. In 1542 he became tutor to the young count of Mansfeld, and a year later field chaplain for the same patron. In 1545 he again returned to Wittenberg and spent

<sup>1</sup> Kroker, 235. Plato is ignored by the *Realencyclopaedie* and the *Allg. Deut. Bib.* Mentioned only once by Köstlin, ii, p. 676 n. to p. 487. He refers to De Wette, vi, 328, "Luthers *Hausrechnung*," where we find the entry "*5 Platon Stublin*." The note there calls him "Simon Plato Nobilis Pomeranus," but Kroker shows this to be incorrect and gives the true name. Einl., p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> This resumé is taken from Kroker, Einl., p. 14.

a year with Luther as his guest and *famulus*, accompanying him in the latter capacity to Eisleben in the last year of Luther's life. After his death, Aurifaber again became field chaplain in the army of the Elector of Saxony in the Schmalkaldic War, and in 1550 he was appointed court preacher to John Friedrich der Mittlere.<sup>1</sup>

He took an active part, on the side of the Gnesiolutherans, in the quarrels which arose among the former leader's students. Employed in various diplomatic and confidential missions in the next few years, he got himself into trouble with Chancellor Brück on account of his firm stand against the sectaries. He was obliged to flee to Mansfeld in 1561, where his old patrons maintained him in leisure for some years. It was during this time that his *Tischreden* was prepared for publication (the book appeared in 1566) and others of his works relating to Luther. In 1565 he became pastor at Erfurt, and won the favor of the council there. He died ten years later in 1575.

In his first stay at Wittenberg, he did not come into personal contact with Luther, and he tells us in his preface that his notes were only taken in the last two years of Luther's life.<sup>2</sup> He had already begun to collect Lutherana in 1540, and by 1553 he tells us that he had 2000 of Luther's letters. As the basis of his edition of the *Tischreden* he took the fourth redaction of Lauterbach, translated the Latin words into German and added some material of his own and others. The arrangement gives no indication of the sources from which he took the various *Tischreden*, so it is impossible to say, except from internal evidence, which often cannot be applied, what notes are his own, what are

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Realenc.*, ii, 291. Short lives of Aurifaber are given in the Introductions of Förstemann-Bindseil, Walch and Kröker.

<sup>2</sup> See *Supra*, p. 5.

Besold's, what Lauterbach's and others. It would be a conceivably possible, though a stupendous and almost fruitless task, to unweave the web he has woven and assign each of his sayings to its proper source, where these are already known, and distribute the residue, with some probability, to him or others according to the time in which they apparently fell.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The proofs of the statements, and some account of his work more in detail, will be given later.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SOURCES

IN the Preface we compared the process of accumulation whereby the sayings of Luther were gathered from a large number of primary sources into a few large collections, to a great river system in which many springs send tributaries into a few great streams. This comparison, however, gives no idea of the complexity of the process, and we might make the simile more exact if we imagined a large number of canals and aqueducts taking water from each spring and conducting into a number of tributaries at once, and crossing back and forth from one stream to another until the waters of all were thoroughly mixed. The simplest way of grasping the situation is by turning to the table in the Appendix, where the relations of the MSS. and editions are plotted in such a manner as will make the method of transcription and composition of the collections clear.

It will be seen from this table that we start with the twelve men who have left us records of the Table Talk. The notes of four of these are extant in their first form, or a close copy of it. They are: Cordatus, Schlaginhaufen, Dietrich and Lauterbach. Five others, Mathesius, Plato, Besold, Heydenreich and Weller are known by transcriptions into the Mathesian collection, and sometimes elsewhere. Of the others, Corvinus has left us but one note (taken into Schlaginhaufen's book), and the sayings taken down by Stolz and Aurifaber have become inextricably blended in the collection made by the latter. Besides these notebooks, we have one source of a different kind, in the

Luther Histories of Mathesius. For convenience we shall treat the sources under the three heads: 1. The Notebooks extant in their first form. 2. The Notebooks in the Mathesian Collection. 3. The Luther Histories.

*1. The Notebooks extant in their original form*

As might be expected, the diaries in which the disciples preserved their master's sayings, show all degrees of accuracy. Their value, though in all cases superior to that of the later collections, is very unequal, depending chiefly upon three things: *a.* whether the notetaker was a rapid and good writer or not. *b.* whether he dated his notes or not. *c.* whether he put down only what he heard, or also copied from his friends. We need not consider, at this stage, the possibility of conscious falsification, either in the interests of pious edification, or for any other cause. There would be no such alteration, because, the notes being kept for private use, there would be no motive for disturbing them. Later, when they began to be published, they suffered much in this way.

The best of the notebooks is that of Lauterbach for the year 1538. In this he carefully dated every saying, and he copied little or nothing from any one else. The notebooks of Schlaginhaufen and Dietrich occupy a middle place; dates are not given for every saying, but the notes were taken chronologically and approximate dates are easily deducible for all the sayings, exact dates for many. Schlaginhaufen tells us he copied one remark from Corvinus,<sup>1</sup> and we suspect him of taking a few others from Dietrich and Cordatus, but only a few. Dietrich kept what he copied from others in a separate book, and hence his own notebook is free from sophistication. His notes, unfortunately not yet published, are said to show a great

<sup>1</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 342.

degree of precision.<sup>1</sup> Those of Cordatus are the least reliable; he copied so much and so promiscuously that it is hard to assign any original value to his notes except in the cases in which they can be expressly proved to be his. His notebook, in fact, stands half way between a source like that of Schlaginhaufen, and a collection, such as those we shall consider in the next chapter. Let us now take up the notebooks briefly, in order.

As has been said, Cordatus was the first to think of preserving the Table Talk of Luther. His notes were not used by Mathesius or Aurifaber in their later collections, perhaps because Cordatus took pains to keep them from getting into circulation, mindful of Luther's injunction to his friends not to publish anything without his knowledge.<sup>2</sup> His notebook was first found and published in 1885 by Wrampelmeyer.<sup>3</sup>

Only very vague limits can be fixed as to the time within which his notes fell. The earliest date assignable from internal evidence is 1524 or 1525. The record was closed in 1537 when Cordatus left Wittenberg, as is proved by the naïve subscription of the man whom Cordatus employed to copy his notes, which reads: "Praise and thanks to God that I am at the end, for I have simply written myself half to death, and yet wouldn't give up. May God restore my right side which is smitten with cramp from immoderate writing. 1537. Glory to God! Finis."

<sup>1</sup> Preger, *Einl.*, p. xxiv.

<sup>2</sup> As Wrampelmeyer conjectures, *op. cit.*, *Einl.*, pp. 40, 41.

<sup>3</sup> From a MS. in the Library at Zellerfeld. The identity of the author is established both by the inscription on the cover and internal evidence, such as the use of the first person. *E. g.*, "Ad me, cum Wittenbergae agerem propter Verbum, quoties dixit: Cordate, si vos non pecuniam habetis, &c." See also passage quoted above (p. 14) and Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, nos. 56, 133, 133a.

The value of the source under discussion is seriously impaired by the fact that the author copied promiscuously from his contemporaries Dietrich and Schlaginhaufen, mixing, as he expresses it, their crumbs with his in a mass of pious sayings, which may be pleasing to him but is extremely puzzling to the investigator. The copying was done not at one time, and in a separate part of the book, but concurrently with the process of notetaking by the author himself. Thus we have now a note of Cordatus, then a few from Dietrich, then one or two from Schlaginhaufen and back to Cordatus again.<sup>1</sup>

Dietrich and Schlaginhaufen also copied something from him and from each other, but in an entirely different way, and one which does not impair the value of their notes. Cordatus copied by far the most, and mixed what he copied indistinguishably with his original material.<sup>2</sup>

Dietrich's extremely valuable report, which is preserved in the Nuremberg city library, still awaits an editor.<sup>3</sup> It has been incorrectly attributed to Mathesius on the basis of

<sup>1</sup> The question of the authenticity and chronology of Cordatus' notes is extremely intricate. Wrampelmeyer (*op. cit.*, Einl., pp. 38, 39) gives a table of dates, which shows that he thinks he can fix the time of about 100 out of nearly 2,000 sayings. I consider his table unsatisfactory. On Cordatus' relations to Dietrich, Schlaginhaufen and Lauterbach (from whom he copied very much), see Kroker, Einl., p. 55; Preger, *op. cit.*, pp. xxiv-xxvi. Cordatus was immensely overestimated by Wrampelmeyer; he is, perhaps, unduly depreciated by the later investigators.

<sup>2</sup> Schlaginhaufen copied little; Dietrich kept what he copied separate from what he took himself.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann prepared this MS. for the press, but died before printing was actually begun. Köstlin used it in Seidemann's copy. Cf. Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 27, note 1. Köstlin, *op. cit.*, Vorwort to second edition, and vol. i, p. 774, vol. ii, p. 487. Dietrich's notes are discussed here, his *collection*, an entirely different book, in the next chapter.

an inscription on the binding, but internal evidence proves that Dietrich was the author.<sup>1</sup> On close examination Preger found he could date the individual notes, at least approximately. In their present form they are part of a manuscript which contains other material also. It has been proved that the part containing the Table Talk is simply bound in with the other material, and not copied with it from a common source by the same scribe. In binding, the quires of the notebook were disarranged; they originally followed one another in chronological order, which was restored by Preger.<sup>2</sup>

The conversations reported fall, as is stated in the title, within the years 1529-1535; the great majority of them demonstrably within the years 1531-1533.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The inscription is, "Mathesii ἀντίγραφον." This is certainly an error, probably caused by some half-obliterated words on the parchment binding, of which "Mathesii" is one of the few still legible. These words very likely contained some expression of Mathesius, or some quotation from him; whatever they may mean, it is certain the MS. is from Dietrich's notes. For proof, *cf.* Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xviii. Also Seidemann, *Sächsische Kirch- und Schulblatt*, 1876, no. 43. Lösche, *Analecta*, p. 10. Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 224, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> They are contained in pp. 33-200 of this MS. The notation of the quires is E-DD. An older notation, represented by the small letters, b-q, can be discerned, which lettering is found only on the sheets which have *Tischreden*. The order, mixed in the binding, was restored by Preger, *quem vide*, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. xix-xxi. There is an Appendix of quires, F, G and H, which have no small letters. They probably contain copies from Dietrich's collection, and not, properly, his own notes. They puzzled Preger, who did not know that Dietrich kept a separate book for copies. *Cf. infra*, next chapter.

<sup>3</sup> The dates are ascertainable partly by marginal notes, partly by internal evidence, such as reference to some contemporary event. Preger gives the dates and evidence, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. xix-xx. He thinks the reference to the happy estate of the peasants points to the good harvest of 1530. It seems to me that the reference is rather to the good fortune of peasants in general in being free from temptation. The other indications used by Preger in dating appear to me perfectly sound.



Schlaginhaufen's book of Table Talk was discovered in a MS. in the Munich Library and edited by Preger in 1888.<sup>1</sup> It appears to be almost entirely original, though the author tells us he got one saying from Corvinus (no. 342), and another (no. 142) appears to have been copied also, perhaps from Dietrich or Cordatus. As we have just seen, Schlaginhaufen was much copied by them.

His notes fall in the years 1531-1532, and were taken by him in chronological order.<sup>2</sup> Schlaginhaufen is one of the most accurate and conscientious of the reporters, giving not only the substance but the exact form of Luther's words; as nearly as possible. Careful as he was, however, we can see that at times he wrote from memory, and not, as usually, on the spot, "just as if at a lecture." For example, the long exhortation by which Luther assisted him to recover from his swoon (no. 57) could not have been taken at the time, when he would have been in no condition to write. We have a curious indication, however, that it was written down the next day.<sup>3</sup> In other cases it is natural to suppose that details of time, place and circumstance were added later.

Lauterbach was the author of a large number of books of Luther's Table Talk. These books may be divided into two classes, the notebooks (*Tagebücher*), in which he first entered the sayings as he heard them at table, and the collections, in which he afterwards edited and arranged

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., p. v, proves the MS. to be from Schlaginhaufen's notes.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., pp. xv, xvi.

<sup>3</sup> This is that when Cordatus copied it he dated it the day after it happened, probably copying the day of its entry rather than the day of its occurrence. In general, the accuracy of Schlaginhaufen is seen by the roughness of his notes. Kroker, *op. cit.*, (Einl., p. 3,) suggests this may have been due to the fact that Schlaginhaufen could not write as fast as Dietrich.

his raw material. He never did this in a way which permanently satisfied him, and so we have four redactions of the great edition. They will be discussed later, in the chapter on the collections. His early books of *Tischreden* may again be divided into two classes, those which he kept for his own notations, and those in which he copied what was taken down by his friends (we have called one of these his simple collection as opposed to his large edition, spoken of above.) Of the former class we possess one, the *Tagebuch of 1538*, in a close copy of the original, and two others, one containing material compiled during the years 1536 and 1537, and one for 1539, in the form in which they were later incorporated into the Mathesian Collection.<sup>1</sup>

The *Tagebuch of 1538* is by far the most accurate source we have. It begins on January 1 and goes to December 12, dating each entry exactly, though not containing an entry for every day. Luther's words are put down in their exact form, the mixture of Latin and German which he used being retained. For his own remarks Lauterbach generally employs Latin, as the easier of the languages to write quickly.<sup>2</sup>

The notes are full as well as accurate. Lauterbach spent no less conscientious toil on them than Rörer did on his reports of Luther's sermons. From them and from Luther's letters we can get a clear and detailed picture of just what the reformer was doing and thinking every day of the year 1538.

<sup>1</sup> The relations of the sources to the later collections is made clear in the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> This *Tagebuch* was edited by Seidemann in 1872. In his Preface (pp. iii and xiii) the editor proves the accuracy of the notes. A later critic discovers some omissions, cf. W. Meyer: "Ueber Lauterbachs und Aurifabers Sammlungen der Tischreden Luthers" in *Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaften der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil. Hist. Klasse*, Neue Folge, 1897, vol. i, no. 2, p. 37.

The rapidity of writing caused some errors, and is constantly betrayed in the rough style of the notes.<sup>1</sup> Thousands of changes are made in the later collections in the material taken from this with the desire to improve the literary form and sometimes the sense also. For example, it is recounted of a locksmith's apprentice, how he saw an evil spirit which chased him for several hours one evening through the streets of Wittenberg and asked him whether he believed the catechism and why he had taken the Lord's Supper in both kinds, and forbade him to return to his master's house, which he therefore shunned for some days. Lauterbach and others brought him to Luther, who said, "We must not believe every one, because many are imposters." In the later collection the sense is completely altered; it is not the devil, but Luther who questions the young man on his faith.<sup>2</sup>

Lauterbach's notes for 1536-7 were absorbed into Weller's collection and with it taken into the Mathesian collection.<sup>3</sup> His notes of 1539 have survived in a copy made by the Rev. Paul Richter in 1553-1554. From this a small selection was made and incorporated into the Mathesian collection.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> E. g., Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 44. "3 Martii Luther habebat convivium sui regni. Ibi coenabantur, recitabantur psalmi evangelia catechismus orationes prout singulis erat demandatum; sed familia in pronunciando respirebat." Here *respirebat* is senseless and *coenabantur* is strange. In the MSS. *Wer.* and *Mun.* (see Appendix), and in Bindseil these words are corrected to *haesitabat* and *canabantur* respectively. Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 38. Meyer is criticising Seidemann's editing.

<sup>2</sup> As given in the *Tagebuch* it is undoubtedly correct, though Luther's response is inconsistent with his usually credulous attitude. Other examples given in Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 37. The anecdote is given in Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 6, for Jan. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Secs. 4 and 5 of Kroker's *Tischreden in der Mathesischen Sammlung*. See *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Sec. 6 of Kroker. For Richter, see Appendix on MSS. His MS. is called *Colloquia Serotina*.

2. *Notebooks which have survived in the Mathesian Collection*

Besides the notebooks of the four men discussed in the first part of this chapter we have notes of Mathesius, Heydenreich, Besold and Weller, which were taken in part into the Mathesian collection. Mathesius made his collection on a different plan from those of Lauterbach and Auri-faber, who took the notes out of their original order and re-arranged them topically. Mathesius copied his sources one after the other, so that we can distinguish the contributions of each, date the notes and estimate their relative value. But though the Mathesian collection is divided into sections corresponding with the sources from which the editor copied, he does not tell us who is the author of each particular one, and the nice work of discrimination has to be based upon internal evidence. Kroker, who has edited Mathesius, has done the work admirably, and our account will follow him. Leaving the features which are common to the whole collection to be dealt with later, we shall now proceed to speak briefly of the individual notebooks which compose it.

The most important of these is Mathesius' own *Tagebuch*, printed by the editor as the first section of the collection.<sup>1</sup> The sayings fall in the months of May to November (except July, when Luther was away) of the year 1540. The order is that in which Mathesius took them down from day to day. The reporter did not take the trouble to date every entry he made, as did Lauterbach, but from the dates given and those deducible we can assign each saying to very nearly the proper day. Entries are not made every day, but there are some omissions, the longest of which are for the month of July, when Luther went to

<sup>1</sup> Evidence for the dates of the sayings given, Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 27.

Weimar and Eisenach, and at the end of August, when either Mathesius may have left for a short time—Luther's beer had given out—,<sup>1</sup> or else he remitted his activity in taking notes because of Käthe's sharp reflection on the practice, recorded by Mathesius<sup>2</sup> in the following anecdote:

When somebody asked the Doctor a question his wife said jestingly, "Doctor, don't teach them free! For they have already learned much so, Lauterbach the most and the best." The Doctor answered, "I have taught and preached freely for thirty years; why should I begin to charge now?"

The other notes which have come down to us in this collection are of less importance. Those of Plato will be treated more fully in the next chapter, as they resemble a collection more than they do a notebook. A large and valuable selection from Heydenreich's notes of the years 1542 and 1543 is given in the second section of the Mathesian collection as printed by Kroker. Only excerpts were taken by Mathesius, as is proved by the fact that all the jokes, which must have been present, as they are so frequent in Mathesius' own notes, are omitted as unimportant.<sup>3</sup>

Besold's notes (a few poor ones only have survived) from the year 1544 are taken into the third section of Kroker's<sup>4</sup> edition of Mathesius. Weller's notes also form a section of this work. He kept two books, one of which we may call a notebook, and one a collection, though there

<sup>1</sup>Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 417, August 24.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, no. 332. See also no. 334, note.

<sup>3</sup>There are 158 sayings of Heydenreich dated by the superscription 1542. Kroker (*op. cit.*, Einl., p. 40) proves some of them to have been from 1543. He proves in the same place that the section comes from Heydenreich. The sequence of the sayings was disturbed, just as in the cases of Dietrich and Schlagenhaufen, in the binding.

<sup>4</sup>Sec. 3 of Kroker's *Mathesius*, no. 260-271, Einl., p. 44.

is not much difference between them. He copied much from Lauterbach in both, and we have to distinguish the source of each by internal evidence.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. *The Luther Histories of Mathesius*

Besides the sayings which have come down to us in the notebooks we have just been discussing, quite a number have survived in a different sort of a work where they are introduced casually, and do not constitute the main interest. This work is a series of "Sermons," or lectures, on Luther's life, published by Mathesius thirty years after he had ceased to take notes at Luther's table. Even after this stretch of time, the author was able to remember and recount some sayings of Luther which are found nowhere else, and for which, therefore, these lectures must be considered the source. It is easy to see how much less weight can be given to this than to the other sources which were written on the spot. Let us see how far Mathesius was dependent on his memory, and how far on his own, or others', previous notes.<sup>2</sup>

If we compare Mathesius' collection with his sermons we see that a great deal of material is common to both. Hardly a page of the latter is without some parallel in the former, parallels to his own notes of 1540 being especially

<sup>1</sup> Weller's *notebook*, sec. 4, Kroker; his *collection*, sec. 8. See Kroker, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> The relation of the *Luther Histories* and Mathesius' notes was touched upon by Lösche (*Analecta*, Einl., p. 32), but he thought it not worth considering, as he found only eight parallels. Had he taken short sentences and clauses, which are evidently reminiscences of the notes, as well as the elaborate parallels, he might have made a much larger list. Kroker did this, and found over one hundred parallels to the collection, of which 80 were to Mathesius' own notes; besides this he found parallels to others—Dietrich, Lauterbach and Schlagenhaufen. For the *Luther Histories*, see Appendix.

frequent.<sup>1</sup> Are these parallels due to the fact that he remembers the sayings he inserts independently, or to the fact that he read them from his collection? We notice that he seldom quotes with verbal exactness, which proves, at least, that he did not have the collection before him as he talked. A further analysis shows three kinds of agreement, varying by degree of closeness. (a) Agreement of form and expression, which is very rare. When we find it, it is in short, characteristic expressions. Mathesius has the same penchant for enlarging on what Luther said, that we discover in Lauterbach and Aurifaber. (b) Agreement in content, with difference in expression. This is the rule. Luther's sayings are ornamented and the circumstances of their utterance given. Sometimes there is nothing to distinguish Luther's words from Mathesius' own remarks.<sup>2</sup> (c) Sometimes the sense as well as the form is changed.<sup>3</sup>

It is but natural that much of the material in the ser-

<sup>1</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 67. As sources, Mathesius also used the Wittenberg edition of Luther's writings and Aurifaber's of his letters. Aurifaber's *Tischreden* had not yet appeared.

<sup>2</sup> Kroker gives examples, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 69. The most important one is the story of the Elbe turning red, which is recounted in three separate documents by Mathesius, *viz.*: 1. A letter to Spalatin. 2. *Tischreden*, Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 120. 3. In the *Luther Histories*. On their face these three accounts contradict each other; in one source Luther knows nothing certain of the facts, in another he has seen it; in one he thinks it a natural phenomenon, in another miraculous. Kroker tries to reconcile them all, but not successfully. The case really shows how unreliable is an account given from memory many years after.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker gives examples, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 71. One of these is Kroker, *ibid.*, no. 135. "Ego tres malos canes habeo, ingratitude, superbiam, invidiam," etc., where it seems that Luther is referring to his own temptations. In *Luther Histories*, lxii, 136b, the same words are used, but applied to the clergy under him. Kroker thinks the later account the true one, as the more probable; it seems to me that we ought to follow the earlier even at the cost of making Luther accuse himself of being tempted.

mons and in the notebook should be the same. Mathesius would remember what he had heard and written down previously. But by the variation in the two reports we see that one was not taken from the other. Besides there is much material in the sermons which comes from the years in which Mathesius no longer took notes. For such material the sermons are a source. Not being taken down at the time, however, and varying considerably from the material which was taken down at the time, they have less authenticity and authority than the notebooks.



## CHAPTER V

### THE COLLECTIONS

BESIDES taking notes of their own, many of the reporters were diligent collectors of notes taken by others. Sometimes they kept these separate from their own, sometimes they put what they copied along with their own original material. Sometimes the collections were kept in the form in which they were found in the original, sometimes they were "edited," *i. e.* smoothed off and rearranged in some definite order, usually topical. On the basis of the way in which they were collected we can, for the sake of convenience, divide the collections into three classes.

*a.* Mixed, *i. e.* those in which the reporter put down notes from other sources along with his own original ones promiscuously and with no attempt at order. It is hard to distinguish these collections from the notebooks, and the distinction must be somewhat arbitrary, based on the relative importance and quantity of the original and the copied notes. Cordatus, for example, had such a book, but as his own notes are in fairly large quantity and greater in importance than the copied ones, we found it convenient to consider his book as a notebook. Plato and Weller left books much like his, but in them the amount of original material is relatively so much smaller that we may consider them rather as collections than as notebooks.

*b.* Simple, *i. e.* those in which the author kept the notes

he copied distinct from his own. Such were made by Dietrich, Lauterbach and Mathesius.

c. Edited, *i. e.* those in which the material was much changed, the notes rearranged and polished. Such was the collection known as *Farrago literarum* and such were the great collections of Lauterbach (not to be confounded with his simple one) and of Aurifaber.

We shall speak of each of the collections in turn.

That of Plato is uninteresting and of little value except as illustrating the vicissitudes through which the sayings of Luther might go before they reach us. He made the compilation chiefly by copying freely from Mathesius' notebook of 1540.<sup>1</sup> When Mathesius was making a collection of his own, he got hold of Plato's, most of which was taken from his own notes, and reincorporated it into his own collection, thereby duplicating some 135 sayings which he already had in their original form. Plato also copied from Dietrich, Lauterbach, and perhaps Stolz and Aurifaber, and made some slight attempt to put the sayings in topical order. The work has survived in two other copies. Melanchthon chanced to get a copy, and when he was lecturing to a class on Luther some years after his death, he took large portions of Plato as a text. These lectures were taken down by a student named Vendenhaimer, and have found their way into the *Corpus Reformatorum* along with Melanchthon's works.<sup>2</sup>

Weller's record of the table talk is also more famous for

<sup>1</sup> The three copies in which Plato's collection has survived are those known as *Memorabilia*, *Melanchthon*, and *Mathesius*, sec. 7. Kroker proved Plato to be the author, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. 48-54. How much he copied from Mathesius is seen by the fact that of 149 sayings in the *Mathesian Collection*, 135 had been taken from Mathesius' notes of 1540.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix, p. 115, for *Corpus Reformatorum*.

its complicated history and obscure method of compilation than for any value it has as an original text. We have already discussed his note book, which approaches a collection in form, as it consists largely of copies from Lauterbach. In like manner his collection has a number of original notes. Both have survived only in the copy by Mathesius, the former in Section 4 and the latter in Section 8 (as printed by Kroker).

Weller's larger work was not incorporated in the Mathesian collection by Mathesius himself, but by the man who copied it, Krüginger. As printed by Kroker, Weller's copied notes form the eighth section of the compilation called by the name of Mathesius; in the MS. which he edited it is the first. This is because Weller had been first copied by Krüginger, who made his work the first part of a new collection of his own and copied that of Mathesius as the second part. As Krüginger was a mere copyist, we always speak of the total result as the Mathesian collection, although it must be remembered that properly only sections 1-7 as printed or 2-8 as in the MS., were compiled by Mathesius himself.<sup>1</sup>

To return to Weller. We can discover three sections in his aggregation of notes, the first of which consists chiefly of copies from Lauterbach (and perhaps Cordatus),<sup>2</sup> the second, mostly of selections from Lauterbach's *Tagebuch* of 1536-7,<sup>3</sup> and the third, of excerpts from Dietrich and Lau-

<sup>1</sup> The complicated proof that Weller was the original of this collection, and that Krüginger copied it as a whole and did not compile it himself from the originals, is given by Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. 54, 55.

<sup>2</sup> Parallels are found both in Cordatus and Lauterbach's great collection. The parallels in Cordatus are best explained by saying that Cordatus copied from Lauterbach's notes, which he later took into his great Collection. Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., p. 58. There are no notes for February, 1537, when Luther was at Schmalkalden.

terbach, with a few original notes of Weller's own.<sup>1</sup> The date of compilation was probably 1537 or 1538.

The simplest of the "simple" collection is that of Dietrich, of which nothing need be said but that it contains copies from Cordatus, Schlaginhaufen and Lauterbach made in the same years in which Dietrich was taking notes himself, *viz.* 1529-1535, and that it has survived only in imperfect copies of portions made by three persons, one of whom was Mathesius, who made it part of the 6th section of his work.<sup>2</sup>

Lauterbach's simple collection (we must again warn the reader not to confuse it with his notebooks on the one hand or his great edition on the other) is extant in three MSS. as an appendix to his *Tagebuch* of 1538. It has never been edited, and indeed is not worth editing. All or most of it was taken into his great edition later, when the contents were polished and rearranged. It seems to be quite complete, containing copies from almost all the earlier group of reporters and perhaps some of the later. It was probably made in 1538 or 1539 soon after Lauterbach left Wittenberg.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-65. A few parallels to the third division are found in Weller's works. They are of the kind known as *Trostschriften*; one on a woman in spasms, one on the devil and the jurists—personages who had a peculiarly close relationship in Luther's mind.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., p. 46. The other MSS. which contain excerpts from it are those we have called *Bavarus* and *Obenander*. See Appendix. Some copies are made from an otherwise unknown and unidentifiable source.

<sup>3</sup> The MSS. which contain this collection are *Khumer*, pp. 257-426; *Wer.*, pp. 35-212b, and *Mun ctm* 939, pp. 7b-116b. The whole subject is discussed by Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 40. Seidemann, who edited the *Tagebuch* of 1538 read these notes, which he says also come from Lauterbach's notes (Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. ix, x). He seems to have thought, however, that they were in some way collected by the author

The compilation of Mathesius, in the form of an appendix to his own notes of 1540, is the largest we have, being, in fact, a collection of collections. As it now stands (in the printed edition of Kroker from Krüginger's copy) it consists of eight sections, each section corresponding to the notes copied from one of the author's sources. Each source was taken and copied straight through, with no attempt to rearrange the notes. These sections are:

1. Mathesius' own notes of 1540.
2. Heydenreich's notes of 1542-1543.
3. Besold's notes of 1544.
4. Weller's notebook (with copies from Lauterbach, see *supra*).
5. Lauterbach's notebook of 1539.
6. Copies from the notebook and collection of Dietrich.
7. Plato's collection.
8. Weller's collection.

The accumulation of these sources was gradual. Mathesius started with his own notes of 1540 and after Luther's death added to them notes from others one by one as he came across them, those of Heydenreich and Besold in 1547, the next two sections in 1548 and the seventh some time later. The eighth section was not in Mathesius' own collection but was added by the copyist, Krüginger.<sup>1</sup>

of the MS., *Khumer*, viz., Khumer, a friend of Lauterbach's. This could not have been so, however, as Khumer's MS. dates from 1554, and the collection had already been copied 1550 in *Mun. clm.* 939. In general, the notes agree in form closely with the later great collection of which they formed a chief source.

<sup>1</sup> This section was one which had been copied by Krüginger from Weller before he got Mathesius' collection, and was made by him the first section of the collection as it now stands in the Leipzig MS. Kroker, who edited the MS. in 1903, restored the order of Mathesius and printed (or rather summarized) Krüginger's own collection in the 8th section. Cf. *supra*, p. 37, on Weller's collection.

A greater contrast in the treatment of the same material than that between the original notes and early copies of the Table Talk, and the later polished, or "edited" collections can hardly be imagined. The notes were taken roughly and hastily at first, in transcription they were somewhat altered, abbreviations were expanded, omissions filled in, smooth forms substituted for rough, one language for the mixture of two and grammatical for ungrammatical constructions. These changes were begun by the reporters in copying their own notes, but they were extremely slight compared to the changes made by the later editors.

In the original notes the chronological order is the one usually followed, and there is no attempt to replace it by the topical. In the edited collections the material is cut up and redistributed, explanations are added, much is omitted and much entirely recast. The idea was no longer to give a faithful report of Luther's exact words, it was to make an edifying book, something which would serve partly as a repertory for anecdotes to be used in sermons, partly as a pious memorial of Luther. All obscurities were cleared up, whatever was coarse was softened down, and whatever would give ground to the enemies of the faith was attenuated. Sometimes changes were made in the interest of picquancy, sometimes the original was misunderstood.<sup>1</sup> Dates and circumstances were added from memory, often incorrectly.

<sup>1</sup> An interesting example of this is found in the story related in its original form by Cordatus (Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, 945) and taken (either from him or some other source) into a later collection (Förstmann-Bindseil, *Tischreden*, i, p. 293). In Cordatus it is: "Et Maximilianus valde suspiciosus fuit in re militari. Gentis in periculis mac-taverunt etiam dilectissima," etc. Luther was thinking of such cases as Iphigenia, but the application of his words directly to Maximilian lead to the following amusing translation: "Kaiser Maximilian soll in Kriegshändeln sehr abergläubisch gewesen sein; in Fährlichkeiten thät er Gott Gelübde und schlachtete was ihm am ersten begegnet, wie man von ihm sagt."

One MS. preserves an early attempt to compile such a book by an unknown author, which, though neither large nor good, nor historically important, is interesting as showing the first case of the topical redaction which added so greatly to the value of the book for purposes of edification. The MS. was written in 1551 by "M. B." and is called *Farrago literarum ad amicos et colloquiorum in mensa R. P. Domini Martini Lutheri*.<sup>1</sup>

It was the most assiduous of the reporters who became the most diligent of the redactors and collectors. Lauterbach had a vast quantity of original notes as well as a collection containing copies from other reporters. These he kept by him until 1558 (twenty years after the bulk of them had been taken) and then he decided to put them all into a single volume, neatly polished and topically arranged. This great work took him two years, and when it was done he was not satisfied with it but worked it over three times within the course of the next two years *i. e.* 1560-1562. We shall say just a word about each of the redactions to show his method of procedure and its effect upon the Table Talk.<sup>2</sup>

The first edition of the great collection was made, as has been said, in the years 1558-1560.<sup>3</sup> The arrangement is somewhat peculiar. After cutting up Luther's sayings in tiny sections with separate titles, he combined them into large groups under general captions. He began by arranging these groups according to his idea of the relative

<sup>1</sup> See Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 774; Kroker, *op. cit.*, p. 6, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> My account is taken entirely from W. Meyer: "Ueber Lauterbachs und Aurifabers Sammlungen der Luthers Tischreden," in *Abhandlungen d. k. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften z. Göttingen, Phil. Hist. Kl., Neue Folge*, Bd. i, no. 2, 1897. For these redactions, see pp. 9-18.

<sup>3</sup> MS. in Halle edited by Bindseil in three vols., 1860-63, see Appendix.

importance of their subjects from a theological standpoint. Thus the first chapter treated God, the second the Bible and so on. After a while all the important points of doctrine had been disposed of and he came to a lot of chapters treating of matters indifferent. These he arranged in alphabetic order, making them the second and third volume of his collection.<sup>1</sup>

Lauterbach's second edition of his collection was made shortly after the first was completed.<sup>2</sup> Its peculiarity consists in the rearrangement of the small sections in the larger chapters.<sup>3</sup> Many passages are omitted, some material is added though not much. The chief addition is that of introductions to many sections by Lauterbach himself, giving circumstances and explanations. These he may have taken from notes, but more probably added from memory.

The third redaction we do not know in a good copy, but only in Rebenstock's edition in which all the German is turned into Latin. This was completed about 1561.<sup>4</sup> Its characteristic is that the chapters or chief divisions are rearranged. These changes were in part intentional, in part due to carelessness, a section omitted by oversight in one place being inserted at another. A good example of

<sup>1</sup> This order was misunderstood and confused by the copyist. It has been restored by Meyer.

<sup>2</sup> Preserved in two copies in MSS. at *Dresden* and *Gotha*, see Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> *E. g.*, under chapter "Civitas" all the sayings about each particular state are brought together.

<sup>4</sup> Rebenstock says he took it (1571) from a MS. "*ante annos 10 ad aeditionem parata*." Bindseil, vol. i, Einl., pp. lxxxix-c. He was much puzzled by the relation of Rebenstock to this MS. The date of the second redaction should have been 1561. The *Gotha* MS. has 1562, but that may only refer to the time when it was copied from Lauterbach's original. Or both the third and second redactions may have been 1562; Rebenstock's 10 years being simply approximate.



the first kind of change is the grouping the chapters *Antinomi*, *Anabaptistae*, *Antichrist*, *Papae*, *Papistate* and *Papatus* all together under the head of Luther's enemies, the intention being, of course, to get a more logical order. An example of the other kind of change is found in the insertion of the chapter "*Absolutio*,"—which had been accidentally omitted before,—between the sections on "Luther" and "Melanchthon." Such an oversight is made possible by the fact that Lauterbach distributed his notes into quires, and his arrangement consisted in making a new arrangement of these; when a quire was mislaid it was left out of its proper place, and inserted later, when found.

Another striking characteristic of the third redaction (and also of the fourth, which may have been copied from it) is the recurrence of numerous and important omissions. In some cases these were undoubtedly intentional, as they are of irrelevant passages,<sup>1</sup> in other cases no such reason can be assigned, and the omissions must have been due to carelessness or accident. The arrangement of the last half of Part I and the whole of Part II is the old alphabetic one.

The fourth redaction is known to us in the Wolfenbüttel MS. of 1562. As it was the one taken by Aurifaber as the basis of his printed edition, we will discuss it later when we come to him and his relation to Lauterbach.<sup>2</sup>

The differences between these four editions are far too great to be accounted for by any vagary of a copyist or scribe. They imply conscious redaction. We are sure that Lauterbach was the redactor of the first three editions, and probably of the fourth, though the proof for it is not clear as that may have been an early attempt of Aurifaber.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, pp. 12, 13. On pp. 14-17 he gives a long list of text changes in the various redactions.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*, p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> Bindseil (*Colloq.*, vol. i, Einl., p. xxxix) proved that Lauterbach

Lauterbach's method of working is interesting. We see by comparison of the original sources with his version of them in his great collection that he changed not a little. In his first notes we see how scrupulously careful he was to get the exact form of Luther's words. He changed this a good deal in his first edition of the collection, and even after that, with the intention of improvement. He doubtless felt that the way in which the sayings had been reported was not absolutely definitive. His changes were not confined to supposed textual emendations, but were often made with the manifest purpose of edification, and especially of eliminating whatever might damage the character of his hero.<sup>1</sup>

He took no care, however, to avoid repetitions, and many an old "grouse in the gun-room" story of Luther's meets us in several places. Sometimes he combined entirely different stories to get a good narration. Sometimes he deliberately falsified the text in the interests of piety. Even though his motive was good his lack of literary tact and discrimination made the text worse when he changed it. He was encouraged to change because, having taken notes himself, he was aware that it was hard to get the exact form of Luther's expressions, and therefore corrected them in accord with principles which he supposed would bring out the true sense.

The most famous of all the collections, and, until within was the collector of the first redaction. Meyer (pp. 19, 20) goes over his reasons and proves the 2d and 3d redactions to be by Lauterbach. This certainty is worth something, as it gives a little more authority to changes than if they had been by some one else.

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, pp. 20-25. Besides *Tischreden*, Lauterbach mixed in some extraneous material, such as *e. g.*, letters and allegories related by Melancthon. Meyer found parallels to some of them in old MS. collections of allegories.

fifty years the only one (except Rebenstock's edition, which has always been scarce) to be printed, is that made by Aurifaber. He had begun collecting materials for it with a view to editing at least ten years,<sup>1</sup> indeed one may say twenty years before it came out, when he sat at Luther's table and took notes of his sayings along with the other students. It may have been that he met Lauterbach at this time, when the latter came for a short visit from Pirna where he was pastor.

It was not until about 1561, however, that he really began to think of using the material he had accumulated for an edition of *Tischreden*. In that year his quarrel with Chancellor Brück compelled him to take refuge with his former patron the Count of Mansfeld, and the five years of enforced leisure which followed he used to good advantage in literary labors. He was doubtless encouraged to publish the *Tischreden* by the success his edition of the letters had attained. The materials in his hands were not copious, and to supplement them he turned to Lauterbach whose reputation as the best of the notetakers was already well established. In 1562 he got hold of one of Lauterbach's redactions—though just how is not known. He knew it was Lauterbach's, for he mentions him in his preface as his chief source, and it is probable that Lauterbach himself gave it to him, for he had just completed it himself, and there would hardly have been time for an intermediary copy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In the Introduction to his edition of Luther's letters, vol. i, which came out 1556, he tells us that he had already been collecting: "*Lutheri enarrationes in aliquot libros biblicos, multorum annorum conciones, disputationes, concilia, colloquia & epistolas.*"

<sup>2</sup> The general similarity and numerous minor differences between Rebenstock, the Halle MS. and Aurifaber puzzled investigators like Bindseil, who did not know the history of the redactions, first worked out by Meyer.

In the MS. at Wolfenbüttel mentioned above we have a fragment of what is either a fourth redaction by Lauterbach, or, what is more probable, an early attempt by Aurifaber. It is extremely interesting as being something between Lauterbach's earlier redactions, and the collection of Aurifaber, as we know it in print. It contains only 168 sayings, all translated into German in Aurifaber's manner. He appears to have omitted the introductions and extra material put into his third redaction by Lauterbach, which would go to show that he copied one of the first two. All the material in this MS. was incorporated later into his printed edition by Aurifaber.

Aurifaber was so much pleased with Lauterbach's redaction that he adopted it as the basis of his whole work, and did not change its form much. He translated all the material into the vernacular, and occasionally would improve Lauterbach's account by means of another.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes the same saying crept in twice. Almost all the material can be traced to its source, by far the greater part in Lauterbach, a little to other sources. The irreducible minimum, for which no previous authority can be found, comes from Aurifaber's own notes, or from what he had copied of Stolz.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Example, Aurifaber, ch. 13, no. 39, where Lauterbach's account (Bindseil, i, 59) is corrected by Schlaginhaufen's (Preger, no. 522).

<sup>2</sup>Bindseil noted at the end of his third volume the passages translated from Lauterbach in the German *Tischreden*; every new research shows more parallels between this edition and the sources. Cf. Meyer, p. 33.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PRINTED EDITIONS OF THE TABLE TALK

THE result of all this collecting and editing was seen at last in July, 1566, when the stout folio appeared at Eisleben. Aurifaber placed the arms of the Counts of Mansfeld on the reverse of the title-page, and dedicated the result of his labors comprehensively to "Den Edelen, Ehrenuesten, Erbarn und Wolweisen, Ammeistern, Stadtpflegern, Eldtern, Geheimbten, Bürgermeistern, und Rath, Der Keisserlichen Reichstedte, Strassburg, Augsburg, Ulm, Norimberg, Lubeck, Hamburg, Lüneburg, Braunschweig, Franckforth am Mayn, und Regensburg, &c., Meinen grossgünstigen Herrn."

The Preface tells how the *Tischreden* were collected, and gives an exalted appreciation of their value in satisfying "geistlichen Hunger und Durst."<sup>1</sup> They at once became immensely popular, and were reprinted from this edition in five years at least six times. Two of the new editions were pirated, and in his own reprint of 1568 Aurifaber bitterly complains of this. The book has been exploited, he says, by "Master Klügling, who entered into my labors, changed the title and altered much in the book, at sundry times enlarging and (supposedly) improving it with new sayings, all without my knowledge or approval. . . . But let every one know that if there is any one who can improve or add

<sup>1</sup> Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. xxiii *et seq.* See Appendix for list of editions.

to the *Tischreden*, it is I, (I can say it without vainglory) for I have enough in MS. to make a new volume, or at least greatly enlarge my first one." <sup>1</sup>

The changes referred to by Aurifaber are hardly so great as to justify his language about them. That of the title is simply the insertion of Lauterbach's name along with that of Aurifaber, certainly justifiable from the amount he contributed to it.<sup>2</sup> The other additions and "improvements" are very slight; it is to Aurifaber's interest, of course to exaggerate the faults of "Master Klügling" in order to enhance the genuine worth of his own reprints.

The next editor was Rebenstock, who got hold of one of Lauterbach's redactions and translated the whole thing into Latin. His edition never enjoyed much popularity, and is now excessively rare. It was used somewhat outside of Germany; for example, if we may believe a French translator of the Table Talk, by the great Bayle.<sup>3</sup> The work came out in 1571 in two octavo volumes.

There is a preface of Rebenstock in a letter to Philip Ludwig, Count of Hanoia and Rineck, Lord of Mintzenberg. It is a long exhortation, mingled with sacred history and ending with a eulogy of Luther. As to the Colloquies he is editing he says:

A certain pious man, a lover of the Evangelic truth, wrote Martin Luther's *Colloquies* in Latin, but mixed in many German words. . . . And when the printers, by the advice of

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. xxvi, xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> The changes are, in fact, so small that Bindseil (*ibid.*) did not think Aurifaber could be referring to them, and looked in vain for some other edition which would correspond to his language more accurately. It seems to me, however, that it must have been the editions of 1567 which he referred to, though he made them out worse than they really were.

<sup>3</sup> Brunet, Introduction to his *Propos de Table*.

learned men, wished to publish the colloquies in Latin, they asked me to turn the German words into Latin. . . . I never proposed to undertake this labor, however, in order to defile Luther's pious sayings with other impious and unedifying ones, or to add new ones, or to acquire glory and profit to myself (as the Sacramentarians and Ranters of to-day presume to do), but I proposed to render our master his praise, and so, aided by the counsel of learned men, I entered upon the work. . . .

Dated "Ex Cinericea doma, in die S. Laurentii, 1571," and signed "H. P. Rebenstock Escherheymensis Ecclesiae minister."<sup>1</sup>

This Preface would seem to show that Rebenstock was a mere linguistic aid, and not an editor in the proper sense of the word.<sup>2</sup> He either did not know, or did not reveal, the name of the "pius vir" who made the collection, but he says in his preface that it was not Aurifaber. We, of course, know that it was Lauterbach.

The first editor to compete with Aurifaber in a German edition was Stangwald, Candidate of Theology in Prussia. He printed a first edition in 1571 and a second in 1591. He took Aurifaber's material, but arranged it in a different way, instead of the eighty chapters of Aurifaber, we have nine great unnumbered divisions, and forty-three chapters under these. He claims to have used Mörlin's notations to the MS. of Aurifaber, as well as the notes of Mathesius and others, and also to have excised some sayings which he believed unauthentic. His changes, were, however, very slight indeed.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bindseil, vol. i, p. lxx.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Irmischer, *Tischreden in Sämmtliche Werke Luthers*, vol. 57, Einl., pp. xii-xiv. A full description of all the editions will be found in the Appendix. This present chapter aims to give a brief account of each edition, and some suggestions as to the critical principles to be applied in getting a good edition.

Nicholaus Selnecker (or Selnecker) was the next editor. His edition came out in 1577. He recognized in his title that the *Tischreden* were first collected by Aurifaber, and he claims to have brought them into a new order and added an index. These claims are unjustified. He merely reprints Stangwald's edition of 1571, which had changed the order in Aurifaber's. He was enabled to make this claim by the fact that Stangwald had not put his name on the title page of his edition of 1571, and it is only by his allusion to it in his subsequent edition that we know it was his. It was once a question whether this was really his edition or Selnecker's; it is now settled that it is Stangwald's.<sup>1</sup>

The first editor to make the German *Tischreden* a part of Luther's *Sämmtliche Werke* was Walch, who published them 1740-1753. They form volume XXII of his edition. He gives an account of how they were collected, and a discussion of their value in his preface. His labors were confined to comparing Aurifaber, Stangwald and Selnecker, as none of the sources were then known.<sup>2</sup>

The so-called Stuttgart-Leipzig edition of 1836 is a mere reprint of Walch.

A new edition, on exactly the same plan was undertaken in 1844 by K. E. Förstemann. It was based like Walch on a comparison of Aurifaber, Stangwald and Selnecker. Förstemann died when three volumes of this work had been completed, and H. E. Bindseil edited the fourth and last. In his preface to this he states the method of his work. He compared not only the three editions and Walch, but also Luther's letters, and in part the Latin edition (in the MS.

<sup>1</sup> Irmischer, *op. cit.*, vol. 57, p. xiv. Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, Einl., xxxvii. Some of Selnecker's minute changes are given here. They are simply verbal.

<sup>2</sup> See *infra*, Appendix.



he edited later). He discussed the sources with more science than any one had used hitherto, though he knew nothing of them except as they were mentioned in Aurifaber's preface and Mathesius' sermons. He went as far as any one could who had to rely on the old collections, and who did not know the sources directly.

In 1854 Irmischer edited the *Tischreden* for the *Sämmtliche Werke*, published at Frankfurt-am-Main and Erlangen, of which they form six volumes numbered 57 to 62. Irmischer proceeded on the same critical principles as Walch, although they had really been exhausted by previous editors. Since then no other work of this kind has been undertaken. The volume of the Weimar edition which is to be dedicated to the *Tischreden* will be edited on entirely different principles.<sup>1</sup>

The years 1864-1866 saw a new Latin edition of the Table Talk—the first since Rebenstock's. Bindseil edited it from a MS. he found in the Library of the Orphan Asylum at Halle. He rightly assigned the collection of *Tischreden* found therein to Lauterbach, but was sorely puzzled to explain the relations of his MS. with Rebenstock on the one hand and Aurifaber on the other.<sup>2</sup> He did the work of editing thoroughly, pointing out the parallels in the German and previous Latin editions.

The year 1872 marks an era in the publication of the *Tischreden*. Prior to this time the labors of editors had been confined to working over and over the old collections, especially Aurifaber's. Beginning with the printing of Lauterbach's *Tagebuch* in 1872 the efforts of scholars have been turned to the fresher and far more fruitful field of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 54, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> He merely stated the problem without answering it. The answer was, as we have seen, given by Meyer.

the original notes. J. K. Seidemann<sup>1</sup> was the first to see their value, and he edited the best of the sources in the *Tagebuch* mentioned above. He prepared two other MSS. for the press, Dietrich's notebook, which has never been printed, since Seidemann's unfortunate death interrupted his useful labors, and the *Analecta* which were later published by Lösche, both men believing them to have been the Mathesian collection. The value of the *Tagebuch* was immediately recognized by scholars, who saw the relative worthlessness of the older collections of *Tischreden*. Unfortunately Seidemann's work on Dietrich, the most valuable source now unpublished, has never been taken up again. Seidemann's "diplomatically correct copy" was used by Köstlin in his great work.

In 1885 Wrampelmeyer followed with Cordatus's *Tagebuch*. In the absence of the means of judging it which we possess now, he immensely overrated its value; to him even its faults were qualities, proving its authenticity. Some of its failings were pointed out by Preger in his edition of Schlaginhaufen, some by Kroker in his *Mathesian Collection*.

Schlaginhaufen's notes found an able editor in 1888 in the person of Preger. They at once took their place as among the best of the sources, ranking along with Lauterbach's *Tagebuch* and Dietrich's notes.

In 1892 Lösche edited a rather worthless MS. under the title *Analecta Lutherana et Melanchthonia*, believing it to be the Mathesian collection, the existence of which had long been known by references to it by Aurifaber and Mathesius himself. Lösche was led to this task by his interest in

<sup>1</sup> Lösche gives a sketch of Seidemann's labors in this field. *Analecta*, Einl., p. 1 *et seq.*; Köstlin, *op. cit.* (ed. 1889). Vorwort, p. iii, says he used Dietrich in Seidemann's copy.

Mathesius, whose life he had written and whose works he had edited. Seidemann had left a correct copy of the MS. and pointed out a large number of parallels in the sources. In verifying his parallels Lösche found three hundred which had been overlooked by Seidemann. A later authority found that Lösche had himself overlooked several hundred.<sup>1</sup> We have already seen that the MS. was the copy of a copy of Mathesius' notebook of 1540. Lösche proved this date and also that the MS. dated from the last part of the 15th century, probably after Mathesius's death in 1565.

The real Mathesian collection was edited in 1903 by Kroker. It is extremely valuable as opening up new sources in a reliable copy.

One attempt, and only one, has hitherto been made to get a comprehensive edition of the *Tischreden* founded on the sources. This was undertaken by Professor A. F. Hoppe, of St. Louis in the reprint of Walch's *Sämmtliche Werke*, under the auspices of the Lutherischer Concordia Verlag, 1887. The scope of the edition is indicated in its title *Dr. Martin Luthers Colloquia oder Tischreden; zum ersten Male berichtet und erneuert durch Uebersetzung der beiden Hauptquellen der Tischreden aus der lateinischen Originalen, nämlich des Tagebuchs des Dr. Conrad Cordatus über Luther 1537 und des Tagebuchs des M. Anto. Lauterbach auf das Jahr 1538*.

In his introduction Professor Hoppe gives a very just idea of the worthlessness of the old editions, which are nothing but Aurifaber printed over and over again. Indeed Aurifaber is very severely treated by the new editor who says he handled the originals very arbitrarily, took sayings out of their context, made mistakes in reading, in dates, in translation, in assigning sayings to wrong per-

<sup>1</sup> Lösche, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 6; Kroker, *loc. cit.*, Einl., p. 28, note 4.

sons, in short falsified and altered to suit himself. A glowing description of the high worth of the two sources used is given, taken from the introductions of their editors, and then the work of this new edition is described. 520 duplicates, found either twice in the *Tischreden*, or elsewhere in the works, are eliminated. The 1843 paragraphs of Cordatus and the 488 paragraphs of Lauterbach are translated and incorporated. Twenty-four bits from *Khumer* (*i. e.* the material printed in Lauterbach's *Tagebuch* by Seidermann) are also used. The Bible quotations have been improved by reference to that book. Sayings which are separated in Walch are joined, and others which are wrongly joined are separated.

The order in Walch has been maintained, *i. e.* the topical order of Aurifaber. Whenever a parallel to one of his sayings has been found in the sources, the account is corrected in accordance with the sources or their account substituted. The parallels so treated form but a small part (perhaps one-tenth) of the whole edition; all sayings which have no parallels are reprinted exactly as before, except the duplicates which are taken out. A large number of sayings in Lauterbach and Cordatus which have no parallels in Walch are printed in Appendices.<sup>1</sup>

The result is disappointing. This is partly because the edition came out before the other sources were known, partly from too great conservatism of treatment. The bulk of the work is the same, after all, as that in Walch. The material from Cordatus and Lauterbach is thrown in promiscuously in the old order, which makes it less accessible and less valuable than in the original form. The estimate of Cordatus by Wrampelmeyer is taken at its face value, and most of his material which we know to be value-

<sup>1</sup> Hoppe, *op. cit.*, Einl., *in fine*.

less is inserted as an improvement on Aurifaber. It is singular that the editor does not recognize (what he must have known) that there were other *Hauptquellen*, and that if Aurifaber is worthless when we can find a parallel to him in Lauterbach, he must have been so in other cases.

The editors of the Weimar edition<sup>1</sup> plan to dedicate one of their last volumes to the Table Talk, basing it on a critical study of the sources. This will certainly be the most satisfactory of all the editions; indeed, unless further sources are discovered, which is not probable, it should be definitive. Let us see what may be hoped from such an edition—a convenient way of summing up the results of our researches in the sources.

In the first place the original notes should be the only authority used, including among them the notebooks which have survived in the Mathesian collection, but excluding the collections of Lauterbach and Aurifaber as too unreliable.

The notebooks should be used with discrimination. Those of Dietrich, Schlaginhaufen, Lauterbach, and Mathe-sius, are *prima facie* reliable; the others should be used rather as checks on these and as helps in textual criticism than for their own independent value, which is slight.

The MSS. should all be carefully collated, in order to get the best text. To do this all parallels must be noted, both for the sake of the text and for the dates which are indispensable to a really scientific edition. Parallels must,

<sup>1</sup> Professor Drescher, of Breslau, the editor of the Weimar edition, has kindly informed me, through the publishing house of Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, that the last volume is to be assigned to the *Tischreden*, which will come next after the letters, on which work has already been begun.

of course, be carefully divided into true, apparent, and derived, and treated accordingly.<sup>1</sup>

The chronological order should be preserved. The topical was more useful to those whose first purpose was an exposition of doctrine or an authoritative statement in some problem of theology, but for the scientific historian, as well as for the ordinary reader to-day, the chronological order is readily seen to be the best. The source of each saying should be indicated.

An edition on this plan would have a real use. It would save the scholar going to a number of sources and reading over much of material which is often repetitious. By getting it all together it would throw a much stronger light on the development of Luther's life and thought than the fragmentary sources do.

Let us see how much time we can expect to be fairly covered by the original notes.

1531-1533. The notes of Schlaginhaufen can be dated with considerable accuracy, and run from November, 1531 to September, 1532. The notes of Dietrich, which he dates on his title-page 1529-1535 really fall, with very few exceptions between November, 1531 and October, 1533. Their order has been restored and their chronology established by Preger.<sup>2</sup>

1536-1537. Notes of Lauterbach and Weller in 6th section of Mathesius. Fuller parallels and supplementary material found in the MS. known as *Colloquia Serotina*.

1538. Lauterbach's *Tagebuch*, edited by Seidemann.

<sup>1</sup> *True* parallels being those in which two or more reporters took down the same saying; *apparent* parallels those in which the similarity is due to Luther's having repeated the same story more than once; and *derived* parallels those which are due to copying.

<sup>2</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xxi *et seq.* See *supra*, p. 42.

1539. Copies from Lauterbach's *Tagebuch* in 5th section of Mathesius.

1540. Notes of Mathesius in his collection. 1st section of Kroker's edition.

1542-1543. Notes of Heydenreich in 2d section of Mathesius.

1544. Notes of Besold in 3d section of Mathesius.

We must notice that the sources given above show different degrees of accuracy in dating. Lauterbach's *Tagebuch of 1538* gives the day on which everything was said; in other cases our work has to proceed from internal evidence, which gives sometimes the exact date, often only an approximate date. *E. g.* we can say that no. 377 in Schlaginhaufen was said May 31, 1532, but we can only say that nos. 378-548 fell between June and September of that year. By a sort of system of interpolation we can get the date more nearly; the chances are that a number at the beginning of this series fell in June, one in the middle in July or August, and one near the end in September. These dates are sufficiently accurate to give the basis of a chronological order of *Tischreden*. They will become more and more accurate as more is found out about Luther's life, and as parallels from other notebooks, and circumstances gathered from the letters and other documents are compared with them.

Secondly, we must observe that quite a number of notes can be found outside of these years and the sources indicated for them which will partly supply the lacunae. Some of those in Cordatus can be dated; a few other dates are given in Dietrich, others in the fourth section of the Mathesian collection. Great caution should be used in the insertion of such notes; isolated sayings in an unchronological source should not be given the same weight as those which have, so to speak, a strong presumptive case from the fact

that they stand in a source which arranges its notes chronologically. Still, with care, many notes can be rescued from the sources which will partly fill up the blank spaces.

For the early thirties Dietrich, Schlaginhaufen and Cordatus are the sources. By collation of the three much may be gained. We often find little groups of chronologically ordered sayings which supply and complement each other. What cannot be got into chronological order should be put into an appendix labelled, Sayings prior to 1537 from Cordatus, Dietrich and Schlaginhaufen.<sup>1</sup>

The notes from 1536-1540 can be dated with great accuracy, and leave little to be desired. They are also full.

It is for the last years of Luther's life that the chronology of the notes is hardest to determine. Those of Heydenreich are rather uncertain, sparse, and known only in a copy. Those of Plato are altogether unreliable, being mainly extracts from others. Those of Stolz and Auri-faber have become irrecoverably lost in the collection of the latter. Those sayings which cannot be dated must be relegated to an appendix. The smaller their number is the nearer will the edition reach the desired goal.

Such an edition would do away with the doubt and hesitation with which we now have to read the Table Talk. Any one who has carefully examined the best sources will surely feel that we must give them the same degree of confidence at least that we give to Luther's sermons; and in a source of Luther's life so rich in material, such an increase in certainty will be an immense gain.

The source of each saying should be indicated, as a means of judging of its worth. In summing up we may say that the greatest faith can be placed in Lauterbach, Dietrich and Schlaginhaufen, and only a little less in Mathesius,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kroker, *op. cit.*, p. 63.



Besold and Heydenreich. Cordatus, Weller and Plato are untrustworthy, but with discrimination much of value may be abstracted from them. The collections of Lauterbach and Aurifaber are practically useless. The more we compare them with the originals, the deeper they sink in our estimation. But a complete edition would have to take from them all that could not be found in better form somewhere else, printing it as so much new material, inferior in value to the sources, but not negligible.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kroker, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 65; Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE TRANSLATIONS

THERE have been two principal translations of the *Tischreden* into English, and a number of minor ones. The first,<sup>1</sup> made by Captain Henry Bell, was printed at London in 1652. The Translator's Preface is interesting. It begins:

I, Captain Henry Bell, do hereby declare, both to the present age and also to posterity, that being employed beyond the seas in state affairs years together, both by King James and also by the late King Charles, in Germany, I did hear and understand, in all places, great bewailing and lamentation made, by reason of the destroying and burning above fourscore thousand of Martin Luther's books, entitled, *His Last Divine Discourses*...

This book did so forward the Reformation, that the Pope then living, *viz.*, Gregory XIII, understanding what great hurt

<sup>1</sup> *Colloquia Mensalia; or, Familiar Discourses of Dr. Martin Luther, at his Table, which in his Lifetime he held with divers Learned Men, such as were Philip Melanchthon, Casparus Cruciger, Justus Jonas, Paulus Eberus, Vitus Dietericus, Johannes Bugenhagen, Johannes Forsterus, and Others. Containing Questions and Answers Touching Religion and other main points of Doctrine; as also Many Notable Histories, and all sorts of Learning, Comforts, Advices, Prophecies, Admonitions, Directions, Instructions, Collected first together by Dr. Antonius Lauterbach, and afterwards disposed into certain Commonplaces by Dr. John Aurifaber, D. D.* This title is followed by six quotations as to the utility of *sacra ad mensam*. A very learned "Epistle Dedicatorie to the Right Honorable John Kendrick, Lord Major, The Right Worshipful the Sheriffs and Aldermen, the Common Council, and other Worthie Senators and Citizens of the famous Citie of London," signed by Thomas Thorowgood, is then inserted.

and prejudice he and his popish religion had already received, by reason of the said Luther's Divine Discourses, and also fearing the same might bring further contempt and mischief upon himself, and upon the Popish Church, he, therefore, to prevent the same, did fiercely stir up and instigate the Emperor then in being, *viz.*, Rudolphus II, to make an edict throughout the whole Empire, that all the aforesaid printed books should be burnt. . . . . which edict was speedily put into execution accordingly.

It pleased God, however, that in 1626 one of Bell's German friends should find one of the aforesaid printed books in a deep obscure hole, and being afraid to keep it, because Ferdinand II was a severe persecutor of the Protestant Religion, and at the same time calling to mind that Bell "had the High Dutch Tongue very perfect," sent it to him to translate into English.

Bell was warned by a vision that he should translate it, and shortly after he was committed to the Keeper of Gate-House, Westminster, on a warrant which was not shown him, and kept there in prison ten whole years, the first five of which he spent translating the book.

"Then after I had finished the said translation in prison, the late archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Laud, understanding that I had translated such a book, called Martin Luther's Divine Discourses, sent unto me his chaplain Dr. Bray" to request the perusal of the book. After some demur Bell sent the book which Laud kept two years and then returned under fear that the Commons would call him to account.

And presently, when I was set at liberty by warrant from the whole house of Lords, according to his majesty's direction in that behalf; but shortly afterwards the archbishop fell into his troubles, and was by the parliament sent unto the Tower, and afterwards beheaded. Insomuch that I could never since hear anything touching the printing of my book.

The House of Commons having then notice that I had translated the aforesaid book, they sent for me, and did appoint a committee to see it, and the translation, and diligently to enquire whether the translation did agree with the original or no; whereupon they desired me to bring the same before them, sitting then in the Treasury Chamber. And Sir Edward Dearing being chairman, said unto me, that he was acquainted with a learned minister beneficed in Essex, who had lived long in England, but was born in High Germany, in the Palatinate, named Mr. Paul Amiraute, whom the committee sending for, desired him to take both the original and translation into his custody, and diligently to compare them together, and to make report unto the said committee whether he found that I had rightly and truly translated it according to the original; which report he made accordingly, and they being satisfied therein, referred it to two of the assembly, Mr. Charles Herle and Mr. Edward Corbet, desiring them diligently to peruse the same, and to make report unto them if they thought it fitting to be printed and published.

Whereupon they made report, dated the 10th of November, 1646, that they found it to be an excellent divine work, worthy the light and publishing, especially in regard that Luther, in the said Discourses, did revoke his opinion, which he formerly held, touching Consubstantiation in the Sacrament. Whereupon the House of Commons, the 24th of February, 1646, did give order for the printing thereof.

Given under my hand the third day of July, 1650.

HENRY BELL.

This account is such a tissue of mistakes and improbabilities that it is hardly worth serious criticism. It is clear both from the absence of all other evidence, and the large number of early editions of Luther's *Tischreden* which have come down to us, that no such order was ever issued by Rudolph II as that which Bell describes. The ten years' arbitrary imprisonment is so improbable that it may

be dismissed.<sup>1</sup> The whole thing has the air of being invented to heighten the interest of the translation; even the vision of the old man does not seem to be a genuine bit of self-deception.

The introduction is followed by the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, which gives an interesting

Testimonie and Judgment: Wee finde many excellent divine things are contained in the Book worthie the light and publick view. Amongst which, Luther professeth that he acknowledgeth his error which hee formerly held touching the real presence *corporaliter in Coena Domini*.

But wee finde withal many impertinent things: som things which will require a grain or two of Salt, and som things which will require a Marginal note or a Preface.

A "Marginal note" is herewith added by the Committee:

And no marvel, that among so much serious discourse in matters of religion, sometimes at Table som impertinent things might intermix themselves and som things *liberius dicta* to recreate and refresh the Companie.

Then comes the order of the Commons to print it, and then a short extract from Aurifaber called "Testimonie of

<sup>1</sup> Arbitrary imprisonment was resorted to at this time, but only in important political cases, such as those of Pym and Eliot. It is possible that Bell may have been really imprisoned for some cause he prefers not to mention. Hazlitt says in a note that the cause was that he pressed for the payment of arrears in his salary, an explanation for which he gives no authority.

This Preface worried Walch (*op. cit.*, vol. xxii, Einl., pp. 17, 18) a good deal. He had not seen the original, but quotes from a partial translation of J. Beaumont, whose interest in it was due to the supernatural phenomenon recounted. (*Tractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, &c.*, iii, 73.)

Aurifaber in his Preface to his "Book" and notes from "W.D.", "J.L." and "J.D.". Then Aurifaber's preface, dated 1569, in full.

The same Eighty Chapters are here as in Aurifaber, but the order is somewhat changed. The XIXth Caption is changed from "Vom Sacrament des Alters des waren Leibs und Bluts Christi" to "Of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper."

There is an appendix of Luther's Prophecies. The Imprimatur, at the end, is dated August, 1650, signed by John Downame.

Comparison shows that this was translated from one of Aurifaber's editions; it is nearest like that of 1571 (See Appendix p. 121).<sup>1</sup> The translation is not complete, a very rough guess would be that two-thirds of the original was translated. The omissions were made with the purpose of pleasing the theologians of that day and place. Much of the chapter on The Sacrament is omitted, but I can find nothing in it to justify the Committee's opinion that Luther retracted his former error on this point.<sup>2</sup>

This translation was reprinted 1791 with "The Life and Character of Dr. Martin Luther: by John Gottlieb Burckhardt, D. D., minister of the German Lutheran Congregation at the Savoy, in London" prefixed. In this edition, between pages iv and v of Bell's narrative there is a "Picture of Popery" by John Ryland in four pages. It is in the good old-fashioned style of invective. In this

<sup>1</sup> Points of resemblance are: Mention of Lauterbach's and Aurifaber's name on titlepage; date of preface 1569; Prophecies at the end, and others less striking.

<sup>2</sup> Bell himself implies the Committee had told him that Luther had retracted on this point. Walch, *op. cit.*, vol. xxii, p. 18, speaks of the charge and indignantly denies it.

edition the chapter on Witchcraft was left out, as well as the Report of the Committee of the Commons, and the Dedicatory Epistle and Testimonies. This translation was reprinted again in 1818.

Another partial translation, *Choice Fragments from the Discourses of Luther*, was published in 1832. The translator, who does not give his name, was a zealous Protestant and a decorous, conventional Englishman. He suppressed with the greatest care whatever really showed the free, joyous and somewhat coarse character of Luther, and in his translation we see him transformed into an English clergyman with an unctuous regard for the proprieties, polished, well brought up, grave and formal in his conversation.<sup>1</sup>

The *Tischreden* were translated a third time by William Hazlitt, son of the celebrated essayist, in 1848. The preface is taken half from Bell's narrative, which is quoted without comment in an abridged form, and half from the preface to Brunet's French translation, adding to the errors of the sources several of the author's own. He does not acknowledge his indebtedness to Brunet, but follows him in calling "Selnecker" "Selneuer" and in giving Stangwald's edition of 1591 as of 1590. From Brunet he quotes Fabricius, *Centifolium Lutheranium*, as though he had seen the book himself. From Brunet he gets the anecdote of Luther's throwing the gruel into his disciple's face, but he adds without any authority whatever that it was "told by Luther himself to Dr. Zingreff" (who was born

<sup>1</sup> This translation is in the Lenox Library. My characterization is taken from Brunet, *Propos de Table*, Introduction, p. 18: "Il a supprimé avec le plus grand soin tout ce qui montre dans son intérieur le père de la réforme; il a voulu le peindre en beau; il en fait un prébendier anglicain, poli, bien élevé, à la parole grave," etc.

half a century after Luther's death).<sup>1</sup> A translation of Aurifaber's preface is given, but only a selection of the *Tischreden*, embracing perhaps a fourth of the material found in Aurifaber. The style of the English is excellent, colloquial and yet smooth. It seems to have been made from the German (though Hazlitt tells us he had compared the translations of Michelet with his own) and is sufficiently accurate.<sup>2</sup>

This work has reappeared a number of times. Others of minor importance have been made, among which may be mentioned a number of books either translated from Michelet's *Vie de Martin Luther par lui-même* or closely modelled on it. Hazlitt Englished this work, others pub-

<sup>1</sup> Hazlitt, *Luther's Table Talk*, Introduction, p. 10 (ed. of 1848): "An anecdote told by Luther himself to Dr. Zinzgreff, amusingly illustrates the assiduity of these German Boswells. During a colloquy, in which Dominus Martinus was exhibiting his wonted energy and vivacity, he observed a disciple hard at work with pencil and paper. The Doctor, slyly filling his huge wooden spoon with the gruel he was discussing by way of supper, rose, and going to the absorbed note-taker, threw the gruel in his face, and said, laughing lustily: 'Put that down too!'" Hazlitt gives no authority for this story, which he probably took from a footnote in Brunet's Introduction, but I have found it in Dr. J. W. Zinzgreff's *Teutscher Nation Apophthegmata*, p. 252, where it is in the following form: "Als er [*sc.* Luther] eines jungen Studenten eines rechten Speichelleckers beym Tisch gewahr wurde, dir hinder ihm stund und alles was er redte ohn verstand oder unterschied in seine Schreibtafel aufgezeichnete, verdrosse ihm sehr, liess mit Fleiss einen grueltzen drüber und Sagte: 'Schreib diesen auch auf!'" Zinzgreff gives no authority. I have not been able to find the story in the *Tischreden* or any of Luther's works, and it has no intrinsic probability. We have no other instance of Luther indulging in a practical joke. The story is quoted literally and without remark by Brunet. It is Hazlitt who is responsible for the addition that Luther himself told it to Zinzgreff, which is impossible, as the latter was born in 1591. Besides noticing the lack of critical discernment, it is interesting to see how the anecdote grew in Hazlitt's translation.

<sup>2</sup> In his translation of Michelet's book, referred to just below, he says he compared Bell's, Michelet's, Audin's, and his own.



lished books with the same title either with or without acknowledgment of the source.<sup>1</sup>

A considerable number of Luther's sayings are translated into French by the celebrated historian Jules Michelet in a book entitled *Mémoires de Luther écrits par lui-même*; traduits et mis en ordre par M. Michelet . . . . Paris, 1835. The author's preface testifies to his admiration of the reformer, although he is not a Protestant. The work consists of extracts from Luther's writings and Table Talk *passim*. Bk., IV, however, consists entirely of extracts from the Table Talk, to illustrate Luther's family life, and opinions about marriage, children, nature and the Bible, the Fathers, schoolmen, Pope, councils, universities, arts, music and preaching. The chapter ends with Luther's admission of his own violence and a rather feeble translation of the passage in which Luther says he must have patience with the Pope and Käthe. The appendix (p. xci) describes Aurifaber's edition of the *Tischreden*.<sup>2</sup>

The first (and perhaps the only) attempt to translate a considerable portion of the *Tischreden* into French in a volume by themselves, was made by Gustave Brunet: *Les Propos de Table de Martin Luther, revus sur les éditions originales et traduites pour la première fois en français*. Paris, 1844. The introduction is bright, but uncritical. After an eloquent appreciation of the value of the Table Talk and an apology for its occasional coarseness, the author tells us how the sayings were collected, repeating the

<sup>1</sup> Full list of these in Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> From which we may infer that it was used. Other *Tischreden* appeared in French in J. M. V. Audin: *Histoire de la vie, des ouvrages et des doctrines de Luther*, 1839. These are spoken of by Hazlitt (*supra*, note 1). Audin was a Catholic historian. The work is in the Astor Library.

anecdote of Zinggreff, but without any reference except the name. A short account of the work of Michelet and Audin is followed by an equally brief description of the German editions, in which the same mistakes are made as were made four years later by Hazlitt, who probably copied from him. Selnecker appears as Selneuer, the edition of 1591 appears as 1590, and the first volume of Rebenstock is assigned to 1558, an error not corrected in any account until Bindseil's *Colloquia* appeared, in 1863. An account is given of the English translation of Bell, and of that of 1832.

The translator claims to have compared the editions and to have selected the best text. He changed the order of the other editions entirely, writing solely from the point of view of interest. His principle of selection is the opposite of that of Hazlitt, the more spicy a thing is the more relish it has for him. His copious notes make the work more readable. He begins with a chapter on "Le diable, les sorcières, les incubes &c." This is followed by one entitled "Contes, apologues et joyeux devis." The worst of these he inserts in the notes in Latin, remarking "qu'ils ont tout l'air d'une page des facéties de Pogge ou des nouvelles de Morlino." Next to the "petits contes polissons" the author likes best those in which Luther talked about his enemies, or showed himself the victim of some superstition.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE TABLE TALK IN LITERATURE

THE period of the Reformation in Germany was one of great literary as well as great spiritual activity. Not since the efflorescence of lyric and epic poetry in the thirteenth century, nor again until the latter part of the eighteenth, do we find anything equal in quantity and power to the literary output of this great age. True, no world poet appeared who contends the palm with Goethe and Schiller or even with Gottfried von Strassburg and Walther von der Vogelweide: "the Aristophanic age produced no Aristophanes,"<sup>1</sup> but nevertheless the literature of the Reformation is full of significance, vitality and charm.

The characteristics of the time were intense nationalism, strong religious feeling, and a powerful appeal to the common man, in fact intensity in all forms, which often showed itself in bitter satire and mocking laughter. The title of Pauli's farcical stories, *Schimpf und Ernst*—mocking jest and earnest mingled, might well be the motto of the age. Here, as in the tales of Claus Narr, the romances, the plays, many of them, of Hans Sachs, and the fable of *Reinecke Fuchs* and those attributed to Aesop, we see the appeal to the peasant, the common man, over against the old aristocracy. Sometimes the appeal was not to the peasant's best side—the adventures of Till Eulenspiegel show how a clever

<sup>1</sup> Scherer, *Geschichte d. deut. Literatur*.

scamp outwits his superiors, and the apotheosis of coarseness in St. Grobianus, a character invented by Brandt in his famous satire the *Ship of Fools*, was typical of the least pleasant side of the exuberant vitality which made itself manifest everywhere.<sup>1</sup>

The fiery dialogues of Hutton, as well as the appeals of Luther and a host of less famous men, show how deeply rooted was the nationalism which rebelled against the crafty domination of foreigners; but deepest and loudest of all was the cry for a purer religion and a more vital faith. The satirization of the clergy had been common since the time of Walther von der Vogelweide at least, but the number and bitterness of these satires increased in the sixteenth century. The polished wit of Erasmus supplied to the upper class who could appreciate his Latin style what the *Litterae Obscurorum Virorum* of Rubianus and his collaborators gave to the students, and such popular *Pasquille* as *Die Krankheit der Messe* and *Der Curtisan und Pfründen-fresser* furnished to those who could read only German.

Of this wonderful time Luther was the heart and soul. How tremendous was the place he filled in the hearts of his countrymen may be seen by the popularity of his works, as well as by the frequency of literary allusion to him. The press was full of such little pamphlets as *Luther's Passion*, and even the plays were deeply influenced by his teaching.<sup>2</sup> None of Luther's works was more popular than his Table Talk, published, as we have seen, by Aurifaber, in 1566. Before the century was over no less than twelve

<sup>1</sup> Dedekind, in 1549, wrote a poem on St. Grobianus, who is always appearing elsewhere. The same spirit is seen in Fischer's translation of Rabelais.

<sup>2</sup> Very many such pamphlets are reproduced in O. Schade's *Satiren und Pasquille aus der Reformationzeit*. For the influence on the drama, see below on the Franckfurt *Faust*.

editions were called for in German, besides the Latin translation.<sup>1</sup>

The cause of their popularity is not hard to discover. In reading them we have the concentrated spirit of the sixteenth century, the love of anecdote and satire, the popular note, the strong national and religious feeling, and even the flavor of "grobianism" which nothing escaped. Besides all this, there is the personal interest, which is perhaps the chief one to-day, and was not less powerful then; the same sort of interest which will always make Eckermann's *Gespräche mit Goethe*, or Bourienne's *Mémoires* of Napoleon widely read. We see the great man's daily life and intimate thoughts portrayed with a frankness and unreserve which are refreshing.

In reading the Table Talk we are constantly reminded of the dialogues and satires so common and so popular at that time. Occasional allusions to Grobianus, the frequent appearance of stories about animals, and the perpetual invective against Rome and the clergy,—all these are revelations of the *Zeitgeist* which appears in all the literary productions of the time.<sup>2</sup> Luther, however, not only borrowed much from his contemporaries, but greatly enriched their speech in return. Even his casual utterances often impressed themselves on the speech of his countrymen, and attained a proverbial currency. Such sayings as:

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix for these editions. The popularity of the work seems to have borne some relation to the general literary activity of the country; there were only four editions in the seventeenth century, two in the eighteenth, and more than nine in the nineteenth, not counting five editions of sources.

<sup>2</sup> For Grobianus, cf. Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 1738. Cf. Luther's animal fables, e. g., Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 114, *et saepe*, with such satires as, "Ein Gespräch eines Fuchs und Wolfs," in Schade, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, no. iii. Cf. also *ibid.*, vol. i, no. i: "Ein Clag und Bitt der deutschen Nation," with such of Luther's sayings as Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Frühe aufstehen und jung freien  
Soll niemand's gereuen,<sup>1</sup>

and

Wer will haben rein sein haus  
Der behalt Pfaffen und Mönche draus,<sup>2</sup>

are good examples. Some sayings found in his conversation have been such as he disapproved and refuted, though even thus they took a lasting form in the way he quoted them. Such, for example is the:

Bleibe gern allein,  
So bleiben euer Herzen rein.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps the most famous of his authentic sayings is one which is thoroughly characteristic of the apostle of marriage and the domestic virtues as against the Catholic ideal of celibacy:

<sup>1</sup> Xanthippus: "Gute alte deutsche Sprüche," in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. 85 (July to Sept., 1896), three articles, pp. 149, 344, and 503 respectively. This saying is on p. 351, quoted from Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 363, quoting Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 407.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151, quoting Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 164. Other examples are given elsewhere, *e. g.*, p. 505. Zinggreff, in his *Teutscher Nation Apophthegmata*, gives some proverbs of Luther, which appear to be mainly apocryphal. Like other great men, Luther had sayings fathered upon him which were not genuine. Such is the celebrated

"Wer liebt nicht Wein, Weiß und Gesang,  
Der bleibt ein Narr sein Lebenslang."

It is not found in any of Luther's works, nor in the *Table Talk*, and was first printed, as far as known, in 1775, in *Wandsbecker Boten*. Cf. Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 678, note to p. 507. The verse has just enough of Luther's spirit to make it a good caricature.

Nicht liebers auf Erden  
Denn Frawenlieb wems kann werden.<sup>1</sup>

A still profounder influence is seen in the coloring taken from the *Tischreden* by the *Faust* written anonymously and produced at Frankfurt in 1587. This, of course, is doubly interesting as bringing the work into a direct relation with the greatest masterpiece of German literature. In this play Mephistopheles "takes many sententious rimes from Brandt's *Narrenschiff* and Luther's *Tischreden*."<sup>2</sup> The author makes Faust's fall from grace an apostasy from the Wittenberg theology, and his repentance is taken from expressions of Luther's in the Table Talk.

The brilliant literary promise of the sixteenth century was sadly disappointed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth. It really seemed as if the Thirty Years' War had blasted all the artistic powers which were so strongly developed before it. The nation looked to France for its literature and canons of taste, and the Table Talk fell into the obscurity which most German works shared in this period. Something of a revival is seen in the renewed in-

<sup>1</sup> Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 75, Xanthippus, *loc. cit.*, p. 346. The enemies of Luther have twisted this into a confession of sensuality. The same idea of Luther as an apostle of the joys of the flesh is exhibited by one who was no enemy of his, the once celebrated Philarète Chasle, in an article called "La Renaissance Sensuelle," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March, 1842, where he compares him to Rabelais, Skelton and Folengo.

<sup>2</sup> Schmidt: "Faust und Luther," in *Sitzungsberichte d. k. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.* The author collects a large number of parallel passages which show how much *Faust* was influenced by the *Tischreden*. Minor points are that the devil appears to Faust as he had to Luther; Helena is modelled on Luther's idea of a *succubus*; Faust's impression of Rome is taken from Luther's words on the same, and also his estimate of the "frankly swinish" life of the Turks. See especially pp. 568, 571.

terest taken in it in the nineteenth century, not only in Germany<sup>1</sup> but in other countries as well.<sup>2</sup>

We have spoken of those qualities of the *Tischreden* which are due to its environment and make it interesting as a typical product of the age; let us now turn to some of its individual peculiarities.

In the first place the Table Talk is not a literary work, in the narrow sense of that term, at all. In an age of roughness and bad literary form it has not even the polish of Luther's written works, or of the dialogues or plays with which we have been comparing it. The first thing which strikes us on opening one of the sources (not Aurifaber) is the mixture of languages spoken by the company. Latin and German are so easily interchangeable that a sentence is often begun in one and ended in the other. "Christus is unzuverstehen, quia est deus";<sup>3</sup> "Mein ganz Leben ist eitel patientia."<sup>4</sup> It is almost superfluous to give examples of so common a phenomenon.

The reason of this was simply that both languages were

<sup>1</sup> An unfavorable estimate of the Table Talk, together with the idea that it had a strong influence in fixing the German bürger type, is found in Lavissee & Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, iv, p. 423. The number of editions (see *supra*, p. 69, n. 2) shows their popularity.

<sup>2</sup> For translations, see Appendix. Brunet (*Propos de Table*, Introduction) says that Bayle commented on them. See Hereford, *Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Sixteenth Century*.

<sup>3</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 301.

<sup>4</sup> Bindseil, *Colloquia*, vol. iii, p. 167. That this was their ordinary method of talking can be seen not only from the Table Talk, but from the testimony of Jonas, who tells us (Letter of July 6, 1537, quoted by Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 4) that he found Luther sick in bed "nunc Deum Patrem nunc Christum Dominum, nunc Latine nunc Germanice invocantem." This mixture, which we call *macaronic*, and the Germans *messingisch* (Kroker, *op. cit.*, p. 5), would have appeared less strange even in a literary work at that time. Among numerous examples of it I will cite only the well-known *Carmina Burana*.



equally familiar, and the attempt to discover any other reason is unnecessary. Wrampelmeyer<sup>1</sup> is led by his patriotism to the discovery that German is the language used to express the main thought, an idea which seems to me fanciful. Lösche thinks Latin was used largely to spare the women's ears what they should not hear.<sup>2</sup> This is a nineteenth-century idea, which would be entirely alien to the sixteenth. The precaution would have been useless, for Kätke, at least, knew enough Latin to keep up with the conversation.<sup>3</sup> Then again Luther took no pains to avoid remarks to or about her which shock our fastidious decorum, though they certainly would not have appeared objectionable to the most cultivated taste of Luther's time.<sup>4</sup>

In general the students put down the sayings in the language in which they were uttered, as would usually be the easier thing to do, but sometimes they translated a German remark into Latin which they could write faster. For the same reason they would put all their own remarks in that tongue, and all matter supplied by them, such as details of time, place, and occasion. One instance in which they clearly translated Luther's remarks is that in which he is represented as consoling his poor old dying Muhme Lehna in the learned tongue which must have been unfamiliar to her.<sup>5</sup> Sometimes Greek<sup>6</sup> and even Hebrew are introduced,

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Lösche, *Analecta*, Einl., p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 3.

<sup>4</sup> E. g., Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 1597; Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 419.

<sup>5</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 217. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 213, where he consoles Cranach in the same tongue.

<sup>6</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 3. An example of the use of Hebrew is found in the introduction of the word *Schefflimini* (*Shebh P'mini*, quoted from Psalm cx. 1) in Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 242 (and thence taken into Auri-faber, Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 322) without any indication, to the layman, of its meaning or language. I am indebted to my father's knowledge of Hebrew for its translation: "Sit thou on my right hand!"

though only by way of short quotations. One of these was made apparently to tease Käthe, who goodhumoredly responded: "Good Heavens! Who said that?" The striking similarity of the Greek and German speech was pointed out by the reformer, who proved it by such examples as the cognate words *ὑπέρ, μετά* and *σύν*, and *über, mitt* and *samt*, and the augment as seen in *ἔγραφα* and *geschrieben*.<sup>1</sup>

Luther's colloquial German is very racy, with marked dialectical and conversational peculiarities. He evidently took no such care in his oral as he did in his written language to adopt the purest idiom. All this, as well as the frequent anacoluthon and solecism found in the original notes is smoothed off and standardized, so to speak, in the collection of Aurifaber.<sup>2</sup>

It is perhaps partly because of the lack of literary form in the Table Talk that we get such a perfect picture of Luther in it. Here we see him in all the simplicity and naïveté of his large-hearted German nature. "God has commanded us" he says, "that we should be simple, open, and true."<sup>3</sup> When Käthe was ill God made her well again, he who always gives what is best for his children and more than they can ask.<sup>4</sup> How fresh is this picture:

On the Sunday after St. Michael's day he was happy in mind, and joked with his friends and with me (Mathesius), and disparaged his own learning: "I am a fool," said he, "and you are cunning and wiser than I in economy and politics. For I do not apply myself to such things, but only to the Church and to getting the best of the Devil. I believe, however, if I did give myself to other sorts of business I could master them. But as I attend only to what is plain to view,

<sup>1</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> See Opitz, *Luthers Sprache*.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 48.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 28. See also Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 6.

any one can get the better of me, until, indeed, I see he is a thief, and then he can't cheat me."<sup>1</sup>

Luther is as frank as he is simple; there is nothing in his own life, no opinion of men or books,<sup>2</sup> no recess of religious feeling which he is not willing to talk about. His Table Talk outdoes Rousseau in frankness, though it must always be remembered that Luther would never have thought of publishing the details of his life which Rousseau made the materials of his confessions. One passage, which also casts an interesting sidelight on Luther's marriage, is too good not to be quoted.

*He spoke as follows [in 1538] of his own marriage:* Had I wished to marry fourteen years ago I should have chosen the wife of Basilius, Anna of Schonfeld. I never loved my own wife, but suspected her of being proud, as she is; but God willed that I should show mercy to the poor fugitive, and by his grace it turned out that my marriage was most happy.<sup>3</sup>

This must not be taken to indicate that Luther did not love

<sup>1</sup> "Sontag post Michaelis ex animo laetus erat et jocabatur cum amicis et mecum et extenuabat suam eruditionem: 'Ich bin alber, saget er, und ir seit ein schalck und gelerter als ich in rebus oeconomicis et politicis. Denn ich nim mich der sachen nicht an und hab mit der ecclesia zu schaffen, und muss dem Teuffel auf die schantze sehen. [See Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. viii, p. 2164.] Das glaub ich, wenn ich mich auf die andern hendeln gebe, ich wolts auch mercken. Ich glaub eim itzlichen, drumb kan man mich wol bescheissen; alsbaldt ich mich aber fur einem fürsehe, der nimpt mir nichts.'" Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 430.

<sup>2</sup> His free criticism of the Bible is well known. See e. g., a liberal opinion of Ezekiel in Preger, *op. cit.*, no. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Khumer, p. 381, quoted by Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 162, note. A confused account of the same is given in Bindseil, *op. cit.*, ii, 338. Köstlin (*op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 762) quotes from Bindseil, and hence gets the wrong account, giving the name "*Ave*" instead of "*Anna*."

his wife after their marriage; the Table Talk is full of instances of exemplary conjugal devotion and he told Dietrich he would not change Käthe for France and Venice.<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes this simplicity shows itself in a sort of naïveté and lack of the critical point of view.

I would give the world [he says] to have the stories of the antediluvian patriarchs also, so that we could see how they lived, preached, and suffered. . . . I have taught and suffered too, but only fifteen, or twenty, or thirty years; they lived seven or eight hundred or more, and how they must have suffered!<sup>2</sup>

His way of regarding the French mode of address is hardly more sophisticated.

The question was mooted whether it was a sin to curse a Frenchman. For they themselves have the custom of greeting their dearest friends with a curse, as "Pest and pox take you, sir!" Was it, then, a sin when the mind was free from hatred? He replied: "Our speech should be Yea and Nay, and the name of the Lord is not to be taken in vain. But it may be that their curses are more innocent than many a good-morning with us."<sup>3</sup>

In oral discourse the Reformer showed a marked predilection for the sententious style. Apophthegm and anecdote abound in the Colloquies. Many of those good stories current with us, whose origin is lost in the dimness of antiquity, appear in some form or other. The anecdote of the emperor who considered himself superior by his official position to the rules of grammar, last used to attack President

<sup>1</sup> Dietrich, Dec. 3, 1534. Quoted Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 497.

<sup>2</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

Roosevelt's spelling reform, is related by Luther and attributed to Sigismund.<sup>1</sup> Another story, current before his time, and taken from him by Browning is that of the two brothers *Date* and *Dabatur vobis*.<sup>2</sup>

One of the pleasantest qualities of the Table Talk is the humor which is constantly appearing. Unfortunately most of the witticisms have been eliminated from the later collections, with their serious purpose of edification, and can only be read in the sources. Luther was naturally of a joyous disposition, "*ein hurtiger und fröhlicher junger Gesell*," as Mathesius calls him.<sup>3</sup> Much of the exuberance of his high spirits, which had been crushed out in his youth by physical and mental suffering appeared fully in his later life.

Joy and good humor with reverence and moderation is the best medicine for a young man—yea, for all men. I, who have passed my life with mourning and a sad face, now seek and accept joy wherever I can find it.<sup>4</sup>

His jokes were never "practical" or rough, but they were often personal, as when he compares Pommer's preaching to an underdone meal.<sup>5</sup> He loved to poke good-humored fun at Käthe, who took it well and showed by her quick wit in repartee she did not get the worst of it.<sup>6</sup> Her loquacity, real or imagined, was the subject of occasional

<sup>1</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 452. Browning: "The Twins."

<sup>3</sup> E. Rolfs: "Luther's Humor ein Stuck seiner Religion," in *Preuss. Jahrb.*, 1904, vol. 115, pp. 468-488. See p. 468 for this. The author writes charmingly but misses the great source of Luther's humor in quoting from his letters only. He finds Luther's humor "idyllic."

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 487.

<sup>5</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 99.

<sup>6</sup> See *supra*, p. 72, and Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 332.

jest; one day Luther recommended her to an Englishman who wanted to learn German as his tutor because "she is so copiously eloquent that she beats me all to pieces."<sup>1</sup> Luther humorously recognizes that she is head of the household, comparing her to Moses and himself to Aaron.<sup>2</sup>

Jokes on religious subjects go rather further than those of a thoroughly correct reformer should. In one passage Luther facetiously compares three famous preachers of his day to the Trinity: "They are one essence and three persons, Pomer the Father, Crodel the Son, and Rörer the Holy Ghost."<sup>3</sup>

This of course is with us a matter of taste, and it is just in matters of taste that Luther shows himself the child not only of his age but of his class. Luther spoke out whether in describing the morals of the Italians,<sup>4</sup> or his own ailments<sup>5</sup> or in giving advice to one tempted.<sup>6</sup> He spoke out too, in giving his opinions of his enemies and those of the Gospel in language which has never been surpassed and rarely equalled for invective force.<sup>7</sup> These defects have been so elaborately apologized for by editor and translator that they have perhaps attained undue prominence. Whatever he was Luther was not vicious, and we never see that *polissonnerie* which is so plain in Erasmus, for example. We do not find Luther writing enthusiastically to a friend

<sup>1</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 53. An example of the same kind given by Rolffs from a letter addressed to "Meiner herzlieben Hausfrauen Kathlerin Lutherin Doctorin Zulsdorferin Säumärkterin und was sie mehr sein kann." Rolffs, *loc. cit.*, p. 483.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 94.

<sup>4</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>5</sup> With a satire on the physician. Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>6</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 737e.

<sup>7</sup> See J. H. Robinson: "The Study of the Lutheran Revolt," in *American Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1903.

about the kisses he has enjoyed<sup>1</sup> or wittily toying with the vicious propensities of mankind in the style of the *Praise of Folly*. Luther was considered remarkably pure in his own age. Mathesius relates that he never heard from him one shameful word,<sup>2</sup> a judgment in which any fair-minded reader will concur; Luther was frank, but he was not prurient.

As to invective, Luther only gave as good as he got. He speaks sometimes of the revolting slanders circulated against him.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes he showed an admirable, as well as a wise, self-restraint in this respect, as when, after reading the scurrilous attack of Cochlaeus he decided not to answer it. "I shall not answer Cochlaeus' book against me, and he will then be much angrier than if I did, for he will not get the honor he thought."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> F. M. Nichols, *Epistles of Erasmus*, p. 203. To us, perhaps, Erasmus seems the less excusable; to the eighteenth century Luther would have been the more unpleasing. Cf. Voltaire's *Lettres à son Altesse le Prince de . . . sur Rabelais*. His strictures are certainly satirical, but we get a true note when he says "Swift is the Rabelais of gentlemen," thereby implying that the indecency of the latter (who resembled, though he far outdid, Luther in this respect) was not quite polished enough for good society.

<sup>2</sup> Mathesius, *Luther Histories*, 1570, p. 136a, quoted by Lösche, *Analecta*, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 1738, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 147. The book was: *Sieben kopffe Martin Luthers von acht hohen sachen des Christlichen glaubens durch Doct. Jo. Cochleum*, 1529. In another place (Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 438 *et seq.*) we have an account which seems more doubtful. It makes Luther contradict himself in consecutive sentences, due to the fact that Lauterbach here, as often, blended two accounts of the same thing. "I shall mortify Cochlaeus by silence and conquer him by contempt, for he is a mere fool, worth nothing in either scripture or dialectic; it would be a shame if I should answer his loose lies. . . . The book stinks; I am waiting to answer it until I can get time to answer the whole at once, so that I can do it with new, fresh wrath. He bores me as with a gimlet, but he will make a bunghole [*sc.* out of which my wrath shall flow]."

It is hardly fair to judge a man by his confidential and casual utterances. What Luther meant only for his friends' ears was bruited over Christendom as loudly as his deliberate opinions, meant for the world. He was a man of frank, open nature, much subject to the impression of the moment, often self-contradictory, careless of his own reputation. He never paused to weigh his conversation in a company as sympathetic and indulgent as he was confidential.<sup>1</sup> It is not fair to say, with a French writer,<sup>2</sup> that Luther talked along after dinner "*dans une demi-ivresse*" but we can readily understand that the influences of digestion and malt liquor were not always conducive to an austere observance of the proprieties. On the whole, if we judge him by his words, making allowance, as we must, for the age he lived in, and the circumstances of his education, Luther offers very little indeed whereby he can be condemned.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "No wonder some impertinent things might intermix themselves *liberius dicta* to refresh and recreate the company." *Supra*, p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> Brunet, *Propos de Table, Int.* On his drinking, see Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 506. It appears that he took too much *once*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Michelet quoted by Brunet, *op. cit.*, Introduction. Also Walch, *op. cit.*, vol. xxii, Einl., p. 33, quoting Selneccker's sententious remark "that we should not let a few weeds spoil the whole garden for us."



## CHAPTER IX

### THE TABLE TALK IN HISTORY

THE various sources and collections of *Tischreden* are not only literary monuments but historical documents, and in this chapter we shall treat them as such, showing first what use has been made of them by historians, then discussing their authenticity and reliability, and finally pointing out by a few specimens the kind of value they possess for the student of the Protestant Revolt.

Luther's enemies have always found in the Table Talk a trenchant weapon for attacking his character and doctrines. Even in his writings Luther is neither consistent nor temperate, much more in his private conversation is he careless and unguarded. By taking every thoughtless remark to a friend literally and with no attention to the context, the occasion on which it was uttered, and the cause which evoked it, it is easy enough to entangle Luther in a hopeless mass of contradictions and to asperse his character. This was done by Catholics and humanists as soon as the *Tischreden* were published, and subsequently has been undertaken more thoroughly by more scientific though equally hostile historians.<sup>1</sup>

Döllinger gives us a beautiful anthology of all the least considered and most infelicitous of Luther's sayings,

<sup>1</sup> "The gnat-like tribe of Janssenists," as Lösche (*Analecta*, Einl. *init.*) calls them, not without animus. For the humanist attack, see Walch, *op. cit.*, vol. xxii, p. 20.

whether taken from his works or from the Table Talk. If, in a moment of despondency, Luther says the preaching of the Gospel only seems to make men worse, and that the converts to the new church abuse their liberty and commit all manner of sin, *that* is taken as a serious effort to sum up the effect of the reformed teaching and as a damning indictment against it.<sup>1</sup> "It is a wonderful thing," says Luther again, "and a sad one (*plena offendiculo*) that as the Gospel flourishes the world becomes ever worse, for all turn spiritual liberty into license. For the reign of Satan and the Pope suits this world . . . in truth, it degenerates under the doctrine of grace."<sup>2</sup> This of course is a full proof, to the enemies of Protestantism, that the Revolt had a bad moral effect. The same is shown still more clearly in Luther's impatient denunciation of the Protestant clergy as full of "*faule, schädliche, schändliche, fleischliche Freiheit*."<sup>3</sup>

Döllinger is content with quoting Luther's sayings against himself, without putting a strained construction on them. The recently published book of Father Denifle puts an unnatural meaning on much that he said and thus attacks Luther's life and character with such perverse erudition and such an obvious lack of impartiality that it appears more like the pamphlet of a violent contemporary than a serious history. One example will suffice: *crimine ab uno disce omnes*. The Reformer's words "*misceor feminis*" which from the context obviously mean nothing else than that the reformer no more lives in monastic retirement, but mixes

<sup>1</sup> Döllinger, *Die Reformation, ihre innere Entwicklung*, 1853-4, vol. i, p. 295. Quoting Walch, *op. cit.*, vol. xvi, p. 2013.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320, quoting Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306, quoting from the *Tischreden*.

with society, including that of women, are taken as a confession of habitual immorality.<sup>1</sup>

Protestant historians have used the Table Talk in a fairer and more amiable way, though it is true that they have occasionally been led by admiration of their hero to explain away what might damage his character. This has been done mainly by the editors; the historians proper have simply ignored the less admirable part of the Table Talk, or excused it all in a few general terms, while reserving their specific quotations for those sayings which show the brighter side of Luther's character. The editors, however, had to treat each saying by itself, and many of them have taken liberties with the text in the interests of piety. The first editor, Aurifaber, suppressed much he thought unedifying, as we can see by comparing him with his sources, and the last editor, Kroker, has shown the same tendency in supporting a reading in Mathesius's Luther Histories, recorded so many years later, against one taken on the spot, all in the interest of Luther's reputation.<sup>2</sup>

Of all the historians whom I have consulted<sup>3</sup> Köstlin has made the best use of the Table Talk. He used all the sources known at the time he wrote (*i. e.* all but the Mathesian collection, recently edited by Kroker) and he used them almost exhaustively. It is literally true that nearly every page of his biography has some reference to the Table Talk, and after comparing a large number of his

<sup>1</sup> H. P. Denifle, *Luther und Lutherthum*, 2 vols., 1904, 1905. This expression, taken from one of Luther's letters, is found on page 283 of vol. i. Many references are taken from the *Tischreden*.

<sup>2</sup> In the passage about Luther's "tres malos canes," quoted *supra*, p. 49, note 3.

<sup>3</sup> E. g., Hausrath, *Luthers Leben* (last ed., 1905). Berger, *Martin Luther in kulturgeschichtliche Darstellung*, 1895. Kolde, *Martin Luther*, 1884, 1893. Lindsay, *Luther and the German Reformation*, 1900.

references with the originals, I can only testify my admiration for his thoroughness and fairness.<sup>1</sup>

The unprincipled use of the *Tischreden* by Luther's enemies led to an early attempt on the part of those of his friends whose zeal outran their judgment, to deny their genuineness and to impute them to Catholic forgers.<sup>2</sup> The attempt was so utterly preposterous that it was soon abandoned, and indeed is hardly worth mentioning. The authenticity of the Table Talk (making allowance for very slight editorial changes) is as indisputable as that of the *Address to the Christian Nobility*.

Another set of defenders admitting the authenticity of the work, have expressed their regret that it should ever have been published, and even suggested that the extant editions be suppressed—a proposal as impractical as injudicious.<sup>3</sup> If their real defence, which, as has been stated, lies in a comprehension of the conditions under which they were spoken, be once understood and fairly applied, no partisan friend of Luther (needless to say no impartial historian) will regret their publication.

A very different question from the genuineness of the Table Talk is the question of its reliability. In using this source the historian should give to statements of fact only such weight as can be given to any oral testimony. When the difference between the date of the fact recounted, and the

<sup>1</sup> See Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 774, and vol. ii, p. 487 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> This was the object of a little work by Möller and Strickner, *De auctoritate libri scripti sub titulo Colloquiorum Mensalium Lutheri*, 1693. Walch (*op. cit.*, vol. xxii, Einl., p. 22 *et seq.*) quotes opinions of the same kind, summing up strongly in favor of the genuineness. Since his work, 1743, no editor has thought it necessary to take up the question.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25. Walch defends his own edition by saying it is better to have a good than a bad one.

date of the saying in which it is recorded can be ascertained, the probable degree of accuracy can be calculated. Obviously Luther's story of the Diet of Worms, told by him twenty years after it happened, is worth less than the account of his controversy with the Swiss, taken down within a few weeks of its occurrence.

The date can only be told as a rule, in the sources, and so it is these sources only, and not the collections, that must be used by the historian. Another reason for using them is that they contain the best text of the Table Talk. Again it is plain that the facts are reliable in proportion as they came within the personal observation of Luther and his guests. The not infrequent accounts of the evolutions of the Turkish army, and of the counter moves of Ferdinand and the German Princes, are worth no more than pure fiction as regards the facts they purport to record. They are worth something, however, as indicating the popular anxiety caused by the Turks in Germany in the sixteenth century, and the popular opinion that Ferdinand used these terrors to wring armies and supplies from the German States.<sup>1</sup>

This observation leads us to remark that it is not as a repertory of dates and figures, or as a chronicle of important historical events, that the Table Talk has its value. This lies rather in the brilliant picture it gives of the opinions, the motives, the reading, the daily life and personal attitude of the greatest German of his age, and in their portrayal of contemporary social life and habit.<sup>2</sup>

A good example of the value of the *Tischreden* is seen in the new light cast, by the recently published Mathesian

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 507. Seidemann, *op. cit.*, 3 and 126.

<sup>2</sup> Making due allowance for the context and spirit of the documents.

Collection, on the vexed question of Luther's attitude to Philip of Hesse's bigamy. Here we get a few new facts, as for example that the Landgrave visited Weimar to discuss the project with Luther and Melanchthon, for which the *Tischreden* are the only authority.<sup>1</sup> The visit must have taken place in April, 1534, and the conversation reported by Mathesius who relates it, took place about June 1, 1540, so that it is quite possible that there may be a mistake in Luther's memory. More valuable, however, than a few doubtful facts of this nature, is the light cast on Luther's whole attitude by his continual reference to the unfortunate affair. We can see how perplexed he is about it, and what pressure must have been brought to bear to get him to accede to the second marriage. We regret to note, at the same time, that he seems more worried by the use the "Papists" make of the affair than by its doubtful morality. Fouchet's "worse than a crime, a blunder" is paralleled by his "not only a sin but a scandal."<sup>2</sup> His chief defence of his attitude is by comparison with the worse morality of the Papists. He is firmly convinced that all would have been well if the matter could have been kept quiet as he advised.<sup>3</sup>

Luther's characterization of his contemporaries is always interesting to us, not as a final valuation, but as evidence of Luther's relations with them. His opinion of the rela-

<sup>1</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 181, note 11.

<sup>2</sup> "*Si Macedo peccavit, peccatum est et scandalum*," Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 241.

<sup>3</sup> See Kroker, *op. cit.*, nos. 181, 188, 233, 241, 245, etc. The most recent monograph on the subject, W. W. Rockwell's *Die Doppelhe des Landgrafen Philipp v. Hessen*, 1904, quotes Kroker's *Tischreden* in this connection as a source. He corrects many former misconceptions and shows that at the Eisenach meeting (July, 1540, shortly after the saying above quoted had been recorded) Luther advised "a good strong lie."

tive merits of himself and three other leaders is seen in his calling Melanchthon "Deeds and words," Erasmus "Words without deeds," himself "Deeds without words" and Carlstadt "Neither deeds nor words."<sup>1</sup> Erasmus always excites his wrath, being (if we may borrow a phrase from Milton) one of those lukewarm persons "who give God himself the vomit."

I condoned all his boasts, [says Luther in one place,] but I could not stand his catechism, because he teaches nothing certain in it, but tries to make the youthful reader doubtful. It was the Roman curia and Epicurus who showed him the way. In Germany we have a regular fraternity of Epicureans, Crotus, Mutianus and Justus Menius.<sup>2</sup>

Less than anything else Luther was able to understand or sympathize with the advocate of half-way measures. Of Bucer he has a poor opinion;

That little wretch (*Leckerlein*) has no credit with me. I don't trust him, for he has too often betrayed me. He showed himself up badly at Regensburg, when he wanted to be a mediator between me and the Pope, and said: "It is too bad that there should be so much trouble for the sake of two or three little articles!"<sup>3</sup>

Hardly less interesting than his opinion of his contemporaries is his opinion of men of former generations. As is well known his estimation of Aristotle was small, a natural reaction against the schoolmen.

<sup>1</sup> For this and a number of other characterizations, see Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 266-306.

<sup>2</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 48. For another of the same tenor, see Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 569.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 543. For Agricola, see Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 70. For Oecolampadius, Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 468.

Aristotle is nothing but Epicurus. He does not believe that God cares for the world, or if he does, he thinks that God drowns along like a sleepy maid rocking a baby. Cicero was much better; in my opinion he got all that was best in the Greeks.<sup>1</sup>

Terence was his favorite author among the heathen and in the following opinion of him we see a venerable sanction for the joke on the mother-in-law, which still makes so large a part of current humor :

The *Hecyra* is a fine comedy, the best in Terence, but because it has no action it does not please the common student. But it is full of grave sententious sayings, useful for common life, such as: "All mothers-in-law hate their daughters-in-law."<sup>2</sup>

The Translation of the Bible naturally occupies much of his thought. In one place he lays down a sensible rule of translation which partly explains the success of his own :

It is not sufficient (in translation) to know the grammar and observe the sense of the words, but knowledge of the subject treated is essential to a proper understanding of the words. Lawyers do not understand the law except by practice, and no one can understand Virgil's Eclogues without knowing something of the subject. If the reader knows whether the eclogue is about Augustus or Cæsar, he can easily apply the words. So in the Bible I keep to the sense.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 525.

<sup>2</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 485. His allusions to Terence are quite frequent. In one place (if my memory serves me) he said he read a little of that author every day.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 145. Further examples of the pains the Bible cost him and his estimate of previous translations are found in *ibid.*, nos. 470, 473. See also Dietrich, p. 137, quoted by Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 86, note 2, for his opinion of the commentators on the Bible.



Some will contend that he carried this principle too far when he inserted a word in Romans which Paul had not used.

He often speaks of the part he took in the great historic events of Worms and Augsburg, and though his memory may be at fault as to details, his allusions are always worth much as illustrations of his later attitude. At one time he was inclined to make the Diet of Augsburg of 1518 the turning-point of his life. "Up to that time I knew too little of the errors of the Papacy." Possibly he exaggerated the amount of pressure brought to bear on him to retract.<sup>1</sup>

In like manner his memory of Worms is doubtless somewhat at fault, but his account of it is interesting as showing his later, more advanced attitude. As he remembered it he said:

Most gracious Lord Emperor: Some of my books are disputations (*Zanckbücher*), some didactic. The didactic and the word of God I will not recant, but if I have been too vehement against any one in disputation, or have said too much, I will let it be shown me if you give me time for reflection.

This, of course, contradicts the usual statement that he apologized for the invective and asked for time on the other.<sup>2</sup>

For the daily course of his private life the Table Talk is the best source we have. Even Luther's letters, frank,

<sup>1</sup> Seidemann, pp. 93-97. The Diet of 1518 is of course meant. He states that he was there three days without a safe-conduct. He arrived just at the close of the session. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. ii, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 438-440. The passage cannot be dated with certainty. Of the same kind of reminiscence as the above is his account of his vow to be a monk. *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 187 *et seq.*

charming, intimate as they are, do not give us such a picture of him as does this record of his conversations. For some years such as 1538, we can tell just what he was thinking and doing on almost every day. Out of a wealth of material sufficient to construct a biography, we shall select a few specimens.

Luther's ill-health is a well-known fact, but we do not realize how constant and wearing it was until we read the Table Talk, where it is often alluded to, though never in anything but a brave and manly way. He suffered hardly less from his ailments than from the barbarous remedies of the time. Vertigo troubled him, for which he found help in a little food, remarking that butter was a good thing.<sup>1</sup> A more serious complaint was the ulceration of his body; he once compared his sores to the stars in the sky, saying that there were over two hundred of them.<sup>2</sup> At another time he wished he had died at Schmalkald, where he was tortured by the stone. His observation that medicine was a good thing but the doctors poor, was fully justified by the treatment he received on this occasion.<sup>3</sup>

His superstition, too, is constantly appearing. He had the tendency (common to the unscientific mind) of attributing what he could not explain to supernatural causes. Even a thunderstorm transcends natural phenomena. He said of one: "It is simply satanic. I believe the devils wanted to have a dispute and that some angel interposed this χάσμα and so tore their propositions up." Sometimes his credulity takes an active form which shocks our modern

<sup>1</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 308.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 24. See also Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 747. For his illness in Italy, see Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 105. His best cure, he said, was John iii. 16. Dietrich, p. 119, quoted Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 505.

humanity. He advised, for example, that a poor girl who was said to shed tears of blood in the presence of another woman be tortured as a witch.<sup>1</sup> His advice as to how to frustrate the machinations of the spirits who stole the milk is more disgusting, though less cruel.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes he took a rational view as when he said the stars did not influence events.<sup>3</sup>

Luther's hospitality is strikingly portrayed in the Table Talk. In fact he must have had many guests all the time, or else he could not have had so many records made of his conversation by different persons. Not only did he have his friends with him for long periods together, but many chance visitors put up at his house. Such was the Swiss Superintendent whom Luther received on April 15, 1538. We have an agreeable evidence of his courtesy on this occasion in the delicacy with which he speaks of his relations with the Swiss Reformers.<sup>4</sup>

We have already spoken of his carelessness in temporal affairs and the anxiety it caused his good wife, but the frequency of its reappearance in the Table Talk will perhaps justify us in adducing another example. Käthe complained that she had only three bottles of beer left, to which he complacently replied:

God can easily make them four. If he were not our provider, we should soon be done for. I have an extraordinary way of living, spending more than I get. For I must spend more than 500 florins<sup>5</sup> a year in the kitchen, without counting

<sup>1</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. 117. "Let such be tortured"; perhaps he means the other woman, or both.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62. See also Kolde, *Analecta Lutherana*, p. 378, on the *miscellanea turba* of old and young in Luther's house.

<sup>5</sup> *I. e.*, the amount of his income, 200 florins besides the 300 he got from the elector.

clothes and extras. If I had a smaller house I would keep away the multitude and be as private as I could. But God is the provider for simple folk."<sup>1</sup>

On his relations with his wife and children much may be gathered from the Table Talk, but the subject is already hackneyed. He may joke his wife about her womanly readiness in speech,<sup>2</sup> or pun on her name, calling her his *Cathena*, or Chain, but we feel that it is all good-humored and affectionate. As we have seen Kätke was not always on the best terms with the students, and they undoubtedly retaliated for her jealousy by the depreciatory tone in which they refer to her.<sup>3</sup>

It is interesting to observe how much our appreciation of the comparative worth of the different sayings has changed from that of Luther's contemporaries. To the first editors those sayings were most valuable which gave an authoritative exposition of some knotty point in theology, or an exegesis of some obscure text in the Bible. To us these once vital questions have sunk into comparative neglect, and what Luther may have thought of the Judgment Day,<sup>4</sup> or of Nebuchadnezzar<sup>5</sup> is no longer decisive, hardly interesting. To all who know Luther, however (and who does not?), those stories and jokes, the familiar conversations which reveal so much of the man's heart and life, will have an ever fresh and abiding interest.

<sup>1</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 111 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, ch. ii and iii. Cf. Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, no. 120. Köstlin, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 496.

<sup>4</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, no. 122.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 218.

# APPENDIX

---

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

---

THIS bibliography is divided into six parts. The first is a catalogue of the MSS. and editions of the sources. The second is a similar catalogue of the collections, in the various MSS. and editions. The third part gives a table showing the relations of the various MSS., how the notebooks were gradually combined into the later collections. Part four is a list of all the German and Latin printed editions, both collections and sources. The fifth part is a catalogue of the English and French translations. The sixth and last section is a review of additional explanatory material bearing on the subject. My account of this last category is critical as well as descriptive; the other classes of material have been so fully treated in the text as to render further criticism unnecessary.<sup>1</sup>

### PART I. THE SOURCES

#### **Cordatus**

1. *Tagebuch über Martin Luther*, geführt von Conrad Cordatus. MS. found by Dr. H. Wrampelmeyer in the Church Library at Zellerfeld. It contains a variety of material besides *Tischreden*. At one time Wrampelmeyer be-

<sup>1</sup> I have seen none of the MSS. myself; my account is, therefore, taken from the printed sources indicated in the notes.

lieved it to have been in the handwriting of Cordatus, but later found that it was not.<sup>1</sup>

2. *Die Herliche Schöne und Liebliche Apophtegmata des Hochgelaerhtens Docto. Martini. Lutheri*, zusammen geschrieben Per Dominum Doctorem Conradum Cordatum. "Haec varia et utillissima dicta sanctissimi viri Doctoris Martini Lutheri scribebat sibi Sebastian. Redlich Ber-noënsis, M. D., LXVI." <sup>2</sup>

### Dietrich

3. *Collecta ex Colloquiis habitis cum D. Martino Luthero in mensa per annos sex, quibus cum eo Wittenberge communitus sum usus.* 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35. MS. Cent. V. append. no. 75, Nürnberg.<sup>3</sup> The numbers 29, 30, etc., refer to the years 1529, etc.

4. *Rapsodiae et dicta quaedam ex ore Doctoris Martini Lutheri in familiaribus colloquiis annotata . . . Valentinus Bavarus suo labore et manu propria in hunc librum transcribendo comparavit.* 1548. MS. in the Royal Library of Gotha.<sup>4</sup>

5. *Colloquia Lutheri conscripta a quibusdam et alia quaedam addita sunt. Thesaurus Theologiae* 1543. Christopherus Obenander, Studio Witten. 44.<sup>5</sup> MS. in Royal Library at Dresden.

### Schlaginhaufen

6. *Martini Lutheri Privata Dicta, Consilia, Judicia,*

<sup>1</sup> Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-12.

<sup>2</sup> MS. first noticed by Kawerau. Cf. Wrampelmeyer, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 10, note 1; Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 35 *et seq.*; Lösche, *Analecta*, p. 4, note 1. Redlich of Berne is otherwise unknown.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xi. Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xviii.

<sup>4</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. xxi.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Einl., p. xxii. Bindseil, *op. cit.*, p. cxxii.

*Vaticinia, Item Epistolae, Sales, Consolationes hince inde collectae*, Anno 1567. MS. Clm. 943 in the Munich Public Library.<sup>1</sup>

### Lauterbach

7. *Tagebuch auf das Jahr 1538*. MS. in Royal Library at Dresden.<sup>2</sup>

8. *Meditationes et Colloquia D. Lutheri*. MS. in Stolbergische Bibliothek at Wernigerode.<sup>3</sup>

9. *Tagebuch*, copied by Khumer (Kummer), in Dresden Library, 1554.<sup>4</sup>

10. *Dicta et Facta R. D. D. Martini Lutheri et aliorum*, 1550. "Georgius Steinert hujus codicis est possessor." MS. in Munich, Clm. 937-939. Contains copies from Lauterbach, and others.<sup>5</sup>

11. *Colloquia Serotina D. M. L.*, 1536, 22 Octobris [and to 1539] descripta ex αὐτογράφοις. D. Antonii Lauterbachii primi Superint. Pirn. in Misn. Anno 1553 manu Pauli Judicis al. Richteri primi Pastoris Neapol. s. Neostad. prope Pirnam. MS. at Gotha, B 169.<sup>6</sup>

### Mathesius, Tagebuch

12. *Goth B. 168*. MS. in the Ducal Library at Gotha. Collection of Judgments of Luther on sundry things and persons, chiefly theological. P. 471. This MS. contains a great variety of things. It has many of Mathesius' notes.<sup>7</sup>

13. *Codex Rhedigeranus* of the City Library at Breslau

<sup>1</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. iv, v.

<sup>2</sup> Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. xv *et seq.* Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. iii.

<sup>3</sup> Seidemann, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. iii. Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. i.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. ix.

<sup>5</sup> Preger, *op. cit.*, Einl., pp. xxii, xxiii.

<sup>6</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, p. xxii.

<sup>7</sup> Lösche, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 24 *et seq.*

No. 295. It contains Mathesius' notes copied from X in almost exactly the same form as *Analecta*.<sup>1</sup>

14. *Familiaria Colloquia Rev. Viri D. D. Mar. Lutheri*. In possession of the book dealer Hirzel of Leipzig. This has quite a variety of things including many of Mathesius' notes "undoubtedly near the original" and a few of Lauterbach's.<sup>1</sup>

15. *Excerpta haec omnia in mensa ex ore D. Ma.: Luterj. Anno Domini 1540*. MS. in Nürnberg.<sup>2</sup>

### Mathesius, Luther Histories

16. *Historien von des Ehrwirdigen in Gott seligen thewren Manns Gottes, Doctoris Martini Luthers, anfang, Lehr, leben unnd Sterben*. Nürnberg 1570. (Reprinted later, see *infra*.)

### Plato

17. *Memorabilia dicta et facta Lutheri*. This MS. was used by Köstlin and cited by him as the *Leipz. Mskr.* Its age and author are unknown. The chirography is that of the later Reformation time. The latest datable piece (No. 214) speaks of the Diet of Augsburg, 1547.

It contains 218 Nos. Kroker proved these to come from Plato's collection. Among the *Tischreden* there are a number of anecdotes of the guests, Melancthon, Bugenhagen, Major, Cruciger, Mathesius, &c. It is much the most original of the Plato copies. Kroker prints (*op. cit.*, 52, Einl.) four pieces from it which are found nowhere else.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lösche, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 24 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> Edited by Lösche, 1892, as *Analecta Lutherana et Melanthonia*. See *infra*, printed editions.

<sup>3</sup> Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 1.



18. *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XX, pp. 519-608. Melancthon's reports of Luther's sayings, described as "Certain histories recited by him in his public lectures, collected by a certain disciple, Weric Vendenhaimer of Nürnberg." These consist of 304 sayings taken mostly from Plato's collection.<sup>1</sup>

### Miscellaneous

19. Zwickau N LXX. *Adiaphoristica item quadem apophthegmata*. MS. in Library of the Ratsschule.

20. Hamburg *Supellex epistolica Uffenbachii et Worliorum LXXIV. Ad historiam Reformationis spectantia*.

These two MSS. are of very minor importance, having only a few *Tischreden* in them.

## PART II. THE COLLECTIONS

### Mathesius

1. Eberhard. Freyberg in a school Programme of 1727 speaks of a MS. of Luther's *Tischreden* in his possession which is designated as "*Thesaurus Theologicus*," and came from the hand of C. Eberhard. This man was born 1523, at Schneeberg, and died 1575, at Wittenberg. He had copied it from the original of Mathesius, as he notes in an autograph inscription on a page glued to the cover: "Hunc librum descripsi ex. Dni. Magistri Mathesii libellis cui acceptum refero et gratias immortales ago. Caspar Eberhard 1550, Aprilis 27." This MS. is unfortunately lost. Dr. Schnorr, of Carolsfeld, advertised for it in vain, and so did Kroker.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lösche, *Analecta*, Einl., p. 30 *et seq.* He mentions two other books in which he has found parallels to his own MS, but they are not properly sources at all.

<sup>2</sup> See Seidemann, *op. cit.*, p. ix, and Kroker, Einl., *op. cit.*, p. 38. Schnorr gave some references from Eberhard's life by D. T. Müller (1754) to show that he had written *Colloquia*.

2. *Luthers Tischreden in der Mathesischen Sammlung*. This MS. was spoken of by Lingke, 1769. Lösche refers to it as lost.<sup>1</sup> Kroker discovered it between two books in the Leipzig Library, and edited it. Not mentioned in the Catalogue of Leipzig MSS. by Naumann, 1838; it appears in the catalogue of Pölit's Library as follows: *Luth. Martinus, Colloquia. Manuscripta Collecta*, 1546. In 1885 G. Wustmann printed a little bit of it, naming both Mathesius and Schiefer in connection with it, but this indication of its whereabouts remained unnoticed.

### Unknown

1. *Farrago litterarum ad amicos et colloquiorum in mensa RP Domini Martini Lutheri &c.* MS. in ducal library of Gotha. On the binding is, M. B. 1551. See *supra*, p. 57.

### Lauterbach

1. Halle MS. written 1560, edited by Bindseil, 1863-66. Contains the first redaction of Lauterbach's collection. See above, chapter on collections, and below, printed editions. Found in the library of the Orphan Asylum at Halle. Folio 654 Bl. Very poor hand. The sections often run together. Said to have been edited with "painful accuracy."<sup>2</sup>

2. Dresden A 91 & 92. Two volumes folio of 283 and 365 pages respectively. Anno 1562.

3. Gotha A 262. MS. at Gotha, an incomplete copy of second part of the above. Folio 310 Bl.

4. *Colloquia Meditationes &c. Lutheri*. Edited by Reb-

<sup>1</sup> Lingke: *Luthers Merkwürdige Reisegeschichte*, Einl., p. 3. Seidemann, *op cit.*, Einl., p. xii, gives numerous references on Werndorf and Schiefer. Lösche, *Analecta*, p. 10. Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Bindseil, *op. cit.*, Einl., *passim*. Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.



Cordatus	-	Tagebuch	-	Zellerfeld MS. (Wrampelmeyer).			
				Redlich.			
Dietrich	-	Tagebuch	-	Nürnberg MS.			
				X - - - - -			
		Collection	-	X - - - - -	X -		
Schlaginhaufen	-	Tagebuch (Preger).					
		Tagebuch 1536-7.	-	Weller (infra) - - - - -			
				Dresden MS. (Seidemann)			
		Tagebuch 1538	-	X - - - - -			
Lauterbach	-			MS. Serotina	X -		
		Tagebuch 1539	-	Mathesius § 5			
		Simple Collection	-	X - - - - -			
Weller	-	Tagebuch	-	Mathesius § 4			
		Collection	-	Mathesius § 8			
Corvinus	-	Tagebuch (lost)		X -			
		Tagebuch 1540	-				
Mathesius	-						
		Luther Histories	(1570).				
Besold	-	Mathesius § 3	-	- - - - -			
Heydenreich	-	Mathesius § 2	-	- - - - -			
Plato	-	Memorabilia					
		Melanchthon	(Vendenhaimer in Corpus Reformatorum).				
		Mathesius § 7	-	- - - - -			
Stolz	-	Tagebuch	-	- - - - -			
Aurifaber	-	Tagebuch	-	- - - - -			



enstock at Frankfurt a. M. 1571. See chapter on collections and *infra*, printed editions.

5. MS. in Wolfenbüttel of 1562. Extra 72. Two parts of 169 and 236 pages respectively. It contains some matter besides *Tischreden*.<sup>1</sup>

### Aurifaber

1. *Deutsche Tischreden*, printed 1566 *et saepe*. See chapter on collections and below, printed editions.

2. C germ. 4502 in Munich. Anno 1614. Two parts, 229 and 191 pages, octavo. Extracts from Aurifaber.<sup>2</sup>

3. Karlsruhe 437, *Luther's Tischreden* 1535-1542. Written *circa* 1575; contains extracts from the printed edition, with other matter in the appendices.<sup>2</sup>

## PART III. THE RELATIONS OF THE MSS.

A Table showing the relations of the MSS. will be found opposite this page. The explanation of this table is as follows:

We start here with the twelve notetakers, and trace the process of transcription through which their notes went. We first observe that these transcriptions were not exact, the copyist changed both the matter and the order of what he copied, left out a good deal and introduced extraneous matter. We simply mean that the MSS. took most of their material from the sources indicated, though they often took much from others, especially, of course, in the large collections. A full description of the MSS. has already been given.

The *Tagebuch* of Cordatus is known in two MSS.

Dietrich kept a notebook, and also had a collection, copied from others. The former is known in the MS. *Dietrich*, the lost MS. X copied from both, and was the source of three other copies, *Bavarus*, *Obenander* and *Mathesius* § 6.

<sup>1</sup> Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 7. Mentioned in Kroker, *op. cit.*, Einl., p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Meyer, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

Schlaginhaufen's *Tagebuch* was edited by Preger.

Lauterbach was the author of at least four sources. The first *Tagebuch* was copied by Weller, both in his notebook and his collection. The second was edited from a Dresden MS. by Seidemann, and is also known in three other more or less complete copies, *Khumer*, *Munich MS.*, and *Wernigerode MS.* The third *Tagebuch* is known in the MS. *Serotina*, and also in excerpts in the fifth section of Kroker. The fourth book was a simple collection, *i. e.*, a book of copies from others, which was taken into three of the MSS. which have the *Tagebuch of 1539*, *viz.*, *Khumer*, *Munich*, and *Wernigerode*. From one of these, or a MS. like them, Lauterbach made his large collection, taking notes also from other sources doubtless, especially from his own earlier notes, possibly through Weller. The first redaction was edited from the *Halle MS.* by Bindseil. The second is known in two copies, MSS. at *Gotha*, and *Dresden*. From another lost copy a third redaction was made and edited by Rebenstock. By a fourth line a fourth redaction was made, which we have in the *Wolfenbüttel MS.*, which was the source of Aurifaber. Aurifaber also incorporated other notes, especially important being his own and those of Stolz, which are unknown in any other form.

Weller's *Tagebuch* and *Sammlung*, in both of which he copied largely from Lauterbach, were incorporated into the MS. published by Kroker, but in different ways.

Corvinus' notebook, if he had one, is lost. One of his notes survives in Schlaginhaufen.

Mathesius was the author of two books of *Tischreden*, the *Tagebuch of 1540* and the *Luther Histories*. The first was copied in a lost MS., X, and from it by four other extant MS., *Gotha B.*, *Hirzil*, *Rhedigeranus*, and the one edited as *Analecta* by Lösche. It was also copied by Plato, and incorporated by Mathesius himself as the first section of his collection. The other sources of this collection are indicated by lines; they were all kept by Mathesius himself in a lost MS., X. This was copied by Eberhard, whose MS. is lost, and also by Krünger, who added to them his own copy of Weller, published as § 8 of Mathesius in Kroker.

Heydenreich and Besold are known only in copies in the Mathesian Collection.

Plato was copied by Melanchthon, and taken from him as lecture notes by Vendenhaimer, whence they were reprinted in the *Corpus Reformatorum*. He was also copied by the MS. *Memorabilia*, and by Mathesius in the seventh section.

Stolz and Aurifaber, as has already been stated, survive only in the collection of the latter, where their notes cannot be distinguished from those taken from other sources.

Some MSS., such as *Hamburg*, *Zwickau*, and the collection *Farrago*, cannot be placed in this table at all, as their notes are either too few or their complexity too great to enable the investigator to determine their relations. They are all unimportant.

#### PART IV. PRINTED EDITIONS; GERMAN AND LATIN

##### Aurifaber

1. *Tischreden oder Colloquia Doct. Mart. Luthers*, so er in vielen Jaren, gegen gelarten Leuten, auch frembden Gesten, und seinen Tischgesellen geführt, Nach den Heubtstücken unserer Chritlichen Lere, zusammen getragen. Eisleben. 1566.<sup>1</sup>

The *Tischreden* are divided here, as in all of Aurifaber's editions, into 80 great chapters. In this edition they are incorrectly numbered 82, nos. 23 and 32 being left out.

2. *The same*, Frankfurt am Mayn, 1567. Folio. Doubtless pirated.<sup>1</sup>

3. *The same*, Frankfurt am Mayn. Octave, 2 vols. Under the title we have: "Anfenglichs von Antonio Lauterbach zusammen getragen, Hernacher in gewisse Locos Communes verfasset und aus viel anderer Gelehrter Leuth Collectaneis gemehret Durch Herrn Joh. Aurifaber." This edition was also pirated.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irmischer, *Luthers Tischreden, Sämt. Werke*, Frankfurt am Mayn und Erlangen, vol. 57, Einl., p. x et seq.



4. *The same*, Frankfurt am Mayn, 1568, folio. A new introduction, by Aurifaber, dated July 1, 1567, complains of changes and additions to his authentic volume of *Tischreden*. He probably alludes to the last two editions, though the changes in them are very slight.<sup>1</sup>

5. *The same*, Frankfurt am Mayn, 1569, folio. Appendix with prophecies of Luther collected by Mag. G. Walther, and subscription by J. Fink.<sup>1</sup>

6. *The same*, Eisleben, 1569. Folio.<sup>2</sup>

7. *The same*, Eisleben, 1577. Folio.<sup>1</sup>

8. *Tischreden von Martini Lutheri*, so er in vielen Jaren die Zeyt seines Lebens gegen Gelehrten Leuthen &c. Anfenglich von M. Anthonio Lauterbach zusammen getragen. Hernacher in gewisse Locos Communes verfasst und aus viel anderer Gelehrter Leute Collectaneis gemehret durch Johannem Aurifabrum. Frankfurt am Mayn 1571.

This edition is not mentioned in Irmischer, Bindseil, or any other catalogue of the *Tischreden*. I have seen a copy at Union Seminary, New York, and there is another at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.

It is a pirated edition, copied mainly from no. 3, but with changes taken from no. 5. After Aurifaber's Preface of 1569 comes the register of 80 chapters, and at the end a sort of Appendix put in the Index as "Auch noch viel andere Tischreden Doct. Mart. Luth. zum theil in die obgesetzte Locos gehörende, von allerley Sachen, auss etlichen geschriebenen Büchern zusammen getragen."

At the end comes an Appendix of *Propheteyung* D. Martini Lutheri. Then the alphabetic Index. On the last page the colophon: *Gedruckt zu Frankfurt am Mayn durch Peter Schmid und Sigismund Feyerabend*.

<sup>1</sup> Irmischer, *Luthers Tischreden, Sämt. Werke*, Frankfurt am Main und Erlangen, vol. 57, Einl., p. x et seq.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* I have seen this edition at Union Theological Seminary.

### Stangwald

9. *Tischreden doctor Mart. Luthers*, so er in vielen Jaren, gegen Gelärten Leuten, auch frembden Gesten, und seinen Tischgesellen geführt. Nach den Häupstücken unserer Christlichen Lehre, zusammen getragen. Und jetzt Auff's neuwe in ein richtige Ordnung gebracht, Und nach den geschriebenen Tischreden Doct. Mart. Luth. Corrigiert.

This title is followed by a picture of Luther at table with six men, four boys attending. Lower down on the page we see: *Gedruct zu Frankfurt am Mayn, durch Thomas Rebarts Seligen Erben* . . . (the sheet is torn at this point), and further down the date: *M. D. LXXI*.

Aurifaber's Preface then comes, dated July 7, 1569. The *Tischreden* themselves form a thick folio. They are divided into nine large sections, unnumbered, each section divided into several captions, numbered, making 43 captions in all, as against Aurifaber's 80; though about the same amount of material is in each.<sup>1</sup>

The name of the editor does not appear on the titlepage of this edition, but there is no doubt that it was Stangwald, as he speaks of it in his edition of 1591. In the preface to the latter edition he describes his work, and says he was led to undertake the redaction in order to get an edition closer to the original text.

10. *The same*, 1591, with name of editor on the titlepage, and preface explaining the method of improvement, from the notes of Mathesius and Mörlin. This edition was published at Jena.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I saw a copy of this edition at Harvard, where it was ascribed to Aurifaber in the catalogue until I pointed out to the librarian that it really belonged to Stangwald.

<sup>2</sup> Irmischer, *op. cit.*, xiii, xiv. Förstemann-Bindseil, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. xxviii.

11. *The same*, reprint at Leipzig by T. Steinmann, 1603.<sup>1</sup>
12. *The same*, 1621, at Leipzig, by B. Voigt. This has the colophon at the end, "Printed at Jena by T. Steinman, 1603."<sup>2</sup>
13. Edition of 1669 at Frankfurt a.M.<sup>3</sup>
14. *The same*, folio, 1700, at Leipzig.
15. *The same*, 1723, at Dresden and Leipzig. Georgisch in his *Bücher-Lexicon* gives the date as 1722.

### Selneccer

16. *Colloquia, oder Christliche Nützliche Tischreden Doctoris Martini Lutheri*, so er in vielen Jaren, gegen Gelehrten Leuten, und frembden Gesten, und seinen Genossen, nach den Heuptstücken unserer Christlichen Lehre, gehalten. Erstlich durch M. Johannem Aurifabrum seligen, fleissig zusammengetragen und in Druck gegeben: Jetzt auffs newe in ein richtige Ordnung gebracht, und also verfertiget, das sie allen Christen sehr nötig, nützlich, und tröstlich, sonderlich zu diesen elenden letzten zeiten, zu lesen sind. Sampt einer newen Vorrede, und kurtzen Beschreibung des Lebens und wandels Herrn Doctoris Lutheri, auch sehr nützlichem Register am Ende dieses Buchs angehenget, aller Bücher und Capitel der Göttlichen, heiligen schrifft, wo, und wenn dieselbigen der Herr Doctor Lutherus ausgelegt, und erkleret habe, und in welchen Tomis solche auslegung zu finden sei.

After a Latin couplet and the usual quotation from John 6 we see: Nic. Selneccerus. Leipsig, MDLXXVII.

<sup>1</sup> This is in the *British Museum Catalogue*. It is not spoken of in Irmischer, but its existence might be inferred from his description of no. 12, in which the colophon of this edition was taken over unchanged.

<sup>2</sup> Irmischer, *ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> This is known only through a note in Georgisch in his *Bücher-Lexicon*, quoted by Irmischer, *op. cit.*, p. xv.

After this Aurifaber's Preface of 1569 is inserted. Then an "*Historica Oratio*" on Luther's life.<sup>1</sup>

17. *The same*, 1580<sup>1</sup>

18. *The same*, 1581.<sup>1</sup>

### Other German Editors

19. *D. Martin Luthers sowol in Deutscher als Lateinischer Sprache verfertigte und aus der letzteren in die erstere übersetzte Sämtliche Schriften*. Zwei und zwanzigster Theil, Welcher die *Colloquia oder Tischreden*, so von Johann Aurifaber mit Fleiss zusammen getragen, und nach den Hauptstücken der Christlichen Lehre und Glaubens verfasst worden, enthält; Herausgegeben von Johann Georg Walch, der heiligen Schrift D. und Prof. Publ. Ordin. auf der Universität Jena, wie auch Hochfürstl. Sächs. und Brandenb. Onolzb. Kirchen- und Consistorial-Rath. Halle im Magdeburgischen. Druckts und verlegt Joh. Justinus Gebauer. 1743.

This was the 22d volume of his edition of the *Sämtliche Werke*, which began to come out 1740.<sup>2</sup>

20. *Dr. Martin Luthers Sinnreiche Tischreden*. Nach den Hauptstücken christlicher Lehre verfasst. Neue, wohlfeile Ausgabe. 2 Bde. Stuttgart und Leipzig. Verlag von L. F. Nieger und Comp. 1836.<sup>3</sup>

21. *D. Martin Luthers Tischreden oder Colloquia*, so er in vielen Jahren gegen gelahrten Leuten, auch frembden Gästen und seinen Tischgesellen geführt, nach den Hauptstücken unserer Christlichen Lehre zusammen getragen.

<sup>1</sup> Irmischer, *op. cit.*, vol. 57, p. xv.

<sup>2</sup> These editions are common.

<sup>3</sup> Irmischer, *op. cit.*, vol. 57, p. xvi.

Nach Aurifaber's erster Ausgabe, mit sorgfältiger Vergleichung sowohl der Stangwald'schen als der Seneccers' schen redaktion herausgegeben und erläutert von Karl Eduard Förstemann, und Heinrich Ernst Bindseil . . . . Berlin.

Four Volumes, 1844-1848.

22. *Martin Luthers Tischreden.* Den Deutschen Volke der Gegenwart angeeignet von Dr. R. L. B. Wolf. Leipzig, 1852. This is a selection from the *Tischreden* made by Wolff.<sup>1</sup>

23. *Dr. Martin Luthers Sämmtliche Werke.* Frankfurt a. M. and Erlangen. 1854. Dr. Mart. Luthers vermischte deutsche Schriften. Nach den ältesten Ausgaben kritisch und historisch bearbeitet von Dr. Johann Konrad Irmischer. II *Tischreden.* Vols. 57-62.

24. *Dr. Martin Luthers Sämmtliche Schriften* herausgegeben von Dr. Joh. Georg. Walch. Zweiundzwanzigster Band. *Colloquia oder Tischreden.* St. Louis, Mo., Lutherscher Concordia-Verlag. 1887. *Dr. Martin Luthers Colloquia oder Tischreden.* Zum ersten Male berichtet und erneuert durch übersetzung der beiden Hauptquellen der *Tischreden* aus der lateinischen Originalen, nämlich des Tagebuchs des Dr. Conrad Cordatus über Dr. M. Luther, 1537 und des Tagebuchs des M. Anton Lauterbach auf das Jahr, 1538.<sup>2</sup>

25. *Luthers Tischreden.* Schmidt. 1878. A small selection "für das Christlichen Haus."

26. *Kraft-Sprüche Dr. Martin Luthers.* Aus der Original Ausgabe seiner *Tischreden* von J. Aurifaber zusammen gestellt und mit erläuternden Anmerkungen versehen von A. Reichenbach. Leipzig, 1883.

<sup>1</sup> Hartford Theological Seminary Library.

<sup>2</sup> Union Theological Seminary Library.

27. *Luthers Schriften* in Bd 15 of the series *Deutsche National Literature*. Ed. by E. Wolf. 1884-1892. A very small selection of the *Tischreden* at the end of this.

28. *Meyers Volksbücher. Luthers Tischreden*. Six small volumes, each dedicated to a separate subject. 1889-92.

Probably a large number of other editions of the same character as the last four—little selections for the edification of the pious Lutheran, or for the amusement of those interested in German history and literature—have been published. They are of so little importance that I have not thought it worth while to make an exhaustive search for them.

### Latin Editors<sup>1</sup>

29. *Colloquia, meditationes, consolationes, consilia, iudicia, sententiae, narrationes, responsa, facetiae D. Martini Lutheri, piaae et sanctae memoriae, in mensa prandii et coenae, et in peregrinationibus observata et fideliter transcripta*. Francofurti ad Moenum. Rebenstock. 2 vols. 1571.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is one little book which purports to be a Latin edition of the *Tischreden*, but it is not. I mean: "*Sylvula Sententiarum, Exemplorum, Facetiarum*, Partim ex Reverendi Viri, D. Martini Lutheri, ac Philippi Melanthonis cum privatis tum publicis relationibus; Partim ex aliorum veterum atq. recentium Doctorum monumentis observata & in Locos Communes ordine Alphabetico disposita. . . . Per N. Ericeum. [Pictures of Luther and Melancthon] Francofurti ad Moenum, per Petrum Fabricium & Sigismundum Feyerbend. 1566."

This is a mere collection of odds and ends from writings of and about Luther; no proper *Colloquia*. It may be compared to the *Table Talk* of Dr. Samuel Johnson, collected from his writings and from Boswell.

<sup>2</sup> Rebenstock's name is not on the titlepage, but in the preface. The first volume was dated 1558 in all descriptions of this rare work, until Bindseil, in his *Colloquia*, preface, discovered the true date of both volumes to be 1571. The confusion arose from the fact that a picture was inserted on the first page, which bore the date (singularly enough) 1558; the Preface, however, was signed and dated 1571.

30. *D. Martini Lutheri Colloquia, meditationes, consolationes, iudiciae, sententiae, narrationes, responsa, facetiae.* E codice Bibliothecae Orphanotrophei Halensis cum perpetua collatione Editionis Rebenstockianae edita et prolegomina indicibusque instructa ab Henrico Ernesto Bindseil. 3 vols. 1863-1866. Lemgoviae et Detmoldiae.

### Printed Editions of Sources

31. *M. Anton Lauterbachs Diaconi zu Wittenberg, Tagebuch auf das Jahr, 1538, die Hauptquelle der Tischreden Luthers.* Aus der Handschrift herausgegeben von Lic. theol. Johann Karl Seidemann Pastor zu Eschdorf. Dresden, 1872.

32. *Tagebuch über Dr. Martin Luther geführt von Dr. Conrad Cordatus, 1537.* Zum ersten Male Herausgegeben von Dr. H. Wrampelmeyer . . . Halle . . . 1885.

33. *Luthers Tischreden aus den Jahren 1531 und 1532.* Nach den Aufzeichnungen von Joh. Schlaginhaufen. Von W. Preger. Leipzig, 1888.

34. *Analecta Lutherana et Melanthonia.* Von G. Lösche. Gotha 1892.

35. *Luthers Tischreden in der Mathesischen Sammlung.* Aus einer Handschrift der Leipziger Stadtbibliothek herausgegeben von Ernst Kroker . . . Leipzig, 1903.

This publication contains, besides 772 numbers from the Leipsig MS., 2 from Bavarus, 1 each from Cordatus B and Analecta, 6 from Memorabilia, and 65 from Serotina.

## PART V. TRANSLATIONS

### English

1. *Dris. Martini Lutheri Colloquia Mensalia or Dr. Martin Luther's Divine Discourses at his Table, which*

in his Lifetime he held with divers Learned Men, such as were Philip Melanchthon, Casparus Cruciger, Justus Jonas, Paulus Eberus, Vitus Dietericus Johannes Bugenhagen, Johannes Forsterus, and Others. Containing Questions and Answers Touching Religion and other main points of Doctrine; as also Many notable Histories, and all sorts of Learning, Comforts, Advices, Prophecies, Admonitions, Directions and Instructions, Collected first together by Dr. Antonius Lauterbach, And afterwards disposed into certain Commonplaces by John Aurifaber, D. D. Translated from the High German into the English Tongue by Captain Henry Bell. London: Printed by William Du-Gard, dwelling in Suffolk-lane, near London-stone, 1652.<sup>1</sup>

2. *The same*, 1791. The title is the same down to Captain Henry Bell, then come the words: Second Edition. To which is prefixed, "The Life and Character of Dr. Martin Luther: by John Gottlieb Burckhardt, D. D., minister of the German Lutheran Congregation at the Savoy, in London. London: Printed for the Proprietor, W Heptinstal, No. 3 Wood Street, Spa Fields, Clerkenwell. MDCCXCI.<sup>2</sup>

3. *Familiar Discourses of Martin Luther*. Translated by Captain Bell and revised by J Kerby. Lewes, 1818.<sup>3</sup>

4. *Choice Fragments from the Discourses of Luther*. London, 1832.<sup>4</sup>

5. *The Table Talk or Familiar Discourses of Martin*

<sup>1</sup> Copy at Union Seminary. The titlepage is preceded by a full-length picture of Luther.

<sup>2</sup> The Lane Theological Seminary, of Cincinnati, Ohio, was kind enough to let me see its copy of this edition, which I have not found elsewhere.

<sup>3</sup> Catalogue of Brit. Museum.

<sup>4</sup> Lenox Library.



*Luther.* Translated by William Hazlitt, Esq. London, MDCCCXLVIII.

6. *The same* in *Bohn's Library*, with *Luther's Life* by Dr. Chalmers. 1857.<sup>1</sup>

7. *The same.* 1900.

8. *The same*; American Edition by Lutheran Publishing Co. of Philadelphia.<sup>2</sup>

9. *The Table-Talk of Doctor Martin Luther.* IVth Centenary edition edited by T Fisher Unwin. London, 1883.<sup>1</sup>

10. *Luther at Table. Elegant Extracts from his Talk.* W. H. Anderson, London, 1883.<sup>1</sup>

11. *Luther's Table Talk.* Extracts selected by Dr. Macauley. 1883.<sup>1</sup>

12. Selections from the Table Talk of Martin Luther. Translated by Bell. Cassell's *National Library*, Vol. 14, 1886.<sup>1</sup>

*Tischreden* may also be found in translation in the following volumes:

13. *Luther's Life written by himself*, arranged and translated by Lawson. Edinburgh, 1832.

14. *Luther's Life by himself.* Arranged by J Michelet, Translated by Wm Hazlitt. 1846.

15. *The same* translated by Smith. New York, 1846.<sup>3</sup>

16. *The Prophecies of Luther concerning the Downfall of Rome.* Collected by R. C. m. a. London, 1664.<sup>1</sup>

17. *Warner's Library of the World's Best Literature.* Selection from Hazlitt.

18. *Words that shook the world, or Martin Luther his own biographer.* New York, 1858. By C Adams.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Catalogue of Brit. Museum.

<sup>2</sup> So they write me, but give no date.

<sup>3</sup> Astor Library.

### French Translations

1. *Les Propos de Table de Martin Luther*, Révus sur les éditions originales, et traduits pour la première fois en Français. Paris, 1844. By Gustave Brunet.

Some *Tischreden* are also translated into French in the following:

2. *Mémoires de Luther écrits par lui-même*; traduits et mis en ordre par M. Michelet . . . . Paris, 1835.

3. *The same* Bruxelles 1845.

4. Audin: *Histoire de la vie, des ouvrages et des doctrine de Luther*. 1839.

### PART VI. WORKS RELATING TO THE *TISCH-REDEN*

Most of the textual criticism of the *Tischreden* is to be found in the introductions to the various editions enumerated above. The older editions are worth little, even Bindseil's Introductions to the fourth volume of the Förstermann-Bindseil edition of the German *Tischreden*, and to his edition of the Latin *Colloquia*, though showing more acumen and a greater grasp and critical ability than any of the preceding, are worth less than more recent work, because of the publication of so many of the sources, which has made the old collections comparatively valueless. Criticism of the texts of the sources began with Seidmann's Introduction to *Lauterbach's Tagebuch*, (1872), which is confined to a description of MSS. and their authors and possessors in such condensed form as to be little more than a series of exhaustive references. The copious Introduction and notes of Wrampelmeyer (to *Cordatus Tagebuch*, 1885) hardly went outside the field of his own MS., though he added many parallels to this. His judgment was warped by over-appreciation of his text. Preger,

in his Introduction to *Schlaginhauffen's Notes* (1888) is valuable for his researches on Dietrich and Schlaginhaufen's notes. He aims to strike the happy mean "zwischen dem Seidemann'schen zu wenig und dem Wrampelmeyer'schen zu viel." Lösche, in the Introduction to his *Analecta Lutherana at Melanthonia* (1892), gave the most complete account of MSS. up to that time published, though his interpretation of his own text as a copy of the Mathesian Collection turned out incorrect. He indulges in a somewhat pretentious style, speaking of Luther and Melancthon as the "Reformatorsche Dioscuri," and commenting severely on the "niedriges niveau" shown by Melancthon's telling stories in his class-room. By far the best thing that has come out on the texts, up to date, both for amount of detailed work, and for a large grasp of critical principles, is Kroker's Introduction to his edition of the *Mathesian Collection*. (1903).

The only piece of work on the texts of the *Collections* is found in the article of W. Meyer aus Speyer: "Ueber Lauterbachs und Aurifabers Sammlungen d. Tischreden Luthers." In *Abhandlungen d. k. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften z. Göttingen. Phil-Hist. Kl.* Neue Folge Bd. 1. Nr. 2. 1897. He first established the relation of Lauterbach and Aurifaber, proving that Lauterbach had made several redactions. He based his conclusions on an examination of the MSS. which shows real German *Gründlichkeit*.

A considerable amount of periodical literature on the texts might be cited, but it is either in the form of announcements of MSS. to be published (e. g., H. E. Bindseil: "Bemerkungen über die Deutschen und Lateinischen Tischreden Luthers," in *Theol. Stud u. Krit.*, 1866, pp. 702-716), or of reviews of the same, which in any case appeared in better form in the critical apparatus of the edition in question.

For light on contemporary events and the place of *Tischreden* in history: encyclopedias, works on the Reformation, lives of Luther, and Luther's works, must all be consulted. For particular points, such as the life of one of the *Tischgesellen*, A. Hauck's *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, 3d. ed. which is now appearing (last vol. XVII, 1906 to *Schutzheilige*), is indispensable. Somewhat less useful is the Catholic counterpart, the *Kirchenlexicon* in 12 vols. (completed in 1901). I have also used the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliographie*.

General Histories of the Reformation say little about the *Tischreden*, Lavis and Rambaud (Vol. IV, *Renaissance et Reforme* 1894) gives a brief, and rather harsh appreciation of them.

The lives of Luther, on the other hand, make much of them. Köstlin (*Martin Luther*, second edition, 1883) gives a good account of them (vol. i, p. 774, vol. ii, p. 487 *et seq.*), and refers to them as an authority in almost every note. Thoroughly sympathetic with his subject, he feels the amiability of Luther's domestic life, though he, like the other writers on the subject, thinks he must excuse the faults of taste. Hausrath, *Luthers Leben* (new ed., 1905) must also be mentioned. Lindsay in his small but excellent work, *Luther and the German Reformation*, 1903, speaks appreciatively of the *Tischreden* (p. 293). Döllinger, *Die Reformation, ihre innere Entwicklung* (1853-1854, 3 vols.), and Denifle, *Luther und Lutherthum*, (2 vols., 1904, 1905), attack the *Tischreden* from the other standpoint, finding in them a rich source of damaging material. Seckendorf, *Historie d. Lutherthums* (German ed., 1714), gives some early reference which throw light on occasional points.

Luther's *Works* are of course the most valuable contemporary source in explaining allusions and clearing up

obscurities. The splendid edition coming out now at *Weimar* (29 vols., published 1883-1904) is the best. Walch, *Sämtliche Werke* 24 vols., 1740-1753) is good. Luther's Letters are the source most closely related to the *Tischreden*. De Wette, *Luthers Briefe* (6 vols., 1825-56), covers his whole life. Ender's *Luthers Briefwechsel* now appearing, is fuller (Vol. X. to July, 1536, 1903).

For special purposes the following works on Luther's Life or Works have been referred to:

Lingke: *Merkwürdige Reisegeschichte Luther's*, 1769.

F. S. Keil: *Merkwürdige Lebensumstände Luther's*, 1764.

Kolde: *Analecta Lutherana*, 1883. This is a collection of miscellaneous contemporary sources.

Bretschneider: *Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. 1-28, Melancthon. 1834-1860.

Kawerau: *Briefwechsel d. J. Jonas*. 2 vols, 1884-5, vol. 17 of *Geschichtsquellen d. Provinz Sachsen*.

Lösche: *Johannes Mathesius. Ein Lebens und Sittenbild aus der Reformationzeit*. 2 Bd. Gotha, 1905.

Lösche: *G. Mathesius' Ausgewählte Werke*. 4 Bd. New Ed. Prag., 1904. The principle contents of this work is the "Luther Histories" which we have spoken of as a source of the *Tischreden* also.

Buchwald: *Mathesius' Predigten über Luthers Leben*, 1904, publishes them again.

Rockwell, W. W.: *Die Doppelehe des Landgrafen Philipp von Hessen*. 1904.

Little is to be found on the literary aspect of the *Tischreden*. The Histories of German Literature (Vilmar, Scherer, Francke) ignore them. Most of the editors by way of literary appreciation indulge in a few lugubrious remarks on the coarseness to be found in them. Walch (Einl. to Bd. xxii, see *supra*) gives a short analysis of their con-

tents. Special aspects of the *Tischreden* are spoken of in the following:

Möller & Stricker: *Benignissimo Facultatis Philosophicae indultu, auctoritatem scripti, sub titulo D. Lutheri Colloquiorum Mensalium Editi, considerabunt.* 1693. This is an impossible attempt to defend the Table Talk by proving it a forgery.

Eberhard, J. E.: *Schediasma Historicum de B. D. Lutheri Colloquiis Mensalibus*, 1698, (M DC XCIIX). This tiny quaint old monograph I picked up at a second-hand bookstore. It is very eloquent and very inane.

Zincgref, J. W.: *Teutsche scharfsinnige kluge Apophthegmata*, 1628, gives a number of little stories and proverbs attributed to Luther, most of which are apocryphal.

Xanthippus: "Gute alte deutsche Sprüche." Three articles in *Preussischen Jahrbücher*, vol. 85. (July to September, 1896.) Pp. 149, 344, 503. This gives an interesting and accurate view of the influence of the *Tischreden* on German proverbial speech.

Chasle, Philarète: "La Renaissance Sensuelle; Luther, Rabelais, Skelton, Folengo," in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Mar., 1842. This once celebrated writer sees in Luther the apostle of the movement against asceticism which he thinks preceded the Reformation.

Hereford, C. H.: *Studies in the Literary Relations of England and Germany in the 16th Century.* 1886. This author, although he says in his Preface "for us Luther is solely the author of *Ein Feste Burg*," throws some light on allusions in the *Tischreden* to contemporary German literature, as for example in his short treatment of "Grobianus and Grobianism." (Pp. 379, 380. Cf., Wrampelmeyer, no. 1738.)

Robinson, J. H.: "*The Study of the Lutheran Revolt.*" *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1903. A critical review of recent literature on the Protestant Revolt.

Rolffs, E.: "Luthers Humor ein Stuck seiner Religion." Preussische Jahrbücher 1904, vol. 155. Pp. 468-488. Treats this side of Luther's style in an agreeable and popular manner.

Weiss, J.: *Luthers Einfluss auf die deutsche Literatur*. This author says nothing about the *Tischreden*, but is worth mentioning for his general treatment of the subject.

Schmidt, E.: "Faust und Luther." In *König. preus. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin Sitzungsberichte*, July, 1896. P. 567.

Brunet, G.: Introduction to the *Propos de Table*, gives a bright, though superficial appreciation of the subject.

The following may be mentioned as important linguistic helps in reading Luther's *Tischreden*:

Du Cange: *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*.

Grimm: *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Vols. I-X (to *sprechen*, 1905).

Dietz: *Luther Wörterbuch*. Vol. I, A-H. 1870.

Schmeller: *Bayrischer Wörterbuch*, bearbeitet von G. K. Fromman, München, 1877. This is the best of the dictionaries for dialectical peculiarities which often appear in Luther's speech. It is phonetically arranged, the b's and p's coming together, for example, a sensible plan as they are so freely interchangeable.

Opitz, K. E.: *Luthers Sprache*. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neuhochdeutschen. 1869.

No complete bibliography of any branch of the literature can be found. For the MSS., the Introductions to Kroker, and Lösche's *Analecta*, and the article of Meyer before mentioned, supplement each other. For the editions, the lists in the Introductions of the editions of Irmischer, Walch and Förstemann-Bindseil are good for the time pre-

ceding their issue, but are not complete. One may also consult:

*British Museum Catalogue*; Section on Luther printed separately 1894.

*Fabritius: Centifolium Lutheranium.*<sup>1</sup>

*Zuchold: Bibliotheca Theologica Vol. ii.*

*Hinrich's Catalogues 1750 to date.*

*Köstlin op. cit.*, vol. ii., pp. 723-733.

*Real-Encyclopädie.* Article "Luther," more recent.

<sup>1</sup> I have not seen this, but it is continually referred to by Irmischer and Walch, being apparently their chief source.





## V I T A

---

THE author of this dissertation, Preserved Smith, was born at Cincinnati, Ohio, on July 22, 1880. He graduated from Amherst College in the class of 1901, with the degree of A. B., being awarded the Roswell Hitchcock Fellowship in History on completing his course. The years 1901-1903 and 1906-1907, respectively, he spent in study at Columbia University, under the Faculty of Political Science pursuing courses primarily in the department of history. In 1902 he obtained the degree of Master of Arts, and in the following year was awarded the Schiff Fellowship. He taught in the Department of Government at Williams College for the two years 1904-1906.











# The Concept of Equality

In the Writings of

Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant

BY

Alfred Tuttle Williams, A. M.

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University

---

NEW YORK

1907





# The Concept of Equality

In the Writings of

Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant

BY

Alfred Tuttle Williams, A. M.

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University

---

NEW YORK

1907



## CONTENTS

---

	PAGE
I. CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY FROM PLATO TO LOCKE .	1-12
II. ROUSSEAU . . . . .	13-26
III. BENTHAM . . . . .	27-39
IV. KANT . . . . .	40-55
V. ROUSSEAU, BENTHAM, AND KANT . . . . .	56-67
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . .	68-87
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	88



## The Concept of Equality in the Writings of Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant

### I. CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY FROM PLATO TO LOCKE

In his essay on Equality, Mathew Arnold gives to Menander credit for the first advocacy of equality as a social ideal. The deep faith which Arnold himself professes for equality and democracy is especially significant when we remember two facts concerning him: he had an unbounded admiration for Greek culture, a product which had become possible only through an inequality which allowed of a leisure class; and secondly, no one was better aware than he of the ignorance and shortcomings of the mass of the people, whom he dubbed the 'the populace.' There is, however, another side to Arnold's character: he was a Hebrew as well as a Greek, that is he had the Hebraic appreciation of the worth of man as man. If culture is a possession to be prized according to the Greek idea, then is every man worthy of it, because in the Hebraic idea every man is precious, and therefore, Arnold concluded, should be given the opportunity to acquire culture. He denied that such opportunity was possible under the conditions of social inequality existent in his day and country.

Inequality presented to Arnold the spectacle of an upper class characterized by a splendid materiality which is worshipped by an envious and brutalized lower class. "Our inequality," he says, "materializes our upper class, vulgarizes our middle class and brutalizes our lower class."<sup>1</sup> When one portion of society lives in splendor and culture, a condition which the bulk of humanity cannot hope to reach, the effect is to make the latter despondent and inert, knowing that the best condition of improvement and

---

<sup>1</sup>Essay on *Equality*.

culture attainable by them is disesteemed and despised by the fortunate aristocracy. While to live in a society of equals is to cause a man's spirits to expand and his faculties to grow. Equality, he says, is a necessary avenue to the 'humanization of man in society.' For the attainment of the desired equality the two means given as most important are: a legislative act curtailing the freedom of bequest, and the education of all the people to a plane of culture.<sup>1</sup>

Another literary idealist<sup>2</sup> dreams of an equality which will be the basis of the future society. To men in good society, he says, superiority and inferiority are intolerable. Good society requires that all meet on the footing of equality. When you come into a group as an invited guest you lay aside what claims you may have to distinction or superiority and take an attitude of equality with the other guests, because 'good society' so requires it. The equality of the future will be the enlargement of 'good society' to the whole of the human race.

Humanity is always seeking its level and the aristocrats, the highest equals, says the same writer, have no less the desire to feel themselves on a plane of equality than have the plebeians. In fact it was among the *aristos* that the recognition of an equality first became necessary. Not, of course, through a mere desire for social companionship but as a means of security for their class against the rest of the population. "The ideal of equality," says Professor Ritchie, "is an inheritance from the inequalities of ancient societies; it is an idea of a peerage, an order or caste of nobles who recognize each other as in some respects and for some purposes, equals, while asserting their superiority to the rest of the nation or the rest of the human race. . . . It was *in contrast* to the subject and the slave that men first felt themselves equal and free."<sup>3</sup>

Equality was thus in the beginning a force which made for cohesion. Some idea of inequality is involved in all conceptions of justice, and only when the terms seem just to himself will a man enter voluntarily into group relationships. The acknowledgment of the other as an equal is a means to co-operation whether among the Greek chieftains of the Homeric age or the kings of

<sup>1</sup>Essays on *Equality* and *Democracy*.

<sup>2</sup>W. D. Howells, *Equality as a Basis of Good Society*, Century, Vol. 29.

<sup>3</sup>*Natural Rights*, Ch. XII.

Europe in the third Crusade. Aristocracies less glorious than these have laid aside the petty distinctions which made them unequal in order to maintain themselves the masters of a population of serfs.

The ideas of equality and freedom at first the exclusive possession of an aristocratic society, spread outward so as to include larger groups, until in the eighteenth century it was declared that, 'all men are by nature free and equal.' The modern doctrine of equality is the result of a growth which may be said to have reached a culmination in the eighteenth century. It is the purpose of the present essay, after considering briefly conceptions of certain phases of equality previous to this period, to make some study of the idea as contained in the works of three writers, Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant, men whose opinions present wide differences, yet all of whom seem to belong peculiarly to the eighteenth century, and each of whom has left a deep impression upon later thought.

The Republic of Plato is the ideal exposition of a doctrine of equality based on a functional idea, i. e., all perform the functions for which nature has fitted them in common subordination to the state. When we consider the individuals in a state we find them to be of diverse talents and capacities. At the creation of men, so the story goes, it pleased the gods to mix different elements into their composition. Gold is taken to represent exceptional wisdom and qualifies its possessor to become a ruler or guardian. Silver stands for courage, the quality necessary for the military order. Iron and copper are not terms representing elements disparaging to the persons possessing them.<sup>1</sup> Negatively they imply only the lack of that exceptional wisdom necessary to the ruler or exceptional courage necessary to the soldier. Positively they imply the capacities to be producers and traders. The greatest efficiency in production and trade is attained by a minute division of labor, in which, too, everyone, even the humblest, can find a useful occupation in accordance with his capacity.

Plato makes the utmost of the natural capacity. "No two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in

---

<sup>1</sup>It is true that Plato shared in the Athenian contempt for the occupations of the trader and artisan; nevertheless he recognized them as indispensable to the state.



natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation and another for another. . . . . All things will be produced in superior quantity and quality and with greater ease when each man works at a single occupation in accordance with his natural gifts."<sup>1</sup>

While Plato's state is aristocratic it is an aristocracy based entirely upon talent. A child born into the artisan class who shows the promise of leadership must be raised to the guardian rank, just the same as the children of guardians who have not inherited the talents of their parents, must take their place among the artisans. When Adeimantus makes the objection that the austerity and frugality of the life prescribed for the guardians cannot allow them much happiness, Socrates replies that the object is not that they should be happy, but that they should be good governors. "Our object in the construction of a state is not to make any one class pre-eminently happy, but to make the whole state as happy as it can be made." "In constructing a statue," he continues, "do not suppose that we ought to make the eyes so beautiful as not to look like eyes, . . . but observe whether by giving to every part what belongs to it, we make the whole beautiful."<sup>2</sup> The harmonious operation of the various parts, each attending to the work that he has to do, characterizes the just state.

Herbert Spencer thought that the conception of justice in Plato's republic was founded on the idea of inequality.<sup>3</sup> The opposite contention can be much better maintained. Inequality should not be confused with diversity in talent. Equality tends towards cohesion; likewise is diversity in function and capacity necessary to cohesion and unity. These two statements are entirely consistent if difference in talent is not confused with inequality. In Plato's state each performs service according to his powers and receives rewards according to his needs. Unusual powers in an individual do not constitute a claim for an unequal share of happiness, since all powers exist, not primarily to benefit the individual, but for the use of the state. If his own happiness is the chief aim of each individual and if a state governed on the *laissez-faire* principle is the best means of each attaining his

<sup>1</sup>*Republic*, Bk. II.

<sup>2</sup>*Republic*, Bk. II.

<sup>3</sup>*Essay on Justice*, Ch. V.

happiness, Spencer is right in pointing out the inequality of the Republic. If, however, as Plato says, the aim is not primarily happiness but justice, and if the good of man consists fundamentally in self-realization, i. e., in developing the capacities of each to contribute to a common good, then Plato's doctrine is eminently one of equality, since it affords equal opportunity to all to function according to their talents.

The obvious objection to the *Republic* is that the approach is entirely from the side of the state. It is assumed that we can know just what are a man's talents, and what is the common good, and therefore can parcel out to each individual his duties; the ideal is therefore static. In fact it is a duty of the guardians to forbid innovations because they might result in lawlessness.<sup>1</sup> Evidently there is little room left for the play of individual initiative. This weakness which characterizes the communism described in the *Republic* is not, however, found in the *Laws* where the point of departure is the individual.

"All men," says Aristotle, "think justice to be a sort of equality; . . . and that equals ought to have equality."<sup>2</sup> A difficulty arises in discerning what are the qualities in men which determine their claims to superiority or to equality. Aristotle believed in the principle that rank be given according to desert. "When a number of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist."<sup>3</sup> A man's claims to consideration must be constituted in the capabilities he possesses for obtaining certain valued ends. Distinguished birth, wealth, and virtue, all have certain claims to superiority in the exercise of political power, only because these elements contribute to make a better ruler.

Aristotle's justification of slavery is not inconsistent with the definition of justice as a sort of equality. That there should be a slave class is intended by nature. The higher must always rule the lower, as in the rule of the soul over the body, or of the rational element in man over the passions. Tame animals are better off when ruled by man because they are then preserved.

<sup>1</sup>Bk. IV.

<sup>2</sup>*Politics*, III.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*

The right to rule is centered in intelligence and if there be no inner intelligence, rule should emanate from the intelligence of another. This is the relation of master and slave because the latter is wanting in reason, and it is better for him as for all inferiors to be under the rule of a master.<sup>1</sup> The master profits by the relation because in arranging his household he finds need for certain instruments for the accomplishment of his work. He needs instruments both lifeless and living. The slave is a mere possession as is a machine and lives only to serve his master. His end is not in himself but always in his master, to whom he wholly belongs. Generally speaking the children of slaves are also slaves, and those of freemen are gifted with the reason which makes their parents free. Aristotle admits, however, that nature sometimes makes mistakes and puts the soul of a freeman into the body of a slave and the soul of a slave into that of a freeman. Indeed, because it is so difficult to determine just who are by nature slaves and free, Aristotle makes only the general distinction, that the Greeks being a people of superior intelligence should never be enslaved, a claim which is, however, denied to the barbarians. The ability to exercise reason is the differentiating principle. In Aristotle therefore as in Plato, inequalities of rank have their basis in supposed inequalities in nature.

After Plato and Aristotle came a decline of public life in Greece and of intellectual interest in the state, accompanied by an increasing interest in the personality and private life of the individual.<sup>2</sup> The dignity given to the individual soul by the Stoic School had its basis in a comprehensive philosophy. According to the Stoic pantheism the earth and the whole universe are filled with an animating soul. Of this the human soul is a part, and it bears, too, a special relationship to the Divine Being by the possession of reason—a relationship which becomes closer in proportion as the divine element, reason, is allowed greater play.<sup>3</sup> Reason, however, is not as in Aristotle, a faculty which is the possession of a class. It is a divine endowment common to all and binding all into a connected whole. The life of reason does not depend upon external circumstances and may be lived by the slave as well as his master, but slavery as an institution was condemned by

---

<sup>1</sup>*Politics*, I.

<sup>2</sup>Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, Ch. XII.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, Ch. IX.

Stoicism. Thus mankind is a brotherhood forming one social unit. Justice and mercy should characterize men's social relationships. "Treat men, since they have reason," says Marcus Aurelius, "as members of the same society."<sup>1</sup> "Though we are not just of the same flesh and blood, yet our minds are nearly related, being extracted from the Deity."<sup>2</sup> The assumption of an equality based on a common divine nature which brought all mankind into a universal brotherhood tended to break down national boundaries and the ordinary civil relationships and substitute a citizenship of the world. "Under the particular distinction of Antoninus, Rome is my town and country; but consider me as a man in general, and I belong to the corporation of the world."<sup>3</sup>

The ethical equality underlying Stoicism had an important bearing upon Roman Law and led to the declaration of the Roman jurist that all men are by nature equal.<sup>4</sup> Few departments of Roman jurisprudence were not to some extent affected by the catholic and humane principles of Stoicism.<sup>5</sup> The Stoic asserted the existence of a supreme law in nature which afforded him a norm for the determination of his conduct. Natural law became the foundation of human legislation. "To the Stoics and Roman lawyers," says Lecky, "is mainly due the recognition of a law of nature above and beyond all human enactments, which has been the basis of the best moral and of the most influential though most chimerical political speculation of later ages."

The Christian doctrine of the preciousness of every human soul had its beginning in the Hebrew belief in the worth of man. Primarily it was not every man but every member of Israel. The Hebrew had a delicate sense of his personality which led to an emphasis upon the personal virtues of purity, justice, and mercy. The man thus became a moral being and as such had moral worth. This conception was extended throughout the group since the Hebrews were knitted together by strong racial feelings in the consciousness of the common fatherhood of the God of Israel. Morality was intended to be the constitutional and municipal law

<sup>1</sup> *Meditations*, Bk. IV.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. II.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, Bk. VI.

<sup>4</sup> Ulpian *Digest*, lib. I., tit. 17-32.

<sup>5</sup> Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. 1, p. 315.

of the state; therefore moral equality tended to preserve a social equality.

The most lasting influence, however, on the doctrine of equality had its rise with the advent of Christianity. The enthusiasm for righteousness held by the early Hebrews had given place to a period of formalism, the natural results of an attempt to externalize moral sentiments. Formalism can never long satisfy the human spirit and results in oppression and pessimism combined with a desire for redemption. This feeling was intensified among the Hebrews by national calamity. When the redemption came in the form of a Christian doctrine, it was not for the Hebrew race but for all men. All were the children of a common Father and all had the capacities allowing of salvation. Christ's practical teaching tending to the exaltation of the poor; his use of such phrases as, "the least of these, my brethren," such texts as, "He that is greatest among you let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth serve," and of such parables as that of the Lost Sheep; all were emphatic declarations of the inherent worth of every human soul and have had a powerful influence in establishing at least a spiritual equality among Christian nations.

Christian ideas became inoculated into the social life far more thoroughly than the morality of Stoicism had been able to influence Rome. While the latter appealed to a type of men strong in character, its demand for an austere life without the promise of a future reward did not allow of an appeal to the mass of the people. Christianity on the contrary appealed especially to the oppressed and the lowly and held out the bright hope of a future happiness. The emphasis upon the worth of the individual gave a new status to women and children and tended to a mitigation of slavery. Infanticide could no longer be tolerated since an infant, no more the mere chattel of its father, was understood to be an immortal human soul. The emphasis upon feminine virtues gave a dignity to woman and made her morally the equal of man. It was a dignity however which waned under the ascetic influences of the Middle Ages until revived again through chivalry.

The Christian emphasis upon equality was continued in the Mediæval Church in more ways than one. The means to salvation, the use of the sacraments, and obligatory attendance at Church functions were absolutely alike for all classes. In spite of great differences in social and political rank the lesson was

not forgotten that the most lowly upon earth may not be the least in the Kingdom of Heaven. Furthermore, the ecclesiastical hierarchy kept open the possibility of a career to talent regardless of distinguished birth. The son of a peasant was no less eligible than a noble to any office in the Church, even that of Cardinal or Pope.

In the system of mediæval jurisprudence the position of the individual was determined by status. Each had a place in the feudal hierarchy, the secular complement of the ecclesiastical system. The serf, while not a freeman, was no longer a slave, and existed in a contract relation with his master; i. e., he was recognized as having a right to protection in exchange for his services and was regarded as a man before the law.

The transition from the mediæval to the modern world in the Renaissance is very well illustrated in its philosophical correlate, the victory of nominalism over realism. Realism, the doctrine that universals have a reality denied to particulars and that the latter have existence only by participation in the former, was typical of the social life of the Middle Ages. Nominalism in its assertion that what is real is the individual, was only giving expression in philosophical language to the general awakening of individual life in the Renaissance. Equality had little place in the age of Machiavelli unless it be seen in the breaking down of caste and of the conventional restraints of the past. Politically a premium was placed upon personality but not of a high type.<sup>1</sup> In effecting his ends the individual acknowledged no barriers other than those of expediency. It was the type of an individual just become conscious of his life and power, without having begun, to use a modern term, to become socialized.

Hobbes, too, conceived of man as essentially individualistic and therefore unsocial in his makeup. Before the formation of a state by contract the life of man was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."<sup>2</sup> Men were, however, equal in their powers of body and mind. "Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of the body and mind, as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another; yet

---

<sup>1</sup> Machiavelli, *the Prince*.

<sup>2</sup> *Leviathan*.

when all is reckoned together, difference between men is not so considerable, as that one may claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.”<sup>1</sup> Rights were determined only by powers so that each one had an equal right to everything, a situation which resulted in a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Against such a condition of affairs reason revolted and men came together to preserve peace through the establishment of a state. All enter into an agreement that each shall surrender all his rights to a supreme sovereign whom all agree to implicitly obey; and because each gives up all his rights the conditions are the same for all and an equality is again reached combined with peace and order.

Individual men in a state of nature is the point of departure for Locke as it was for Hobbes. This state is conceived as one of perfect freedom and also of equality, “wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties should also be equal among one another without subordination or subjection.”<sup>2</sup> Locke’s philosophy was widely read not only in England but in the American colonies. The dictum that ‘men are by nature free and equal,’ which was accepted by the American Fathers as a self-evident proposition, may be traced immediately to Locke. Locke was read in America for many years before Rousseau was known.

The state of nature is not as Hobbes conceived it, a state of war; it is rather a state of peace governed by a law of reason which tends towards justice and charity. “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his body, health, liberty or possessions.”<sup>3</sup> These are considered men’s rights and if one invade the rights of another and thereby violate the law of nature ‘which willed the peace and preservation of all mankind,’<sup>4</sup> everyone has a right to assist in punishing the transgressor; a right that was well known to Cain when he cried out after the murder of his brother, “Everyone that

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Civil Government*, Ch. II.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, § 6.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, § 7.

findeth me shall slay me," because it is written in the hearts of mankind.<sup>1</sup> Kant has been anticipated by Locke in grounding laws of right in human nature; because to Locke laws must conform to a rule of reason, and crime consists "in violating the laws, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature and to be a noxious creature."<sup>2</sup>

The state of nature, however, wherein each has a certain legislative and executive power as well as being judge of his own case, carries with it such inconveniences as make necessary the formation of a Civil State. A political or civil society is formed when any number of men unite into one society, each agreeing to resign the executive power he held in nature in favor of the public. In the civil society so constructed each binds himself to be ruled by the determinations of the majority.<sup>3</sup> One of the chief needs for a civil government is in the regulation and preservation of property. The right to property is based upon labor, since only he may appropriate a portion of goods out of the state of nature and call it his own who has 'mixed his labor with it.'<sup>4</sup> Hence cultivating the land and having dominion over it are joined together. Furthermore, a man should have as much as he can make use of and not more than that.

The doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, according to Professor Ritchie,<sup>5</sup> resemble far more closely the views of Locke than those of Rousseau. He calls attention to the fact that in places even the phraseology is the same.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand Sir Henry Maine<sup>7</sup> alludes to the undoubted influence apparent in the writings of Thomas Jefferson of the semi-juridical, semi-popular opinions that were current in France.

The genesis of these opinions centering as they do about a law of nature, is traced back to Stoicism and Roman law. In the days of the Roman republic there developed besides the Civil Law, the *Jus Gentium* or Law of all the nations, a necessary result of the contact and conflict between Rome and other

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, § 11.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, § 10.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, § 89-86.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, § 27.

<sup>5</sup>*Natural Rights*, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup>See Locke, *Civil Government*, II., p. 225.

<sup>7</sup>*Ancient Law*, Ch. IV.



tribes due in part to immigration and foreign trade. At a later time the Jus Gentium which originated as a mere political necessity, prescribing a manner of dealing with foreigners, became identified with the Law of Nature, the theory of a philosophical school. The law of nature, originally with the Greeks a principle of the manifestation of physical nature, was applied later to the moral life of man because the moral was added to the physical in the conception of nature. To live according to nature meant to the Stoic to live at least a simple and dispassionate life in accordance with a principle. The blending of the Stoic law of nature with the Roman Jus Gentium gave to the latter a dignity which it had never possessed in its early history. In fact it began to be looked upon as a model, and thus Natural Law, universal in its application, became established as a norm to which all law ought to conform.

Natural law in Roman jurisprudence had its effect in Western Europe after the Protestant Reformation when Roman law began to be studied. The lawyers of France found in the system of jurisprudence in their country a peculiar conglomerate of inconsistencies constituting a legal chaos, and they eagerly seized upon a law of nature as the Moses to lead them out of the wilderness. It was a law which overleapt provincial boundaries and disregarded distinctions of rank and became in a sense the common law of France. But it wrought no specific improvements and its influence would not have been great had not the idea been given a new career in the literature of the eighteenth century and more especially in the writings of Rousseau.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>See Maine, *Ancient Law*, Ch. III. and IV.

## II. ROUSSEAU

The most radical of Rousseau's writings are the two early Discourses, on the *Influence of Learning and Art*,<sup>1</sup> and on the *Causes of Inequality among Men*.<sup>2</sup> The point of view taken in these essays can make but little appeal to our admiration today; our appreciation of them, however, is much increased by transporting ourselves in imagination to the France of 1750. Here we behold a country where two-thirds of the land is owned by a tyrannical aristocracy, and the remainder by a scarcely less oppressive ecclesiastical organization; and where taxation is so administered as to compel the peasant farmer to pay the utmost sum that can be ground from him to support a profligate nobility living in idleness about the royal court. At a time and place when the intrinsic worth of human life was not only disregarded but was disbelieved in, and when the tyranny of the property owners was sanctioned and supported by the strong arm of government, it is not surprising that the two greatest evils that have befallen the human race appeared to Rousseau to be, (1) the institution of private property, and (2) the establishment of government.

In the attack upon the arts and sciences Rousseau tells of an ideal condition of the race when human life was simple and virtuous; character was not concealed, manners were natural, and people were happy. Through the advance of the arts and sciences manners have been corrupted and men have become suspicious of one another; they do not reveal their true selves. Treachery and hypocrisy are covered with a varnish of refinement. Philosophy is but a display of words, and the sciences, if they reveal anything, reveal that which had better not be known. Of nations, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, each in its time, was strong before developing a philosophy and a civilization. Science boasts of achievements in learning the ways of insects and of heavenly bodies; but government could be no worse than it is had there been no science.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Discours : si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs.*

<sup>2</sup>*Discours : sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes.*

Rousseau's chief indictments against the arts and sciences are: (1) An evil effect upon their followers, whom in his experience at Paris he found to be egotistic and clever without being honest and sincere. (2) Science and Art had brought no social benefits and, indeed, were anti-social, because they had introduced social distinctions and had thus augmented the artificial inequality that had grown up in human society.

Rousseau does not overlook the natural differences among individuals. In the *Discourses on the Causes of Inequality* he distinguishes between two types, (1) inequality in physical and mental endowment, and (2) social and political inequality; i. e., inequality in riches, honor, and privileges which some enjoy to the detriment of the rest. Inequality of the first order is established by nature and existed among men in their primitive state and did not make them less happy, because each lived in isolation. Men gradually came together for joint labour in overcoming some external conditions, therefore they began to measure one another. Through accident, tools were invented for metal-working and tillage, and the development of these arts led to the holding of private possessions, a step which brought into prominence the natural inequalities among men and finally resulted in the great distinction between rich and poor. In its degeneration the race is conceived to have passed through three stages:

(1) The appropriation of private property. This evil began when the first individual built a fence around a piece of land and called it his own. The harm thus begun was accentuated by a growing division of labor.

(2) The institution of government, which was a device of the rich and strong to protect their property against the poor, and from this there resulted the condition of—

(3) Slavery for the great mass of the people.

The *Social Contract* evinces a marked change of attitude. Government is no longer condemned and a plan is laid for the construction of a just government. The existence of private property is assumed, and, in fact, is necessary to the maintenance of equality. It is just because the circumstances of things tend constantly to destroy equality that the state should endeavor to maintain it. A system of legislation should have as its main objects liberty and equality. The *Social Contract* is not given as

descriptive of primitive society, but tells how society ought to arise. Rousseau takes as his fundamental problem to find a form of association which defends and protects, with the force of all, the person and property of each associate, and whereby the individual in surrendering himself to the organization sacrifices none of his individuality and gets in return the support that comes from the organization.<sup>1</sup> The solution of the problem is found in the notion of the general will, the "public person" or body politic.

The following analysis may be given as the essence of the social contract: Each places in common his person and his powers under the direction of the general will, and in return each receives every member as a part of the whole. The conditions are the same for all, so that individual liberty is not infringed upon; and since everyone gives up to all, each gains for his protection the equivalent of what he loses, and even more, too, because he gives up the power of one but gets back the protection of the entire number in the social compact.<sup>2</sup>

The body thus constituted by convention is the sovereign. Each individual has a double relation, viz., he is a member of the sovereign, with definite relations towards individuals, and is also as an individual a member of the state and subject to the sovereign. It should be noted too that sovereignty is inalienable, since it is the exercise of the general will, and will is something which cannot be surrendered to another. Moreover, sovereignty is indivisible and the rights which individuals, as individuals, claim must be kept subordinate to the general will.

In the doctrine of a general will we have a social conception. It involves the notion of a common good. If we eliminate the strictly private interests or ends in which individuals differ, we still find an interest common to all, and this gives us the notion of a common good—the good of the community as such. To attain this common good is the desire of the *general will*. The significant fact in this conception is that it involves a social person. The introduction of a social individual makes Rousseau an inno-

---

<sup>1</sup>*Social Contract*, Bk. I., Ch. 6.—Trouver une forme d'association qui defende et protege de toute la force commune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu'anparavant.

<sup>2</sup>*Social Contract*, Ch. VII.

vator in eighteenth century thought. Eighteenth century writers regarded their problem as one of detachment. The individual must become detached from the conditions, conventions and institutions which held him. Rousseau was the arch champion of detachment. But after we have separated the individual from convention and tradition, when we study him alone as an individual, what do we find him to be? We find that his interests are bound up with those of his fellows—we find in him a universal element which binds him to others and makes him a social person. Only in the assumption of a social person can we explain the conception of a general will. But the notion of a social person was not developed by Rousseau. That was a work begun by Kant and continued in the nineteenth century. In fact, Rousseau seems to be far away from this idea in his next work, *Émile*.

Émile's education is strongly individualistic. He is brought up in isolation. Social and political education is left out of account. Obligations to the state and to social institutions are ignored. The words command, obey, authority, and duty, were not to be learned. Émile's education is based on the principle of adjustment to situations in accordance with personal interest on one hand and physical necessities on the other. This does not mean that Émile is to be without virtues. He is to be a moral individual, but it is a morality founded mainly upon personal interest, or, at best, upon personal feelings. Until the age of fifteen the boy is educated not only for himself but by himself; self-love has been the controlling motive. "We must," says Rousseau, "love ourselves more than anything else."<sup>1</sup> A time comes when the youth begins to feel his moral nature and now he must 'study himself through his relations with men.' He no longer remains isolated, because he feels the 'need of a companion.' He inquires after his relations to mankind. There arises in him certain quasi-social virtues, sympathy and charity for all of the species to whom he is bound by common feeling. "He must be touched but not hardened at the sight of human suffering." But these 'gentle and affectionate passions spring from the love of self.' At no place do we find a willingness to subordinate himself to the interests of society as such, or to the state, or to a cause external to himself. Nor do we find any acknowledgment of duties to institutions, or recognition of the individual's place in the great social struggles

---

<sup>1</sup> *Émile*, Bk. IV.

that mark the advance of the generations. On this point Mr. Morley writes, "But if a man only nurses the conception of his own personality for the sake of keeping his own peace and self-contained comfort at a glow of easy warmth, surely the best thing that could befall him is that he should perish, lest his example should infest others with the same base contagion. . . . Thus even Rousseau's finest monument of moral enthusiasm is fatally tarnished by the cold, damp breath of isolation, and the very book which contained so many elements of new life for a state was at bottom the apotheosis of despair."<sup>1</sup>

Before examining in detail the notions of equality stated or implied in the foregoing works it is worth while to consider one more illustration of Rousseau's doctrine. A romantic novel has the advantage over a philosophical discourse that a glowing imaginative presentation has over formal argument. In *The New Heloise* the heroine, the daughter of a nobleman, is in love with a poor tutor, St. Preux by name. Remembrance of his plebeian station does not lessen the ardor of his passion for the high-born Julie; nor is she wanting in affection for him. They interest and love each other. The happiness of one appears to be involved in that of the other. But Julie has been promised to a nobleman, one of her own rank. Between him and her there is no congeniality, no common interest. She does not love him. Pride of birth, however, prevails. Rank is placed above affection however intense the passion, and Julie is wedded to Wolmar. Here again is the antagonism between nature and convention. The sequel does not concern us. The story is a dramatic expression of a very common condition wherein the artificial inequality of caste is made to stifle out the healthy promptings of nature.

The conception of equality in the foregoing works of Rousseau may be discussed under three headings :

- (1) Equality in an ideal primitive world before the beginning of civilization. For this conception we refer chiefly to the Discourses.
- (2) Equality on the basis of feeling which is at least an implied ideal in the *Émile* and the *New Heloise*, and
- (3) Equality in the social state, the supposition of the Social Contract.

<sup>1</sup>Rousseau, Vol. II., Ch. IX.

The first topic introduces us to a discussion of the meaning of a primitive state, the meaning of civilization and of natural law.

The idealized conception of the "noble savage" was not peculiar to Rousseau. It infested the romanticism of his day. That this ideal lingered in the French mind is evidenced, for example, in the popularity which the works of James Fenimore Cooper attained in France. The "noble savage," however, was loved at a distance. Simplicity and happiness were assumed to characterize the primitive state. Rousseau seized upon the conception as a delightful contrast to the wretchedness of his own day and country. The ignorance, barbarity, and superstition which pervades what we know of primitive races was not known or not recognized by Rousseau.

The terms nature, law of nature and natural right are difficult to define because what is "natural" to one is not natural to another. "According to nature" usually means according to the views of the particular theorist who uses this phrase. It is remarked by Ritchie that the advice of the senior law partner, "No case; abuse plaintiff's attorney," has its parallel for the theorist in "no case; talk about the law of nature."<sup>1</sup> It was the tendency of eighteenth century thought to detach itself from authority and tradition. In place of these sanctions appeal was made to nature. Ancient and hereditary rights gave place to natural rights. That nature was the center of the social philosophy of this period is evident by the Declarations of Rights in the American colonies, an idea that was later embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Virginia declared that "all men are by nature equally free and independent." Jefferson wished to include a "declaration of Rights," based, of course, on a conception of nature, in the Constitution of the United States.

The term nature has many connotations. It is sometimes used to include the totality of existence, but it is not so used by Rousseau. He emphasizes the dualism of civilization and nature. The "natural" is sometimes the "original" as opposed to the acquired or to social accumulation. The "natural" is used in opposition to the artificial or to what man produces. All social distinctions are artificial and must be eliminated before human living can become natural. Nature also connotes the simple and the normal, the condition that ought to be.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, Ch. II.

Rousseau's indictment of civilization, his assumption of its worthlessness, follows logically from his premises which place at one end of the process a happy primitive race and at the other a corrupt and miserable society. Civilization had not advanced by the way of progress but by that of corruption. It was responsible for the transition from freedom to slavery. But what are the elements of civilization? A tentative statement of some of its elements may be made as follows :

1. Science and Philosophy: These terms connote respectively knowledge and wisdom. Nature has been subjugated through knowledge. Knowledge has created instruments for its control. The growth of the human race, in fact, its continuance in any form has depended upon the knowledge and skill which man could summon to compel material environment to contribute to his needs. Through wisdom man has learned to view the divergent elements of his experience more correctly in their relations and also to attain a more correct estimation of values, and thus to overcome the superstition and supernaturalism of an earlier day.

2. Social and Political Institutions: Man is by his nature a social creature and must live in a social community. Institutions are necessary for the security of life and liberty, for the prevention of disorders which friction between individuals would necessarily cause, and for the distribution and transmission of the means to right living, which the accumulated experience of the ages has justified.

3. Art, Literature, and Language: The highest aspirations and ideals of the race have been crystalized into these forms, and through them the heights attained by a few rarely gifted individuals have become visible to the many.

4. Religion: Perhaps nowhere more than here is the clarifying and progressive tendency of civilization in evidence. The crude symbolism and superstition of the primitive man's religion affords a dark background to the fraternalism that begins to illumine our social horizon.

The above constitute perhaps the more important strands of our civilization, the accumulation of the best experiences of the race. From this view-point civilization is a spiritualizing process. Our difference with Rousseau hinges on the conception of liberty. Civilization is not a regressus from freedom to slavery, but rather



a progressus from primitive animal bondage to the emancipation of the human spirit.

That there is a darker side to existent civilization no one will deny. An orderly interweaving of the above strands has not yet been attained. The proper interrelations and adjustments between the parts necessary for a perfect organization has not been learned. The reciprocal dependence of these strands has not been sufficiently recognized. Science has little more than begun its investigations. Philosophy has been the possession of the very few, and the same is true of Art. In literature we are deluged with an output that is perhaps as shallow as it is extensive. Our institutions progress chiefly by the hit and miss method and very often they miss. Religion has not attained remarkable success in inoculating its ethical content into the lives of men. And what is very important, we have never succeeded in any adequate formulation of a national ideal. But in spite of the shortcomings of present civilization our hope lies not in the past but in an onward movement. The above elements of civilization are the most precious possessions of the human race, because to them is due what freedom humanity has already attained and to them we must look as a means to a fuller realization.

What is a natural right? Professor Ritchie takes as a definition of a legal right, "a capacity residing in one man of controlling with the assent and assistance of the State the actions of others."<sup>1</sup> The right need not have been created by the state but it is such that the law courts will recognize when appeal is made to them. When disputes arise as to what is the legal right the decision is referred to the state as the ultimate authority. A moral right is defined as "the claim of an individual upon others recognized by society, irrespective of its recognition by the State."<sup>2</sup> In this case the sanction is the approbation or disapprobation of private persons in greater or lesser number. The moral right (so defined) is necessarily without the definiteness and precision of the legal right, because different sections of the same society may hold different views as to the moral worth of an act. Where shall we find a standard for the determination of moral judgments? Hobbes turned to the legal power for author-

---

<sup>1</sup>*Natural Rights*, Ch. V.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

ity in moral matters. The Roman Catholic Church claims Papal infallibility in matters of morals as well as of dogma. Both of these solutions have at least the virtue of being consistent and clear.

For an ultimate reference in matters both legal and moral different standards have been advanced. At one time the Church claimed authority in both. The so-called 'greatest happiness principle' of the Utilitarian school we shall have occasion to discuss later. A third solution is that of appeal to the law of nature. Natural rights are supposedly based in the very nature of things. They are the most fundamental; from them other rights are derivative. But when we come to examine the claims of the defenders of natural rights we find an utter lack of unanimity as to what the natural rights are, and of universality in their application. What appears more fundamental than the right to life? The Greeks found infanticide socially expedient. To-day we do not hesitate to deprive men of their liberty, and of their lives, too, if they violate certain requirements of the state. Nor can we find any "natural right" to property, to the power of assembly, or to the suffrage. In practice all are kept subordinate to expediency in relation to the state's *aim*. The rights we have to life, liberty, property, and the suffrage, are provided us not by nature but by the state.

The only meaning we can ascribe to a natural right is, that it is a natural power. A natural right (apart from a moral right) without the power to maintain that right is unthinkable. The individual possesses many natural powers, but the field in which he shall use his powers is curtailed by social approval or disapproval and by legal statute. Therefore, not only do we fail to find in nature a standard for legal and moral rights, but natural rights, in the only meaning we can ascribe to them, are seen to be subordinated to the legal and moral.

Natural Law has been supposed to apply to the field of Economics. Is it true that the so-called economic laws are "natural"? We are accustomed to regard the laws of physics and chemistry as fixed by or rather in nature, prior to and quite regardless of human volition, and therefore to be natural laws. It is evident that the economic laws, the "law of wages," or the "natural law of rent," are not quite of the same character. The economist of course has the right to make generalizations from his observa-

tions of society and to make predictions as to what will happen under certain conditions. Such a study of society is most useful. But he cannot correctly give to his generalizations the character of the inevitable and immutable, he cannot call them laws in the sense that gravity is a law. At the best they represent but a fleeting condition, or but a particular stage in the advance of civilization. A rearrangement of social conditions in conformity with more correct notions of equity will doubtless render these so-called laws obsolete. Other "laws" will take their place, which means merely that other generalizations and predictions will be made, based upon the new conditions. The very obvious objection which the moralist urges against conceiving of the economic laws as "natural" is, that such conception stands in the way of social betterment. It appears to give to the present conditions an eternal character, while a higher social ideal may demand the complete transformation of those conditions. It leaves an easy loophole for the denial of moral responsibility. If it is seen that society does not rest necessarily upon certain assumed inevitable laws, human volition is more likely to assert itself as a factor in introducing new conditions to conform to a more advanced moral ideal.

The enlightenment of the eighteenth century was for the most part rationalistic. Voltaire was a rationalist and therefore he, better than Rousseau, typifies eighteenth century thinking. Rationalistic interpretation cannot appeal to the many. The intellect is aristocratic, it tends to a division into classes. Rousseau was a man from the people and spoke for the people. Human behavior is overwhelmingly controlled by feeling. The voice of the people is oftenest expressed in feeling terms. In the feelings, Rousseau maintained, we find a common or universal element, we find a basis on which all men are equal, a level at which all may understand each other. At this deep level social distinctions cannot exist. "Men are by nature neither kings nor grandees, nor courtiers, nor millionaires; all are born naked and poor; all are subject to the miseries of life, to chagrins, evils, needs, and sorrows of every sort, and finally all are condemned to death. This is what man truly is. . . . Begin then by studying that which is most inseparable from human nature, that which most truly constitutes humanity."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>"Les hommes ne sont naturellement ni rois, ni grands, ni courtisans, ni riches; tous sont nés nus et pauvres, tous sujets aux misères de la vie, aux chagrins, aux maux, aux besoins, aux douleurs de tout espèce, enfant tous sont condamnés à la mort. Voilà ce qui est vraiment des l'homme. . . . Commencez donc par étudier de la nature humaine ce qui en est le plus inséparable, ce qui constitue le mieux l'humanité."—*Émile*, Bk. IV.

The emphasis placed upon nature has a corollary in the dignifying of the passions. "Our passions are the principal instruments of our conservation," and God did not intend they should be destroyed. "What God wishes a man to do He does not cause it to be told him by another man, . . . He writes it in the depths of his heart." In *The New Heloise* we have but the expression of healthy passion. Our sympathy is freely given to the lovers who are doomed to separation through difference in social rank. Passion creates equality, but caste does not recognize it.

The reduction of the whole of humanity to a common level on the basis of the ordinary feelings we must accept of course as a matter of fact. It is a fact of very great importance though its most ready appeal is to the sentimentalist. It does, however, serve to a large extent as a spring to moral action. It increases our pity for human suffering, and not alone human suffering. We must include the brute creation as Rousseau would admit. "How shall we allow ourselves to be moved to pity if not by transporting us out of ourselves and identifying ourselves with the suffering animal."<sup>1</sup> That the value of this principle is lessened by the logical extension of its application is an indictment which may, as we shall see later, be brought also against the 'greatest happiness' principle of the Utilitarians. Remembrance that the whole sentient creation are one in that they are subject to suffering is influential in opening our hospitals to a Chinaman or a South Sea Islander and to the formation of humane societies; but it cannot persuade us that all men should have the suffrage or even that a caste system is a national crime. If we say men are equal by virtue of the common possession of heads, we have a statement of fact, but it has little value. Though misery, and the desire for happiness, too, makes the whole world kin, knowledge of this fact does not extend us much light in the formation of political theories, unless we agree with the Utilitarians that this and not some other is the fact of ultimate importance. It is true, however, that the recognition of every individual as a center of sentience, of happiness and of misery, does present us a fundamental equality, and has been the root of innumerable philanthropic movements; and while this fact of common sentience

---

<sup>1</sup>"Comment nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous et nous identifiant avec l'animal souffrant?"—*Emile*, Bk. IV.

does give but little direct light to political philosophy, its ethical recognition is still indispensable to both political theory and practice.

We have now to examine the idea of social equality based upon common participation in the social state, and therefore into the meaning of the general will. It is remarked by Wallace<sup>1</sup> that political unity for Hobbes is found in a will actual but not general, while with Locke it is general without being actual. An attempt is made to unite these two elements in Rousseau's conception of the general will. He agrees with Hobbes in conceiving of authority as will, while with Locke he places the ultimate seat of authority in the people and thereby forms the conception of a sovereign people. The voice of the sovereign people is heard in the expression of the general will. The general will implies a community of interest and aims at a common good. The individual cannot will first according to his private interest alone, and then if he choose for the common good in so far as this does not conflict with his own. If he will regardless of the common good we have the condition of society, described by Hobbes, before the social compact. That there is a common good is implied necessarily in the notion of self-government. It is because individuals have interests in common that they maintain institutions for the common welfare. Examination into the structure of society will show that the interests of individuals qua individuals do not in the main conflict with the common good. And that, as a rule, the individual while appearing to will his own interest, wills at the same time the general good, and therefore his will is one with the general will. We say as a rule because often a man is mistaken as to what really is his own interest and that of society, and at times, too, a man's motives may be malevolently anti-social. It would be absurd to maintain that in practice to-day there is no conflict between private interest and public good. Very few regard the monopolist as a friend to society, and the corrupter of legislatures, as well as the legislators who yield to corruption, are undoubtedly its enemy. These are forces that are malevolently anti-social.

Generally speaking, however, one's permanent interest is found in the interest of the whole and yet to be his own private interest.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics.*

It is to be expected that a man's private interest will be foremost in his mind at the time of his action; his view point is necessarily partial; he can not see the full significance of his act to the whole society. It is easier and more correct to think of society as made up of groups than of individuals; and the identity of interest between the individual and his group will be more readily conceded. Each group represents certain capacities which are necessary to the well being of other groups. The interdependence of these groups makes evident the existence of a common good. A working harmony must be maintained between them if society is to be preserved. Society must be conceived as an organization in which the interests of individuals (or of groups, since we have decided to take the group as our social unit) are unified, though apparently not completely unified, because the organization is not perfected. Properly speaking, society is in a process of organization. It is made up of a number of lesser organizations, each in itself more or less closed and complete, and each possessing certain needs and capacities. A completer organization or harmonization between these various components is necessary to a perfect society.

Where a number of individuals are concerned diversity is necessary to unity. Each individual reflects the whole society from his own unique view point. Each group and each individual has a function which is distinctive; diversity in function is necessary to obtain unity of organization. As in the imperfect analogy of a vast machine wherein one cogwheel plays into another and the various parts are operated in mutual dependence, so in society individuals and groups play into and co-operate with one another for a common end and a common good.<sup>1</sup> In such a scheme of organization, where do we locate equality? In a locomotive we cannot say a whistle is equal to a safety valve, nor is a man's right arm equal to his heart. All we can say is that each in its proper functioning is indispensable to the complete machine or complete organism, though some parts have undoubtedly a more vital function than others in the operation or life of the whole.

---

<sup>1</sup>The notion of an organic society as the implication of the *Contrat Social* does not conflict with the origin by contract. Notwithstanding the title of the book the contract theory is quite subordinated; moreover, the contract would never have been made had a common good not first been recognized.

Applied to the human world what we have given is the whole society. The whole society is the given fact, and to it each part is indispensable. Were it not indispensable and were dispensed with, we should have not this given whole but some other. The functions of the various parts are diverse and cannot be reduced to a basis of equality. Equality is found only in the indispensableness of each to the given whole. Of course the contribution of each should not be viewed merely as objective, i. e., from the standpoint of the state as is done in Plato's Republic. On the side of the individual there is implied the equal right of each organic constituent to realize in his own consciousness the meaning of the common good and to develop his capacities in accordance with it. This conception of self-realization which we shall have occasion to discuss later is not present in Rousseau's writings because he was not conscious of the organic character of society.

Reviewing the successive steps of the argument we find: A general will implies the notion of a sovereign people and a sovereign people means a self-governing people. Self government necessarily includes the recognition of a common good. Examination into this common good leads us to the conception of society as an organized unity. Society is made up necessarily of diverse parts each with its specific function contributing to the life of the organism. The various functions cannot be brought to a level of equality except in the sense that each is indispensable to the existent whole, and has the equal right to realize himself in accordance with the common good.

### III. BENTHAM

Throughout the writings of Bentham there is a consistency that is absent in the works of Rousseau. He scouted the notion of natural rights as so many abstractions. And because metaphysics, as he thought, deals with abstractions it held but little place in his regard. A doctrine of equality occupies an important place in his *Civil Code*, but the value of equality is derivative, not ultimate. It tends to increase the sum of happiness in the world; therefore it is good. That all men are "born and remain free and equal in respect of rights" is nonsense, says Bentham. On the contrary, men are born into a state of helplessness, and, according to the complaints we hear, grow up into one of slavery. Let us talk not about what is, but rather about what ought to be. We cannot say that men are free, but rather that they ought to be. And why? For the same reason as before. Freedom adds to the sum of happiness; therefore it is a good.

Let us get away from the speculation of bare logic to an observation of the facts of human life. What do we find? Bentham found, in the opening words of the Introduction to the *Principles of Morals and Legislation* that, "nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think." With this view in mind he formulates his principle of utility, "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question." Or, as it was later termed by the author, the greatest happiness principle. This principle becomes the apex of his system. It is the guide in all matters of morality and legislation. The civil and penal codes are made to conform to it. The worth of religion is tested by it.



Morality, politics and religion can have only one common object, the attainment of happiness.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Deontology* we are told that interest and duty are identical. To obtain the greatest amount of happiness to himself is the object of every rational being. But a man can be happy only by obtaining the friendly affections of those on whom his happiness depends. Therefore certain social virtues are to be cultivated; but the motive is egoistic and nowhere does Bentham succeed in mediating between an individualistic and a social motive. Bentham was infested by the individualism of his age. He thinks of man as an individual standing apart from other individuals. The conception of an organic society and of moral sentiments which bind together individuals into an organic unity was unknown to Bentham. With him the business of the moralist was to educate, but to educate the individual man in seeing the consequence of his acts, with the end that he should obtain the maximum of his own happiness.<sup>2</sup>

In matters of legislation he teaches the doctrine of *laissez-nous-faire*. Still the powers of government should not be too much restricted, because there are occasions when utility makes government interference desirable. Bentham adopted the *laissez-faire* principle not as did Herbert Spencer, because of certain supposed natural rights of the individual with which government might interfere; but because he believed it was the best means to secure the greatest happiness. But it is sometimes necessary that government should curtail liberty. It is the function of legislation to distribute among the community, rights and obligations, therefore curtailments of liberty are inevitable. "It is impossible to create rights, to impose obligations, to protect the person, life, reputation, property, subsistence, liberty itself, but at the expense of liberty."<sup>3</sup> The sole object of government ought to be the greatest happiness of the greatest possible number of individuals, or as it is again stated, "the legislator should have for his object the happiness of the body politic."<sup>4</sup> To secure this object we find given as means four subordinate objects, Subsistence, Security, Abundance, and Equality.

---

<sup>1</sup> *Deontology*, Vol. I.

<sup>2</sup> *Deontology*, p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Civil Code*, Ch. I.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, Ch. II.

Security is the principal object because it implies extension in point of time. But subsistence is equally important, and upon these two life itself depends. The other two are rather the ornaments of life. They should be had provided it is feasible. Liberty is not included separately in this group, but it is a branch of security. However, it must give way to the general security when necessary. Equality must not be favored when it injures security. A doctrine of absolute equality is absurd. It would render all legislation impossible. Distinctions that are the necessary outcome of differences in age, intelligence, position in the family, would disappear. It is true that capable men have advocated the doctrine of the equality of rights, but they intended merely certain restrictions and modifications. The blind multitude have misunderstood them. Then, in what sense is equality desirable? The steps in the argument are simple enough.<sup>1</sup> Happiness is made to depend upon material wealth. Each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness, and the greater one's wealth the greater are one's chances of happiness. It is to be noted, however, that happiness does not continue to increase in proportion to wealth, because from the constitution of human nature sensibility to felicity is limited. This principle has its psychological correlate in the law that the intensity of a sensation does not increase in direct ratio with an increase in stimulus. Therefore a given portion of wealth will create more happiness in one quarter than another. One man's wealth amounts to one thousand dollars, and that of another to ten thousand. The addition of a thousand dollars to the first man doubles his chances of happiness; to the second, happiness is increased only one-tenth. Or, take an instance of two competitors of equal fortunes. One loses half of his wealth to the other and thereby decreases his happiness by one-half. The increase of happiness to the other is only one-third, so there is a diminution of happiness. The conclusion of the argument is that the more nearly the distribution of wealth approaches to equality the greater will be the sum total of happiness. Bentham does not overlook the fact that individuals according to temperament differ in their sensibility to happiness. The rules laid down will doubtless be inexact when applied to any particular case. But as general rules they are held to be true. Generally speaking, in the

---

<sup>1</sup> *Civil Code*, Ch. IV.

laborer the sensibility to happiness is a maximum while the degree of sensibility in the monarch is likely to be a minimum.<sup>1</sup>

Equality in the distribution of the matter of wealth is seen to add to the sum of happiness, still it is but a subordinate object of legislation.<sup>2</sup> It is not possible, says Bentham, to obtain the greatest good but by the sacrifice of some subordinate good.<sup>3</sup> Therefore equality is to be sacrificed when it stands in the way of security. But the conflict between security and equality is not eternally fixed. In the course of time they may be brought to coincide. In a nation which is prosperous in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, there is a continual progress towards equality. A necessary condition is that the government maintain a policy of *laissez-faire*. Security and freedom are all that industry requires. In good time a high degree of equality will come as a result.<sup>3</sup>

That progress in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, have contributed to equality Bentham saw in the breaking up of feudal Europe. That prosperity combined with a *laissez-faire* policy of government need not make for equality, Bentham would perhaps have seen if he lived at the present day in the United States, where the most enormous aggregation of wealth the world has seen are being centered in the hands of private individuals.<sup>4</sup> Bentham succumbed to a fallacy so common in his time, especially in France and America, and later maintained by Herbert Spencer, namely, the compatibility of liberty (in the commonly accepted *laissez-faire* sense) with social equality.

Liberty and Equality are antithetical. A correct compromise between them would give us a correct conception of justice. In Hobbes' state of nature we have the doctrine of liberty carried to the extreme. The result was a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. In the adoption of the social compact, involving the unconditional

---

<sup>1</sup> *Constitutional Code*.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles of the Civil Code*.

<sup>3</sup> *Civil Code*.

<sup>4</sup> It might be justly argued of course by a Benthamite that the condition depicted in the United States is partly due to a protective tariff, which would be an instance of the class legislation which Bentham so strongly opposed. The tariff is intended in theory at least for the good of the majority of the people, and they could doubtless stand more regulation on the part of the government of the affairs which affect their industrial life than at present is assumed.

surrender of the liberties of all to the sovereign, we have at once the extreme of equality, excluding of course the sovereign in whom the rights of all had been vested. To mediate between these two extremes, to give a fair proportion of both liberty and equality has been the aim of just legislators. But one can be had only with the sacrifice of the other. No two persons in the world are quite equal. A large aggregation will present the greatest diversity in powers and capacities. If liberty is given sway the direst inequalities will result. If equality is to be secured liberty must be curtailed. Justice is based on the idea of equality. The just legislator will aim to secure a condition of equality or equity which will prevent the more capable from exploiting the weakness of the less capable, but he will take care not to destroy spontaneity and initiative when such independent action is given a legitimate outlet.

An attempt to formulate a compromise between liberty and equality is given in the words of Herbert Spencer. "Every man is free to do what he likes, provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."<sup>1</sup> It takes but a superficial analysis of the facts of human society to show the futility of this formula. It would give equal freedom to all. Every man may do as he likes but must allow the same privilege to all others. If each person were a Robinson Crusoe on his own island each could therefore have unlimited sway within his own domain, and the formula would apply so long as each was contented to remain in his isolation. But instead of living in such separation men's lives are lived in a most complex and intricate social state. All of one's actions bear more or less upon the lives of others. No one's sphere can be definitely mapped out indicating just what is to be his conduct and what not. Men differ very radically in ideals, in natural capacities, and in notions of happiness. Perpetual conflict is inevitable. What is to become of the "equal freedom" that the formula promises? It can never be attained on the basis of a philosophy of individualism such as that of Spencer and his school. Spencer follows Bentham in failing to recognize that individualism which connotes the *laissez-faire* doctrine of liberty, makes toward inequality as its goal.

It is remarked by Burton, one of the editors of Bentham's works,<sup>2</sup> that there are many who accede to his practical measures

<sup>1</sup>*Justice*, Ch. VI.

<sup>2</sup>*Introduction to Bentham's works*, in Vol. I.

while they reject his general principles. Such an attitude is partly in keeping with the view point of the present essay. It is not necessary here to attempt a detailed refutation of hedonism, since we are not concerned with it as our main problem. Still, were the greatest happiness principle universally accepted as the goal of morals, religion, and politics, our conception of social equality would probably be modified by that fact. Some reasons for rejecting this principle here are the following.

In the first place, it confuses psychology with ethics. The hedonic principle aims at increasing the feeling of pleasure and avoiding the feeling of pain. This feeling is necessarily individual, therefore egoistic. An act performed in the service of others, if it gives pleasure to oneself remains an act of egoism if done for the sake of that pleasure. If we are to have an Ethics at all, it must be concerned with ends beyond one's self. J. S. Mill, in advocating universal hedonism, cites the instance of Brutus condemning his sons to death.<sup>1</sup> Mill says, it is impossible to suppose this gave him happiness, but that in the end it was calculated to bring happiness to others. This would be an illustration of complete altruism, a doctrine equally as false as egoism. Men do not make great personal sacrifices for the sake of creating a passing feeling in others. We cannot explain the lives of the world's greatest heroes, sages, and martyrs on the principle of either egoistic or universalistic hedonism.

The most common fallacy of hedonism is probably the following: because men contemplate with satisfaction the attainment of their desires it is assumed that the satisfaction itself is what they desire. We desire things as means to an end or as ends, and what makes towards such ends is of course viewed with pleasure or satisfaction. If it were not so, if we were of such a nature as constantly to contemplate with dissatisfaction the things which at the same time we desired, what an irrational world would be ours! Such a situation is however scarcely conceivable. The fallacy consists in supposing that the satisfaction or pleasure which accompanies the end is the end itself. Satisfaction is included in the very notion of volition, but it is by no means an element prominent in consciousness at the time of an act of willing. One does not say, "I want to do this because it will bring me happiness or satisfaction." That our desires are for specific objects

---

<sup>1</sup>*Essay on Bentham.*

rather than the pleasure which accompanies such objects was very clearly pointed out by Bishop Butler.

Viewing the subject from the psychological side the following fact may be added: while sometimes pleasure and pain, or the thought of them, do serve as motives to our actions, they are by no means the only motives. Percepts, concepts, creations of the imagination—all have the “impulsive quality,” or, in other words, may serve as stimulants to action.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, Bentham’s wide extension of the term pleasures, the very diverse situations to which he applies it, detracts much from the significance of the term. Under Springs of Actions (outlined in Vol. I of Bentham’s Works) are given the several species of pleasures and pain. When we find given as sources of pleasure, vengeance along with righteousness, cupidity with honesty, and malice with friendship, the common element, pleasure, becomes utterly colorless and meaningless. The prominent fact in the first grouping, for example, is certainly not pleasure but vengeance and righteousness.

We have already observed that Bentham pretended to despise metaphysics. It is questionable, however, whether an adequate ethics can be formulated without a basis in some view of reality. Of course the highest moral conduct is possible in an individual without his forming any definite conception of what this reality is, leaving the question to remain vaguely in the background. But that human conduct may have some ontological bearing, that human lives may be planned in conformity to some cosmological purpose, it has been common for men to believe. The Utilitarian ethics does not allow for sufficient speculation along this line. Not that we would include, with Spinoza, the whole universe in our ethics. We may even agree with the Utilitarians that ethics and cosmology should not blend; that the highest good for ethics may have nothing to do with a creator of the physical world or with the forces in physical nature, and still see in the facts of experience indications of a spiritual process within the cosmos which gives to men’s actions a meaning wider than if centered merely in themselves.

We have pointed out how it is possible to disagree with Bentham in his general principles and still approve of his detailed applications. We have differed from his fundamental happiness principle. His theory of equality is open to obvious objections

---

<sup>1</sup>See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Ch. XXVI.

if it is to be taken seriously at all. It seems impossible to correlate a portion of material wealth with a definite measure of happiness. If this were possible it would still be necessary to obtain a certain minimum quantity of both wealth and happiness to serve as starting points for calculations. The cause of happiness in the case of any individual is made up of a number of elements. The possession of wealth is but one element and it operates in varying degrees in different instances. Bentham confuses wealth with other causes of happiness. For example, he argues that the continued increase in the matter of wealth to the multi-millionaire represents so much added happiness, because were it not so he would no longer strive after wealth.<sup>1</sup> The fact is, however, that the source of pleasure in this case is not in the added increment of wealth, but in the activity of successful pursuit. Perhaps just as keen, if not keener pleasures have been felt by artists and authors at the successful completion of some work which brought them little or nothing in the matter of economic wealth.

But it would be only a narrow ascetic or an oligarch who did not acknowledge that an increase of wealth and prosperity among the masses tends to human betterment. This is what makes Bentham's doctrine of the equality of wealth assume very great importance. A more equal distribution of the products of industry is desirable. Mr. W. M. Salter in discussing the Rights of Labor in his book called *Ethical Religion*, gives the following example to illustrate the inequalities of distribution: "Mr. Edward Atkinson has recently made an interesting analysis of the cost of running an average New England cotton-mill.<sup>2</sup> . . . The number of working people in the mill he puts at 950, working on the average for \$300 a year each, making a total in wages of \$285,000. The profit of the three mill owners over and above all expenses, insurance, taxes, and a liberal allowance for depreciation of the mill he estimates at \$60,000 or \$20,000 each. . . . one owner has sixty-six times as much as one of his employees." It is worth noting that Mr. Atkinson was a cotton mill owner himself and was speaking in defense of the rights of capital. Mr. Salter recognizes that both capital and management have their claims to shares of the profits, but believes an unjust distribution exists through the encroachment of those claims upon the share of the third factor, that of labor.

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of the Civil Code*, Ch. VI.

<sup>2</sup> Atkinson, *The Margin of Profits*.

That the sum of happiness would increase with an approach to equality in the possession of wealth, Bentham believed. There are, he says, certain fundamental enjoyments of which human nature is susceptible, common to both laborer and monarch.<sup>1</sup> There are pleasures which have to do with the preservation of life, with repose and with sympathy. For the enjoyment of these pleasures a certain minimum of the matter of wealth is necessary. When they cannot be enjoyed pain is felt. Their enjoyment is necessary to preserve a balance of happiness. They are pleasures that belong to subsistence and subsistence as an object of legislation must take precedence over abundance. It is better that all should share the means of subsistence than that a few should possess abundance.

If the principle of subsistence for all before abundance for the few were made operative in modern industrial life, more consideration would doubtless be given to the claims of labor. Every man, be he laborer or not, has a human life to live. To this end a certain minimum requirement of wealth is necessary. The workingman renders services to society and in return he should have enough, to quote the words of Mr. Salter,<sup>2</sup> "to enable him (1) to run a fair chance of living out the average term of human life; (2) to have a family of moderate size; (3) to let his children go to school until they are at least fifteen years of age; (4) to let his wife attend to the duties of a mother and a housekeeper; (5) with reasonable economy to lay aside something for his support in old age." The writer says further it is impossible to speak of just and unjust wages in terms of money, owing to the constant changes in its purchasing power. But there should be minimum wages, whatever their money equivalent may be, which would permit industrious workingmen the privileges above enumerated, and below this point competition should not be allowed to determine the wages of the laborer.

It would be a mistake to think that Bentham advocated the subsistence of all before abundance to the few as a principle of legislation. That he believed in such principle as contributing to greater happiness, we may easily infer if we credit him with consistency. The terms 'subsistence of all before abundance to the few' are not Bentham's. He uses the general terms subsistence and abundance, and his doctrine that subsistence should be prior

<sup>1</sup> *Constitutional Code*, Ch. III.

<sup>2</sup> *Claims of Labor in Ethical Religion*.



to abundance in the legislator's consideration is a general statement. Abundance wherever it can be attained is to be encouraged, that is, it must not be discouraged. But in respect of both subsistence and abundance the laws have almost nothing to do.<sup>1</sup> All that the law can do is to create motives. In the case of subsistence, "the force of the physical sanction being sufficient the employment of the political sanction would be superfluous." And to secure abundance, "what more is required than the force of these natural motives for carrying the increase of wealth to the highest possible degree." The wealth of society consists, says Bentham, in the total of the wealth of the individuals composing it. The individual is encouraged to increase his abundance "to the highest possible degree."<sup>2</sup> That this application of the *laissez-faire* doctrine of liberty might interfere with the bare subsistence of some other part of the population is not recognized.

The doctrine of *laissez-faire* means, in briefest terms, non-interference on the part of the government; or, since some interference into the affairs of the governed is necessary to the very notion of government, let us say, it means a minimum of government interference. That this was the ideal of the author of the Declaration of Independence and has continued the ideal of a large class of political thinkers, including Herbert Spencer, is well known. According to this philosophy the liberty of the individual stands in opposition to the power of the state.<sup>3</sup> Any added increment of power to the state is accompanied by a curtailment of liberty to the individual. To secure the greatest amount of individual freedom let there be a minimum of state interference. There is a fallacy here that is lucidly discussed by Dr. T. W. Taylor in his essay on justice.<sup>4</sup> The mistake consists in failing to distinguish between society and the state. Society, as well as the state, imposes its restraints. In fact, they are more num-

<sup>1</sup> *Civil Code*, Ch. IV.

<sup>2</sup> *Civil Code*, Ch. V.

<sup>3</sup> This last remark will hardly apply to Bentham because as was noted before his individualism differed from that of Jefferson and Spencer in not being founded on abstract individual rights, but was adopted as the best means to the greatest happiness. His ideal is not the liberty but rather the happiness of the individual, and individual endeavor may be restrained by the government when such endeavor is seen to operate in a manner contrary to the greatest happiness principle.

<sup>4</sup> *The Individual and the State*.

erous and more dreaded than those of the modern state can be. There are restraints dictated by fashions; by current conceptions of honor and morality; by church societies; by the boycott; by labor unions and by combinations of wealth; by clubs and by one's social caste. "The distinction between the state and society lies, not in the presence or absence of coercion, but in the presence or absence of law."<sup>1</sup> In addition to the restraints and constraints above enumerated there is the fact of aggression. Unlimited aggression of one element of society upon the remainder will inevitably result, unless there is interference by the savory laws of the state. It should be the object of the legislator to practice just interference, to protect members of the state from the unjust restraints and constraints imposed by certain elements within society. "The end of law," says Locke, "is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom."<sup>2</sup> State activity is therefore for the promotion, not the curtailment of freedom. True, its method is necessarily one of restraint. The problem of justice is here. The state restrains injustice. It guarantees freedom under just laws. What is justice and what should be the limit of state interference are questions we need not enter upon. But it is most probable that, at present, in America much more is to be feared from private aggression, and from unreasonable impositions emanating from private sources than from state activity.

In Bentham's fundamental principle itself, aiming as it does at the increase of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, no one can overlook the potent tendency to a universal equality. It is true that pleasures differ in kind; some are called refined and others coarse. Bentham himself makes no use of this distinction. And though we may think the exquisite rendition of grand opera much superior to the satisfaction of physical appetite as a source of pleasure, and find in this fact some justification for inequality, even on the pleasure-pain basis, still the like character of body and mind common to the whole human race shows such inequalities to be non-essential. There are certain pleasures that all, princes and paupers alike, covet. Bentham mentions those that have to do with preservation, with repose and with sympathy. There are certain pains that all must suffer. In the essential parts there is a striking similarity throughout humanity. What

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>*Civil Government*, Bk. II, § 57.

more convincing argument for equality on this basis have we than the plea of Shylock: "Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?"

Some men are susceptible to pleasures that are denied to others. All men have pleasures that are denied to the highest of the lower animals. Nevertheless, if pleasure and pain constitute the fundamental principle of connection we cannot leave out the animal world. That at one time men alien to the tribe received no more consideration than stones, history records. That to day horses are treated as mere physical mechanisms, their susceptibility to pain affording opportunity for manipulation, is witnessed in our city streets. Our human tribe has enlarged, giving birth to humanity, but they are still without the tribe. The pleasure-pain hypothesis would bring them in. It demands for them kind treatment. Let there be a balance of pleasure over pain. Rousseau's tenderness for animals was noted in discussing the *Émile*. On this subject Bentham is still more explicit, as the following lines from the Deontology will show: "If the animals we call inferior have no title to our care, on what foundation stands the claim of our own species? The chain of virtue will be found to girdle the whole of the sensitive creation. The question is not can they reason, nor can they talk, but can they suffer?"<sup>1</sup>

That all men and animals are alike in that all are susceptible to pleasure and pain is undeniable. That all suffer is a statement of a very obvious fact. But what is the value of this fact? Pain in any form is undesirable, and unless there is a greater good derivable from it, no avoidable pain should be felt. Let there be a minimum of suffering. We have dispensaries, hospitals and humane societies, and could make use of more. The sight of common suffering should make men kind. The recognition that all of the sentient creation are environed by unrelenting law should teach men forbearance. Similarity of physical life is, however, not a fact of great importance in a discussion on social equality. All the flowers in a garden may have their roots in the

---

<sup>1</sup>Ch. I.

soil, but this does not make the poppy equal to the rose. All may be nourished by the same summer rains, but this is a fact of little importance in determining their relative values. Similarity of physical life throughout the kingdom of men and animals is a fact of little importance in determining their relative claims to reverence.

## IV. KANT

The contrast is extreme indeed between Bentham and Kant. Here again is the antithesis of Epicurean and Stoic. With the first we are on the earth, and in the eyes of some of his critics, of the earth, and being of the earth, earthy. With the second we walk the upper air of abstract reasoning. We find our refuge under universal laws that are coterminous with the length and breadth of the universe. Authority is placed in abstract laws. These to the Benthamite are but the cobwebs of a fanciful brain. Bentham condemns authority. "Reason, right reason, nature, nature's law, natural right, truth," etc., he says, "all are but the dogmas of men who insist on implicit obedience to their decrees."<sup>1</sup> To Bentham self-interest and duty are one. On the notion of a man's performing an act of self-sacrifice he writes: "Unless in some shape or other he derived more pleasure from the sacrifice than he expected to make in abstaining from making the sacrifice, he would not, he could not make it."<sup>2</sup> To Kant self-interest, i. e., inclination, and duty are antithetical. The empirical self must be constantly sacrificed in order to bring one's actions in accord with a universal law of right. In short, Kant's universal law which is absolutely binding, quite regardless of its utilitarian consequences, is to Bentham the merest vagary. And Bentham's fundamental principle is exactly what Kant excludes as a motive to moral action. He does say, however, that it is a duty to promote the happiness of others though not of one's self. Is this distinction, on Kant's own test of rightness, consistent? Altruism and the assumption of happiness as an end of conduct is doubtless introduced to relieve the austerity of his system, but the introduction is at the expense of consistency. It is inconsistent because happiness is a so-called natural end, i. e., it has to do only with the empirical and therefore cannot become the goal of a moral law. It is difficult, too, to see why a man whose character as an end in itself is determined by his having

---

<sup>1</sup>*Deontology*, Pt. I, Ch. IV.<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

a rational nature should be interested in furthering the inclinations of sensitive beings, since rationality is put in antithesis to inclinations, and inclinations are regarded as a source of slavery. Moreover, the principle cannot be universalized, since it is always to exclude the self of the doer. It would be evident from this doctrine alone that Kant shared the atomistic conception of society common in the eighteenth century. It is a duty of the individual to work for the happiness of others but never for his own. He sacrifices himself therefore to other individuals. If Kant had really attained the organic conception of society he would have seen that the sacrifice of the individual is to be made not to other individuals but to a universal. This universal has usually the form of an institution, e. g., that of the family or of the state. The individual sacrifices himself to the universal of which he himself is a part. Therefore his sacrifice cannot be absolute. It is the merging of the self into a larger life. Altruism as a doctrine must disappear along with the atomistic conception of society.

The point of departure for Kant's ethics is the dualism of desire and reason. This antithesis Kant had inherited from the past, an antithesis that had come up again and again in varying form. It may be traced back to the Middle Ages and even to Plato. In the figure of Plato it is the monster in the man as opposed to the man himself, i. e., it is appetite opposed to wisdom. In the mediæval Church it was the dualism between nature and supernatural grace, and only through the mediation of the Church could a man proceed from his natural, or fallen state, to the state of grace. The dualism of the carnal and the spiritual found in the Epistle to the Romans becomes fundamental in the theology of Luther. But now the Church is no longer necessary as a mediator. The individual in an immediate relation to his Creator receives the grace necessary to his salvation. In Hobbes we find reason opposed to the passions. In the state of nature the passions have sway, resulting in a *bellum omnium contra omnes*. But reason is made to prevail over the passions by the institution of the civil state. The submission of individual passion to legal authority (though not by contract) is an idea which Hobbes inherited from Machiavelli. In Spinoza the terms of the dualism

<sup>1</sup> *Republic*, Bk. IX.

do not stand in such sharp antithesis. Reason is the same as thoroughly intelligent desire. A man must act by desire, but to the purified intelligence desire and reason are one. To Bentham the dualism did not exist. In Kant, however, it is strongly emphasized. But in Kant it is an internal dualism, and the solution is found within self-consciousness. Evil is not overcome by a free gift of grace from on High, as theology taught, nor is authority from the Church, neither is authority vested primarily in the State, as Machiavelli and Hobbes believed. But rather man gives law unto himself. His will is autonomous. Authority is conceived as internal, not external. There is still a conflict between reason and desire, and reason must control desire, but the nature and the means of this control are found within the man himself.

It is the form rather than the content of an act that determines its claim to moral worth. The *Metaphysic of Morals* opens with these words: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will. . . . A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects . . . considered by itself it is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay, even the sum total of all inclinations." If Kant means that a will is to be considered good or otherwise quite regardless of the *end* to which it is directed, since the end is necessarily empirical and therefore cannot serve as a proper motive to moral actions, or, in other words, if he holds to an empty form of will quite regardless of some notion of an end willed, his conception is at least hard to grasp. Upon this Kantian doctrine the criticism of Herbert Spencer appears tenable.<sup>1</sup> Spencer reiterates his own criterion of a necessary truth, the inability of the mind to conceive of its negation. But, he says, Kant sets out with propositions the affirmative of which is inconceivable and from such affirmations proceeds to draw conclusions. "Will," says Spencer, "implies the consciousness of some end to be achieved. . . . Will becomes cognizable by morality only when it gains its character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as good or bad. . . . Kant says a good will is one that is good in and for itself without reference to ends . . . an inconceivable proposition." It is possible to approve of the

---

<sup>1</sup> *Fortnightly Review*, 1888.

above criticism without adopting Spencer's own test of the rightness of an act, i. e., its value in contributing to the increase of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. From the act of willing remove the empirical content, i. e., the end willed, and the will becomes an empty form, if it can be conceived at all.

The charge of pure formalism is again brought against Kant's conception of duty. Duty consists in obeying the general formula of the categorical imperative: "Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law." Duty consists in obeying a Law of Right and the essential characteristic of such law is universality. There must be no individual bias or inclination. Only that act has moral worth which is done on the principle of duty. To act morally is to do not merely as duty requires, but because duty so requires. A stoical austerity underlies his entire conception of duty. If I have a pleasurable inclination to perform an act which at the same time I could will to be a universal law, my act loses in moral worth merely because the performance of the act gives me pleasure. If this is true, it is impossible to find happiness in well doing, because when one begins to feel happy in the performance of a right action, that action begins to lose its moral worth. The position of Kant that acts done from inclination have no moral worth leads, according to Spencer, into absurdities.<sup>1</sup> Because in order to be sure an act has moral worth it must be seen to be done not through inclination, but rather, contrary to inclination. The most moral man is he who has not the inclination to be honest, or kind to his family, or a good citizen, but is so nevertheless at the command of duty. When a man takes pleasure in promoting the happiness of his family then his endeavors lose their distinctive moral quality. Allowing the justness of Spencer's criticism, it is worth noting that his own test of the rightness of an act, as was suggested above, is no more tenable than that of Kant. Only that act is absolutely right, to Spencer, which involves absolutely no pain.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the humane operations of the dentist and surgeon have in them an element of wrong. Writers on ethical theory are usually the most convincing when engaged in criticism of their adversaries; and they are least convincing in the presentation of their own systems.

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>*Data of Ethics*, § 102.



The categorical imperative is again stated thus : "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law." It is true that the element of universality is necessary to a proper conception of justice. It insists upon the omission of bias, upon the absence of anything that stands in the way of fair play to all. Were it possible to obtain a complete knowledge of what justice is, we should probably have a summation of all ethics. Too much homage cannot be given Kant for his emphasis upon the element of universality in ethics. But when I perform an act it is in a particular concrete situation. I will a definite end, the expected realization of which is either immediate or remote. It is the end that moves me and not an abstract formal maxim without reference to an end. The maxim according to which my particular act must correspond is conceived by Kant as a priori determined. It is absolutely binding upon all rational beings, it is unchangeable, eternal in its character. But it is evident that a rule of right applicable to society at one stage of evolution might not be right at another, and that all the situations wherein I as an individual am called upon to act are particular situations and cannot be universalized.

A law of right, when it is once determined according to a maxim, is universal in its application ; i. e., it can admit of no exception. Moreover, this particular law of right is conceived as a priori determined without reference to other laws. But they may conflict with one another and as a matter of fact they do. Let us use Kant's own illustration.<sup>1</sup> A man has a talent which if it were developed would make him a useful member of society. Therefore the development of this talent is his duty. But certain means are necessary which he does not possess. Still, he must not steal, because this would violate another law of right. Another man sees his family in dire distress and feels it his duty to relieve them. This can be done only by borrowing money on a promise to repay at a certain time, a condition which he knows he cannot fulfil. But lying in any form is a violation of a universal law of right. A prosperous man finds it his duty to relieve the condition of the wretched people around him. But how far should he go in the distribution of his wealth? In these difficulties Kant's formula is no guide whatever. If we were purely rational beings and utterly devoid of all empirical belongings (a condition which

---

<sup>1</sup>*Metaphysics of Morals.*

is of course inconceivable), then perhaps Kant's theorem would apply. It would apply, however, to a static world. Happily human society appears to have a dynamic character. It is possible for it to change. Huxley thought it better for the human race to be annihilated than to remain in its present condition. I can approve of a law made in support of private property when I see that certain moral and social results are thereby obtained; but I cannot conceive such a law as universally and externally applicable to all rational beings throughout the universe if I believe private property an institution merely expedient to the present stage in our social evolution, and which, possibly, will find no place in a later and higher stage. The gist of the argument is that a law cannot be merely formal. No law applicable to the individual or to society can be made without close analysis of the empirical situation and without reference to an end or ideal which it is the hope of the individual or of society to approach.

Underlying Kant's scheme for the formulation of a universal law of right appears the spurious assumption of an equality that was common in the eighteenth century, the assumption that men are alike in their capabilities. It was the supposition that the inequalities which were obvious in society were non-essential. They were but an artificial and temporary condition that had resulted from an imperfect development. Kant gives as the test of the morality of an act its own self-consistency when conceived as a universal law. When you propose to yourself a certain act, assume that every other rational being will act in the same way. If your maxim is then seen to be self-consistent, i. e., if the end proposed in your act is not defeated by its universalization then the act is moral. If a man is tempted to tell a lie, let him first consider his act as universalized. Then it will be known that the truth is never told, and no one will believe another. In this case it would be useless to lie, because he who lies does it with the expectation of being believed. So it becomes futile to lie at all when lying is considered as a universal maxim. The case is the same with stealing. If this habit were to become universal it would be useless to steal at all. Because, what could be the use of acquiring property of which you would immediately be deprived by another? Here again the end of your action is defeated when considered as a universal rule of action, i. e., the maxim is inconsistent with itself. There appears to be a fallacy here in the supposition that if all

were disposed to act according to the false maxim, they would be equally able to do so.<sup>1</sup> It is easy to imagine some few individuals endowed with unusual strength to habitually steal from the remainder of the population and to have the power of compelling this remainder not to steal, at least from them. Neither could all men have the same skill in lying, therefore where one would succeed another would be defeated in his purpose. It would thus be possible for some to obtain, by virtue of superior strength, the proposed ends of their actions when acting contrary to a Law of Right, even though the entire remainder were disposed to act in the same manner.

In so far as Kant's purpose is merely to obtain a universal maxim which is seen to be consistent with itself, e. g., telling the truth, and to avoid a maxim which when universalized is inconsistent with itself, e. g., lying, our criticism at this point does not hold. But in so far as self-interest is regarded as a criterion of a rule of right, as it appears to be in the four illustrations given in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, then the objection holds, because numerous instances could be given where self-interest is not defeated though the action is contrary to a universal law of right.

In the second fundamental formula of the *Metaphysics of Morals* we have what is perhaps of most permanent significance in the Kantian ethics. Every human being must be conceived as a personality of absolute worth, and as such can never be used as the tool of another. There is a vast difference between a person and a thing; and it is only a thing that can be regarded merely as a means. "Rational nature exists as an end in itself." Each man necessarily conceives of himself as an end, and every other rational being conceives of its existence similarly. Therefore the nature of each as an end becomes a universal principle, which is formulated in the practical law, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." This does not mean that the second formula is derived from the first or in any way depends upon it. The conception of man as an end in himself comes in *de novo*. That a rational nature exists as an end in itself is a self-evident proposition. Man has a universally legislative will; he is the source of definite laws; we estimate him and find him to be of absolute worth.

---

<sup>1</sup>See Adler, *Critique of Kant's Ethics*, *Mind*, 1902.

The term end as used in the second formula requires some explanation. I cannot make myself or any other personality the end of an act of will. In my conduct I may be influenced by the notion that all persons have absolute worth and are therefore to be regarded in a sense as ultimate ends, but I cannot make them as rational beings the ends of my acts. Rational beings themselves are never the ends of my acts of volition. What can be acquired by our actions is of conditional value, it is related to things; but rational beings are of absolute value. It would be less confusing to say, not that humanity in thine own person or in that of any other is to be regarded as an end, but rather as something of absolute worth in view of which ends are to be determined.

The second formula serves better than the first as a basis for practical rules. Let us take Kant's own examples.<sup>1</sup> The first is that of contemplated suicide. He who would put an end to his own life would on the first formula consider his intended act as universalized. Will the maxim as a universal be self-consistent? Kant's answer is that a system of nature could not without contradiction allow of a law to destroy life for the sake of self-love, which is the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life. But the inconsistency here belongs to nature and not to the maxim of the suicide. The maxim of his act could be universalized and acted upon with perfect self-consistency. On the second formula, however, with its idea of humanity as an end in itself, the would-be suicide is confronted with the situation of subordinating a personality, something of infinite worth, to a transient inclination. This would be a violation of the formula. The superiority of the second rule is again evident in the case of theft or falsehood. It is impossible to imagine such acts as these as universalized; the resulting condition, if conceivable at all, would be an utter absurdity. As stated before, we can imagine all disposed to act on such maxims, but with the result that the strong would obtain their coveted ends and still maintain some degree of social stability by forbidding the weak to act upon the same maxims. But from the second formula again it is easier to deduce a practical rule. If I regard those around me as personalities having in some actual or potential sense absolute worth, this very idea so compels my respect that I can

---

<sup>1</sup>*Metaphysics of Morals.*

not consistently subordinate them to the petty ends coveted in my act of theft or falsehood. It is a matter of the estimation of values. I have some responsibility wherever my influence extends. If I believe there are certain capacities centered in another's personality and that these are capable of development and are, too, the only things of which I can predicate real worth, then I evidently ought not, since I am a responsible being, to permit an affront to another's or my own personality for the sake of the gratification of passion. The exploitation of the personality of any human being, or conduct that would lead to the retardation in growth of the capacities contributing to his fuller life, is clearly interdicted by the second formula. This formula Kant calls the practical imperative. It has been readily accepted by more recent writers on Ethics, with the substitution of the term *personality* for rational nature. Personality is taken to connote all the capacities of a man that are socially useful.

It is possible to see the rich significance in the formula which makes humanity an end in itself without adhering very strictly to the categorical imperative, or, indeed, without depending upon that imperative at all. The categorical imperative would move us to moral action by the very idea of universal law. Its formula is but the application to conduct of the ideas of necessity and universality. It is probable that very few, if any, persons are determined solely, if at all, by such motives. Kant himself says, we can never be sure in the case of any particular act that a person is acting in deference to a law of right, rather than in self-interest. The fact is, that human acts arise from quite an unlimited number of motives. Among these may perhaps be included the desire to act purely in accordance with principle or with a supposed universal law of right. Even in this case however it is probable that some end is implied, even if not at the time uppermost in consciousness. Such an end might be, to feel oneself in the company of the best or to contribute to the realization of some social ideals. Moreover it is possible to act on a principle which leads to a bad end. It is safe to say that Kant erred by making a general two-fold division of all motives to human action. The first division includes actions done for the sake of duty and in accordance with universal laws of right; only such acts are to be credited with moral worth: and the second division, all acts resulting from inclinations or desires, all of which are summed up in the

general term happiness. That all desires are for happiness is a mistake which Kant shares with the Utilitarians. It is Benthamite doctrine accepted only to be rejected. Both agree in the premise that all desire is for happiness. Therefore, says Bentham, it ought to be and must be the end of all human conduct. The desire for happiness as an end, says Kant, can never give to your act moral worth. And as all acts from desire involve happiness as their object such acts cannot be termed moral. Man is a rational being and must act in accordance with universal laws and without any empirical bias whatever. Only that act is moral which is done on the principle of duty.

When we want practical rules of conduct, however, we find that the formula of the categorical imperative, "act on a maxim that is fit to be a universal law," affords but little light. It does not serve as a source for the derivation of practical axioms nor as a motive to action. In any situation in which we are called upon to act the maxim of our action will depend rather upon *our estimation of values*. The categorical imperative pushes one from behind he knows not whither. The formula here substituted beckons one ahead to that which he sees as the highest good. And what becomes of the "I ought" that is contained in the categorical imperative? It remains as before a matter of experience. The "I ought" is a complexus of ideas and feelings and according to Kant must be taken as an experienced fact. But the direction which the will receives from the "ought" is to that end which is seen to be of most worth.

Kant became the mediator between the atomistic notion of society prevalent in the eighteenth century and the conception developed later that society is organic. He went beyond the first without having reached the second. Eighteenth century thought attempted to get along without the past; it endeavored to secure detachment from tradition, authority, and even from organization. Kant certainly dispensed with tradition. The problems of authority and organization were disposed of by making them primarily internal principles. Hume had conceived of the mind as but a flux of mental states, or a stream of sensations and ideas that came and went and among which was no identity and no law other than that of custom. There is such a flux or chaos of appearances, Kant maintained, but that is only half of experience. Analysis of experience shows this flux of states which considered

alone is an abstraction, to be brought into organization by the unity of apperception under the form of the categories. The conception of the mind as such a form, Kant maintained, gave organization and law to experience and certainly to knowledge. A comparison of the ethics of these two men is also interesting. Hume found the basis for human conduct in two fundamental tendencies that were grounded in human nature: (1) the tendency of each man to seek his own advantage, and (2) the tendency to sympathize with other men. These Humean principles were adopted by Adam Smith, becoming respectively the basis of his Political Economy and his Ethics. Tendencies to self-interest and to sympathy could not serve Kant, however, as foundations for moral law, in the conception of which he included the attributes of universality and necessity. Self-interest and sympathy are included in the mass of inclinations which must be subordinated to the Law of Reason. Reason in the man sets up an absolute authority in the moral law. The source of such law and authority is found in an autonomous will (another name for Practical Reason); i. e., a will in the man which is universally legislative, which prescribes the very laws which he and all other rational beings are bound to obey. This is the tie which connects one member with the group, which identifies the individual with the social. He need act only on his own will, but he thereby wills the universal. He is thus in accord with all rational beings, because all are conceived as willing alike.

The conception that every rational being prescribes in the maxims of its will universal laws, so as to judge itself and its actions by such standards leads, says Kant, to another conception, that of a kingdom of ends. By this he understands "the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws." This is certainly, as Kant says, a very fruitful conception. But its derivation should come from the second and not the first formula of the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Criticism has already been made of the impossible application of the first formula. Allowing for a moment its use as the avenue to a kingdom of ends, this conception might mean a system of effects or goals willed in common by rational beings according to universal laws. But the effects so willed would necessarily be empirical and therefore would not constitute for Kant a system of moral ends. Or, perhaps a system of *forms* in which the willing occurs, or of principles without regard to empirical ends; but this is inconceivable. The term 'end' evi-

dently refers to a rational being as such, and therefore the conception of a kingdom of ends is better derived from the second formula. It could be derived from the first formula only in the sense that each is an end by virtue of sovereignty, because every other, as well as himself, must obey the laws which his will decrees. Each is both sovereign and subject and as sovereign may be considered an end.

The second formula, however, "Treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, never as a means only, but always as an end," is more fruitful as a source for the derivation of the moral conception of a kingdom of ends. Each person is an end in himself, i. e., each is a being whose worth cannot be estimated, because it is not relative but absolute. We pass in array the many elements of our experience. We may make with Kant the general division into things and persons, and submit them to an estimation of value. The worth of the former is always conditional, it is always relative to some end. The latter cannot be so regarded unless it be in reference to some cosmical purpose of which we have at present no knowledge. A personality we must accept as an end in itself, i. e., as having absolute worth. Kant arrived at this conclusion from the fact alone of man's rational nature, by which man becomes the giver of universal principles. "The will of a rational being," he says, "must always be regarded as legislative, since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in itself." The one fact of rationality, according to Kant, gives to man his character of absolute end. But the rational is only one side of man. He is a complex being endowed with capacities which have to do with judgment, with accomplishment, and with feeling, and which are necessary to his social adaptation and are to be developed in reference to social ends. Together they contribute to make up a personality. Since personality is that in our experience which is of most worth, in fact, that only of which we can predicate absolute worth, it becomes a center for law and morals. My conception of another as a personality endowed with capacities for good will influence my conduct towards him. My estimation of values makes it apparent to me that I must not hamper, but rather promote his growth, if that alone in my experience has real worth. The moral conception of a kingdom of ends is thus reached which is not based upon the assumed fact of a universally legislative will prescribing laws to



all rational beings, but on the principle that each is a personality of absolute worth and therefore becomes to every other an object of supreme consideration.

It is not difficult to find a basis for an ethical equality underlying the Kantian Ethics. Each person is regarded as a rational being, endowed with membership in a kingdom of ends. Each is sovereign in this kingdom by virtue of possessing a universally legislative will. Duty applies "to every member of it and to all in the same degree."<sup>1</sup> Equality on the basis of rationality, and therefore subjection to moral law, excludes the animal world; which we found Bentham had included in the "chain of virtue." That Kant believed the moral law is the differentiating principle which raised man to a height infinitely above the brute creation is evident from this statement: "To suppose that the Moral Law within us is itself deceptive, would be sufficient to excite the horrible wish rather to be deprived of all Reason than to live under such deception, and even to see oneself. . . . degraded like the lower animals to the level of the mechanical play of nature."<sup>2</sup> It has been very common for humanity to acknowledge a close affinity with the animal world. A savage tribe most commonly worships certain animals as its deities and looks to some animal as its great ancestor. Egypt had her sacred animals. The stories told of Buddha indicate the high place they held in the East. Western thinking, however, has always tended to sustain the judgment of Kant, that there is a qualitative distinction which makes man supremely superior to the highest of the brutes, and the kinship in respect to origin maintained in the Darwin theory has been acknowledged without shaking this belief. This does not mean, however, that animals may not have a complex psychical life and are but the "mechanical play of nature," an idea which Kant probably adopted from Descartes.

Do we find in reason, however, and in the thought of duty, an adequate basis for a conception of equality? An attempt has been made to show that very few if any men are determined in their actions by the mere idea of universal law, and since reverence for law is the sole test of duty we are never sure that particular acts are performed through duty at all. We must therefore find some

---

<sup>1</sup>*Metaphysics of Morals.*

<sup>2</sup>*Philosophy of Law*, tr. by Hastie, p. 23.

other, or additional, elements in humanity, if we are to regard it as an end in itself. The fruitful conception that each person is an end in himself depends, according to Kant, on the assumed fact that each is a rational will which is universally legislative. The correctness of this characterization of human nature was tested in the applications of the first formula, a principle which was found to be an impossible guide to human conduct. The function of reason is to discriminate between the various inclinations that present themselves as motives, and to estimate their values, but reason itself as a form can never serve the will as a motive. When a man says, "I will act according to reason," he means he will select that end which reason shows to be of the highest value. In reason, regarded as a power or a so-called mental faculty, we find the greatest differences among men. All have not like powers of judgment and of discrimination in the determination of values. But reason so regarded is only a part of human nature. It is but a part of that less precise but supposedly richer term, *personality*.

Exponents of a doctrine of personality not only accept the notion of man as an end in himself, as contained in Kant's practical imperative, but enlarge upon it. The idea that each is a personality endowed with capacities capable of development but always in conjunction with a like development of others must remain, it would seem the very corner stone of ethics. Here, indeed, is a word which carries with it an ethical concept of equality. Man as an end in himself, as a being of absolute worth, possessing the promise of unlimited possibilities, is a personality. We cohabit in a dynamic and a progressive world. Our estimate of the worth of men can by no means be limited to the actual which they present. The most unattractive appearances may screen untold potentialities. There is no one to whom we can refuse the conception of personality. There is no class which can appropriate the title to itself alone. "Personality," says Professor Dewey, "is as universal as humanity; it is indifferent to all distinctions which divide men from men. Wherever you have a man there you have personality, and there is no trace by which one personality may be distinguished from another so as to be set above or below. It means that in every individual there lies an infinite and universal possibility, that of being a king and priest."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Ethics of Democracy*, Philos. Papers, Univ. of Mich., 1888.

In Kant is an overemphasis of the rational element in human nature and a consequent tendency to individualism. His society is an aggregate of rational atoms, whose bond of relationship is found in common subordination to an impossible system of universal laws. They are not life of one another's life. The primal fact is not the relation between individual and society, but the relation of the individual to universal law. He failed to reach a truly organic conception of society and therefore to attain an adequate idea of ethical personality, because the idea of personality cannot be grasped apart from social relations.

Kant's formula, which insists that humanity shall be an end in itself and therefore always an object for supreme consideration, was doubtless an inspiration beyond his own theories, and has contributed much to acknowledge the right of personality to the central place in law and morals. His own emphasis, however, appears to be on law rather than on personality: e. g., a man has supreme worth because he has a universally legislative will; a correct standard of conduct is that which is fit to become a universal law; the end of the state is to secure the greatest harmony between its constitution and the Laws of Right;<sup>1</sup> the greatest problem of the human race is to found such a civil society as will realize law everywhere.<sup>2</sup> Apparently a person is made for law rather than that law gets its meaning through personality.

Nevertheless, strong emphasis is placed by Kant on the development of the latent powers of the individual as an object of education and of the state. He shared in the conception of education that became common in his later life and which is generally associated with Pestalozzi, that of the "harmonious development of all the powers." In the *Ueber Pedagogik* he speaks of the child as possessing genius which nature furnishes and education must grow, "by developing his natural gifts in their due proportion." Also in the *Natural Principle of Political Order*<sup>3</sup> he dreams of a universal Cosmopolitan Institution "in the bosom of which all the original capacities and endowments of the human species will be unfolded and developed."

But what are the powers of the individual the development of which is of such great importance? They are nothing apart from

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 173.

<sup>2</sup> See Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, p. 278.

<sup>3</sup> *Principles of Politics*, p. 25.

a social environment. The individual helps to make society and at the same time his activities are performed in response to social needs. These so-called powers have no existence apart from the ends to which they are directed. Individual and society can be logically distinguished, but can not be separated. They are but the termini of an interactionary process which must be viewed as unitary. The individual grows through participation in social activities. Through a social sympathy he advances into a wider life. The end of education as "the harmonious development of the powers of the individual" can have no meaning if society is conceived as atomistic, but it is full of meaning if we adopt the organic conception. We can know such powers or capacities to exist only by knowing the direction they take, their use, and their accomplishment. It is therefore evident that all of an individual's activities are social. All are to be rated in a scale of ethical values. The aim of a good life and therefore of education is to get into right relations with men. But the term ethical should not be taken in a narrow sense. It applies to all fields of activity. We must get rid of the notion that actions possessing moral worth are only those which focus about certain religious institutions. Service is the test of the worth of conduct. All industrial life must be conceived as ethical. The labor of the street cleaner is not undeserving of respect and may rank higher morally than the giving of charity.

## V. ROUSSEAU, BENTHAM, AND KANT

The eighteenth century saw the culmination of an individualism that had been developing since the beginning of the Renaissance. We have observed the unreality of this individual; that detachment had made him a mere abstraction. Also that the organic idea allows of a truer conception of the individual, that of a personality, a being which has no meaning apart from the whole and which yet, as an individual, has a nature to be realized, and must be assumed to have absolute worth. This modern doctrine of personality is, however, very largely the result of the work of the three writers we have considered. Each directs attention to the individual and emphasizes his worth and his claim to consideration. It is true that they differ in opinion as to where the real good of man is found. The significant fact is, however, that the good of the individual in some form is taken as the thing of fundamental importance. Rousseau's doctrine of natural rights is meant to be an ethical conception. The right to life, liberty, and participation in sovereignty is based in human nature itself. Bentham believed that the individual's supreme wish was for happiness; therefore let him have happiness. Happiness became the end of morality, religion and politics. To Kant however the greatest debt is owed, because by making man a member of a kingdom of ends he approaches the nearest to an organic conception.

What we think the individual to be will largely determine for us what the state ought to be. The most difficult problem we have to face is to secure an adequate conception of the individual self. The conception of the isolated individual has its corollary in that of an atomistic society. Having given the individual, how are we to build up the social union? Rousseau's answer is by means of a social compact, a theory which became known through Hobbes and popularized in a different form in the eighteenth century. In the *Social Contract* the members of the prospective society recognize that each has interests both different and the same as those of others. They agree to cancel where necessary the diverse interests in order to make secure the common good.

In this way freedom and protection is guaranteed to each through the power of the whole. The nineteenth century has decried the social compact in favor of the organism; but there is much truth in the agreement theory and much that is wanting in the organic conception. The term organism as applied to society has not yet been well defined. The superiority of the latter term is in showing that society is not a mere aggregate of individuals brought together in an artificial manner; that it throbs with life and tendencies; that it possesses continuity and growth. The analogy with the animal organism whose actions are determined from a common center is, however, very imperfect and indeed misleading. The parts or organs of an animal have no other than a functional existence; they are nothing more than a means for carrying out the purpose of the whole; they are without individuality of their own. The members of society, on the other hand, are individuals, they are ends in themselves. Society has no power to think or will apart from its members. Though society is conceived as in some sense an organism the individual must remain the prominent fact; he is by nature a being of independent self-activity. It is possible however that future writers on political philosophy will discard this term in favor of a better. An organism requires at least that its parts play freely one into the other and co-operate in the attainment of a certain end. Mutual helpfulness and not antagonism would characterize the relations between its members. Capital and labor are recognized as necessary factors in modern industrial life. They are necessary to each other, and they co-operate in the attainment of the common end of production. Moreover, the whole society is vitally concerned in this production. A coal strike in Pennsylvania is an injury to the entire country. So far we have the conception of an organism. On the other hand, society presents us with a picture of struggle. Group is arrayed against group. Strong and bitter tension is the order of the day. A stable society is maintained through the mutual compromise of group interests; or, in other words, through the agreement to sacrifice certain diverse interests for the sake of a common good. Representatives of capital and labor come together to agree on terms. The thirteen colonies entered into an agreement which was believed to be for the general welfare. But in each case the common good is prior to the agreement. Were it not first recognized the agreement would not have been made. Therefore some

degree of organization must be prior to any contract. But agreements consciously entered into by groups within society are a necessary means to complete social organization. Society appears to be in a process of organization. The only way in which society can be regarded as a real organism is as an ethical ideal towards which the process tends. The ideal, however, cannot mean that there will ever be cessation of antagonism between the members. Antagonism makes for progress; opposition is an instrument of realization. Without opposition society becomes static and dead. The ideal will leave a field for individual activity and initiative. Progress has come largely from the organization of advanced ideas in individual centers, which have become clarified and woven into the social woof through opposition.

Rousseau did not mean the social compact to be regarded as historical. It is a figure to illustrate the formation of a just state. The notion of a social compact would have received far more sympathy in the nineteenth century if it had been an agreement not between individuals but between groups. It is said at once, "Man is a social creature; he has an instinct that impels him to the company of others; it is not his nature to be considered in isolation; he has always been one of a group." This is true; but my social instinct and interest is satisfied by association with my own group. It does not impel me to fraternize with the whole of society. It is evident then that there is still a place for the application of the contract theory if we take, as we must, the group as the social unit.

Another common and valid objection to the contract theory is that it attempts to construct society anew. We may arrange some form of social union, i. e., we may construct a state; but we cannot construct society. Empiricism has taught us the great truth that we must accept what is given. Society *in toto* is a given fact. It follows that there can be no opposition between the individual and society; even though there may be between individuals and groups or between either and the state. Even the expression 'Individual and Society' has no meaning because there is no such relation other than that of the abstract whole and part relation. You cannot remove the individual from society to make him a distinct term in the relationship without destroying society. A particular stave may have a definite relation to any or all of the other parts of the barrel, but it is not related to the whole barrel except as a mere part. Remove the stave and the

barrel is destroyed. But we can speak of the individual and an ideal society because the given individual not being a part of that society can be put into definite relationship with it.

The bond of social union in Rousseau's doctrine is the recognition of a common good. Just what this common good is at any time must be declared by the general will which is always sovereign. All participate in the sovereignty not as a result of contract but by natural right. Though Hobbes had supposed otherwise, sovereignty cannot be alienated or even delegated. Rousseau does not prescribe any particular form of government other than republican, which means that the general will shall rule. The general will may desire the form of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. The general will expresses itself in the assembly of all the people. Here alone is heard the public voice. This is the method of a New England town meeting. Rousseau's lack of practicality let him assume it was possible in the case of a large nation. When the people are so assembled they are asked to vote on measures proposed for laws according to their conception of what the general will is. From the counting of the votes is deduced the declaration of the general will.<sup>1</sup>

During the popular assembly the existing government *in toto* is considered as suspended in deference to the people. Apparently the right to the suffrage in the assembly is not restricted by sex or age or anything else. Sovereignty is a birth-right and carries with it the right to expression. Moreover, since all laws are for the time being abrogated, there would be no law operative to limit the voting qualifications.

By lodging the sovereign authority in the body of the people Rousseau emphasized the cardinal principle of democracy. In saying that every man by his very nature is born free and master of himself and cannot be enslaved against his will, he is giving expression to the inherent dignity of humanity. When, however, we look for practical suggestions in the formation of a state we find his doctrine insufficient. In fact, in the formation of his own state he passes away from the conception of an unhampered and free individual to the extreme of a communistic state, a state in which even a religious creed is prescribed and he who refuses to believe is punished with banishment. He furthermore leaves a loophole for continued tyranny by making the convocation of the

---

<sup>1</sup>*Social Contract*, Bk. IV, Ch. II.



peoples' assembly dependent upon the will of the existing government.

Movements for equality have taken different forms at different times, according to the idea that is uppermost in the public mind. The following are the principal forms in which equality as a social idea appears :

(1) Political equality, which usually means the almost unrestricted extension of the voting privilege.

(2) Civil or legal equality, i. e., equality before the law.

(3) Economic equality or equality in wealth, or at least in opportunity.

(4) Religious equality which allows to everyone the privilege to believe and worship as he chooses.

(5) Moral equality, which prescribes a uniform standard of morals for all classes and both sexes.

The realization of the idea of moral equality depends, for the most part, on the gradual education of the race. This form of equality might be said to include all the others. Religious equality has become for the most part a fact. The justice of legal equality is so obvious that it is usually taken as axiomatic.

The problem in Rousseau's day was to secure political equality. This ideal has since been realized to a high degree in the form of universal suffrage. Credit is due Rousseau for recognition of the intimate relation between economic interests and political government. To be king over a people one must be king over the territory which they inhabit.<sup>1</sup> In brief, there cannot be in a good society conflict between property interests and the political power. In the formation of the contract each gives himself including his property. As with his liberty however, he gets it back, and his possession receives the sanction of the whole community. Only in this way do individuals obtain legitimate ownership. As owners, however, they are considered but as "depositories of the public property" and "the right which each individual has over his own property is subordinated to the right which the community has over all."<sup>2</sup> Still, it can hardly be inferred from this that Rousseau is a communist; because he justifies the private ownership of the first occupant, provided however that he has only such a quantity

<sup>1</sup>*Social Contract*, Bk. I, Ch. IX.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

of territory as is necessary for subsistence, and has made his title good- by labor and cultivation. Rousseau is not specific in the treatment of this subject. In general, all territory is to be under the ultimate control of the community, but private property is justified because "the social state is advantageous to man only when he has some property, and no one has too much."<sup>1</sup>

Bentham was not concerned with the problem of a social contract. Theories of origins and first principles concerning rights were but empty speculations. Society is a given fact, and of course a government is necessary. The existing governments have in them elements both good and bad. If a representative system and freedom of speech are found to be good things, let them be adopted or continued. If the existence of an executive office not responsible to the people is a bad thing, let it be abolished. The test of value in all such instances is found in the happiness principle. Not in rights that are determined in nature, but in a happiness that ought to be, is found a criterion for the making of civil laws. That is the best form of government which can best contribute to the greatest happiness of the people concerned.

The only government which can have for its end the happiness of the people is a democracy, i. e., one that is by constitution responsible to the people. Bentham goes so far as to say that the situation of a monarch either absolute or limited, or the situation of a member of a hereditary legislative house, or that of a member of a representative body in a limited monarchy, is that of an enemy to the people; because such governments will not legislate on the greatest happiness principle.<sup>2</sup>

In a political state all power is either operative or constitutive. Constitutive power, i. e., the supreme or sovereign power, should reside in the body of the people. It is by its exercise that the operative power, i. e., the power which carries on the actual operations of government, is created and conferred. The operative power includes the various departments of government, legislative, administrative, and judiciary, all of which are presided over by agents of the people. In Bentham's state political equality is practically unlimited, since almost all adult males are eligible as electors. The happiness of the most helpless pauper is as im-

---

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>*Constitutional Code*, Bk. I, Ch. XVII.

portant as that of the most opulent and powerful member of the community, therefore he should possess an equal share in the supreme constitutive power which is conceived as the means for the security of the general happiness.

It is with much reluctance that Bentham declares the female sex ineligible to the suffrage, i. e., from participating in the constitutive power. Their claims to the means of happiness is no less than that of men. In fact, "inasmuch as there are so many causes of suffering which do not attach upon the male, and do attach upon the female sex," the principle of equality would demand that they be favored above the male sex. He concludes, however, that the prejudices against the eligibility of women as electors is as yet too general and too intense to make wise the advocacy of that principle and might stand in the way of other improvements more probable of attainment.<sup>1</sup>

In this essay some discussion has already been made of Bentham's treatment of economic equality. Wealth is a means to happiness. And the nearer the distribution of wealth approaches to equality the greater will be the sum of happiness. This is true, on the principle that a given quantity of wealth will produce the greatest amount of happiness when it is given to the person or persons to whose already existing wealth it will bear the largest possible ratio. In spite of the shortcomings of this theory we found it to contain very important implications: (1) that a more equal distribution of the products of industry is desirable, and (2) that private property as an institution should be subordinated to an ethical principle.

Industrial developments since Bentham have shown the mistake in his supposition that equality would naturally follow under a government operated on the non-interference or *laissez-faire* principle. Security and freedom, he thought, are all that industry requires to make a state prosperous; and in a prosperous state there is continual progress towards equality. Let trade be unrestrained by politics and property will become diffused by a natural process. In America to-day, however, the tendency is not towards diffusion, but towards the concentration of wealth into the hands of corporate interests.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Constitutional Code*, Ch. XV.

The *Constitutional Code* was written between 1820-32.

Kant follows Rousseau in the use of a social contract theory, but with him it is merely an idea of the reason which is involved in the conception of the state as an institution. Having given a rational individual, what are the steps to the formation of a state? The problem would be easy on the Kantian doctrine if a man were a purely rational being, unhampered with individual empirical interests. The state prescribes a system of general laws. These need be but the enactments of the universally legislative wills of the members who share in a common rationality and therefore could not disagree. It is however from the fact that man is an individual with private interests that the demand for a state arises. There are certain natural rights which each possesses by virtue of his humanity. These are, an innate freedom, the birthright of all; and a corollary of this, an equality which denies to anyone the right to exercise mastery over another, except by contract. The protection of these natural rights together with the right of private property, which grows out of them, makes necessary a state government.<sup>1</sup>

Each personality reveals itself in a physical existence. Each attaches to itself certain material objects in which its will is expressed and which are necessary to its freedom. In this way property arises with the distinction of mine and thine. The objects which I call mine are linked with my personality and partake of its inviolability. The right to my property implies the exclusion of other persons, but my claim to particular objects cannot be made irrespective of other persons. They, too, are personalities whose freedom and possessions it is my duty to respect.

The fundamental principle of the Science of Right is expressed thus: "Act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the freedom of all others, according to a universal law."<sup>2</sup> This formula appears at first to differ but little from that of Spencer: "Every man is free to do that which he wills provided he infringes not the freedom of any other man."<sup>3</sup> There is however a very important distinction, due to a difference in emphasis. Spencer centers his ideal in the free individual who does as he pleases and regards law

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophy of Law*, p. 56, (tr. by Hastie).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>3</sup> *Essay on Justice*, Ch. VI.

as a restraint, or at best as a necessary compromise. With Kant, however, the emphasis here as elsewhere is upon law. Freedom is to be had through law. "*Nur das Gesetz kann uns die Freiheit geben.*" Moreover, law is not perceived by the self-conscious being as a restraint, because it is of his own making. He is conceived as prescribing the law according to his rational nature; and therefore, as willingly imposing limitations upon his own actions through respect for the rights of others.

Although each person must be conceived as an end in himself, he has at the same time a particular existence with certain empirical belongings and is necessarily limited by the particular existence of others. Each rational nature is conceived as acknowledging the right of other individuals when claiming his own; i. e., when I set aside some external thing as mine I debar another person from its use, and this implies the reciprocal obligation on my part to abstain from what is his. It is not supposed, however, that each individual's reason can prescribe just the limitations of his property right. To determine this a state is necessary. It is also necessary to secure for each the enforcement of his right. To Kant the private right is the natural right. It includes primarily the innate right to freedom, a freedom in so far as this can coexist with the freedom of all, according to a universal law; and the corollary of this, a right to equality in self-mastery; no one can be another's master except by contract. These rights are natural in the sense that they proceed from a rational principle which is in each man. To guarantee to each his rational right and its outcome in a property right a state is necessary. The principle of this transition given is as follows: "In the relation of unavoidable coexistence with others, thou shalt pass from the state of nature into a juridical union constituted under the conditions of a distributive justice."<sup>1</sup> Property and other rights exist prior to the civil state, being determined by the rational natures of individuals as such; but these rights are merely provisional, i. e., they cannot have the sanction of public law except through a political power. It is obligatory upon all to enter into the social union and to have determined by law what shall belong to each.

All social contracts, says Kant, are established to promote in common some chosen end. The contract which takes shape in the civil state has as its end, "the realization of the Rights of Men

---

<sup>1</sup>*Philosophy of Law*, p. 157.

under public compulsory laws, by which every individual can have what is his own assigned to him and secured against the encroachments or assaults of others."<sup>1</sup> A public law is the act of a public will and this can be no other than that of the whole people. No particular will can be legislative for a commonwealth. The suffrage is allowed to all those who possess civil personality. These are the active citizens and are characterized by independence or self-sufficiency. The passive citizens include all women and children and such men as work for masters. A majority of the peoples' votes or of their delegated representatives must be taken as expressing the terms of the compact.<sup>2</sup>

From this fair promise of republican government we turn to a despotism almost equal to that of Hobbes. We are reminded that the social compact is merely an idea of the reason. Its practical value consists in the influence it is assumed to exert on the ruler and his subjects. Unlike the scheme of Rousseau there is no actual assembling of the people, and the ultimate authority is not placed in the people, but in the ruler. Nor have they by their suffrages placed him in office. The right of the existent sovereign to rule is accepted as a fact. The idea of the compact serves to remind the legislator that he ought to enact such laws as *might have arisen* from the united will of the people; and to admonish every subject to regard the law *as if* he had consented to it of his own will. Under no circumstances, however, should the people resist the actual law. Their duty is to obey. "It is the duty of the people to bear any abuse of the supreme power even though it should be considered to be unbearable." "There cannot even be an article contained in the political constitution that would make it possible . . . in case of the transgression of the constitutional law by the supreme authority to resist or even to restrict it in so doing."<sup>3</sup> The people have only legislative influence. The sovereign ought to rule in accordance with the idea of the social compact; i. e., to make such laws as he thinks would meet the approval of the people. But if he fails to do so, the people must not rebel. Rebellion is absolutely prohibited.

There is, however, one privilege allowed to the people which was denied in the commonwealth of Hobbes. They may freely

<sup>1</sup>*Principles of Politics*, p. 34, (tr. by Hastie).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup>*Philosophy of Law*, p. 177, (tr. by Hastie).

but respectfully express their opinions. The liberty of the press is the sole palladium of the rights of the people.<sup>1</sup> In fact, it is by this means that the sovereign learns what is the general will; and *in idea* it is because he represents the general will that he is sovereign. But the exercise of this privilege must be in keeping with reverence for the existing constitution.

No people is safe where the ultimate appeal is not to its own body. Under an autocrat of less wisdom than Frederick the Great the reduction of a people to serfdom would be the probable result of the Kantian scheme of government. Moral but not political freedom would remain. The subject could exclaim, with Epictetus, "God hath made me free; I know his commands; after this no one can enslave me." But he must not refuse to obey a legal law however unjust. There is no surety that the sovereign will choose to act in the spirit of the compact. Kant's theory would have been more consistent, as well as more serviceable, if after emphasizing the worth of man by dilating upon certain natural rights, he had guaranteed the defense of those rights by making the sovereign responsible to the people.

From this actual state, with its possible evil consequences, we turn to the ideal state, i. e., one where the idea of the social compact is realized and all laws are in accordance with the general will of the people. The general will is conceived as determined by a majority of votes. Equality in civil personality or political equality is almost universal among men.<sup>2</sup> The suffrage is denied only to criminals and to those who work for masters, and are therefore not self-dependent. The latter class would include, e. g., the plowman and the resident tutor, but not the farmer or the school master. But they have always the possibility of becoming active citizens. Inequality in citizenship, however, due to the dependence of the passive citizens upon the will of others, is not inconsistent with the liberty and equality of the individuals as men. Though laws are conceived as enacted by the expression of will of the active citizens only, the passive citizens in their natural rights have an equal claim to consideration in the determination of legislation.

Private ownership of land, Kant regards as a necessary condition to the ownership of external things in general. The sov-

---

<sup>1</sup>*Principles of Politics*, p. 57.

<sup>2</sup>*Philosophy of Law*, p. 167.

ereign is conceived as the supreme proprietor of all the land but he may hold none of it in private possession. Private property in the soil belongs only to the people, taken distributively and not collectively. Its division among them is determined by the sovereign according to "conceptions of right."<sup>1</sup> Just what "conceptions of right" may mean in this instance is not told; therefore we can get from Kant no light on the subject of economic equality. He is not a communist. Still, no property can be held in private capacity by any corporation, class or order, and transmitted hereditarily without the willing assent of the sovereign, who is supposed to represent the general will.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Philosophy of Law*, p. 82.



## VI. CONCLUSION

To say 'man is a being of absolute worth,' is to express a very simple principle. All else that comes into human experience, in so far as it is valued at all, is valued relatively; i. e., in relation to the end which it serves. Man as an end in himself, concerned with the growth of his capacities into a perfected character serves as an ultimate standard for the valuation of things.<sup>1</sup> His capacities are essentially social; the means as well as the justification of their realization must be found in the conception of a common good. Character cannot be perfected in isolation; nor can it leave quite out of consideration the whole of society. All are presented to it in some way as a part of its problem. Its development must come from participation in and contribution to a common good. From this view-point, what meaning can be attached to individual rights? A right implies at least two things, (1) a power or capacity on the part of the individual, and (2) a willingness on the part of society determined by the conception of a common good that such power should be expressed. A right therefore cannot exist apart from society nor can it be exercised except in accordance with a common good. The capacity of an individual to identify his own good with that of the whole society determines his character as a moral being. It is only as a moral being that he can be said to have rights. The notion of natural rights included in the idea of the social compact differed from this conception in very important respects. There a "natural right" was something which existed anterior to society and to protect which society and its laws came into being. In the latter conception the right co-exists only with society and finds its justification in reference to a moral end. Laws cannot be deduced from "natural rights." "A law is not good," says T. H. Green, "because it enforces 'natural right,' but because it contributes to the realization of a certain end. We discover what rights are natural only by considering what powers must be secured to a man in order to

---

<sup>1</sup>This is not intended as an argument submitted in proof of a thesis; but rather as the statement of an ethical belief.

the attainment of this end. These powers a perfect law will secure to their full extent. The consideration of what rights are natural (in the only legitimate sense) and the consideration what laws are justifiable form one and the same process, each presupposing a conception of the moral vocation of man."<sup>1</sup> "Rights are derived from the possession of personality; i. e., the capacity which man possesses of being determined to action by the conception of such a perfection of his being as involves the perfection of a society in which he lives."<sup>2</sup> . . . . "The capacity on the part of the individual of conceiving a good as the same for himself and others and of being determined to action by that conception is the foundation of rights."<sup>3</sup> "There can be no claim on society such as constitutes a right, except in respect of a capacity freely (i. e., under determination by conception of the good) to contribute to its good."<sup>4</sup> "There ought to be rights because the moral personality—the capacity on the part of an individual to make a common good his own—ought to be developed; and it is developed through rights; i. e., through the recognition by members of a society of powers in each other contributing to a common good, and the regulation of those powers by that recognition."<sup>5</sup>

The above passages may be summed up in the following propositions: (1) Personality is primarily the capacity for being freely determined by the conception of a common good. (2) A right is derived from personality; it implies the exercise of those powers of the individual which can be exercised in accordance with the common good; i. e., in relation to a moral end. (3) Laws coexist with rights for the attainment of a moral end; i. e., for the realization of a common good in which all individuals find their ideal good. . . . . A system of perfect laws would have as its aim the regulation of external conditions in such a way as to make possible the realization of all moral rights. The laws of any people at any given time are indicative of the heights which its moral consciousness has attained.

If we accept the above conclusions regarding the relations of the individual in society as an approximation to truth, the con-

<sup>1</sup>*Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, § 20.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid*, § 27.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid*, § 29.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid*, § 154.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid*, § 26.

structive importance of the three writers we have considered will be found in their contributions to it. All recognized a common good for society. It is necessary to the idea of social contract in Rousseau and Kant, and likewise to the greatest happiness principle of Bentham. But the organic relation of the individual with the common good is not recognized even in Kant. This is correlative with the somewhat isolated notion of the individual, a conception, however, which was a necessary step to secure freedom from the dead weight of tradition. The conception of the individual is however pre-eminently moral in its intent. He is the thing of supreme consideration, his supposed "natural rights" and his happiness are to be the objects of all legislation. It is consideration, too, characterized by universality or equality. Rousseau included all in the sovereignty because all had "natural rights" to be maintained. The rights of those whom Kant excluded from the suffrage were equally sacred in the determination of legislation. Each was an end in himself by virtue of his humanity. For reasons of present expediency Bentham denied the franchise to women, but believed them entitled to even a greater share of the means of happiness than the male sex on the ground of greater suffering. In the right to happiness "everyone is to count as one; no one for more than one."<sup>1</sup>

The above considerations have had the utmost to do with the development of the more modern doctrine of personality, an ethical idea which assumes the absolute worth of man and supplies the only possible basis for a conception of social equality.

"There is no absolute equality," says Eisler. "Equality (Gleichheit) is absolute similarity, undistinguishableness in respect to quality and quantity."<sup>2</sup> Two things cannot be equal in all respects, i. e., absolutely equal; because they would then be identical. The mere fact that things resemble each other implies that they differ in something. If we assume two peas to be entirely alike in size, color, weight, etc., we have two contents different in position, though apparently not in quality. But if we are to regard differences in position, i. e., in space and time relations as qualities belonging to the attributes of contents, even the two peas will be

---

<sup>1</sup>See Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, p. 234.

<sup>2</sup>*Wörterbuch*.

qualitatively distinct. Objects are, however, probably never found in nature so much alike as to be different only in space or time relationships. No two blades of grass are just alike. The microscope reveals distinctive differences in grains of sand. When it was the fashion to read philosophy in royal society, it is said that the knights and ladies about the French court amused themselves in hunting after leaves or twigs that appeared exactly alike in order to refute the statement of Leibnitz, "There are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike and in which it is not possible to find a difference."<sup>1</sup> It is not reported that they were successful. When things are said to be equal, we have to ask, as did Aristotle, "Equal in what respects?"<sup>2</sup> Things are equal only in respect to their common elements. If a thing is defined as the sum total of its qualities (Locke's definition of substance) the greater the number of like qualities between two things the greater will be the degree of equality or the nearer the approach to an absolute equality. Still, it is not the mere number, but the essential qualities and uses of a thing that afford a basis for comparison.

An object which possesses many attributes will be linked with many different associates at the same time, because it possesses the elements which are fundamental to membership in the several groups. A man is in the continuum of space because he has an extended body; he may belong to the Republican party by virtue of his political principles; and to the Catholic Church through his religious beliefs; and to the negro race by the color of his skin. Furthermore, he may be large or small in body; bright or stupid in mind; honest or dishonest, skilled or unskilled; all these and innumerable other attributes are influential in fixing his group relationships, and add to the complexity of modern society. A man may be equal to another in one respect and very unlike him in others. Children within the same families often show the utmost differences in temperament and ability. Some men are born political leaders; others are followers in this region who, by native ability, lead in art or science. There are others in all vocations who are most serviceable as assistants, but this, too, is an essential function. We have no norm for evaluating proportionately these various abilities and services. All are essential, but they cannot be said to be either equal or unequal. A human

---

<sup>1</sup> *Monodology*.

<sup>2</sup> *Politics*.

being possesses a vast number of attributes. The greater the number and diversity of the attributes the more difficult becomes the comparison and the more impossible the determination of equality.

In the connotations of man, however, we must distinguish between the essential and the non-essential. If we find one fact in the life of man of such overwhelming importance as to overshadow other attributes, and that this is a fact common to all men, in it alone can we find a basis for universal equality. It has become the modern fashion to scout the doctrine of equality as the vagary of a sentimental dreamer, one Jean Jacques Rousseau. With a wave of the hand the new doctrinaire settles the matter with the question, "Don't you see that men are most unequal?" and he thinks inequality is for all time established. This would be true if equality were but an arithmetical and a static conception; if it were but a matter of computation and comparison of the visible qualities which human beings present. There will always be inequality in men's abilities and attainments. This is a law of nature and one that lends to social cohesion, since diversity is necessary to unity. Equality is, however, an ethical conception; it distinguishes man (including all men) as the thing of moral worth in the known creation, and involves his good as the object of attainment. All help to constitute a dynamic world. The good of man cannot be expressed in static terms, neither can it be in retrogression; so we must think of it as a progressus, as a growth, as an expansion into something higher. Potentiality is the main category for ethics, is the great fact of life and the hope of the world. We cannot limit in any man the potentialities for betterment nor deny his latent ability for membership in a perfect society. Potentiality must be placed among the foremost connotations of a conception of personality.

There is thus a fundamental equality among men to be found in an ethical idea. It is based on the notion that every member of society is an end in himself and must be assumed to possess by his human nature absolute worth. Accepting this doctrine as true, what influence should it have in the determination of legislation? A good law will contribute to a moral end. This end is no other than the development of the potentialities of the individual to contribute to and participate in a common good. Personality so conceived becomes the determining center for laws as well as

morals. That constitutions and laws have their justification in moral conceptions is not a new doctrine. The Declaration of Independence is based upon it. The framers of this declaration believed in it. "We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, . . ." They (the people of America) would assume "among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature . . . entitle them." The above are, in their intent at least, strictly ethical conceptions and should be so interpreted. These statements in the famous declaration are being decried nowadays, owing to the obvious inequalities among men in mental ability followed by inequalities in wealth and attainments. They are said to be "out of date." They are out of date in so much as such terms as 'law of nature,' 'natural right,' 'natural equality' are found wanting in expressing the relation of an individual to an organic society. What they did, however, was to emphasize the worth of the individual and to dignify humanity. The end sought was a moral one. Let the above propositions, that men are by their common humanity equal, that they possess inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, be given a moral interpretation (and no other is possible) and the Declaration of Independence remains the most remarkable of historic documents. That certain moral principles in the eighteenth century were looked upon as so reasonable and necessary as to have become "natural" indicates the advanced stage which the growth of the social consciousness had reached. Probably some of the unrealized ideals of the present will one day be so far attained as to be called "natural." Properly speaking, we have no laws of nature which can determine ethical values. Therefore the appeal of the American Fathers was not to a law of nature, but to an ethical law. Rules of moral conduct can not be based upon natural laws, except perhaps by the Stoic and by him only because he first conceived of all nature as itself divine.

It is true that so far as is shown in the Declaration no attempt was made to work out sufficient definitions of the terms liberty and equality as to make them compatible with one another. It was not seen that some approach to an equality in the means of living as would be demanded by equality in human nature was

inconsistent with a *laissez-faire* doctrine of freedom. What we need is new definitions of these terms in keeping with a highly organized society. Liberty there must be. It is necessary to individual moral growth, and to social progress. Development can never be forced from the outside, because it depends upon self-activity. It is a strong argument for democracy that however well a paternal government may be conducted it can never allow the self-realization to the governed which might come to them through initiative and responsibility. Liberty is the law of life, since life is growth and growth is from within. Each has capacity peculiar to himself by which he may contribute to the common good. From the conception of an unrealized self comes liberty as a moral requirement; but likewise comes equality, since it is in the conception of common potential personality we find equality to reside. All the members of society are such selves, whose expansion into the wider life is equally indispensable to the complete realization of the ethical ideal. He who acts freely in accordance with the recognition of this situation is the moral person. Laws should be made to facilitate the attainment of moral ends and to restrain those persons who attempt to act in an individual capacity in opposition to the common good. It is not circular reasoning to say that the development of the individual is necessary to the common good and that the common good determines the development of the individual, i. e., what capacities shall be encouraged. It is consistent with the organic relation of the individual and society.

Political equality in the form of an approximation to universal suffrage, the extension of which Carlyle called the "unchaining of the devil,"<sup>1</sup> will remain the necessary palladium of the liberties of the people. However desirable government by experts may be, to use John Stuart Mill's phrase, we must trust the intelligence of the people to secure periodically such experts. History has shown that although an aristocracy may be very patriotic in one generation, it does not remain so. Moreover, the use of the ballot is a form of activity which contributes to self-realization. Democracy is in keeping with the nature of men as men.

Legal Equality means more than the prohibition of class legislation, and that all individuals are equal theoretically before the laws. We shall never have legal equality as long as one disputant

---

<sup>1</sup>*Shooting Niagara; and After.*

with greater wealth can (without a valid reason) retard the execution of justice through the power of appeal, knowing that his poorer opponent has not the means necessary to continue the dispute. And on the other hand, as long as a jury of poor men feel it as their first duty to decide against a corporation as such. Legal equality is much dependent upon economic equality.

Wealth is power in whatever sphere it operates. Without some approach to an economic equality there can be no genuine political or civil equality. What is a just distribution of the products of industry, and what is a just apportionment of the nation's wealth is a problem too great to be entered upon here. Various theories have been given, such as a distribution according to needs, or according to services; the abolition of inheritance; or of private property, etc. Opponents of such theories have had but little difficulty in pointing out their flaws. It is true, however, that if man as a personality is the thing of most worth, industrial relations must be more and more determined by that conception. Equality as an ethical idea does not demand an equal division of wealth. It would be impossible to maintain such a condition, even though it were not undesirable. Private property is, nevertheless, a social institution; it is created and protected by society and must be used in accordance with the common good. There is no wealth apart from society, it is intimately involved in the social organism; it is a necessary instrument of ethical realization. The justification for private property as of individual rights must be found in reference to an ethical end. Corporate wealth must be used for the benefit of the people, whether 'owned' by them or not. We no longer trust the administration of government to an aristocracy, but industry has come more and more under aristocratic control; i. e., into the hands of the few. To secure the operation of industries, including of course transportation, in accordance with the common good, by bringing them under a more or less direct regulation by the people, i. e., by making the operators responsible to the people, is the problem of economic equality.

The most common form in which equality is advocated is equality of opportunity. But opportunity for what? Let each man, it is said, have a chance to use his talents, to make a career for himself. Surely each man cannot be let alone to make what career he chooses. Given a land of opportunities such as America has furnished, with the *laissez-faire* principle of administration,



and inequality is the inevitable result. Equality of opportunity is soon at an end. There can be no permanent equality in opportunity, unless the individual in the use of his talents is determined by the conception of a common good. In her educational system America is unique among the nations of the world by providing free education from the kindergarten through the university. Besides abundant primary and secondary schools each state has its university holding out opportunity to its youths, in most cases quite free of tuition and in no case is the fee more than nominal. The plan is to encourage the individual, to let him develop his talents. These institutions have the ready sanction of the people, otherwise they would not exist. At the same time we hear daily of the selfish encroachments of wealthy corporations; it is said that they exploit the people through gaps or imperfections in the laws. To utilize these imperfections, i. e., to manipulate the laws, they employ the best legal talent to be had. This legal talent receives its first stimulus and development in the universities. And criticism must not, of course, be limited to one profession only. If a state providing a university supported by the people could know in the case of any youth who applies there for knowledge, that he will use his talent in opposition to the common good, and does not prevent such youth's admittance, that state would be performing to that extent a suicidal act. No state can afford to encourage the development of talent to be used against itself and any talent immorally directed is so used.

Individuality must ever be encouraged; it is in keeping with the ethical concept of personality, with man as an end in himself. The most useful as well as the greatest men have been the most individual; they have been marked by originality, initiative and self-dependence. Each person has his peculiar capacities and through these attains his best self-realization. Freedom is the prime condition of growth. Moreover, freedom is necessary for social progress, just as equality is necessary for cohesion. "All progress," says Fichte, "is due to unselfish devotion to ideas." He was not aware of the importance of natural selection as a factor of progress; but he was right in giving a high place to conscious selection—devotion to ideas. Great ideas have their birth in free individual minds. Nevertheless, the development of the individual's powers should be determined by a conception of the common good. No power can be exercised, no act can be performed by

the moral individual, which leaves that quite out of consideration. The 'common good' can never be precisely defined. It is not a fixed, but a dynamic conception. It can never determine in detail just what powers the individual shall exercise, or just what are his 'rights' in every given situation, any more than a boundary line can be fixed between the individual and society. The state, however, exists for the furtherance of the common good. It is thus a means for the ethical realization of its members. It should be determined by the ethical concept of equality, i. e., that each person has a human life to live and a moral destiny to realize. Self-realization, it is true, is a matter of inner growth; each one must help himself. Nevertheless, many a flower has been dwarfed through coming up by chance in the shade of a rock.

We shall never have a *perfect* democracy until every member of the state is imbued with the spirit of the Roman poet: "*Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.*"<sup>1</sup> This line contains the essence of democracy with its attendant attributes of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Democracy has been defined by Mazzini as meaning, "The progress of all through all under the leading of the best and wisest."<sup>2</sup> In a perfect democracy each one would regard every other as in some way a part of his problem. And there would be no decreased opportunity for individual careers. America has faith in her children; therefore she provides abundant individual education. By America we mean the state, that which stands for the common good. There shall be no mute inglorious Miltons, no unknown Cromwells. Their talents shall be developed and add to the sum of good. The genius of an Emerson or of a Shakespeare needs a free atmosphere. No earthly power can dictate to such men what they shall be. What guarantee, however, has America that her educated children will use their power in accordance with the common good, that they will not turn and rend her? In the first place, democracy itself is founded upon an enlightened principle and as we have seen upon an ethical principle. This godmother who presided at its baptism will remain as a guiding star in its growth. The general spread of enlightenment through education will produce a higher average citizenship. Where each citizen is an integral part of the sovereignty, education is the indispensable condition of the right use of his privilege.

<sup>1</sup> Terence: "I am a man; I regard nothing human as indifferent to me."

<sup>2</sup> *Thoughts upon Democracy in Europe.*

If history shows democracy to be the highest consummation of the world's political experience, knowledge of that fact will tend to maintain it. Moreover, knowledge adds to efficiency in the vocation and therefore to a more stable type of citizen. Nevertheless, knowledge from our so-called general education and specific technical education does not tend necessarily to create in the student an appreciation of responsibility to the state. Education must become more and more moralized, it must have as its object the socializing of the individual, i. e., to create in him a ready disposition to be determined by a conception of the common good. It is our problem to maintain a democracy in a society which has already reached a high degree of complexity and in which a pulsation originating in one group sends a quiver throughout the whole. Moral or social education will try to understand society with its many problems, and to further the progressive realization of a national ideal as well as the personal realization of all its members.

In the foregoing pages we found certain equalities and inequalities to be fundamental in human nature.

(1) The doctrine so common in the eighteenth century that 'men are by nature equal,' if taken to imply an equality in natural powers and abilities is obviously so false that a refutation of it is unnecessary. Knowledge of the inherent inequalities of men has been intensified too by the modern study of biology and the laws of heredity. If palpable differences in abilities are admitted and equality is yet maintained as a 'natural right' the term 'natural right' has to be explained. We found that there can be no 'right' for the individual apart from the common good of society, and therefore that 'natural rights,' the doctrine of individualism, rights which each individual is supposed to hold prior to his existence in society, must give place to moral rights. Moral rights are those which the individual holds in relation to ends and which must accord with a conception of the common good. Neither can there be any natural and equal right to participation in sovereignty since sovereignty too must be determined by an end to be attained and this end must be first defined. Not natural right but expediency has been chiefly instrumental in the extension of the franchise.

(2) Equality based upon sentience. In the feelings of pleasure and pain can be found a deep and fundamental equality which has afforded perhaps the chief motive to philanthropy. Recognition of the feelings common to humanity led Rousseau to a doctrine of equality and Bentham to the principle which is fundamental in his system. While Bentham denied any place to 'natural rights' including a right to equality he nevertheless believed that in the claims to happiness 'each was to count for one and nobody for more than one,' which means that in his mind justice was really prior to the greatest sum of happiness.

(3) With Kant the fact of common sentience is unimportant while an equality is found in "rational nature," a combination of reason and will. This marks off distinctly the human from the brute creation which was found to be included in the group of sentient beings. It is true that every human being has some reasoning ability, though the degree differs widely among different persons and races. Kant's interpretation of rational nature, that each is a universally legislative will, and its corollary that men are equal in a common subjection to duty we found open to grave criticisms. But the claim that everyone by his human nature is to be regarded as an end in himself and therefore as possessing absolute worth, though but the assumption of a theory of ethics, furnishes the basis of a universal equality as an ethical idea. Kant's assumption of the absolute worth of man led him to a belief in the innate natural right of the individual to liberty and equality. The criticism already made on the meaning of a 'right' applies again at this point. The failure to recognize the intimate organic relation of the individual with society made possible the claim of individual rights apart from a conception of a common good. Kant's doctrine of the worth of man contributed immediately however to a conception of personality, an idea which at least implies in the words of T. H. Green, "the capacity to be determined by a conception of the common good." The terms *personality* and *common good* have been freely used in the above pages. A further attempt will here be made to define them.

That there are many 'goods' which men hold in common will be readily granted; but that we may speak of one supreme common good, even in a single state in devotion to which the individual finds his own highest good and in which the best interests of individuals do not clash, is a more difficult propo-

sition to maintain. The fact of any self-governing society, i. e., one in which the individual members co-operate voluntarily and not through coercion, implies necessarily the recognition of a common good. Even if some state now having this character, i. e., a democratic state, was first brought into existence by force, nevertheless the principle holds to-day as long as there is voluntary co-operation. That collective action is able to further individual good is but another way for saying that people have interests in common which can best be served by co-operation. The most frequent illustration of this is found in the distribution of the means and comforts of living, which is embodied in our extensive industrial system. But if the term 'common good' has the meaning and significance which T. H. Green gives it, it cannot be limited to a material distribution; such things are but its incidents and furnish a motive only to the calculation of a somewhat immediate comfort.

We are reminded here of a criticism by Bosanquet on the *general will* doctrine of Rousseau.<sup>1</sup> The general will is that which wills the common good. Rousseau makes a fundamental distinction between the *general will* and the *will of all*, but he really makes sovereign not as he supposes, the general will, but the will of all when this happens to represent the unanimous private interests of the individuals in the group. Common good to Rousseau therefore is 'common,' but it is not universal. This distinction becomes clearer in an illustration. The Athenians received a sum of revenue from certain silver mines, which it was the custom to distribute among all the citizens. It then had the character of a 'common good,' because the private interests of all were served. At the proposal of Themistocles, however, each agreed to forego this private advantage and to devote the annual revenue to the building of a fleet. This fleet later fought at Salamis, and thereby saved the institutions of the Greeks and permitted the development of a free Europe. It is characteristic therefore of the *universal good* that it is not only common to all but it has permanence in time. It is the peculiar function of the institutions of society to be conservers of the universal good. The 'common good' to Rousseau and other exponents of individualism is apparently exhausted in the private interests of the individuals of the given society. It does not have the character

---

<sup>1</sup>*Philosophical Theory of the State*, Ch. V.

of a universal which takes form in an enduring institution and which may demand the sacrifice of private interest common to even all the members of the given group.

The conception of common good in the writings of T. H. Green has the same two attributes: it must be both permanent and common. Man, who thinks of himself as permanent, conceives the idea of a well-being of himself, which shall not pass away with this, that, or the other pleasure.<sup>1</sup> It is the demand for an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self,<sup>2</sup> but the idea does not admit of a distinction between good for self and good for others.<sup>3</sup> The reason conceives the good as common to all and to the nation and thus there has arisen an order of life which habituates the individual to the subordination of his likes and dislikes to social requirements. Green assumes as a fact the identity of the social good with the highest good of the individual. It is with him a matter of reason. Reason has a function of union in the life we know; through it we are conscious of ourselves and of others as ourselves; it is therefore the basis of society because it establishes equal practical rules in a common interest. Institutions are the form and body of reason.<sup>4</sup>

The above reasoning may appeal but little to the citizen who grumbles about paying his taxes and views all requirements of the state with suspicion. In fact *complete* identification of interest between the individual and society, the belief that all activities of the individual are at all times best for himself when best for the whole can be maintained only on certain moral considerations grounded in a Metaphysics. Nevertheless, to use the words of Fairbrother, "considerations of a common good however limited in range, are the guiding influence of the ordinary citizen in his habitual obedience to civic institutions."<sup>5</sup>

It is probable that he who makes complaint of his tax assessment does so not because he objects to the principle of co-operation that is implied, but to a supposed unjust distribution of the burden or a misuse of public funds. Of course in many concrete situations just what is to be the content of the 'common good'

<sup>1</sup> *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 203.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, § 234.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, § 235.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, § 204.

<sup>5</sup> *Philosophy of T. H. Green*, p. 133.

cannot be readily determined. Different opinions arise through different degrees of enlightenment and through personal bias. The vision of the ordinary citizen is too limited to see the full significance of the institutions under which he lives. Nevertheless it is in the fundamental institutions of society, the home, vocation, school, church, and state that the 'common good' finds its embodiment.

We accepted as the fundamental fact of our theory of ethics the belief in the absolute worth of man. Man has a social nature which can be best realized by participation in the experiences that are conserved and systematized in the above institutions. These considerations will influence our conception of the content of the common good in any given situation.

Personality has been defined as including the capacity to be freely determined by the conception of a common good; it might be said a capacity to be just, were it possible to define justice. Personality connotes certain elements having to do with the ordinary human relations that are developed through participation in the above institutions. These institutions are the conservers of the best experiences of the human race. They are the social moulds or habits through the instrumentality of which the individual finds his most consistent development. They tend to make possible the freedom necessary to the self-realization of his moral nature. While ideally embodiments of the socially excellent, the concrete forms of these institutions in a given situation may be quite unworthy of the idea of the absolute worth of man; i. e., they may not be contributory in the maximum degree to the realization of the good of all concerned. Therefore reform is always necessary if not in the forms at least in the working out of these institutions; in fact reform, or social reconstruction, is but another name for progress. The reformer aims at the realization of a more correct idea of the common good in some given situation. Sometimes the rectitude of his claim is so manifest as to involve no antagonism. At other times the accepted standards or sanctions repulse the innovation and the individual stands out in opposition to his group. Such opposition is always inevitable in a progressive society since progress comes mainly as the result of individual initiative. If the new proposal is well founded, i. e., if it really aims at a higher condition of common good and has at the same time the capability of adaptation to the given situation, it is likely to be adopted

sooner or later. Society progresses according to a dialectical principle. That a well-founded opposition passes over in the course of time into a higher synthesis is illustrated in the frequent occurrences of history in which society has martyred its prophets and later accepted their doctrines.

It is evident that there can be no simple and ultimate conception of a common good and certainly not one that can become the possession of all or many of the individuals in society. People are moved by the thought of a good that is more or less immediate, i. e., motives to actions are necessarily identified closely with the given situation but this situation includes chiefly relations of the individual with others and is therefore ethical in character. What form the common good demands in the given situation may be evident, though the individual has no conception of a meaning of the good as ultimate. In fact any notion of an ideal good has value only in so far as it can serve as a working hypothesis in concrete situations. The value of conceiving of society as an ethical organization in which there is an equality by virtue of indispensableness to the given whole as is demanded by the ethical idea, is found in the fact that this idea furnishes a social end to be attained, which is in keeping with the acknowledged worth of the human being as such and will tend to influence the conditions of the social organization so that ethical personalities may come into their development and realization.

The objects to be attained in a democratic education cannot be precisely defined until we learn the real meaning of democracy, and that we have not yet done. The ethical idea that each individual is a person to whom must be accredited in some sense absolute worth, at least means to the educator that each child endowed with capacities for social life is an individual problem to be studied, and means to the State that each child is worthy of education. It is necessary to discover what are his peculiar gifts and capacities that these may be developed for the sake of both himself and society. Since there is no equality but rather the greatest diversity in natural gifts, no fixed and uniform treatment can be prescribed for a group selected at random. Whatever democracy will come to mean it will at least never sanction the insistence upon an inert uniformity such as would discourage a useful and peculiar talent in any individual. On the other hand,



life in groups where the pupil learns how to live with his fellows, is indispensable in democratic education.

It is especially true in a democratic society that the leader is he who serves. Each individual is in a sense a leader in his special sphere; i. e., he is a leader by virtue of efficiency in his particular calling. The leader is really the expert because his claims to leadership must be based on expertness in social service. This is true of any calling whether that of shoemaker, poet, or statesman. The necessity for expert knowledge and guidance in government as in all the departments of life becomes more recognized because of the frequent failure of the direct rule of popular assemblies in matters requiring expert knowledge. In the scheme of education outlined in the *Republic* the individuals of exceptional talent are selected into a distinct group and educated to the highest possible degree while the great majority remain ignorant. If education were merely to develop leaders there would be no reason for rejecting the Platonic plan. But a belief in the worth of man as man implies that each has a potential gift, the development of which is not only valuable to the State but is the condition of the individual obtaining his own highest good, which again is part of the common good. Education endeavors to discover and to develop the useful capacity. Useful capacities are those which contribute to social service, i. e., to a common good: but since in a dynamic society there can be no fixed and immutable conception of the whole common good, abundant opportunity for originality and initiative should remain to the individual: in fact only those capacities can be considered useless, and whose development is therefore immoral, which are manifestly indifferent or opposed to social service. The worthy leader is he who has insight into the meaning of social service, i. e., has an advanced conception of the content of the common good; and at the same time has the ability to so control operations in society as to further the realization of his ideal.

The idea of worth, the person being the point of departure, is taken as initial by Professor Maccunn, and from it are made certain deductions, moral, political, and industrial. We discern, says this writer,<sup>1</sup> in persons even with meagre and stunted opportunities a strong and struggling principle of moral life which commands respect; and as a matter of fact, we do expect and demand of them moral worth. The respect so commanded

---

<sup>1</sup>*Ethics of Citizenship*, Ch. on Equality.

must be expressed in action. Moreover the principle of moral life which gives to a man worth, requires opportunity for expression. A certain minimum of opportunity must be secured by civil right. For the same reason political right is demanded, this being but an additional opportunity or instrument whereby the potential moral worth of the man becomes the realized and practical worth of the enfranchised citizen, and whereby is opened up to him the larger life of active citizenship. The same initial idea must carry its influence into industry. Worth and grinding poverty are ill bed-fellows. Political rights are only a satire to one whose life is an absorbing struggle for a livelihood. There is a demand, therefore, not only for improvement in the distribution of the products of industry, but for the opportunity to secure vocational efficiency.

If the above position is well taken the idea of the potential moral worth of all persons is one fundamental idea which will not be overlooked by the moral educator. That this idea is already constantly in evidence in the world is indisputable; e. g., while state expediency might well justify the present movement against child labor that certainly has not been the controlling motive with those who have taken the initiative. It is but the repetition of platitudes to say that no workman can be expected to display enthusiasm for our civil institutions unless he has been educated to an appreciation of their meaning, and that the active citizenship implied in the extension of political rights must remain a farce unless the voter is able to grasp with some intelligence the great issues involved. Of course education in matters political, civil, and moral, cannot be limited to an early period of life. It has been too much the custom to think of education as limited to the period of childhood and youth. The idea of man as a moral personality admits of no fixation in his realization, so education is really, as Plato suggested, a lifelong process. From the industrial view-point this same initial idea would appear to demand that each have the opportunity to attain that vocational efficiency which is necessary to maintain himself in the proper human relationships. Moreover the vocation, which demands the greater part of one's energy and thought, must become, whatever it may be, the main source of one's ethical realization. These demands on the educator follow not only from the idea of personality as it has been conceived but from the idea of democracy. Democracy is based on the principle of voluntary co-operation, and education is neces-

sary that the individual may intelligently co-operate. A workman should not only be efficient but should have some intelligent notion of the significance of his work to the whole industrial and social organization. Some conception of the common good of society to which his own life is contributing must be realized in his consciousness ; otherwise he acts blindly as a machine. This demand becomes the more imperative with increased minuteness in the division of labor, which reduces to a minimum the knowledge necessary for his vocational efficiency and makes the industrial organization a mere mechanical arrangement of independent parts rather than a process characterized by intelligent co-operation. Unless the workmen see the significance of their work, i. e., unless they have a conception of the social whole and their own place in it, the idea of democracy will remain unrealized and we shall continue to live under the rule of minorities skilled in the manipulation of majorities.

One of the dangers against which democratic education should guard—a danger that increases with the growth of cities and newspapers—is the development of the mob spirit and with it the demagogue. Sudden contagions arise and sweep over smaller or larger areas resulting in measures quite contrary to what experience has shown to be wise. This may be as much in evidence in the unexpected landslide in a presidential election as in the illegal execution of a criminal. Persons whose powers for accurate observation and description have been trained, and who have some knowledge of the historical evolution of society, will not lend themselves to the mob spirit.

If the question is approached from either the side of the person or of the organic whole it is evident that an individual human being exists in a condition of most intimate dependence with a vast multitude of others. This fact of an organic society can be presented to the child in numerous illustrations. And not only does he enjoy to-day a 'good' in common with his fellows but this 'good' is seen to extend back in time and therefore has the attribute of permanence. History, if well taught, cannot fail to arouse an appreciation of institutions, since these represent the toil and best experience of centuries. The thought of continuance carries with it responsibility for the future. History makes clear what the present owes to the past and also that it has obligations to the future. The pupil can thus see himself as a distinct part of a

social process which involves intimate relations not only with his fellows, but with the past and coming generations.

Still education should be national in character. The aim of American education is to produce good Americans while that of France is to produce good Frenchmen. The schools become channels for the development of the national genius. The idea of the unity of a democratic community should be emphasized in democratic education, a unity that is consistent with and includes the utmost diversity of function. That differences in talent and abilities should result in certain material inequalities should be seen to be inevitable and not inconsistent with democracy. A mistaken notion of democracy readily gives rise to a spurious assumption of equality which finds expression in irreverence and bad manners. Plato, after describing the democratical man as licentious, one who lives from day to day in the gratification of the casual appetite, following now one fancy and now another, adds that such is the life of "a man whose motto is liberty and equality."<sup>1</sup> It is evident that we need to teach meanings of the terms liberty and equality very different from those held by the Greek philosopher, since these terms are indissolubly associated with the birth, traditions, and ideals of the American nation.

An ideal can be realized only if believed in deeply; for apathy and scepticism whether in the individual or in a nation have never accomplished results. America can hope to attain the realization of her ideals only in so far as these take the form of a widespread and determined conviction.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Republic*, Bk. VIII.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aristotle. Politics.  
 Albee. History of English Utilitarianism.  
 Addams, Jane. Democracy and Social Ethics.  
 Bentham. Deontology, Principles of Morals and Legislation,  
 Civil Code, Manual of Political Economy, Constitutional Code.  
 Bonar. Philosophy and Political Economy.  
 Bryce. American Commonwealth.  
 Butler. Meaning of Education.  
 Bosanquet. Philosophical Theory of the State.  
 Caird. Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.  
 Fairweather, W. H. Philosophy of T. H. Green.  
 Green. Prolegomena to Ethics.  
 Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation.  
 Hadley. Freedom and Responsibility.  
 The Education of the American Citizen.  
 Eliot. Educational Reform.  
 Harris, G. Inequality and Progress.  
 Hobbes. Leviathan.  
 Hudson, W. H. Rousseau.  
 Hume. Treatise of Human Nature.  
 Kant. Theory of Ethics, tr. by Abbott; Philosophy of Law,  
 and Philosophy of Politics, tr. by Hastie.  
 Lecky. History of European Morals.  
 Locke. Of Civil Government.  
 Mackenzie. Introduction to Social Philosophy.  
 Maccunn. Ethics of Citizenship.  
 McKechnie. The State and the Individual.  
 Maine. Ancient Law.  
 Morley. Rousseau.  
 Mill, J. S. Essay on Bentham. Utilitarianism.  
 Plato. Republic.  
 Ritchie, D. G. Natural Rights.  
 Rousseau. Discourse on the Influence of Learning and Art,  
 Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, The New  
 Heloise, Social Contract, Émile.  
 Sidgwick. Methods of Ethics, Elements of Politics.  
 Spencer. Data of Ethics, Justice.  
 Stephen, L. English Utilitarianism.  
 Stephen, J. F. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.  
 Taylor, T. H. Individual and the State.  
 Wallace. Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics.  
 Watson. Hedonistic Theory.  
 Zeller. Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics.

## VITA

The author of the foregoing dissertation was born in Illinois in the year 1878. His early education was received in the public schools of St. Louis, and his first academic degree—that of A. B.—was conferred in that city at Washington University in June, 1902. The year following he spent as an instructor at the Nevada State University, and at the end of that year the University conferred upon him the degree of A. M. In June, 1903, the Committee on Rhodes Scholarships in the State of Nevada awarded him the first Rhodes Scholarship in that state. He resigned it at the end of the summer in order to study in New York. The years 1903-1906, spent in residence at Teachers College, Columbia University, were devoted to the subjects of Philosophy, Ethics, and Education, mostly under the direction of the following professors, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Felix Adler, John Dewey, John Angus MacVannel, E. L. Thorndike, and William P. Montagué.





























